Stingel v Clark - [2005] HCATrans 969

[2005] HCATrans 969

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M63 of 2005

B e t w e e n -
CAROL ANNE STINGEL
Applicant
and
GEOFFREY CLARK
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2005, AT 9.31 AM

MR R.P. GORTON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR T.J. SECCULL, for the applicant. (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Cashman)

MR R.J. STANLEY, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR C.M. O’NEILL, for the respondent. (instructed by Coadys)

GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Gorton.

MR GORTON: If the Court pleases. There was a letter sent to the parties raising ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J: Yes, we have digested all of that and there seems to have been a false alarm.

MR GORTON: That has gone, yes, thank you, your Honour. Your Honour, section 5(1A) of the Limitation of Actions Act is a section which has vital importance for over 150 cases in Victoria on the affidavit evidence that has been filed. It is a section which has been considered by 12 Supreme Court judges.

GUMMOW J: We see it set out at page 40 of the application book, do we not?

MR GORTON: Yes, that is correct, your Honour.

KIRBY J: You formally read the affidavit of Dr Vivian Waller, I assume.

MR GORTON: Yes, your Honour. Do you wish me to read it?

KIRBY J: No, I am just putting it on the record in case there is any objection to it.

MR GORTON: We do rely on that. The section has been considered, as I said, by 12 judges of the Supreme Court.

GUMMOW J: What is the nub of the disagreement as to the construction of the text?

MR GORTON: There are three matters that are there, your Honour. The first is read the words “personal injuries consisting of a disease or disorder contracted by any person” in their ordinary everyday meaning. Do not look for any restriction or limitations in any extrinsic material or background way and consider each case on its facts to see whether they fall within those words. That is what six of the judges have said.

Two of the judges, President Winneke and Justice Chernov, said that in interpreting those words, having regard to the extrinsic material, they should be interpreted as saying, in effect, that there is a dichotomy to be drawn between traumatic injuries and insidious diseases, and traumatic injuries cannot fall within the words and insidious diseases do, and the words ought to be interpreted as if they were limited to insidious diseases, whatever that term encompasses, and they should be interpreted as excluding any condition that arises from trauma.

The third interpretation placed on them was the interpretation in the current case in the judgement of Justice Eames with…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Stingel v Clark

Details

AGLC: Stingel v Clark [2005] HCATrans 969
Case: [2005] HCATrans 969
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland in a dispute between the appellant, Mr. Stingel, and the respondent, Mr. Clark. The core of the disagreement concerned the enforceability of a written agreement for the sale of a business, specifically whether the agreement had been validly terminated by Mr. Clark. Mr. Stingel sought to enforce the agreement, while Mr. Clark contended that he was entitled to terminate it due to alleged breaches by Mr. Stingel.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Mr. Clark's purported termination of the sale agreement was effective. This required the Court to determine whether Mr. Stingel had committed a repudiatory breach of the agreement, thereby giving Mr. Clark a right to terminate, or whether Mr. Clark's actions constituted an unlawful repudiation of the contract himself. The Court also had to consider the proper interpretation of the terms of the agreement concerning the obligations of the parties and the consequences of any default.

The High Court found that Mr. Clark had not been entitled to terminate the agreement. Their Honours reasoned that the conduct of Mr. Stingel did not amount to a repudiatory breach of the contract. Instead, the Court concluded that Mr. Clark's own actions, in purporting to terminate the agreement without a valid basis, constituted a repudiation of the contract by him. The legal principle applied was that a party seeking to terminate a contract for breach must demonstrate that the breach was fundamental, going to the root of the contract, and that Mr. Clark had failed to establish such a breach.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The Court found that the agreement remained on foot and that Mr. Clark had wrongfully repudiated it.

Orders