Stevens v The Queen - [2005] HCATrans 442

[2005] HCATrans 442

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B20 of 2005

B e t w e e n -
LAURIE STEVENS
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT BRISBANE ON WEDNESDAY, 22 JUNE 2005, AT 10.02 AM

(Continued from 21/6/05)

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER: May it please your Honours. Your Honours, to conclude the remarks I was making in relation to the question raised by the Chief Justice, there are of course, as your Honours appreciate from the authorities cited in the party’s written submissions here and in the authorities to be found discussed in those decisions, for example, in Kaporonovski, there has been a relatively long history of consideration of provisions like section 23 from various different aspects of the difficulties thrown up in the context of particular cases.

There are differences around the country. Western Australia is effectively the same. Tasmania, interestingly, on a matter germane to the present case, seems to have been assimilated in the authorities, notwithstanding that the word “chance” rather than “accident” is used in the Tasmanian equivalent: see Vallance’s Case (1961) 108 CLR 56. A particular passage which has been much cited is that from Chief Justice Dixon at page 61. You will see there the extract from subsection 13(1) of the Tasmanian Code, just after halfway down the page:

“nor . . . for an event which occurs by chance.” I think that this somewhat difficult phrase covers events which the person who might otherwise be criminally responsible neither intended nor foresaw as possible results of his conduct: they must too be fortuitous in the sense that no one would reasonably expect them to occur as a consequence of that conduct.

That phrase has not been carried through in terms but one can see that it has a family resemblance to what Sir Harry Gibbs referred to in Kaporonovski. At the foot of that page of Vallance there is conveniently found also a much quoted passage which is the reason why, in our submission, this present case is simply not an occasion to explicate, as it were, comprehensively, the relation between the two limbs, in section 23(1), let alone to provide what might be regarded as a categorical or definitive, that is true for all cases, gloss for summings-up in relation to accident. I refer to where, about an inch from the bottom, Sir Owen says:

Indeed I think that it is only by specific solutions of particular difficulties raised by the precise facts of given cases that the operation of such provisions as s 13 can be worked out judicially -

and goes on to make what might be regarded as a somewhat ironic comment in relation to this being a Code. Nonetheless, in our submission, because this is a Code, judicial glosses should, if anything all the more,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Stevens v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Stevens v The Queen [2005] HCATrans 442
Case: [2005] HCATrans 442
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stevens appealed his conviction for murder to the High Court of Australia. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained from a search of the appellant's property, which was conducted without a warrant. The appellant argued that the evidence was unlawfully obtained and should have been excluded by the trial judge.

The High Court was required to determine whether the search conducted by police was lawful under the relevant legislation, and if not, whether the evidence obtained should have been excluded under the common law or statutory provisions governing the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence. This involved considering the scope of police powers to search premises without a warrant and the principles governing the discretion to admit such evidence.

The Court examined the provisions of the *Crimes Act 1900* (NSW) and relevant common law principles concerning the admissibility of evidence. It was held that the search was unlawful as the police did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant had committed or was about to commit a serious indictable offence, nor did they obtain the necessary consent or warrant. The Court then considered the discretion to admit unlawfully obtained evidence, applying the principle that such evidence should generally be excluded unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudice it would cause to the accused. In this instance, the Court found that the admission of the unlawfully obtained evidence had occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders