Stevens and Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs

[2006] AATA 240

Administrative

Appeals

Tribunal

 

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 240

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No Q2005/506

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION		)
Re		JOYCE STEVENS

Applicant

And SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Dr EK Christie, Member

Date6 March 2006

PlaceBrisbane

Decision

With respect to the debt due to the Commonwealth of age pension overpayments, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.  This means Mrs Stevens’ application for review is unsuccessful.

With respect to the debt of family tax benefits due to the Commonwealth, the Tribunal sets aside the decision under review under the “special circumstances waiver provisions”, with date of effect, 5 January 2005.  This means Mrs Stevens’ application for review is successful.

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Member

CATCHWORDS -

SOCIAL SECURITY – age pension – family tax benefit -  overpayment – debt due to the Commonwealth – administrative error - special circumstances - write off.

Social Security Act 1991 ss 1236, 1237A, 1237AAD
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 s 101

Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60
Australian Tea Tree Oil Research Institute v Industry Research and Development Board (2002) 124 FCR 316
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCFCA 133
Re L and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 21 AAR 412
Rose v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1990) 19 ALD 601
Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1939] 3 All ER 722

WRITTEN REASONS FOR ORAL DECISION

15 March 2006 Dr EK Christie, Member

1.      This is an application for review of the following two decisions of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (the “SSAT”) made on 12 July 2005:

(a)to recover an age pension debt of $3,166.59 for the period 18 November 1999 to 23 September 2003; and

(b)to recover the amount of $2,012.53 representing family tax benefit paid during the period “14 September 2004 to 4 January 2005” [‘the relevant period’].

2. The evidence before the Tribunal comprised the documents filed pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the “T” Documents) [Exhibit 1] and the various exhibits lodged by the parties.

3.      The applicant represented herself at the hearing. The respondent was represented by Ms H Wallis-Dunne, a Departmental Advocate.

Issues Before The Tribunal

4.      The only issues for the Tribunal to decide were whether (i) the age pension debt and (ii) the family tax benefit paid during the relevant period could be waived, in part or in full, under the “administrative error” or the “special circumstances” provisions of the Social Security Act 1991 (“the Act”).  Alternatively, whether these amounts could be “written off” under the “write off” provisions of the Social Security Act.

5.      Given that the age pension debt and the family tax benefit paid during the relevant period arose from quite different facts, the Tribunal considers each matter separately.  However, the legal requirements and principles for “waiver” and for “write off” apply equally to both matters.

6.      During the hearing held on 24 January 2006, it became clear that a Mr T Katowicki was a relevant person in terms of providing evidence to the Tribunal on the use of FTB entitlements provided on behalf of Ethan Stevens.  With the consent of both parties, the Tribunal issued a summons for Mr Katowicki to appear before the Tribunal and to give evidence in this regard.  However, persistent and frequent attempts by the process servers, International Detection Services [28 days from 23 February to 2 March 2006 – sometimes a number of attempts on the same day] were all unsuccessful in effecting service of the Summons at his home address (Exhibit 6).

Facts: Age Pension Debt

7.      On the basis of the evidence before it the SSAT made the following Findings of Fact [T2, Folio 6]:

(i)Mrs Stevens was in receipt of age pension and British Retirement Pension throughout the period, 18 November 1999 to 23 September 2003; and

(ii)Mrs Stevens failed to advise Centrelink that she was receiving a British Retirement Pension.

8.      At the commencing of the hearing, Mrs Stevens agreed with both of the Findings of Fact made by the SSAT.

§  Oral Evidence, Joyce Stevens: Age Pension Debt

9.      Mrs Stevens stated that in 1993, her late husband’s Australian Invalid Pension was converted to Age Pension with a wife pension.  A pro rata UK Age Pension with a UK Dependant Spouse Benefit also matured.

10.     In July 1999, after Mrs Stevens had turned 65, she was notified that the payment of the UK Respondent Spouse Benefit would cease if she failed to claim a retirement Income in her own name.  She said that she was aware that she was not entitled to a UK Pension, having made no UK Tax contributions.  Therefore, she believed the status of the payment could not be changed.

11.     Mrs Stevens said that she then claimed the Benefit as requested.  The Dependent Spouse Benefit was then reclassified as Personal Retirement Income and her entitlements paid to her as a separate amount in a joint bank account held with her late husband.

12.     Mrs Stevens said that as a consequence of adhering to this request, the following features emerged:

(a)Her “legal status” to entitlements had changed by default.  However, she believed that the legal status of a person could not be changed retrospectively by legislation in another country;

(b)There was no change in her financial circumstances;

§  The pro rata UK pension was frozen; and

§  There was no need for her to open a separate bank account from her husband to set access to her entitlements.

13.     Mrs Stevens said that she decided to not inform Centrelink of the changes in her pension details that she believed to have been “forced” upon her, because “it was contrary to the fact” and because her “financial circumstances” could not change.

14.     During cross-examination, Mrs Stevens acknowledged that she was aware that receipt of UK Pension entitlements would have affected the amount of her Australian Age Pension entitlements. 

Facts: Family Tax Benefits Payments During the Relevant Period

15.     On the basis of the evidence before it the SSAT made the following Findings of Fact [T3, Folio 16]:

“(i)Mrs Stevens claimed family tax benefit in respect of her grandson, Ethan on 22 July 2004.

(ii)On 14 September 2004, Mrs Stevens went overseas and Ethan went to live with Mr Katowicki.

(iii)When Mrs Stevens returned home after three weeks, Ethan continued to reside with Mr Katowicki.

(iv)      Ethan has never returned to Mrs Stevens’ care.”

16.     At the commencing of the hearing, Mrs Stevens gave the following responses to the Findings of Fact made by the SSAT:

§Fact (i):         Mrs Stevens said that she had sought advice from Centrelink as to what entitlements her grandson Ethan might be entitled to.  She thought he may have been entitled to a Homeless Youth Allowance.  Her son (Ethan’s father) had abandoned Ethan and had taken his own life.  She feared that Ethan might become a State ward if there were inadequate funds to care for Ethan.  As Ethan was a few months older than 14, the Centrelink advice she received was that he would only be entitled to FTB until he turned 15.  She was also told that when Ethan turned 15 he would be entitled to Youth Allowance in his own name.  She said that she had asked her other son (Mark) to claim FTB for Ethan because she was aware that her UK income was treated as “other income”.  However, when her son Mark left abruptly, she had no alternative than to have the FTB benefit transferred to her.

§Fact (ii):        Mrs Stevens agreed with this fact but said that the period Ethan was to live with Mr Katowicki was only to be for three weeks. 

§Fact (iii):       Mrs Stevens said that there was no indication that this situation had arisen until 1 December 2004, when Mr Katowicki asked her whether he could enrol Ethan in the Forest Lake State High School

§Fact (iv):       Mrs Stevens agreed with this fact.

§  Oral Evidence, Joyce Stevens: Family Tax Benefits Payments

17.     Mrs Stevens was not aware of any legal agreement for her grandson to live with her; she was not his legal guardian.  She said that Ethan was a homeless youth until she took him in.  She chose to care for him in order that he could lead a normal life – go to school, to find employment

18.     She said that she had travelled to the UK because of a family bereavement.  The trip was paid for by her sister.  Whilst she was away she arranged for Ethan to stay with a neighbour, Mr Katowicki.  This was an arrangement between herself and Mr Katowicki.  Mr Katowicki had no legal responsibility for Ethan.  She could not leave Ethan with her daughter [Angela] as she was disabled. 

19.     When she returned from the UK, Ethan chose to remain with Mr Katowicki because he liked it there.

20.     She had not informed Centrelink that Ethan was living with Mr Katowicki as she thought he would return to live with her.  She could not point to a date when Ethan decided to live with Mr Katowicki, permanently.

21.     Mrs Stevens said that over the period September to November she had given Mr Katowicki all of the FTB entitlements she received for Ethan ($125 per week).  However, from November 2004, she had opened a Bank Account in Ethan’s name and all FTB payments were paid into this account.  She had not, in effect, used any of the FTB money paid on behalf of Ethan - as directly (payments to Ethan’s bank account) and indirectly (payments to Mr Katowicki), Ethan had received all of the FTB entitlements.

22.Ethan was granted Youth Allowance in 2005. 

§  Oral Evidence, Angela Stevens [Daughter of the Applicant] : Family Tax Benefits Payments

23.     Angela Stevens stated that on two fortnightly occasions in September 2004 following the time her mother went to the UK for a family bereavement, she had given $250 to Ethan i.e. his FTB entitlements, whilst he was residing with Mr Katowicki.  This money had been given to her in advance by her mother to be used by Mr Katowicki for Ethan’s benefit. 

24.     She said that she then went to Townsville for a short period.  During her absence in Townsville, the arrangements to pay Ethan his $250 fortnightly FTB entitlements to Mr Katowicki continued.  However, at this time Mr Katowicki received this money from her son (Adrian).  Her son was living in Mrs Stevens’ home at Wacol whilst she was in the UK.  These payments for Mr Katowicki continued up to the time Mrs Stevens opened a savings bank account for Ethan.

25.     Angela Stevens provided a diary (Exhibit 5) which, amongst other details, recorded the bank account details of members of the family, including the Suncorp Metway Account opened by Mrs Stevens for Tyrone (Exhibit 5).

26.     Angela Stevens said that Tyrone Katowicki had been her neighbour for eight years.  She stated that he was around home when the process server attempted to serve the summons on him.  She said that Mr Katowicki did not get along very well with females and this posed difficulty for herself and her mother, at times, in their dealings with him.

27.     When asked in cross-examination how did she know that Mr Katowicki received Ethan’s $250 per fortnight FTB benefits whilst Ethan lived with him she replied:

“(a)If the money had not been given, Mr Katowicki would have let her know”; and, as well,

“(b)her son had told her he had given Mr Katowicki the money.”

Statutory Requirements And Case Law

28.     The Tribunal has applied the following legal requirements and principles in its interpretation of the law in its consideration of the outcome for Mrs Stevens’ factual situation.

§  The Tribunal’s Decision Making Powers

29.     There are a number of decisions possible in this application for review: whether the debt due to the Commonwealth can be waived under the “administrative error” or “special circumstances” provisions of the Social Security Act 1991; in addition, whether the debt could be “written off”.  Accordingly, the question for the determination of the Tribunal is whether the decision under review is the correct or preferred one.

[See Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60 at 68]

30.     In this application for review, the Tribunal considers all the evidence and information before the Tribunal as at the date of the hearing, and supplementary submissions following the hearing - to the extent those facts are relevant to the decision by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation pursuant to which the discretion is conferred. 

[See Haidar v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 157 ALR 359 at 367]

31.     The Explanatory Memorandum [“EM”] to the Social Security Legislation Amendment (Carer Pension and Other Measures) Bill 1995 is significant in relation to the pathway for the Tribunal to consider in deciding the preferred decision for Mrs Stevens’s factual situation. Under “4. Explanation of the Changes”, the EM states that “consideration as to the circumstances of a debtor are central to a decision to write off a debt under section 1236 of the [Social Security] Act and should not be the basis for a decision to waive [the debt]”.

32.     Consequently, the Tribunal firstly considers the legal principles for write off of the debts due to the Commonwealth, before considering the legal principles for waiver of debts due to the Commonwealth.

The Write Off Provision

33. Section 1236(1) of the Social Security Act sets out the requirements for a debt due to the Commonwealth to be written off. A former President of the Tribunal, Mathews J, has commented on the write-off provisions of the Social Security Act in Re L and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 21 AAR 412. Mathews J summarised the position as follows (at 428):

“The essential inquiry will always be whether recovery is a feasible proposition, bearing in mind the financial means and obligations of the individual concerned.  Will recovery cause such personal hardship as to run contrary to the beneficial nature of the legislation?  If an affirmative answer is reached to this question, then it would be appropriate to defer recovery [by write off]”

§  The Administrative Error Waiver Provision

34.     In this application for review ,the “administrative error” provision is one issue in dispute for the Tribunal to decide. Section 1237A of the Social Security Act provides for a debt due to the Commonwealth to be waived, either in part or in full, because of “administrative error”:

35.     For this section of the Social Security Act to apply to Mrs Stevens’ factual situation, Mrs Stevens must not have contributed, in any way, to the administrative error that led to the overpayment.  In addition, Mrs Stevens must have received his overpayments of social security entitlements in “good faith”.  Both these requirements must be satisfied in order for Mrs Stevens to succeed under the “administrative error”, waiver provisions of the Social Security Act.

§  The “Special Circumstances Waiver” Provision

36.     In this application for review, the “special circumstances” provision is another issue in dispute for the Tribunal to decide. Section 1237AAD of the Act provides for a debt due to the Commonwealth to be waived, either in part or in full, because of “special circumstances”. For this section of the Social Security Act to apply to Mrs Stevens’ factual situation, there must be “special circumstances” that led to the overpayment of social security entitlements.  In addition, Mrs Stevens must not have “knowingly” made a false statement or false representation - or “knowingly” failed to have complied with a provision of the Act. Both these requirements must be satisfied for Mrs Stevens to succeed under the “Waiver in Special Circumstances” provision of the Social Security Act.

37.     The meaning of the term “knowingly” has been considered by the Tribunal in Re Callaghan and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1996) 45 ALD 435 where the Tribunal stated (at 445):

“There is nothing in s 1237AAD which suggests that the word ‘knowingly’ should be given any meaning other than that a person has actual knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge, that he or she is making a false statement or representation or that he or she is failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the Act. That actual knowledge is to be ascertained by reference to the statements of the person as to his or her actual state of knowledge at the time and to events surrounding the false statement or the act of or omission”. [Emphasis added]

The Tribunal later drew a distinction between the meaning of “knowingly” and “fraudulently”.

38.     The common law meaning and application of the expression “special circumstances” has been considered by the Federal Court and the Tribunal on many occasions.  The relevant legal principles that have emerged, over time, that have been applied to provide a meaning for “special circumstances” can be summarised as follows:-

(a)“The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. …This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special.” [Emphasis added]

[See Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD (at 3)]

(b)“…would require something to distinguish [the case to be decided] from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case…It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary.” [Emphasis added]

[See Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 545]

(c)“To some extent the question whether there were special circumstances must depend on how it came about that the error occurred …

“There will be a requirement that the circumstances are such that takes the case out of the ordinary” [Emphasis added].

[See Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133]

Consideration of the Issues

39.     The first issue for the Tribunal to consider is whether the debts due to the Commonwealth could be written off.

40.     A review of the pattern of deposits and withdrawals, reveals that, at times, quite substantial amounts were held, in Mrs Stevens’ Suncorp Metway Bank Account over 2000 to 2004.  The status of deposits in her offshore Bank Account in which the UK entitlements were paid were also significant.  Further analysis of the latter account indicates no withdrawals over time, but a continued aggregation of deposits of UK entitlements of ₤139 per month:  The balance as at  30 December 2005 was ₤2,302.

41.     Consideration of the balance details in both these bank accounts leads the Tribunal to conclude that recovery of both debts would not “cause such personal hardship as to run contrary to the beneficial nature of the legislation”.  There are substantial sums of money, at various times, in both these accounts.  Therefore, there is no basis for the Tribunal to write off the Age Pension debt, or the FTB payments debt. 

42.     Given this finding, the Tribunal next considers whether there is a basis to waive either of the debts due to the Commonwealth.

43.     With respect to the Age Pension debt due to the Commonwealth and waiver for “administrative error”, it is not in dispute that Mrs Stevens had failed to advise Centrelink that she was receiving a British Retirement Pension (see Paras. 7, 8).

44.     Consequently, given this acknowledgement by Mrs Stevens, the Tribunal can make no other finding than to conclude that Mrs Stevens has contributed to the “administrative error” that has led to her receiving overpayments of Age Pension over the period 18 November 1999 to 23 September 2003.

45.     With respect to the Age Pension debt due to the Commonwealth and waiver for “special circumstances” the Tribunal concludes that Mrs Stevens had “knowingly” failed or omitted to comply with a provision of the Social Security Act; not only has she acknowledged that she had failed to advise Centrelink that she was receiving a British Retirement Pension – but also, and most significantly, the fact she was aware that her UK Pension entitlement would affect the amount of her Australian Age Pension entitlements.

46.     Notwithstanding this finding, the Tribunal further concludes that there are no facts in Mrs Stevens’ case that could be described as “unusual”, “uncommon” or “exceptional” circumstances that would take her case “out of the ordinary”.  The Federal Court has decided that pension entitlements from overseas countries received by an Australian citizen, constitutes “income” for the purposes of the Social Security Act even if this pension entitlement is not available for use in Australia:  see Rose v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1990) 19 ALD 601. This decision has been followed in many cases decided by the Tribunal. The Tribunal therefore finds, the application of the legal principle in Rose’s case, means there are no “special circumstances” in Mrs Stevens’ case given her failure to notify Centrelink of her UK Pension entitlements and her awareness that the UK Pension would affect the amount of her Australian Age Pension entitlements.

47.     Given the above conclusions, the Tribunal finds that there is no basis to waive the Age Pension debt due to the Commonwealth under “special circumstances” provision of the Social Security Act.

48.     The Tribunal next considers whether there is a basis to waive the debt of FTB payments received by Mrs Stevens over the period 14 September 2004 to 4 January 2005, under the “special circumstances” provision (s 101) of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (the “Family Assistance Act”). Section 101 of the Family Assistance Act is identical to the “special circumstances” provision (s 1237AAD) of the Social Security Act.

49.     With respect to the question whether Mrs Stevens has “knowingly” failed or omitted to comply with a provision of the Family Assistance Act (e.g. to inform Centrelink when Ethan did not return to her care after returning from the UK in October 2004), the Tribunal agrees with the finding of the SSAT in this regard [T3, Folio 19].That is, because of uncertainty, Mrs Stevens did not knowingly fail to advise Centrelink of Ethan’s circumstances.  Specifically, because the arrangement for Ethan to stay with Mr Katowicki was an indefinite one, Ethan had not determined where he wanted to live and it was not until late December 2004 that it was decided Ethan would remain with Mr Katowicki so that he could attend high school. 

50.     Based on Mrs Stevens’ state of knowledge at the time and to events surrounding the false statement or the act and omission, the Tribunal finds that Mrs Stevens does not satisfy the test in Callaghan’s case of having “actual knowledge”.

51.     Next the Tribunal considers the circumstances that an error occurred that has led to a FTB debt due to the Commonwealth of $2,012.53 for payments received during the period 14 September 2004 to 4 January 2005.

52.     In this regard, in relation to their evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal finds both Mrs Stevens and Angela Stevens to be witnesses of truth who answered all questions asked of them in an honest and forthright manner.

53.     Next, the Tribunal concludes that the following facts are relevant in understanding the circumstances that led to the debt due to FTB payments over the relevant period:

(a)That Ethan Stevens was a homeless youth having been abandoned by his mother at the age of 2. Ethan’s father (Mrs Stevens’ son) took his own life in March 2001.

(b)Mrs Stevens took Ethan into her home and chose to care for him in order to provide a normal life for him, and as well, as to avoid him being made a State ward;

(c)Because Ethan had not turned 15, Mrs Stevens accepted the advice of a Centrelink social worker and claimed FTB for Ethan – the only entitlement available for him at this time – as well as being the only option preventing him from becoming a State ward;

(d)Mrs Stevens travelled on a trip, funded by her sister, to the UK for three weeks in September 2004 in order to attend a family bereavement;

(e)She left Ethan in the care of her neighbour, Mr Katowicki, during her absence in the UK.  She had no alternative member of her family to take on this role.  The only possibility was her daughter – but she is disabled. The arrangement for Ethan to stay with Mr Katowicki was indefinite; uncertainty existed for much of the time FTB benefits were paid.  Ethan had not decided where he wanted to live until sometime in late December 2004 when it was decided he would remain with Mr Katowicki in order to attend high school.

(f)During the period Ethan lived with Mr Katowicki, all FTB payments ($125 per week) she received were given to Mr Katowicki.

(g)Given the fact that the Summons issued to Mr Katowicki to give evidence at the hearing was unsuccessful (see para 6), the Tribunal has given no weight to the undated Statutory Declaration signed by Mr Katowicki.

(h)In November 2004, Mrs Stevens opened a bank account in Ethan’s name.  From this time, all FTB payments were paid to Ethan.

54.     The Tribunal accepts Angela Stevens’ evidence that the $250 per fortnight FTB entitlements for Ethan were paid in cash to Mr Katowicki on two occasions in September 2004 when she was living next door to Mr Katowicki.  In addition, that during the period October/November, the payments of FTB entitlements for Ethan continued to be paid to Mr Katowicki by her son (Adrian) [see paras 23, 24 and 27].

55.     Mrs Stevens’ evidence that FTB entitlements due to Ethan were paid into a Suncorp Metway Savings Bank account she opened for Ethan in November 2004 were verified by Bank Statements (Exhibit 4) which revealed transfers of $250 into Ethan’s account on 2, 16, 30 December 2004 and 13 January 2005.

56.     Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that there are sufficient positive facts that can be proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal (the civil standard of proof) to support an inference that the FTB entitlements paid during the period 14 September 2004 to 4 January 2005 were applied directly and indirectly, for the “day to day care, welfare and development” of Ethan i.e. through payments made to Mr Katowicki and, subsequently, by transfers of moneys into Ethan’s Suncorp Metway Savings Bank Account opened for him by Mrs Stevens:  See Caswell v Powell Duffryn Collieries Ltd [1939] 3 All ER 722.

57.     The Tribunal concludes that based on all of the above findings, as to the circumstances how the debt of FTB payments arose are “special circumstances” when the above facts are related to the relevant legal principles:

(a)the factual circumstances meet the description of being “unusual;” or “uncommon” [Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1] although not necessarily “extremely unusual or uncommon” [Boscolo v Secretary Department of Social Security (1999) 53 ALD 277];

(b)that the factual circumstances are such that something “unfair or unintended or unjust” has occurred in Mrs Stevens’ case [Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541]; and

(c)that the factual circumstances are such that it takes Mrs Stevens’ case out of the ordinary [Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133].

58.     Given the above conclusion, the Tribunal concludes that the FTB debt due to the Commonwealth should be waived in full for the period “14 September 2004 to 4 January 2005”, under the “special circumstances” provision of the Social Security Act.

59.The Tribunal decides:

(a)with respect to the debt due to the Commonwealth of age pension overpayments, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.  This means Mrs Stevens’ application for review is unsuccessful; and

(b)with respect to the debt of family tax benefits due to the Commonwealth, the Tribunal sets aside the decision under review under the “special circumstances waiver provisions”, with date of effect, 5 January 2005.  This means Mrs Stevens’ application for review is successful.

I certify that the 59 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr EK Christie, Member

Signed:         Miss Kirsten Donohue
  Administrative Assistant

Date/s of Hearing  24 January 2006, 6 March 2006
Date of Decision  6 March 2006
Date of Written Reasons          15 March 2006
The Applicant was unrepresented  
For the Respondent                  Ms H Wallis-Dunn, Departmental Advocate