Stephen Bradley Lauder as executor of the will of Elaine Kathleen Rankin v Lauder

[2018] WASC 91

[2018] WASC 91

JURISDICTION

CITATION

:   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

:   STEPHEN BRADLEY LAUDER as executor of the

will of ELAINE KATHLEEN RANKIN -v- LAUDER
[2018] WASC 91

CORAM

:   PRITCHARD J

HEARD

:   ON THE PAPERS

:   28 MARCH 2018

:   CIV 2389 of 2017

DELIVERED

FILE NO/S

MATTER

:   IN THE MATTER of section 50 of the Wills Act 1970

(WA)

and

IN THE MATTER of the Estate of the late Elaine

Kathleen Rankin of 41 Bristol Avenue, Bicton,

Western Australia, deceased

BETWEEN

:   STEPHEN BRADLEY LAUDER as executor of the

will of ELAINE KATHLEEN RANKIN
Plaintiff

AND

STANLEY JAMES LAUDER

Defendant

Page 1

[2018] WASC 91

Catchwords:

Wills and estates - Application for rectification of a will by the Court - Whether

the will gives effect to the testator's intention

Legislation:

Wills Act 1970 (WA), s 50

Result:

Application granted

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff

:   No appearance

Defendant   :   No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff

:   HHG Legal Group

Defendant   :   No appearance

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

ANZ Trustees Ltd v Hamlet [2010] VSC 207

Kerr v Kerr (No 2) [2016] SASC 24

Palethorpe v Public Trustee of Queensland [2011] QSC 335

Public Trustee v McLean [2009] WASC 158

Re Dippert [2001] NSWSC 167

Re Prevost [2004] VSC 537

Re Schoenmakers [2013] VSC 556

Re Schoenmakers [No 2] [2013] VSC 658

Re Swain [2008] NSWSC 1343

Trimmer v Lax (Unreported, NSWSC, 9 May 1997)

Vescio v Bannister [2010] NSWSC 1274

Page 2

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

PRITCHARD J:

1

This is  an Application  by Mr Stephen Lauder  (executor), the  executor

of   the   estate  of   the   late   Elaine   Kathleen   Rankin    (Estate),   for

1

rectification of the will made by Mrs Rankin on 5 October 2005 (Will).

2

The Application is made pursuant to s 50(1) of the Wills Act 1970

(WA)  (Act).   The  Application was  made  outside the  six-month  time

limit prescribed by s 50(2) of the Act, and the executor also seeks an

order extending the time for making the Application.  The executor also

seeks  an  order  that the  costs  of  this  application  be  paid  out  of  the

Estate.

3

4

The Master  ordered that the  Application be heard  on the papers  in the

absence of the parties.

For the reasons that  follow, I will make an  order to extend the time for

making the  Application, an  order for the  rectification of  the Will, and

an order that the costs of this application be paid out of the Estate.

5

These reasons deal with the following matters:

1.

The factual  background to  the Application,  and  the provisions

of the Will said to require rectification;

2.

3.

4.

Why an extension of time should be granted;

Why an order for rectification is warranted in this case; and

The orders which should be made, including as to costs.

1.

The factual  background  to the  Application, and  the provisions  of

the Will said to require rectification

6

The Application  is supported  by two affidavits  sworn by  the executor

dated  7  August  2017  and  15  September  2017  respectively,  and  an

affidavit  sworn  by  Ms Helen  Joyce  Drury,  sworn  10  August  2017.

(Ms Drury  is a  solicitor who  took  instructions from  Mrs Rankin, and

prepared the Will.)   The findings I make in the course  of this judgment

are drawn from the evidence in those affidavits.

1

Mrs Rankin  was  also  known  as  Eline  Kathleen  Rankin. In  these  reasons,  I  adopt  the  spelling  which

Mrs Rankin used in the Will.

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[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

The Will

7

Mrs Rankin died  on 10  November 2016,  at the  age of  95 years.   Her

husband  pre-deceased  her  and  she  had  no  children.    The  Estate  is

valued at just over $1.3 million.

8

By   the   Will,  Mrs Rankin   appointed   her   half-brother,   Mr Stanley

Lauder, as the executor  of her estate, or, in the event  that he renounced

that  role,   she  appointed   her  nephew,  Mr Stephen   Lauder,  who   is

Mr Stanley    Lauder's    son.

Mr Stanley    Lauder    renounced   his

appointment on 20 February 2017.

9

The executor obtained probate of the Will on 6 April 2017.

10

The  Will  was  signed  by  Mrs Rankin,  and  by  two  witnesses  in  her

presence and  the presence  of each  other.   There is  no suggestion  that

the Will was not validly executed or that  it is incomplete (save in so far

as the deficiency identified in clause 3.7.2 is concerned).

11

In the  Will, Mrs Rankin  made a number  of specific  bequests.  One  of

those (in  clause 3.6 of  the Will) was  conditional on Mrs Rankin  being

the registered  proprietor of land  at 74 Millcrest  Street, Scarborough at

the date of her  death.  Mrs Rankin then provided  for the distribution of

the remainder of her estate (Residuary Estate) in the following terms:

3.7.

As  to   the  remainder   of  my  estate   to  pay   my  funeral   and

testamentary expenses, taxation  liabilities (if any),  debts and all

duties payable by reason  of my death on the  whole of my estate

and to hold the balance UPON THE FOLLOWING TRUSTS;

3.7.1.

if  at  the  date  of  my  death   I  am  still  the  registered

proprietor of the residential  property situate and known

as   74  Millcrest   Street,   Scarborough   then,  but   not

otherwise, I give the remainder of my estate as follows:

3.7.1.1.  one   undivided   quarter  share   to   my  friend

ALBERT EVERETT if he survives me;

3.7.1.2.  one  undivided   quarter  share   to  my  brother

KAY WOODS if he survives me; and

3.7.1.3.  one  undivided  half  share  to  my half  brother

STANLEY JAMES LAUDER; HOWEVER

3.7.2.

if at the  date of my death I  am no longer the  registered

proprietor of the residential  property situate and known

as 74 Millcrest  Street, Scarborough and thus  clause 3.6

Page 4

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

above  is  void,  then,  but  not   otherwise,  I  GIVE  the

remainder of my residuary estate as follows:

3.7.2.1.  as to one undivided one twentieth share  for my

brother KAY WOODS  if he survives but  if he
does not  then for  my half  brother STANLEY
JAMES LAUDER;

3.7.2.2.  as to one undivided one twentieth share  for my

good    friend   ALBERT    EVERETT    if   he
survives me but if he does not then  for my half
brother STANLEY JAMES LAUDER; and

3.7.2.3.  as  to the  remaining eight  undivided one tenth

shares for my half  brother STANLEY JAMES
LAUDER if he  survives me but if  he does not
then  for  my  nephew  STEPHEN  BRADLEY

LAUDER

and

my

niece

SHARON

KETURAH  MOSS as  tenants  in  common  in

equal shares.

12

13

At the  date of her  death, Mrs Rankin was  not the registered  proprietor

of  the  property  at  74  Millcrest  Street,  Scarborough.

clause  3.7.2 of  the  Will determines  the  distribution of  the  Residuary

Estate.

2

Accordingly,

Both Mr Kay Woods and Mr Albert  Everett pre-deceased Mrs Rankin.3

By clauses 3.7.2.1 and 3.7.2.2 of the Will, Mr Stanley Lauder is entitled

to  each  of  the  one twentieth  shares   of  the  Residuary  Estate  which

would otherwise have passed to  Mr Kay Woods and Mr Albert Everett.

Mr Stanley  Lauder  is  also  entitled  to  eight  tenths  of  the  Residuary

Estate pursuant to clause 3.7.2.3 of the Will.

14

The sum  of  the distributions  provided for  in clause  3.7.2  of the  Will

amounts to nine  tenths of the  Residuary Estate.  If  the Will remains  in

its present terms, and is  not rectified, there will be a partial intestacy  of

the Estate, as to a one tenth share of the Residuary Estate.

The Application for rectification

15

The   executor  says   that  clause   3.7.2   contains  a   clerical   error  or

alternatively that  it  does not  give effect  to Mrs Rankin's  testamentary

intentions in that she  intended, by that clause, to dispose of  the entirety

2

3

Affidavit of Stephen Bradley Lauder sworn 7 August 2017 [14], Annexure SBL-4.

Affidavit of Stephen Bradley Lauder sworn 7 August 2017 [16] and [18], Annexure SBL-5 and SBL-6.

Page 5

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

of the  Residuary Estate (whereas  clause 3.7.2 presently  gives rise to  a

partial intestacy).

16

On 7 August  2017, Mr Stanley Lauder's attorney, who  has an enduring

power  of attorney  in  relation  to  Mr Lauder, advised  that  Mr Stanley

Lauder  intended to  abide  by the  Court's  decision  in this  Application

(which had, by then, been foreshadowed but not commenced).    A copy

4

of the originating summons, together with the affidavits in  support, was

served on Mr Stanley Lauder's attorney once the Application was made.

No appearance has  been entered on behalf of  Mr Stanley Lauder in the

Application.

5

17

On  7  November 2017,  Master  Sanderson  made  an  order  dispensing

with the  requirements of  the  Court's Consolidated  Practice Directions

for  the  executor  to  give  notice  of the  Application  to  those  persons

whose  interests might  be prejudiced,  or  to any  person  who might  be

prejudiced, by  the rectification sought  by the  executor, and to  put any

comments of any such person before the Court on affidavit.

2.

Why an extension of time should be granted

18

Subsection 50(2) of the Act requires that  an application for an order for

rectification  of a  will  under  that section  be  made  within six  months

after the death of  the testator.  The Application was  filed on 17 August

2017.

19

20

Subsection  50(3) of  the  Act provides  that  the  Court may  extend  the

period of time for making an application, even if the original period  has

expired, but not if  the final distribution of the estate  has been made.  A

final distribution of the Estate has not yet been made.

6

The  Court has  a wide  discretion  to grant  an extension  of  time under

s 50(3) of the Act. That discretion must to be exercised judicially. It is

neither necessary  nor  appropriate to  attempt to  formulate any,  or any

exhaustive, list of the factors which might  be relevant to the exercise of

that discretion.  The prospects  of an application will clearly be  relevant

to determining  whether, in the interests  of justice, an  extension should

be granted.   The length of the delay in bringing the application, and the

7

question  of  prejudice to  any  beneficiary  or  third  party, will  also  be

relevant.   The six-month time  limit for rectification  applications under

4

5

6

7

Affidavit of Stephen Bradley Lauder sworn 7 August 2017 [32], Annexure SBL-8.

Affidavit of Stephen Bradley Lauder sworn 15 September 2017 [1].

Affidavit of Stephen Bradley Lauder sworn 7 August 2017 [13].

Re Schoenmakers [2013] VSC 556 [34] (McMillan J).

Page 6

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

the  Act   no  doubt  reflects  both   the  desirability  of   the  expeditious

administration  of  deceased  estates,  and   the  fact  that  a  rectification

application  may be  made  even  after the  grant  of probate.    Once  the

grant  of  probate   is  issued,  it  can   be  produced  to  third   parties  as

evidence of how  they should transmit a testator's  property.  The longer

the delay  in seeking rectification  of a will, if  it is required,  the greater

the  potential  for prejudice  to  beneficiaries  or  third parties  who  may

have acted  on the will  in the form  which was the  subject of the  grant.

For that reason, to  recall the grant after a substantial  period would be a

serious  step   to  take,    and  no   doubt  the   question  of   prejudice  to

8

beneficiaries or third parties would loom large  in any application for an

extension in such a case.

21

This case  does  not involve  a substantial  delay.   The Application  was

brought approximately  three months  out of time.   The  delay has  been

adequately explained  by the executor.   There was  a delay in  obtaining

the  grant  of  probate,  largely  because  that required  a  decision  as  to

whether   Mr Stanley   Lauder  would   renounce   his   position   as   the

executor  named  in  the  Will.   Once  probate  was  granted,  there  was

another, albeit short,  delay before the executor's  solicitors were able to

obtain  an  affidavit from  Ms Drury  to  support  the  Application.   The

prospects  of  the  Application  are  obviously  strong.    No  question  of

prejudice to  any beneficiary or  third party has  been raised, nor  does it

appear at all  likely in the  circumstances.  An  extension of the time  for

making the Application will be granted.

3.

Why an order for rectification is warranted in this case

22

As s 50(1) of the Act makes clear, the Court may only rectify a will if it

is satisfied that the will does not carry out the testator's intentions  either

because a  clerical  error was  made, or  because  the will  does not  give

effect  to  the testator's  instructions.    As  Pagone  J explained  in  ANZ

Trustees Ltd  v Hamlet,  a case  concerning the Victorian  equivalent of

s 50(1), the Court's power to rectify is not to be used as an alternative to

properly construing a  will, the meaning of  which is unclear.  Rather,  it

is a  precondition to the  rectification of a  will that the  Court concludes

that, on its proper construction,  the will does not carry out the testator's

intentions.

9

23

The task for  the Court, therefore, is to  first ascertain what the  meaning

of  the  will  is,  on  its  proper  construction, and  then  to  ascertain  the

8

9

Re Swain [2008] NSWSC 1343 [19] (Young CJ in Eq).

ANZ Trustees Ltd v Hamlet [2010] VSC 207 [2] (Pagone J).

Page 7

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

testator's intentions at  the time of making  the will.

10

Rectification will

be permitted if the former does not conform with the latter.

24

25

If there is no evidence  to show what a testator's actual intention  was, at

the  time  of  making   their  will,  the  Court  cannot  rectify  the   will.

11

Consequently,  it  will  not   be  sufficient  to  show  what  the   testator's

intention probably would have been had they thought about the matter.

12

In determining the testator's intention at the time of making the will, the

standard of proof  is the balance of  probabilities.  However, it  has been

said that 'clear and convincing  proof'

required  because the  proper execution  of  a will  raises  a presumption

that a testator knew and approved of  its contents.    It  will therefore not

13

of the testator's intention will  be

14

be sufficient to establish  only that a testator would not  have wished for

an intestacy  to  result, or  would not  have  wanted their  property to  be

distributed as a particular clause directs.

15

26

In  determining  a  testator's  actual  intention,  the  evidence  of  a  legal

practitioner  who  received  the  testator's   instructions  will  necessarily

carry  great weight  in determining  what  a testator's  instructions  were,

and will often, if not always, be determinative of a testator's intentions.

16

The proper construction of clause 3.7.2 of the Will

27

In this  case, there is  no doubt about  the meaning of the  words used in

clause 3.7.2  of the Will.   The  Residuary Estate is  to be  distributed by

giving   one   undivided   one twentieth   share   to   Mr Stanley   Lauder

(Mr Kay  Woods having  predeceased  Mrs Rankin),  another undivided

one twentieth  share  to Mr Stanley  Lauder  (Mr Albert  Everett  having

predeceased  Mrs Rankin)   and   eight  undivided   one tenth  shares   to

Mr Stanley  Lauder,  who  survived Mrs Rankin.    The  result  is  that  a

one tenth share  of the  Residuary Estate  remains, and there  is a  partial

intestacy to that extent.

10

Re Prevost [2004] VSC 537 [17] (Whelan J); Rawack v Spicer [2002] NSWSC 849 [26] - [27]; Re Dippert

[2001] NSWSC 167 [18]; Trimmer v Lax (Unreported, NSWSC, 9 May 1997) 6 (Hodgson J).

11

12

13

Re Prevost [2004] VSC 537 [17] (Whelan J) citing Re Dippert [2001] NSWSC 167 [18].

Re Prevost [2004] VSC 537 [17]; ANZ Trustees Ltd v Hamlet [2010] VSC 207 [14] (Pagone J).

Re Prevost [2004] VSC 537 [17] (Whelan J) citing Trimmer v  Lax (Unreported, NSWSC, 9 May 1997) 6

(Hodgson J); ANZ Trustees Ltd v Hamlet [2010] VSC 207 [14] (Pagone J).

Palethorpe v Public Trustee of  Queensland [2011] QSC 335 [22] (Philippides J); see also Public Trustee

v McLean [2009] WASC 158 [12] (Jenkins J).

Re Prevost [2004] VSC 537 [17] (Whelan J) citing Rawack v Spicer [2002] NSWSC 849 [26]; Trimmer  v

Lax (Unreported, NSWSC, 9 May 1997) 6 (Hodgson J).

ANZ Trustees Ltd v Hamlet [2010] VSC 207 [14] (Pagone J); see also Vescio v Bannister [2010] NSWSC

1274 [15] (Barrett J).

14

15

16

Page 8

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

28

The presence  of the word  'remaining' in clause  3.7.2.3 is, in  my view,

indicative,  on its  face,  of a  clear  intention on  Mrs Rankin's  part that

Mr Stanley  Lauder  was  to   receive  the  remainder  of  the   Residuary

Estate  after  the first  two  shares,  as  described in  clauses  3.7.2.1  and

3.7.2.2, were distributed.  However, what is not clear, on the face  of the

words  used, is  whether  the  error lies  in  describing  the shares  in  the

Residuary Estate  which are to  be distributed under  clauses 3.7.2.1 and

3.7.2.2  as   'one twentieth'  shares,   rather  than   'one tenth'   shares,  or

whether  the error  lies in  the  use of  the reference  to  'eight' undivided

one tenth shares, rather than 'nine'  undivided one tenth shares, in clause

3.7.2.3.   While it makes little  practical difference in  this case, because

each of  the distributions under  clauses 3.7.2.1, 3.7.2.2  and 3.7.2.3 is  a

distribution   to   Mr Stanley   Lauder,   the   preferable   course   in   the

circumstances  is  nevertheless   to  proceed  to   ascertain  Mrs Rankin's

intention, rather than to proceed on the basis of a clerical error.

29

30

I turn, then, to the evidence as to Mrs Rankin's  intention.  The available

evidence of Mrs Rankin's intention at the time of  making the Will is set

out in the affidavit of Ms Drury.

In about  September 2005,  Mrs Rankin instructed  Ms Drury to prepare

the Will.

17

Ms Drury met with Mrs Rankin on two lengthy occasions at

Ms Drury's  office.   Ms Drury  has a  clear  recollection  of Mrs Rankin

and of those meetings.  Ms Drury also searched  what is available of her

file in relation to the  preparation of Mrs Rankin's will among her firm's

computer  records (the  actual  file having  been  destroyed in  2015),  to

identify any further information which might be available.

31

Ms Drury deposed  that she discussed  with Mrs Rankin her  wishes and

intentions regarding the  distribution of her entire  estate.18  Ms Drury's

evidence was that

at the time the Deceased gave me  her instructions regarding preparation

of the Will it was the Deceased's instructions and intention to dispose of

the whole  of her  residuary  estate under  whichever of  clauses 3.7.1  or

3.7.2  applied  at   the  date  of  her  death.     This  is  evidenced  by   the

Deceased stating in clauses 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 of the Will that she gives the

'remainder of her residuary estate'.

19

17

18

19

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.1].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.2], [4.12].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.7].

Page 9

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

32

The  apparent error  in the  Will  was in  fact  identified, and  brought to

Ms Drury's   attention,  in   October   2013.     However   by   that   time,

Mrs Rankin no longer had capacity to make a will.

20

33

When the error  was drawn to her attention,  Ms Drury retrieved her file

in relation  to the  Will, perused  the handwritten notes  she made  at the

time  of  taking   Mrs Rankin's  instructions,  and  wrote   to  Mr Stanley

Lauder  (who  was  then  Mrs Rankin's attorney)  to  advise  him  of  the

information she had which could shed  light on Mrs Rankin's intentions.

In that letter,  Ms Drury noted that  she discussed a  number of potential

proportional  divisions   of  the   Residuary  Estate   with  Mrs Rankin.

21

Ms Drury's practice was  to suggest a potential proportional  division, to

note it down,  and - if her client was  not satisfied with that  division - to

repeat  the  process   until  the  client   was  content  with   the  proposed

division.

22

In Mrs Rankin's case, Ms Drury's notes showed notations  of

'1/4 and  3/4', '1/10 and  '9/10', and  '1/5 and 4/5',  but there was  nothing

expressly   written   in  Ms Drury's   file   notes   to   say   which   option

Mrs Rankin  instructed her  to  put into  the  Will.

that in each case:

23

Ms Drury  deposed

the lower  fractions were the possible  portion of the  residuary estate …

to be  divided equally  between Albert Everett  and Kay  Woods and  the

larger  fractions were  the  portion  of the  residuary  estate to  be  left  to

Stanley Lauder.

24

34  Ms Drury recalled that:

during  each  attendance  with  me  the  Deceased   emphasised  that  she

wanted her half brother Stanley  James Lauder (Stanley) to be the major

and primary  beneficiary of her estate,  but at the  same time she  wanted

to  give something  to her  good  friend Albert  Everett  (Albert) and  her

brother Kay Woods (Kay).

25

35

Ms Drury   also  recollected   that   Mrs Rankin  instructed   her   that  if

Mr Woods or  Mr Everett died before  her, she wanted  their share to be

given  to Mr Stanley  Lauder  (and not  to  Mr Wood's  and Mr Everett's

estates).

26

Ms Drury  deposed  that  Mrs Rankin  was 'adamant  in  her

instructions to  me that if  both of  Albert and Kay  died before  her then

Stanley was to receive all of her residuary estate'.

27

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.8].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.9].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.10].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.9].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.9].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.12].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.14] - [4.15].

Page 10

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

36

Ms Drury deposed  that  based on  her long-standing  practice of  noting

possible proportional divisions  of an estate, and  her recollection of  her

conversations  with   Mrs Rankin,  she   believed  that   a  typographical

mistake  was  made  in the  Will,  and  that  clauses  3.7.2.1  and  3.7.2.2

should have  referred to a  one tenth share  of the Residuary  Estate, and

that  the error  'likely occurred  in  a miscalculation  of  the fraction  that

each of  Albert and Kay  would receive when  dividing a one fifth share

between them'.

28

37

The latter  evidence was  of Ms Drury's  own view - reached by  piecing

together the limited information  available to her - as to what  she thinks

is   likely   to   have   been   Mrs Rankin's   intention,   rather   than   her

recollection of  what was Mrs Rankin's  actual intention  as conveyed to

her.  With  respect, to suggest that  what occurred can be  described as a

typographical error rather  strains the concept of  a 'typographical' error,

in that it  assumes that the drafter  wrote the words 'one twentieth  share'

on two  occasions, even  though  the words  'one tenth share'  were what

was   intended.     To  my   mind,   an  equally   likely   scenario  is   that

Mrs Rankin  intended   that  each   of  Mr Kay   Woods   and  Mr Albert

Everett  would  receive a  one twentieth  share  in  the Residuary  Estate

provided they  survived her  (and if they  predeceased her,  then each  of

those  shares   would   pass  to   Stanley  Lauder   instead)  and   that  an

arithmetical  error  was  made  when,   in  referring  to  the  total  of  the

remaining  one tenth  shares,  the  word  'eight'  was  written,  instead  of

'nine'.  However, neither  of those possibilities concerns the evidence  of

Mrs Rankin's actual intention.

38

It is unnecessary  to resolve this aspect  of the question  of Mrs Rankin's

intention,  for  two  reasons.    First,  the  evidence  clearly  supports  the

conclusion, and I find, that Mrs Rankin's intention was to dispose of the

entire Residuary  Estate  through the  distributions in  clause  3.7.2 (if  it

applied),  and  that  the  remainder  of  the  Residuary  Estate  (after   the

distributions  to Mr Kay  Woods  and  Mr Albert Everett)  should  go  to

Mr Stanley  Lauder.   Secondly,  it  was  clearly  Mrs Rankin's intention

that  in  the   event  that  Mr Kay  Woods  and   Mr Albert  Everett  both

predeceased Mrs Rankin, but  Mr Stanley Lauder survived her, then  the

entirety of the Residuary Estate would go to Mr Stanley Lauder.

39

That being the  case, it is  apparent that the  Will does not give  effect to

Mrs Rankin's intentions.   Under the  Will as it  stands, there is  a partial

intestacy as  to one  undivided one tenth  share in  the Residuary  Estate,

27

28

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [4.16].

Affidavit of Helen Joyce Drury sworn 10 August 2017 [6].

Page 11

[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

whereas  it was  clearly  Mrs Rankin's intention  that  if Mr Kay  Woods

and Mr Albert Everett both predeceased her, all  of the Residuary Estate

should pass to Mr Stanley Lauder.

4.

The orders which should be made, including as to costs

40

The executor seeks that the  Court makes the following order by way of

rectification of the Will:

that the Will of the Deceased be rectified pursuant to section 50(1) of

the Wills Act 1970 by inserting a new clause after clause 3.7.2.2 of the

Will as follows:

3.7.2.2A    as  to  one  undivided  one tenth  share  for  my  half  brother

STANLEY JAMES LAUDER if:

(a)   he survives me; and

(b)   KAY   WOODS   and   ALBERT   EVERETT   do   not

survive me.

41

The insertion of  a clause in  those terms will ensure  that the Will gives

effect   to   Mrs Rankin's  intentions   in   a   way   which   most   closely

corresponds with the  extent of the evidence as  to what those intentions

actually  were,  and   without  the  need   to  grapple  with  the   question

whether  Mrs Rankin  intended to  give  a  larger  percentage  (that  is, a

one tenth share) of the  Residuary Estate to each of  Mr Kay Woods and

Mr Albert Everett, had they survived her.

42

43

The executor  submits that  the costs of  this Application  be paid out  of

the Residuary Estate because the Application was necessary to correct a

clear error  in the Will  and because  it is the  residuary beneficiary  who

will ultimately benefit from the rectification of the Will.

29

The  costs  order  sought  by  the  executor  should  be  made,  for  three

reasons. First, O 66 r 9(2) of the Rules  of the  Supreme  Court  1971

(WA)  sets  out  the   general  rule  that  where  a  person  is   a  party  to

proceedings  in  the capacity  of  a  trustee  they  will - unless  the Court

orders   otherwise,    on   the    grounds   that    the    trustee   has    acted

unreasonably, or for their  own benefit - be entitled to the costs  of those

proceedings, in  so  far as  they are  not recovered  from or  paid by  any

other person,  out of the  fund held  by the trustee.   Secondly,  the usual

order in  rectification  proceedings such  as this  is  that the  costs of  the

parties be paid out of the  estate, on the basis that the litigation has been

29

Plaintiff's Submissions [6.1].

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[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

necessary as a  result of the conduct, or  fault, of the testator.

30

Thirdly,

there  is  no  question in  this  case  of  any  conduct  on  the part  of  the

executor which  would disentitle  him from  recovering  his costs  of the

Application from the Estate.

31

44

The  following  orders,  which  are based  on,  and  consistent  with,  the

orders sought in the Application, will be made:

1.

Pursuant to s 50(3) of the Wills  Act 1970 (WA), the time for the

making of this application be extended to 17 August 2017.

2.

Pursuant to s 50(1) of the Wills Act 1970  (WA), the Will of the

late  Elaine  Kathleen   Rankin  of  41  Bristol   Avenue,  Bicton,

Western Australia, be rectified by inserting  the following clause

after clause 3.7.2.2 of the Will:

3.7.2.2A

as  to  one  undivided  one tenth   share  for  my  half

brother STANLEY JAMES LAUDER if:

(a)

(b)

he survives me; and

KAY WOODS  and  ALBERT EVERETT  do

not survive me.

3.

4.

A  certified  copy of  these  orders  be  attached  to the  Grant  of

Probate and  the plaintiff produce the  original of Grant  Number

PRO/1491/2017 for that purpose.

The costs of  this application be paid  out of the  residuary of the

estate of the late Elaine Kathleen Rankin.

45

The final orders which I now make are those set out in [44]. The orders

will take effect at 4.00 pm on the day of publication of these reasons.

30

31

Kerr v Kerr (No 2) [2016] SASC 24 [3] - [4] (Gray J).

Cf ANZ Trustees  Ltd v Hamlet  [2010] VSC 207 (Pagone J) [19]; Re Schoenmakers  [No 2] [2013] VSC

658 [24] - [25] (McMillan J).

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[2018] WASC 91

PRITCHARD J

I certify that  the preceding paragraph(s)  comprise the reasons for  decision of

the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

NDG

SECRETARY

28 MARCH 2018

Page 14