Stefek v Garnama Pty Ltd
[2014] ACTSC 140
•5 June 2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Stefek v Garnama Pty Ltd |
Medium Neutral Citation: | [2014] ACTSC 140 |
Hearing Date(s): | 30 May 2014 |
DecisionDate: | 5 June 2014 |
Before: | Master Mossop |
Decision: | Application for extension of time granted. Application to amend statement of claim granted. |
Category: | Interlocutory application |
Catchwords: | LIMITATION – personal injury – workers compensation – whether just and reasonable to extend time - whether any prejudice to the defendant – delay of previous solicitors |
Legislation Cited: | Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) ss 36, 16A Workers Compensation Act1951 (ACT) |
Cases Cited: | Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 |
Parties: | Zelka Stefek ( Appellant) Garnama Pty Ltd t/as Les Mills Asia Pacific ( Respondent) |
Representation: | Counsel Mr R McIlwaine SC & Mr I Bradfield ( Plaintiff) Mr R Crowe SC ( Defendant ‑ QBE) Mr B Jones (Defendant – CGU) |
| Solicitors Maurice Blackburn ( Plaintiff) Dibbs Barker ( Defendant ‑ QBE) Moray & Agnew (Defendant – CGU) | |
File Number(s): | SC 132 of 2012 |
Publication Restriction: | Nil |
Decision Under Appeal: | N/A |
Mossop M:
Applications
There are two applications before me. One is an application for an extension of time in which proceedings may be brought to 1 May 2012. The application is brought pursuant to s 36 of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT). The other is an application to amend the statement of claim in the proceedings in accordance with a draft which is annexed to one of the affidavits filed in support of the application.
Appearances
Mr McElwain SC and Mr Bradfield appeared for the plaintiff. Mr Crowe SC appeared for the defendant in the interests of QBE which was on risk from 1 July 2007. Mr Jones appeared for the defendant representing the interests of CGU which was on risk during the period from 2001 to November 2002
Evidence
Read in support of the applications was an affidavit of the plaintiff’s solicitor which provided a procedural history of her involvement in the matter, annexed the proposed amended statement of claim and also annexed a report of Associate Professor David Champion dated 15 July 2013.
Also read in support of the applications was the affidavit of the plaintiff dated 19 March 2014 which provided a history of her employment, the back and other pain that she suffered at work, the treatment that she was provided and her workers compensation claim. It annexed various medical reports and other documents, in particular:
(a)letters from Dr David Hughes, a sports physician, dated 5 April 2005 and 18 May 2005;
(b)a report of a bone scan on 13 May 2005;
(c)an email from the plaintiff to “Melinda Honeychurch”, an employee of the defendant, dated 5 April 2007;
(d)clinical notes of a physiotherapy practice for the period 22 August 2008 until 29 October 2008. Those notes record that she had previously had massage over the last 12 months with a Brad Hiskins;
(e)an email from her physiotherapist dated 3 June 2009 providing recommendations relating to her working conditions and in particular her seating arrangements; and
(f)a bundle of other documents from that physiotherapist’s clinical file including:
(i)notes and a report from a physiotherapist, Bradley Hiskins, who treated the plaintiff in 2009 for the workers compensation insurer;
(ii)a report of an MRI scan dated 1 July 2009;
(iii)a pelvic ultrasound dated 24 May 2005;
(iv)a letter from a chiropractor to the workers compensation insurer dated 5 February 2010; and
(v)clinical notes and assessment;
(g)an email exchange with her employer dated 3 June 2009 through to 9 June 2009 and further emails through to 13 June 2009;
(h)the workers compensation report of injury dated 3 June 2009; and
(i)an ergonomic evaluation report dated 17 July 2009 prepared by a consultant to the workers compensation insurer.
The defendant relied upon the affidavit of Sarah Avery dated 14 May 2014 which provided evidence going to the issue of actual prejudice.
In relation to each of these affidavits and the evidence in them I will return to them where relevant below.
Also tendered were 4 exhibits:
(1)Two photographs of the plaintiff at her workstation;
(2)A letter relating to a notice for non-party production and documents produced by a traditional Chinese medicine practitioner by the name of Feng Yuan which related to the period October 2009 to October 2010;
(3)An email from the plaintiff to her solicitor annexing an email from the plaintiff to Melinda Honeychurch and Robert Keogh dated 13 June 2007 concerning the purchase of an ergonomic chair; and
(4)Letters requesting further and better particulars from the defendant’s solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors and replies thereto.
The proposed claim
The statement of claim originally filed pleaded the plaintiff’s case at a high level of generality. It pleaded an injury to the plaintiff arising over the period after 2001 with an acute aggravation in 2008-2009. The statement of claim for which leave is now sought significantly confines the claim by restricting it to the period following 23 March 2009 when the plaintiff returned to work after her honeymoon. The plaintiff wishes to allege that:
On her return from leave on or about 23 March 2009 the Plaintiff was required to work excessive hours over an extended period of time in an unergonomic chair, causing injury.
Given that the proposed pleading identifies a cause of action which was complete, at the earliest, at the end of 23 March 2009, the limitation period expired on 23 March 2012.
It is convenient to address the issue of an extension of time on the basis that the plaintiff’s claim would be amended so that it was confined in the way contemplated by the proposed amended pleading. In the event that an extension of time to commence the proceedings is granted the defendant made no submission that the amended pleading was otherwise inappropriate.
Chronology of events
The plaintiff deposed to the following history. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant from May 2001 through until September 2011 when she was made redundant. The defendant conducted a business in the “fitness industry”. The plaintiff was involved in sales as well as conducting exercise classes herself.
She describes having discomfort in her left sacroiliac region from approximately 2002 and treatment between 2002 and 2005. She consulted Dr David Hughes. In 2006 she was promoted to sales manager. On 5 April 2007 her evidence was that she sent the email annexed to her affidavit to Ms Honeychurch to follow up a request for a new ergonomic chair.
On 16 May 2007 she strained her right hip flexor/ligament teaching a “body balance” class. Between 2008 and 2009 she attended a physiotherapist for what she described as “ischial tuberosity on the left side”. Her evidence was that by December 2008 she was essentially pain free. She was married on 7 March 2009 and after three weeks off work she returned to work. She said that she had not received the ergonomic chair which she had previously requested. She said she was working seven days a week, 9-10 hours per day sitting at her desk with the same chair performing administrative work and data entry. She said that by May 2009 she noticed increasing back pain.
In June 2009 she returned to her physiotherapist with constant lower back pain having worked 60 hour weeks for the previous few weeks sitting in the same chair. She referred to the email dated 3 June 2009 from her physiotherapist. On the same day she completed a QBE workers report of injury. There was email correspondence with her managers and the defendant which was annexed to her affidavit. On 17 July 2009 the ergonomic evaluation report was prepared. Her evidence was that after May 2009 she had continuous unrelenting low back pain which include muscle spasms across her lower back.
The plaintiff had seen lawyers at the end of 2010. Her evidence was that she was not aware of any limitation period issues although she was, obviously, now aware of them. After dealing with one solicitor at that firm she subsequently met another solicitor who seemed very unorganised and that prompted her to contact her current solicitors to see if they would take the matter over.
The plaintiff’s current solicitor met with the plaintiff on 30 January 2012. She was instructed to obtain the plaintiff’s file from the plaintiff’s previous lawyer. Between January 2012 and the end of April 2012 the solicitor made reasonable and appropriate efforts to obtain the client’s file from the previous solicitors. Those efforts were not successful. On 1 May 2012 the current solicitor called the previous solicitors again and later that day the file was delivered. Within two hours of receiving the file she caused an originating claim and statement of claim to be filed in the Supreme Court based on draft pleadings previously prepared by junior counsel for the plaintiff in November 2011.
Those pleadings pleaded a claim based on the plaintiff’s nature and conditions of employment from the period after 2001.
The plaintiff settled her claim with the insurer for the defendant on risk in relation to the period 1 December 2002 until 30 June 2007 for an amount of $10,000.
Section 36 of the Limitation Act 1985
Section 36 permits an extension of the period within which an action on the cause of action may be brought if a Court decides that it is just and reasonable to do so. The section applies to an action for damages but the exclusions in s 36(5)-(6) mean that its scope is limited to common law claims which relate to personal injury that is compensable injury under the Workers Compensation Act1951 (ACT) and where a claim could be or could have been made had a notice of the injury been given as required by that Act: see s 16A of the Limitation Act 1985.
The power to extend time may be exercised notwithstanding that the limitation period has expired and may be exercised after the relevant proceedings have been commenced: s 36(4).
In deciding whether or not it is just and reasonable the Court is obliged under s 36(3) to have regard to “all the circumstances of the case” including six specific matters, which are listed in paragraphs (a)-(f). I will refer to the terms of those paragraphs below.
The primary question is whether, in all the circumstances, it is “just and reasonable” to grant the application: s 36(2); Sessions v Phengsiaroun [2008] ACTSC 132 at [40].
A material, and often the most important, question is whether, by reason of the time which has elapsed, a fair trial is possible: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 547-548, 550, 555. Sessions at [41]; Laws v Web Scaffolding [2010] ACTCA 3 at [37].
The overall onus is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that it is just and reasonable to extend time. That onus remains with the plaintiff throughout. If a defendant, however, wishes to rely on actual prejudice then the defendant bears the onus of adducing or pointing to evidence sufficient to establish that fact: Brisbane South at 547, 551, 553-554, 566-567; Laws v Web Scaffolding at [34]-[36].
The criteria specifically referred to in s 36 are not exhaustive. However, they do point reasonably comprehensively to areas of relevance: Sessions at [42].
One matter not mentioned in s 36 is the relevance of a possible cause of action vested in the plaintiff for damages for any neglect or default on the part of the plaintiff’s solicitors in prosecuting the plaintiff’s claim. In general, notwithstanding the availability of a claim against the plaintiff’s solicitors, the primary wrongdoer should be looked to for compensation although there may be occasions when a proper balance between the blame to be attributed to the plaintiff’s solicitor and prejudice to a defendant would mean that an applicant under s 36 should be required to pursue his or her solicitors: Daroczy v B & J Engineering Pty Ltd (in liq)(1986) 67 ACTR 3 at 18; Noja v Civil and Civic Pty Ltd & Ors (1990) 93 ALR 224; Sessions at [42].
The prospects of success of the proposed plaintiff are also a matter which may be considered: Paramasivam v Flynn (1998) 90 FCR 489 at 496-497; Doyle v Gillespie (2010) 4 ACTLR 188 at [43].
When assessing the prejudicial effects of delay it is relevant to consider the whole of the delay between the cause of action arising and a hearing of the proceedings if leave is granted rather than the marginal delay between the end of the limitation period and such a hearing: Brisbane South at 548-549, 554-555, 556
Prejudice may be presumed as a consequence of the effluxion of time even if actual prejudice is not demonstrated: Brisbane South at 551, 556.
Where actual prejudice of a significant kind is demonstrated or a real possibility then it is more in accord with the legislative policy underlying limitation periods that the plaintiffs lost right should not be revived than the defendant should have a spent liability reimposed: Brisbane South at 555.
Consideration
I will consider each of the paragraphs of s 36(3) separately.
Section 36(3)(a): the length of and reasons for the delay on the part of the plaintiff
The plaintiff’s evidence was that she was not aware of any limitation period. That evidence was not effectively challenged in cross-examination. Although lawyers were instructed in 2010 and had taken steps to brief counsel to prepare a draft statement of claim by November 2011, no steps were taken to commence proceedings so as to minimise limitation period issues. So far as the claim now sought to be brought is concerned the critical period of delay is that between 31 January 2012 and 1 May 2012. Although the correspondence with the plaintiff’s previous solicitors was not in evidence it appears that the plaintiff and her new solicitors acted reasonably in seeking to obtain the file from her previous solicitors but were only successful after three months.
Section 36(3)(b): the extent to which, having regard to the delay, there is or is likely to be prejudice to the defendant;
This is the most important point raised by the submissions of the defendant. The defendant submitted that the plaintiff had not discharged her ultimate onus to show that a fair trial was possible. Two areas of specific prejudice were pointed to:
(1)The lack of recollection of certain potential witnesses and the absence of documentary records which were deposed to in the affidavit of Ms Avery; and
(2)The absence of certain clinical records relating to the treatment of the plaintiff in the period prior to 2008.
The evidence of Ms Avery related to the availability of records held by the defendant, and the recollection of two employees of the defendant, Mr Keogh and Ms Honeychurch. The evidence focused, in particular, upon the requests said to have been made by the plaintiff for an ergonomic chair in 2006 and 2007. Relevant to this submission, the particulars provided in relation to the first version of the statement of claim described a May 2006 meeting between the plaintiff and Mr Keogh in relation to the provision of an ergonomic chair and an assessment of the plaintiff’s workstation by Ms Honeychurch several weeks after the meeting. Ms Avery deposed on information and belief that:
(a)A search had been undertaken of the company’s email servers and paper storage facilities for records relating to requests made in 2006 and 2007 for an ergonomic chair to Mr Robert Keogh and Ms Melinda Honeychurch. The only record found was a spreadsheet which was annexed to Ms Avery’s affidavit. I will discuss that spreadsheet later;
(b)A search for an email dated 13 June 2007 and any replies or any records of a meeting in May 2006 between the plaintiff and Mr Keogh failed to produce any relevant material; and
(c)The email accounts of both the plaintiff and Mr Keogh were no longer stored on the defendant’s backup servers and hence the defendant no longer holds any records which may provide evidence of correspondence between the plaintiff and Mr Keogh between 2006 and 2008.
Enquiries located Ms Honeychurch. Ms Honeychurch had ceased employment with the defendant around seven years ago. She was unable to recall any workplace incident in which the plaintiff may have suffered an injury. She was asked whether she could recall conducting a workstation assessment or a spreadsheet which may have contained information about workstation assessments or whether she remembered the plaintiff requesting a new chair. She said she was unable to recall any of these things.
Mr Keogh was able to recall some details of the events surrounding the plaintiff’s allegations. He was unable to recall any specific formal meeting with the plaintiff in 2006 at which a request for an ergonomic chair was discussed. He was unable to recall receiving or responding to an email from the plaintiff dated 13 June 2007 requesting an ergonomic chair. His period of employment was from 2 May 2006 until 23 November 2007. He had some memory of the plaintiff making a request for a new chair towards the end of his employment. He could recall discussing an alleged back problem with the plaintiff both in meetings and passing conversation but he was unable to specify the dates on which such discussions occurred. He recalled approving in principle a request to purchase the plaintiff a new chair and subsequently viewing a catalogue of chairs with the plaintiff. He recalls following up the plaintiffs request but remembers that the plaintiff stated that her “external advisor” was uncertain as to the precise specifications needed to achieve the desired outcome.
The defendant also points to:
(a)the absence of evidence of the existence of the clinical file of the plaintiff GPs prior to 2009;
(b)the absence of evidence of the existence of notes from the plaintiff’s Chinese medicine practitioner Mr Yuan before 2009; and
(c)the absence of evidence of records of the massage which the plaintiff said she received prior to 2008.
These submissions were based upon cross examination of the plaintiff which identified that in 2007 the plaintiff was receiving massage from a person she identified as Vesna Brosnic and receiving acupuncture from Mr Feng Yuan. She also gave evidence that in 2006 she had no regular GP but saw a husband and wife team, each known as Dr Lai, at the Medical Centre in Deakin. Calls were made for the production of the medical records of Mr Yuan or from the Deakin Medical Centre. Only records of Mr Yuan from 2009 and 2010 were produced. A call was made for the records of Bradley Hiskins who the plaintiff said gave her massage to the extent that they were not already included in her affidavit. No other documents were produced.
In my view the evidence is not such as to disclose that the medical records of Drs Lai and Mr Hiskins no longer exist. It was not established that the documents had been sought by either party and could not be obtained. Rather, documents were not produced in response to a call made in court of which no notice had been given. The defendant submitted that I should infer that had they been available they would have been put into evidence. That is not an inference which I’m prepared to draw. While it may be necessary to tender or identify certain records as available to the plaintiff, the fact that they are not tendered or identified does not prove that they do not exist.
In relation to Mr Feng Yuan the only records were for 2009 and 2010. Having regard to the terms of those records they appear to record the whole of the treatment of the plaintiff. There is a real prospect that the evidence of the plaintiff as to the date on when she was treated by Mr Yuan which was elicited from her in cross-examination may not be accurate. There is no positive evidence that Mr Yuan’s records, if any, from the earlier period have been destroyed or lost. On the evidence before me I am not satisfied that the records of Mr Yuan which once existed now no longer exist. Even if such records now no longer exist the loss of evidence of a treating acupuncturist from 2007, while being some evidence of actual prejudice, would not be of significance in the context of the overall case.
My assessment of the evidence of Ms Avery directed to actual prejudice is as follows.
It is significant that the evidence which formed the basis for the submission relating to actual prejudice was evidence of events that occurred substantially before the period the subject of the proposed amended claim. It provides part of the historical lead up to the proposed claim and provides significant evidence about the state of awareness of the defendant. While that is significant for the purposes of some of the allegations, in particular the failure to heed and act on warnings of the plaintiff, it is not central to the circumstances in which is the injury was alleged to have occurred.
In relation to the evidence of Mr Keogh it is clear that he does have some recollection of his transactions relating to the plaintiff’s chair. I’m not satisfied that there is any prejudice of significance in relation to his evidence.
In relation to the evidence of Ms Honeychurch, clearly there is a significant lack of recollection on her part. However, the documentary material that is available and Mr Keogh’s recollection provides a coherent chronology which tends to reduce the significance of Ms Honeychurch’s lack of specific recollection.
An ergonomic workstation audit was prepared and dated 12 March 2007. That is an annexure to the affidavit of Ms Avery. That appears to disclose that the plaintiff’s chair was identified as requiring replacement and a headset was to be ordered. It also appears to identify an issue with the depth of her workstation and a requirement for replacement of her computer screen.
On 5 April 2007 the plaintiff wrote the email (annexure B to her affidavit) which, consistently with the existence of the earlier spreadsheet, says “Any news on my chair & headset? Only asking cause my back & neck hurt!”
On 9 June 2007 Exhibit 3 shows that the plaintiff wrote to Melinda Honeychurch and Rob Keogh following up the chair issue including,
I know I have asked several times and now I have lost my patience. I really desperately need a good chair. I am spending a small fortune on specialist appointments every week and am in pain every day, even sitting hurts,
and providing information from an ergonomic office furniture supply company to them.
The content of that email fits in with the recollection of Mr Keogh, who was employed until 23 November 2007, that
(a)he approved, in principle a request to purchase the plaintiff a new chair;
(b)he subsequently viewed a catalogue of “ergonomic” chairs with the plaintiff; and
(c)he later followed up on the plaintiff’s request but that the plaintiff had stated that her external advisor was uncertain as to the precise specifications needed to achieve the desired outcome.
There are therefore documentary records relating to Ms Honeychurch’s earlier involvement and the subsequent higher level decision-making relating to the chair undertaken by Mr Keogh.
I accept that there is some actual prejudice arising from the inability to access email communications between the plaintiff and Mr Keogh between 2006 and November 2007. However the extent of that prejudice is reduced by the existence of a recollection on the part of Mr Keogh about the transactions that occurred.
Section 36(3)(c): the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff, including the extent (if any) to which the defendant took steps to make available to the plaintiff means of ascertaining facts that were or might be relevant to the cause of action of the plaintiff against the defendant
The plaintiff was at all relevant times able to ascertain the facts which were or might be relevant to the cause of action against the defendant and hence this aspect of s 36(3)(c) is not significant. It is, however, relevant that because of the plaintiffs workers compensation notice of injury dated 3 June 2009 and the acceptance of that claim in July 2009 the workers compensation insurer had the opportunity to investigate the circumstances that existed at that time, proximate to the allegations now sought to be made and the medical condition of the plaintiff. I recognise, however, that any insurer’s investigation would have had little focus on the historical matters from 2007 because of the different test for liability in relation to workers compensation entitlements.
Section 36(3)(d): the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising on or after the date of the accrual of the cause of action
In Heather Doyle v Michael Gillespie (2010) 4 ACTLR 188 at [81]-[93] Refshauge J made a comprehensive review of the somewhat unsatisfactory state of authority in relation to the meaning of “disability” in this paragraph. In the Territory there is authority consistent with the reference to disability meaning legal disability as well as authority consistent with the reference to disability meaning physical disability. My tentative view, consistent with the tentative conclusion reached by Refshauge J, is that the reference in paragraph (d) is to a legal disability rather than a physical disability. My view remains a tentative one given that I was not assisted by any submissions of the parties on the point and it was not essential to determine the point in the present case. Therefore I proceed on the basis that the paragraph is not relevant in the present case where there was no relevant legal disability. In any event I have taken into account the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s alleged physical disability when considering the merits of the case below.
Section 36(3)(e): the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he or she knew that the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury of the plaintiff was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages
The evidence on this issue is somewhat limited. It is clear that the plaintiff made a workers compensation claim in 2009 and saw solicitors in 2010. What happened after that is not clear. There is no evidence that the delay after this time was due to the action or inaction on the plaintiff’s part personally. So far as the period in 2012 is concerned the plaintiff’s conduct was reasonable. There was a significant delay in making the present application after the date when the defendant put on a defence raising the Limitation Act in November 2012 however no prejudice arising from that delay was identified.
Section 36(3)(f): the steps (if any) taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of the advice the plaintiff may have received
Once again the evidence on this issue is limited. The plaintiff clearly took steps to obtain advice in 2010 from solicitors. There is no evidence to indicate that the delay in commencing proceedings after that time was due to a default on her part personally as opposed to on the part of her solicitors.
Other matters
As indicated above, it is relevant to take into account the merits or otherwise of the case. In the present case the report of Associate Professor Champion makes it clear that causation will be a very significant issue. The report indicates that it is difficult to explain the plaintiff’s complaints of pain. Associate Professor Champion appears to adopt the description of “non-specific low back pain”.
His report summarises the position as follows:
[the plaintiff] has low back pain arising principally from L45 and L5/S1 probably discogenic, with the deep somatic referred pain to the left lower buttock, and this has been substantially causally influenced by the nature of her sedentary work without provision of an adequate office chair.
At present it is sufficient to say that the plaintiff appears to have an arguable case that at least some of her back pain is attributable to the limited period the subject of the proposed amended statement of claim.
Assessment and conclusion
While there is a degree of actual prejudice to the defendant arising from the delay on the part of the plaintiff in commencing the proceedings, having regard to
(a)the nature of the allegations as to the circumstances in which damages arose;
(b)the limited period now central to the plaintiff’s allegations;
(c)the period in relation to which the actual prejudice exists; and
(d)the existence of some recollection and records relating to the period when actual prejudice exists,
I am not satisfied that the actual prejudice to the defendant is significant or that the defendant will be denied a fair trial as a consequence of the delay in commencing the proceedings.
In my view it is significant that the critical delay in commencing proceedings appears to have been caused by conduct on the part of her previous solicitors, who did not give appropriate recognition to the fact that any delay in handing over her file would cause further or additional Limitation Act problems for the plaintiff. As the authorities make clear it is in general better that the primary wrongdoer should be looked to for compensation.
I weigh in the balance the merits of the proceedings. Although there are very significant hurdles that the plaintiff faces I am satisfied that there is an arguable case.
Balancing the various considerations I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established that it is just and reasonable to grant the extension of time which has been sought by the plaintiff.
The parties agreed as to the costs orders that were appropriate in the event that I granted an extension of time. I will make orders in the terms agreed by the parties as appropriate.
Orders
In the light of my conclusions the orders that I make are:
(1)That the period within which the plaintiff can bring an action against the defendant for injuries she alleges to have suffered from 23 March 2009 be extended to 1 May 2012.
(2)The plaintiff is granted leave to amend her statement of claim so as to put it into the form of the draft annexed to the affidavit of Jacinta Northam sworn 28 March 2014.
(3)The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the application to amend the statement of claim dated 4 February 2014 and any costs thrown away by reason of the amendment;
(4)The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the application to extend time dated 28 March 2014; and
(5)The costs referred to in orders 3 and 4 not be assessed or payable until the conclusion of the substantive proceedings.
| I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour, Master Mossop. Associate: Date: |
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