State of Tasmania v Shaw (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read

[2002] TASSC 12

CITATION:                 State of Tasmania v Shaw (No 2) [2002] TASSC 12

PARTIES:  STATE OF TASMANIA

DIRECTOR OF HOUSING
v
SHAW, Stuart Gordon

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (FULL COURT)
JURISDICTION:  APPELLATE
FILE NO/S:  FCA 12/2001

FCA 13/2001

DELIVERED ON:  25 March 2002
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  5 November 2001
JUDGMENT OF:  Cox CJ, Crawford and Slicer JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Damages - General principles - General and special damages - Special damages by way of interest - Assessment of loss - Damages to compensate for the delay in obtaining payment of the assessed damages - Whether damages in the nature of interest may be awarded with respect to a claim for unliquidated damages - Action for damages for negligent misstatement - Award based on compound interest.

Hungerfords & Ors v Walker & Ors (1990) 171 CLR 125; Hart v Mossensons & Anor [2000] WASC 295; Duke Group Ltd (in Liquidation) v Pilmer & Ors (1999) 73 SASR 64, followed.
Aust Dig  Damages [1]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellants:  T J Ellis SC
             Respondent:  S B McElwaine
Solicitors:
             Appellants:  Director of Public Prosecutions
             Respondent:  Shaun McElwaine

Judgment  Number:  [2001] TASSC 12
Number of paragraphs:  34

Serial No 12/2002
File No FCA 12/2001

FCA 13/2001

THE STATE OF TASMANIA & THE DIRECTOR OF HOUSING
v STUART GORDON SHAW (NO 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  FULL COURT

COX CJ
CRAWFORD J
SLICER J
25 March 2002

Orders of the Court:

Appeals dismissed.

Serial No 12/2002
File No FCA 12/2001

FCA 13/2001

THE STATE OF TASMANIA & THE DIRECTOR OF HOUSING
v STUART GORDON SHAW (NO 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  FULL COURT

COX CJ
25 March 2002

  1. The Court has already dealt with a number of grounds of appeal in this matter, but was reconstituted to deal with the remaining challenge to the award made by the learned trial judge.  That challenge is to the award of damages by way of compound interest on the amount assessed by the learned trial judge as the respondent's immediate loss sustained in consequence of the negligent mis-representations of the appellants' agents.  When the property, built at the insistence of the appellants, had been sold in March 1993 and all allowances made, it became clear that the respondent had suffered a loss which the trial judge assessed in the sum of $106,191.91.  His Honour accepted the respondent's evidence that throughout the whole period from 1993 to the date of trial, he borrowed various sums of money from banks in order to carry on his business.  The evidence was to the effect that at no time since the completion of the shopping complex had the respondent been free of debt.  He said that had he received the loss that he made upon the sale of the shopping complex at about that time, he would have used the money in his business, thereby rendering unnecessary the loans that he obtained.  He was accordingly awarded, by way of additional damages, a sum calculated by reference to interest…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read State of Tasmania v Shaw (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2002] TASSC 12
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case State of Tasmania v Shaw (No 2) was heard by the Supreme Court of Tasmania's Full Court, which was tasked with addressing the appeals brought by the State of Tasmania and the Director of Housing against the decision of the trial judge. The primary issue was the award of damages by way of compound interest on the amount assessed by the trial judge as the respondent's loss from negligent misstatements made by the appellants' agents. The appellants contested the trial judge's award of compound interest as damages, arguing it was excessive and contrary to legal principles.

The court examined the principles established in Hungerfords & Ors v Walker & Ors (1990) 171 CLR 125 and subsequent cases, which distinguish between awarding interest to compensate for delay in payment of damages and awarding damages for the loss of use of money. The court found that the trial judge correctly awarded damages for the loss of use of money, as the loss was foreseeable and not too remote. The court further determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the award of compound interest, despite the appellants' contentions that the evidence was insufficient or contrary to the actual interest paid by the respondent.

The court concluded that the trial judge's award of damages, including compound interest, was justified under the principles of compensating for the loss of use of money and was not an improper award of interest for delay in payment of damages. Both appeals were dismissed, upholding the trial judge's decision.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a dispute between Stuart Gordon Shaw and the State of Tasmania and the Director of Housing regarding damages for negligent misrepresentation. In 1989, Shaw contracted with the Director of Housing to develop a shopping complex. The State of Tasmania provided advice and information to Shaw about the potential success of the project. However, the State failed to disclose material facts that would have affected Shaw's decision to proceed with the development. The shopping complex was completed in 1993, but it did not perform as expected due to the undisclosed facts. Shaw sold the complex at a loss and subsequently sued the State and the Director for damages, alleging negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge found in favour of Shaw and awarded him damages for his loss, as well as interest on that amount as compensation for the delay in receiving the damages. The State and the Director appealed the decision, arguing that the award of interest was not permissible under the law. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania dismissed the appeals, holding that the award of interest was appropriate in the circumstances.

The Full Court found that the trial judge was correct in awarding interest as part of the damages for Shaw's loss of the use of money caused by the State's and the Director's negligence. The court noted that the decision in Hungerfords & Ors v Walker & Ors did not preclude the award of interest on unliquidated damages in appropriate cases. The Full Court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's assessment of the interest component of the damages. The court concluded that the award, while perhaps generous, was not excessive or against the evidence.

This appeal before the Supreme Court of Tasmania's Full Court is an appeal from the orders of the trial judge, which assessed damages for the plaintiff's loss of use of money in the context of a negligent misrepresentation case. The appellants, the State of Tasmania and the Director of Housing, challenge the trial judge's award of compound interest on the assessed damages. The appeals were brought initially in the names of the State of Tasmania and the Director of Housing separately, with the Director later being added as an appellant in one of the appeals. The appeal concerns two primary issues: whether the award of compound interest on unliquidated damages was permissible under the law and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the award of such damages. The Full Court considered the principles established in Hungerfords v Walker and subsequent cases, concluding that the trial judge did not err in awarding compound interest as compensation for the loss of use of money, provided that the loss was foreseeable and adequately proven. The Full Court found that the trial judge's assessment was supported by sufficient evidence and dismissed the appeals.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Can damages in the nature of interest be awarded with respect to a claim for unliquidated damages in accordance with the authority of Hungerfords v Walker (1990) 171 CLR 125?
2. Was the award of compound interest as damages by the trial judge commensurate with the respondent's loss, and was there sufficient evidence to support this award?
3. Did the trial judge err in his application of the principles stated in Hungerfords & Ors v Walker & Ors (1989) 171 CLR 125 when assessing damages?
4. Was the award of damages by the trial judge based on the correct approach to the issue, considering the law of election and mitigation?
5. Was the method employed by the trial judge in calculating compound interest as damages appropriate, and did it reflect commercial reality?

Held
1. The court held that damages in the nature of interest can be awarded with respect to a claim for unliquidated damages in accordance with the authority of Hungerfords v Walker (1990) 171 CLR 125. The court concluded that there is no distinction between an award of damages for loss of the use of money in the case of a liquidated claim and the award in an unliquidated claim.
2. The court held that the award of compound interest as damages by the trial judge was commensurate with the respondent's loss and there was sufficient evidence to support this award. The court concluded that the evidence provided was ample to justify the award of damages calculated based on overdraft interest rates charged.
3. The court held that the trial judge did not err in his application of the principles stated in Hungerfords & Ors v Walker & Ors (1989) 171 CLR 125 when assessing damages. The court concluded that the trial judge's approach was correct and consistent with the principles outlined in the case.
4. The court held that the award of damages by the trial judge was based on the correct approach to the issue, considering the law of election and mitigation. The court concluded that the trial judge correctly assessed damages in tort rather than contract and rejected a submission based on a misunderstanding of the law of election and mitigation.
5. The court held that the method employed by the trial judge in calculating compound interest as damages was appropriate and did reflect commercial reality. The court concluded that the approach used by the trial judge was a "broad brush" approach, which reflects both the difficulties of precision in economic analysis and the requirement to provide fair compensation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania dismissed appeals brought by the State of Tasmania and the Director of Housing against an award of damages by the trial judge in favour of the respondent, Stuart Gordon Shaw. The primary judge had awarded Shaw damages for loss caused by the negligent misstatements of the appellants, which included compound interest as damages for the loss of use of money. The appeals challenged the award of damages in the nature of interest on the basis that such damages are not permissible for unliquidated claims under Hungerfords v Walker (1990) 171 CLR 125 and that the award was excessive and not supported by the evidence.

The Court found that damages in the nature of interest could be awarded for unliquidated damages, as the High Court in Hungerfords had rejected the view that such damages were only permissible for liquidated claims. The Court followed the reasoning of Murray J in Hart v Mossensons & Anor [2000] WASC 295 that damages may be awarded as compensation for the loss of use of money, where the loss is foreseeable, even if the exact amount of damages cannot be determined until after the event. The Court held that the trial judge was correct to award compound interest as damages for the loss of use of the $106,191 loss amount from the time of the crystallisation of the loss in March 1993 until the trial in July 2000.

The Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the award of compound interest, as Shaw had provided evidence that he had been borrowing money continuously from 1993 to fund his business and had not been free of debt since the completion of the shopping complex. The Court held that the trial judge's "broad brush" approach to assessing the damages, while not precise, reflected commercial reality and the need to provide fair compensation. The Court rejected the appellants' arguments that the award was excessive and that the trial judge had erred in principle, finding that the award was within an accepted methodology for compensating for the loss of use of money.