State of New South Wales v Williams

[2017] NSWSC 516

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

State of New South Wales v Williams [2017] NSWSC 516

Hearing dates:

3 May 2017

Date of orders:

05 May 2017

Decision date:

05 May 2017

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Davies J

Decision:

1. Pursuant to section 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (“the Act”):

 

a.   Two qualified psychiatrists, and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of such persons) conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by 31 July 2017; and

 

b.   The defendant attend those examinations.

 

2. Pursuant to section 10A of the Act, the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order (“ISO”) commencing on 28 May 2017 for a period of 28 days.

 

3. Pursuant to section 11 of the Act an order directing the defendant, for the duration of the ISO, to comply with the conditions set out in Annexure A to these orders.

 

4.   The plaintiff is to file and serve any evidence and written submissions upon which it relies for the final hearing by 14 August 2017.

 

5.   The defendant is to file and serve any evidence and written submissions upon which he relies for the final hearing by 21 August 2017.
6.   The matter is listed for final hearing at 10:00 am on 23 August 2017 with an estimate of 1 day plus.

 

7.   Liberty to apply on 24 hours’ notice.

 

8. Pursuant to s. 8(1)(a) of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 the proceedings be subject to a non-publication order until further order of the Court on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

 9.   Access to the Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted without the leave of a judge of the Court, and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to be given an opportunity to be heard.

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – high risk offenders – application for interim extension order - high risk sex offender – sexual intercourse with child under the age of 10 – victim was daughter of offender – prior offending including property and violence offences – one prior sex offence – offender assessed as high risk of further sexual offending – whether offender an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence – offender conceded that interim order was appropriate – parties agreed on conditions of order – conditions found to be appropriate

Legislation Cited:

Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW)
Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW)
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Anderson v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 86
Attorney General for New South Wales v Haytar [2007] NSWCA 993
Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119
Lynn v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 57
State of New South Wales v Conway [2011] NSWSC 976
State of New South Wales v Fisk [2013] NSWSC 364
State of NSW v Roach [2010] NSWSC 184
State of New South Wales v Thomas (Preliminary) [2011] NSWSC 118
State of New South Wales v Veeran [2015] NSWSC 75
State of New South Wales v Watson [2011] NSWSC 1692
State of NSW v Weribone [2016] NSWSC 1474

Category:

Procedural and other rulings

Parties:

State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Gordon Thomas Williams (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
P Aitkin (Plaintiff)
A Cook (Defendant)

  Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors Office (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2017/96641

Judgment

1. The State of New South Wales seeks an Extended Supervision Order for a period of five years under s 5C of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW). The Defendant’s current sentence expires on 28 May 2017. Accordingly, the State seeks an Interim Supervision Order from that date, and for the appointment of two qualified psychiatrists and/or registered psychologists to conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations of the Defendant and to furnish reports to the Court on the results of those examinations.

Legislation

2. Section 5B of the Act provides:

5B High risk sex offender

(1) An offender can be made the subject of a high risk sex offender extended supervision order or a high risk sex offender continuing detention order as provided for by this Act if and only if the offender is a high risk sex offender.

(2) An offender is a high risk sex offender if the offender is a sex offender and the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision.

(3) The Supreme Court is not required to determine that the risk of a person committing a serious sex offence is more likely than not in order to determine that the person poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence.

3. Section 4 defines sex offender as meaning:

a person over the age of 18 years who has at any time been sentenced to imprisonment following his or her conviction of a serious sex offence.

4. The definition of serious sex offence is found in s 5 which relevantly for the present matter provides:

5 Definitions of “serious sex offence” and “offence of a sexual nature”

(1) For the purposes of this Act, a serious sex offence means any of the following offences:

(a) an offence under Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900, where:

(i) in the case of an offence against an adult or a child, the offence is punishable by imprisonment for 7 years or more, and

(ii) …

…

(c1) an offence by a person that, at the time it was committed, was not a serious sex offence for the purposes of this Act but which was committed in circumstances that would make the offence a serious sex offence if it were committed at the time an application for an order against the person is made under this Act, and ...

5. Section 9(3) sets out matters to which regard must be had when determining whether or not to make an Extended Supervision Order. Other matters may be considered.

Legal principles

6. In Lynn v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 57 Beazley P (with whom Gleeson JA agreed) said:

[57]   To the extent that there are differing approaches in the first instance authorities to the determination of whether a person is a “high risk violent offender” within the meaning of s 5E(2), I am of the opinion that the approach of Davies J in Richardson should not be followed insofar as that approach includes having regard to:

“… the serious consequences for the Defendant either because he will be detained beyond the period of his sentence although he has not committed any further offence or he will be subject to an onerous supervision order …”

[58]   Rather, the proper approach is to give the words of s 5E(2):

“… their everyday meaning, in the context of the provision in which they appear, and having regard to the objects of the Act”

as stated by R A Hulme J in Thomas (Final) at [38], and as I have explained above.

Section 5E is the equivalent of s 5C for a high risk violent offender.

7. In Anderson v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 86 the Court of Appeal made clear that the process under s 5B on the one hand and ss 5C and 5D on the other hand is a two stage process. The Court said:

[14] It suffices in order to summarise and resolve the essential submissions which arise on this appeal to observe that ss 5B and 5D mandate a two stage process. The first question is that posed by s 5B, which is whether the person is a high risk sex offender. This entails the Court being satisfied, to a high standard, that the offender would pose an “unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision”. Only if the answer to that question is affirmative can there be power to make either a continuing detention order or an extended supervision order.

8. Although the Court in that case was dealing specifically with a Continuing Detention Order the differences between the questions in the two stage process set out by the Court of Appeal are relevant where an Extended Supervision Order is sought. The Court went on to say:

[15] The second question only arises if the person is a high risk sex offender. It is the question posed by s 5D, which is whether the Court is satisfied that adequate supervision will not be provided by an extended supervision order. If the answer to that question is affirmative, then there is power to make a continuing detention order. (For the purposes of this appeal, we put to one side the separate discretion whether to make a continuing detention order at all, discussed in State of New South Wales v Donovan [2015] NSWCA 280 at [14]-[15].)

[16] There are at least four important differences between the questions posed by ss 5B and 5D. The first two differences flow directly from the text of the statute. One is that the Act requires a different level of satisfaction to be achieved in relation to the first, as opposed to the second. Another is that the second question is only reached in the event that the first question has been answered affirmatively.

[17] A third is that it is established that the test of “adequate supervision” in s 5D is not “anchored” to an assessment of “unacceptable risk”, but involves a wider ranging inquiry, including having regard to the secondary purpose of the Act of encouraging rehabilitation: see State of New South Wales v Donovan.

[18] A fourth is that there is a wide range of conditions which could be imposed by an extended supervision order, so that the issue posed by s 5D also involves considering a range of conditions and whether if imposed they would constitute adequate supervision: see Lynn v State of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 57.

9. The task of the Court at the preliminary stage for an interim order is not to predict the ultimate result. Rather the test is said to be one similar to the prima facie test applied by magistrates in committal proceedings: Attorney General for New South Wales v Tillman [2007] NSWCA 119; Attorney General for New South Wales v Haytar [2007] NSWCA 993; and State of New South Wales v Thomas (Preliminary) [2011] NSWSC 118 at [11].

Background

10. The Defendant is a 43 year old indigenous man who committed sex offences against his young daughter a number of times during the period May 1997 to September 1999. He was charged with three counts of sexual intercourse with a child then under the age of ten years, namely five years, contrary to s 66A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). At the time of the offending the maximum penalty was 20 years imprisonment. He was found guilty after a trial by jury.

11. On 11 June 2010 he was sentenced as follows:

Count 1:   A fixed term of imprisonment of four years commencing 29 May 2009 and expiring 28 May 2013;

Count 2:   A fixed term of imprisonment of four years commencing 29 May 2010 and expiring 28 May 2014;

Count 3:   A non-parole period of 12 months commencing 29 May 2013 and expiring 28 May 2014 with a balance of term of three years expiring 28 May 2017.

12. The Defendant was released from custody to parole on 8 April 2015 on conditions which included complying with reporting obligations under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW). On 16 March 2016 police discovered that the Defendant was in an undisclosed relationship with a woman who had three young daughters. He was arrested and charged with failure to comply with the reporting obligations. On 9 August 2016 he was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of nine months with a non-parole period of six months in respect of the failure to comply with the reporting obligations. That sentence wholly expired on 15 December 2016.

13. The defendant was also charged with aggravated indecent assault of a child under the age of ten years and sexual assault relating to the children's mother. The defendant is currently held bail refused on those charges. His parole was revoked by the State Parole Authority on 1 April 2016. Those matters are due to go to trial commencing 24 July 2017.

14. There may be some doubt whether the offences for which the Defendant was convicted fall within s 5(1)(a)(i) because at the time of the offending Pt 3 of the Crimes Act did not have Division headings although s 66A was in the same position in the Act and in relevantly similar terms (it referred to “another person” in lieu of “a child”). I do not have a concluded view about that matter and, on the present application, the matter was not argued. However, I am satisfied that the offence falls within s 5(1)(c1) of the Act because if the offence was committed at the present time it would be an offence within Div 10 of Pt 3. I note the decision of Rothman J to that effect in State of New South Wales v Watson [2011] NSWSC 1692 at [31] and I note that a similar approach has been followed by James J in State of NSW v Roach [2010] NSWSC 184 at [43] and by Beech-Jones J in State of New South Wales v Fisk [2013] NSWSC 364 at [38].

Defendant’s criminal history

15. The Defendant’s offending began in Western Australia when he was about 14 years of age. That offending, and his offending up to and including 1994 involved offences of stealing, break and enter, unauthorised use of a motor vehicle, common assault, possess cannabis, breach bail, breach probation, escape lawful custody, steal a motor vehicle and attempt to pervert the course of justice.

16. His sexual offending commenced in 1995. On 9 July 1995 he was convicted of indecently assaulting a woman whose house he had been visiting. He was convicted at a trial of this matter in 2002 and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment to be served cumulatively on sentences imposed on 29 June 2001 referred to below.

17. In January 2001 he committed an armed robbery of a pharmacy and a burglary of a 72 year old disabled woman's home where he dragged her from her bed as a result of which she fractured her hip and received bruises. There may have been a sexual element to this assault because the Defendant, who was naked from the waist up, ripped the victim’s pyjama top off her, exposing her breasts. He was sentenced for those offences on 29 June 2001. In all, he received an imprisonment period of ten and a half years. He was released from custody on 29 May 2009 and was immediately extradited to New South Wales to face trial for the index offences.

18. In January 1997 the Defendant was charged with the sexual assault of his then de facto partner, Ms C, but the matter was not proceeded with. In the same month he was also charged with the aggravated sexual assault of another woman, Ms Tyson, but the Director of Public Prosecutions did not proceed with that matter.

19. In State of New South Wales v Conway [2011] NSWSC 976 I held at [27]-[39] that uncharged acts would not fall for consideration under the criminal history provision in s 9(3)(h) of the Act but may be relevant under s 9(3)(a) and (i). That approach has been followed in State of New South Wales v Veeran [2015] NSWSC 75 at [16] and State of NSW v Weribone [2016] NSWSC 1474 at [13].

Risk assessments

20. The Defendant was interviewed for the purpose of the present application by a senior psychologist from the Serious Offenders Assessment Unit, Samuel Ardasinski, on 14 October 2016. Mr Ardasinski noted that the Defendant had been assessed on at least four separate occasions throughout his current sentence using the STATIC-99R instrument. His scores on those previous administrations varied as did the risk categories into which he fell, ranging from Moderate-Low to Moderate-High risk relative to other male sexual offenders. Mr Ardasinski said the reason for the scoring anomalies related to the information available to the various risk assessors at the time of scoring. Mr Ardasinski re-scored that actuarial assessment tool taking into account the most recent charges and convictions, and he assessed him as being in the high category for offending.

21. Mr Ardasinski also assessed the Defendant on the Risk of Sexual Violence Protocol (RSVP) and concluded that he presented a high risk of committing further sexual violence generally with few impediments to re-offending without further intervention and community supervision.

22. Mr Ardasinski said that if the Defendant was released into the community without supervision the risk of repeat offending could be significant especially within the context of new relationships. He said:

The overall totality of evidence suggests that Mr Williams falls in the High risk category of sexual offending relative to other adult male sexual offenders. Since almost all of his previous sexual offending has been 'serious' in nature, it is probable that any future sexual violence or other criminal offending would approach the threshold of a "serious sexual offence" as defined in the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006. Without having been apprehended earlier in 2016 for his risky behaviour which was in contravention of his obligations under the CPR, it is difficult to know how long the identified risky situation would have persisted in Raymond Terrace [where the presently charged offending occurred].

23. Mr Ardasinski also said that further risks were identified in relation to the Defendant having sexual entitlement issues and attitudes supportive of sexual assault, insight issues, possible problems resulting from his own history of child abuse, being somewhat impulsive, having poor problem solving skills or the capacity to plan and follow through with plans, not having a stable work history or a solid vacation, and failing to be open in treatment. He said sexual offending appeared opportunistic and impulsive by and large, but it could be said that the Defendant’s offending against children could take on more elements of planning and premeditation. He said that although the Defendant could independently remain offence free following the expiry of his current sentence Mr Ardasinski considered that the Defendant would likely require further assistance to manage his every day risk issues and avoid a repeat offence.

24. Mr Ardasinski summarised the type of supervision that he thought the Defendant needed as follows:

a.   Mr Williams's social contacts would be scrutinised, with the aim of increasing pro-social influences and scrutinising new relationships as they are formed. Mr Williams suggested in interview that he felt he did well in 2015 while on parole by forming new non-intimate relationships, but acknowledged that this was “a good challenge”;

b.   Mr Williams will be supported to re-enter the workforce, and if appropriate, continue with fulfilling vocational education. Since he has lost his previous employment since being reincarcerated, he will be forced to 'start over' once again upon his eventual release from custody;

c.   He would be subject to unannounced home visits;

d.   He would likely be obliged to wear electronic monitoring equipment and to provide a schedule of his daily activities. Electronic monitoring may assist in his risk management, considering his offending history and his deceit in concealing his “weekend relationship” which saw him breach the CPR;

e.   He may be re-referred to the community-based Maintenance program at FPS Surry Hills, and would initially be expected to participate in weekly group sessions to assist him with risk management strategies. If he has not undertaken any further custody-based treatment, these group sessions would likely be supplemented with individual work from an appropriately qualified psychologist;

f.   Mr Williams may be subject to drug-swab testing and urinalysis to detect possible return to drug use, and breath-analysis to detect use of alcohol. He may also be encouraged to engage with services to assist him to manage these risk issues if a return to problematic AOD use is established.

25. A risk management report was also prepared by Chris Rolleston, a Community Corrections Officer on the Extended Supervision Order team. That report identified particular risks to be managed and monitored, and made suggestions about the sort of conditions that should be imposed to deal with those risks.

25. I note also the contents of a report from Renata Cimino, a Forensic Psychologist, likely prepared for the purposes of sentencing the Defendant for the index offences dated 18 April 2010. Although the report is now seven years old many of the conclusions are similar to those contained in Mr Ardasinski’s report although Ms Cimino assessed his risk of sexual re-offending as moderate. Somewhat presciently in the light of the presently charged offences Ms Cimino said at paragraph 39:

There are concerns that his actual risk may increase in particular situations, such as, should he commence another relationship with a female with children in the household.

Is the Defendant an unacceptable risk?

27. For the purpose of the making of an Interim Supervision Order the Defendant conceded that he was a high risk sex offender, that an Interim Supervision Order was appropriate and that it was open to the Court to find matters alleged in the supporting documentation would, if proved, justify the making of an Extended Supervision Order and the appointing of two experts to conduct assessments on the Defendant. In the circumstances of this case, these were appropriate concessions.

28. Despite these concessions by the Defendant it is, nevertheless, necessary for the Court to be satisfied to the requisite level of proof that the Defendant is an unacceptable risk.

29. Although the Defendant does not have a lengthy record of sexual offending that is only one matter for consideration. The index offences were described by the Sentencing Judge as extremely serious. Not only was the victim five years old, she was under the Defendant’s authority and actual violence was used. In addition, the earlier sexual offence in Western Australia for which he received an 18 month prison sentence, the two other incidents in respect of which charges were not proceeded with as well as the presently charged offences can be taken into account.

30. Quite apart from the offending, the Defendant has been assessed at a high risk of re-offending by an experienced senior forensic psychologist. Except for the assessment of the level of future risk, his assessments concerning the Defendant were largely consistent with those of the psychologist Ms Cimino who assessed him in 2010. That is despite the Defendant completing the CUBIT course in prison and attending 24 sessions of the community-based Forensic Psychology Services program to deal with his sexual offending. It is also of significance that the Defendant’s past compliance with various obligations including parole and reporting have been described as “abysmal” and “poor”.

31. I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the evidence which I have summarised, if proved, demonstrates that the Defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he is not kept under supervision.

Conditions

32. The State annexed to the Summons the conditions of supervision it sought in relation to the Defendant. The Defendant’s submissions sought a number of variations and one deletion. Subsequently the State prepared revised conditions which accepted most but not all of the suggestions put forward on behalf of the Defendant. Thereafter, further negotiations ensued with the result that all of the conditions are agreed for the purpose of any interim order that is made. The parties are to be commended for this approach.

33. I have had regard to the matters is s 9(3) of the Act. I have also had regard to the approach to the Defendant’s supervision by Mr Ardasinski in his report (see [24] above). I have had particular regard to the matters detailed in Mr Rolleston’s report. I consider that the proposed conditions, at least on an interim basis, are appropriate to ensure adequate supervision of the Defendant.

34. The Interim Extension Order I shall make is to contain the conditions set out in Annexure “A” to this judgment.

The need for an interim order

35. It is necessary to say something about the present position of the Defendant. As noted earlier, after the Defendant was arrested on 16 March 2016 for failing to comply with the Child Protection Register reporting conditions, he was arrested on 30 March 2016 and charged with two counts of aggravated indecent assault with a child under ten years and sexual intercourse without consent with the child's mother. There are also five charges of common assault. The Defendant is bail refused on those charges and it seems likely he will remain in custody when his current sentence expires until the conclusion of the trial which commences on 24 July 2017.

36. Section 10C of the Act provides:

10C Term of interim supervision order

(1) An interim supervision order commences on the day fixed in the order for its commencement (or if no such day is fixed, as soon as it is made) and expires at the end of:

(a) such period (not exceeding 28 days from the day on which it commences) as is specified in the order, or

(b) if the order is suspended for any period - the period specified in paragraph (a) plus each period during which the order is suspended.

(1A) An interim supervision order, and the offender’s obligations under that interim supervision order, are suspended during any period the offender is in lawful custody, whether under this or any other Act or law.

(2) An interim supervision order may be renewed from time to time, but not so as to provide for the supervision of the offender under such an order for periods totalling more than 3 months.

(3) Any day or part of a day on which an interim supervision order is suspended does not count towards the 3-month limit referred to in subsection (2).

37. From whatever date the Interim Supervision Order is stipulated to commence it will be suspended immediately thereafter whilstever the Defendant remains in custody. It could be argued that there is little utility in making an Interim Supervision Order. However, an application must be made within the last six months of the Defendant’s current custody by virtue of s 6(2) of the Act. If the Defendant is acquitted on the offences due to go to trial in July 2017 he would no longer be detained and would be released into the community without any supervision in the absence of an Extended Supervision Order being in place.

38. Of course, if the Defendant is convicted after trial of any of the sex offences the strong likelihood is that he will remain in custody and will be sentenced to a period of further custody given the nature of the offences and his record.

39. In all the circumstances, it is appropriate to make an interim order but to ensure that the final hearing is fixed for a time sufficiently after the trial so that the outcome of the trial and any sentence can properly be considered when deciding what should happen in these proceedings.

40. In the light of the pending trial of the Defendant both parties have asked for a non-publication order with respect to these proceedings. I consider that such an order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice.

Conclusion

41. Accordingly, I make the following orders:

1. Pursuant to section 7(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (“the Act”):

a.   Two qualified psychiatrists, and/or registered psychologists (or any combination of such persons) conduct separate psychiatric or psychological examinations of the defendant and to furnish reports to the Supreme Court on the results of those examinations by 31 July 2017; and

b.   The defendant attend those examinations.

2. Pursuant to section 10A of the Act, the defendant be subject to an interim supervision order (“ISO”) commencing on 28 May 2017 for a period of 28 days.

3. Pursuant to section 11 of the Act an order directing the defendant, for the duration of the ISO, to comply with the conditions set out in Annexure A to these orders.

4. The plaintiff is to file and serve any evidence and written submissions upon which it relies for the final hearing by 14 August 2017.

5. The defendant is to file and serve any evidence and written submissions upon which he relies for the final hearing by 21 August 2017.

6. The matter is listed for final hearing at 10:00 am on 23 August 2017 with an estimate of 1 day plus.

7. Liberty to apply on 24 hours’ notice.

8. Pursuant to s 8(1)(a) of the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) the proceedings be subject to a non-publication order until further order of the Court on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

9. Access to the Court’s file in respect of any document shall not be granted without the leave of a judge of the Court, and, if any application for access is made by a non-party in respect of any document, the parties are to be notified by the Registrar so as to be given an opportunity to be heard.

**********

ANNEXURE A

Departmental Supervising Officer (DSO) - Any reference to DSO includes any other person supervising the defendant

Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW)

Part A: Reporting and Monitoring Obligations

Monitoring and Reporting

1.   The defendant must accept the supervision of CSNSW until the end of the Order.

2.   The defendant must report to the DSO.

3.   The defendant must follow all reasonable directions by his DSO.

Electronic Monitoring

4.   If directed, the defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment as directed by the DSO.

Schedule of Movements

5.   If directed, the defendant must provide a weekly plan (called a schedule of movements) and this is to be provided 3 days before it is due to start.

6.   If the defendant wants to change anything in his schedule of movements once it is approved by his DSO, he must tell his DSO about the change 24 hours in advance, unless the DSO approves a shorter period.

7.   The defendant must not deviate from his approved schedule of movements except in an emergency.

8.   The defendant must truthfully answer questions from his DSO about where he is, where he is going and what he is doing.

Part B: Accommodation

9.   The defendant must live at an address approved by his DSO.

10.   The defendant must be at his approved address between 9:00pm and 6:00am unless other arrangements are approved by his DSO.

11.    The defendant must allow his DSO to visit him at his approved address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address.

12.   The defendant must not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address without the prior approval of his DSO.

13.   The defendant must not permit any person to enter and remain, or to stay overnight, at his approved address, without the prior approval of his DSO.

Part C: Place and travel restrictions

14.   The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the prior approval of CSNSW.

15.   The defendant must surrender any passports held by the defendant to the Commissioner of CSNSW.

16.   The defendant must not go to a place if his DSO tells him he cannot go there.

17.   Without limiting condition 16 above, the defendant must not go to any residences where the defendant knows that persons under the age of 18 ordinarily reside.

18.   The defendant must not purchase alcohol or attend any retail outlets that only sell alcohol.

Part D: Employment, finance and education

19.   If the defendant is unemployed, the defendant must enter available employment if and as directed by the DSO or make himself available for employment, education, training or participation in a personal development program as directed by the DSO.

20.   The defendant must not start any job, volunteer work or educational course without the approval of his DSO.

Part E: Drugs and alcohol

21.   The defendant must not possess or use alcohol or illegal drugs, and he must not possess or use prescription medication other than as prescribed.

22.   The defendant must submit to testing for drugs and alcohol as directed by his DSO.

23.   The defendant must not enter any licensed premises without the approval of his DSO. The defendant does not require the approval of his DSO to attend cafes and restaurants.

24.   The defendant must attend and participate in programmes and courses for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as directed by his DSO, and must not discharge himself from such programs and courses without prior approval of his DSO.

Part F: Non-association

Association with Children

25.   The defendant must not approach or have contact without anyone who he knows is under the age of 18 years unless his DSO tells him he can, and he is with someone who has been approved in writing by his DSO.

Associations with Others (not children)

26.   The defendant must not associate with people that his DSO tells him not to.

27.   The defendant must not associate with any people who are consuming or who he believes are under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol, except with the permission of his DSO in relation to alcohol consumption.

28.   The defendant must not engage the services of sex workers without the approval of his DSO.

29.   If the defendant starts a romantic relationship with someone, he has to tell his DSO who may want to tell the person about his criminal history. The defendant must not start, or be in, a romantic relationship with anyone who has custody of, or care from time to time of, children under the age of 18 years, unless his DSO gives him permission.

30.   The defendant must obtain written permission from the DSO prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation, including any internet or mobile based social networking service.

Part G: Gambling

No applicable conditions

Part H: Weapons

31.   The defendant must not possess or use any firearm within the meaning of s.4 of the Firearms Act 1996 or prohibited weapon as defined in s.4 and Schedule 1 of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998.

Part I: Access to the internet and other electronic communication

32.   If directed, the defendant must give his DSO a list of all devices, services and applications he uses to communicate with or to access the internet. This includes phones, tablet devices, data storage devices or computers. This includes the details of telephone numbers, service provider account numbers, email addresses or other user names and relevant passwords and codes, used by the defendant and the nature and details of the internet connection, as directed.

33.   The DSO (or any other person requested by the DSO) may remotely inspect any internet account used by the defendant, including the defendant's email addresses, in monitoring compliance with this order.

34.   The defendant must obey any reasonable directions by his DSO about the use of phones, tablet devices, data storage devices, computers and other devices, including any reasonable directions relating to his access to the internet.

35.   The defendant must allow his telephone and/or internet service provider to share information about his accounts with his DSO.

36.   The defendant must provide a list of communication devices and data storage devices in the defendant’s possession and advise the DSO of any change to the inventory immediately.

Part J: Search and seizure

37.   If the DSO believes on reasonable grounds that a search (of the type referred to in sub-paragraphs d to g below) is necessary:

a.   for the safety and welfare of residents or staff or persons present at the defendant’s approved address;

b.   to monitor the defendant’s compliance with this order; or

c.   because the DSO reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence;

then the DSO may direct, and the defendant must submit to:

d.   search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant’s approved address;

e.   search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant;

f.   search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any storage facility, including a garage, locker or commercial facility owned, hired by or under the control of the defendant; and/or

g.   search and examination of his person.

38.   For the purposes of the above condition:

a.   a search of the defendant means a garment search or a pat-down search.

b.   to the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a DSO of the same sex as the defendant, or by an Officer of CSNSW of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the DSO.

NOTE:

"Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body.

"Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched.

39.   During a search carried out pursuant to condition 37 above, the defendant must allow the DSO to seize anything found, whether in the defendant's possession or not, which the DSO reasonably suspects will compromise:

a.   the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved address; or

b.   the welfare or safety of any member of the public or any other person; or

c.   the defendant's compliance with this order;

or which the DSO reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious offence.

40.   The defendant must allow CSNSW to search any phone, tablet device, data storage device or computer that he may use.

41.   The defendant must not attempt to destroy or interfere with any object that is the subject of a search or seizure, carried out pursuant to conditions 37 to 40 above.

Part K: Access to pornographic, violent and classified material

42.   The defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate in or listen to material classified or material that would be classified as Refused Classification, X18+, R18+, Restricted Category 2 and Restricted Category 1, or any other material as directed by the DSO, without the approval of his DSO.

Part L: Personal details and appearance

43.   The defendant must not change his name from “Gordon Thomas Williams” or use any other name without the approval of his DSO.

44.   The defendant must not use any alias, log-in name, or a name other than “Gordon Williams” or use any email address other than those known to the DSO under condition 33 above, on any internet site (including social networking sites), any online communication applications or any third party sites or applications that requires the user to have a user identification name or log-in email.

45.   The defendant must not permanently change his appearance without the approval of his DSO.

46.   The defendant must let CSNSW photograph him.

47.   If the defendant changes the details of any current form of identification or obtains further forms of identification, he must provide the DSO with such details.

Part M: Medical intervention and treatment

48.   If directed, the defendant must notify his DSO of the identity and address of any healthcare practitioner that he consults.

49.   The defendant must attend all psychological and psychiatric assessments, therapy, support and treatment that his DSO tells him to attend.

50.   The defendant must take all medications that are prescribed to him by his healthcare practitioners.

51.   If the defendant knowingly ceases to take medication that has been prescribed, either on a temporary or permanent basis, the defendant is to notify the DSO within 24 hours of ceasing to take the medication.

52.   If directed, the defendant must agree to his healthcare practitioners sharing information including reports on his progress and information he has told them with each other and with his DSO.

53.   The defendant must agree to any information being shared between those agencies that are involved in his supervision including, but not limited to, his DSO and CSNSW.

Amendments

10 August 2017 - Publication restriction lifted

Decision last updated: 28 October 2025