State of New South Wales v Watson
[2011] NSWSC 1692
•11 October 2011
Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: State of New South Wales v Watson [2011] NSWSC 1692 Hearing dates: 11/10/2011 Decision date: 11 October 2011 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Rothman J Decision: 1Order 2 made by his Honour, Justice Adams on 18 August 2011 be set aside from the date of this order.
2Pursuant to section 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 ("the Act"), the Defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of 3 years from the date of this order.
3Pursuant to section 11 of the Act, direct that, for the period of the order, the Defendant comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to this Order.
4The Commissioner of Corrective Services will pay for any cost relating to the electronic monitoring of the defendant, including the costs of installing, maintaining and operating the electronic monitoring equipment. In the event that the Commissioner of Corrective Services does not pay such costs, the State of New South Wales undertakes that it will pay such costs.
Catchwords: Serious Sex Offender - application for Extended Supervision Order - statutory requirements satisfied - no issue of principle - Extended Supervision Order made for 3 years Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006Cases Cited: Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575
M v M (1988) HCA 68; (1988) 166 CLR 69
State of New South Wales v Richardson (No. 2) [2011] NSWSC 276
State of New South Wales v Thomas (Preliminary) [2011] NSWSC 118Category: Principal judgment Parties: State of New South Wales (Plaintiff)
Peter Watson (Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
R Ranken (Plaintiff)
S A Beckett (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor's Officer (Plaintiff)
Legal Aid (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2011/235403
Judgment
HIS HONOUR: On 12 October 2011 the Court, as presently constituted, issued Orders, being an Extended Supervision Order pursuant to s 9 of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 (hereinafter "the Act") directing that the defendant, Peter Watson, comply with the conditions set out in the Schedule to that Order. Short reasons for judgment were issued, ex tempore, for each of the conditions contained in the Order, at least to the extent that such conditions were the subject of contest. Full reasons for the Orders were reserved to be issued if either party requested them. The plaintiff has sought full reasons and these reasons for judgment are issued for that purpose.
Background
The State of New South Wales (hereinafter "the plaintiff"), by summons filed 21 July 2011, sought Orders against the defendant under the provisions of the Act.
After a short preliminary hearing, Adams J issued an Interim Supervision Order and appointed two qualified psychiatrists to conduct separate examinations of the defendant and furnish reports to the Court. The Interim Supervision Orders required the defendant to comply with certain conditions set out in the Schedule thereto.
The application for an Extended Supervision Order was heard by the Court on 11 October 2011 and the Court indicated which of those contested conditions sought by the plaintiff should apply and the period for which the Extended Supervision Order ought to operate. The plaintiff then provided an Order reflecting the reasons and indications given by the Court, which Orders were issued and entered on 12 October 2011.
In support of its application for final relief the plaintiff relied on the following affidavits:
(1) Affidavit of Kaye Sato, affirmed 16 August 2011;
(2) Further affidavit of Kaye Sato, affirmed 17 August 2011;
(3) Affidavit of Theresa Britton, Clinical Psychologist, affirmed 7 October 2011;
(4) Affidavit of Zouhier Abedine, affirmed 7 October 2011;
(5) Affidavit of Bradley Corkett, affirmed 7 October 2011;
(6) Affidavit of Katherine Sahm, affirmed 10 October 2011;
(7) Report of Dr Samson F Roberts, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, dated 14 September 2011; and
(8) Report of Dr Stephen H Allnutt, Forensic Psychiatrist, dated 3 October 2011.
The latter two documents are reports provided pursuant to the orders of Adams J, to which reference has been made.
One of the defendant's victims provided a statement to the Court, pursuant to s 21A of the Act, expressing his views about the Order and the conditions which ought to apply (Exhibit F).
The Defendant
Peter Watson, the defendant, is a 59-year-old convicted male sex offender with a history of having committed sexual offences against children in both New South Wales and Queensland. The defendant has been convicted of, or has otherwise admitted, committing 19 sexual offences involving 10 separate victims. The victims were all boys aged between 10 and 15 years. The plaintiff provided a chronology of sexual offences upon which I rely.
The defendant's first convictions for offences of a sexual nature were recorded in 1988 in respect of 6 counts of indecent assault upon a person under the age of 16 years, contrary to s 61E(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900, and one count of homosexual intercourse with a male above the age of 10 years and under the age of 18 years, contrary to s 78K of the Crimes Act, as it then was. The offences were committed over a three-month period. All but one of the offences was committed upon the same 15-year-old male victim. The other victim was also a 15-year-old boy.
In 1990, the defendant was convicted of two counts of committing an act of indecency towards a person under the age of 16 years, contrary to s 61E(2) of the Crimes Act. This time, the victims were a boy aged 11 years and a boy aged 10 years respectively. In sentencing the defendant, the District Court took into account a further offence contrary to s 61E(2) involving a third male victim of 13 years of age.
In 1993, the defendant was charged with a number of offences alleged to have been committed against a 14 year old male in that year, including the commission of a gross act of indecency with a male under the age of 18 years, contrary to s 78Q(1) of the Crimes Act and an offence of homosexual intercourse with a male above the age of 10 and under the age of 18 years, contrary to s 78K. The defendant was committed for trial, failed to appear before the Court (a breach of his then bail conditions) and a bench warrant issued.
In 1996, the Queensland District Court, at Cairns, convicted the defendant of a number of sexual offences said to have been committed in December 1995. In particular, the defendant was convicted of an offence of wilfully exposing a child under the age of 16 years to an indecent photograph, an offence of knowingly having in his possession child abuse films and a further offence of indecently dealing with a child. The alleged victim of each of these offences was a 15-year-old boy.
At or about that time, the defendant began treatment with anti-libidinal medication to reduce his level of sexual desire. The defendant complied with that medication until his recent incarceration in New South Wales.
Notwithstanding the anti-libidinal medication regime, the defendant committed further offences of indecent treatment of children under the age of 16 years in Queensland in May/June 2004 and December 2004. The victims were a 15-year-old boy and a 14-year-old boy respectively. The Queensland District Court convicted the defendant of the offences in February and June 2006 respectively.
In December 2006, the defendant was extradited to New South Wales from Queensland to be tried for the 1993 offences to which reference has been made.
On 30 July 2007, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of homosexual intercourse with a male over the age of 10 and under the age of 18, contrary to s 78K of the Crimes Act, and two counts of aggravated indecent assault, contrary to s 61M(1) of the Crimes Act.
In December 2007, while awaiting sentence for the 1993 offences, the defendant was charged with a further offence of homosexual intercourse with a male above the age of 10 years and under the age of 18 years, contrary to s 78K of the Crimes Act, committed in 1985 upon a 15 year old boy. The defendant indicated an intention to plead guilty to the offence and was committed for sentence to the District Court to be dealt with together with the 1993 offences.
On 28 March 2008, the District Court convicted and sentenced the defendant for the 1993 offences and the 1985 offence. For the 1985 offence, the defendant was sentenced to a non-parole period of 2 years and a total term of 2 years and 8 months, to date from 16 December 2006. For the 1993 offence of homosexual intercourse with a male above the age of 10 years and under the age of 18 years, the defendant was sentenced to a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months and a total term of 3 years and 9 months, to date from 16 December 2007. In respect of the remaining 1993 offences, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for 2 years commencing on 16 December 2007.
The defendant commenced a program for sex offenders in January 2010, being the Custody Based Intensive Treatment (CUBIT), which he completed in February 2011. He had previously participated in other programs including a program to provide an introduction to treatment for convicted sex offenders and an anger management program.
On 1 June 2011, the defendant was released on parole in respect of the 1993 offence. The balance of his imprisonment expired on 15 September 2011 and, as already stated, he has been subject either to the Interim Supervision Order issued by Adams J or the Extended Supervision Order since 18 August 2011. He is currently residing at a Community Offenders' Support Program Centre.
The defendant was the subject of a risk assessment report dated 1 July 2011, prepared by Ms Theresa Britton, a Clinical Psychologist employed by Corrective Services NSW, which assessment is before the Court. That assessment expresses the opinion that the defendant represented:
"A high risk of sexual re-offending, having regard to both actuarial and dynamic risk factors."
As earlier stated, pursuant to the Orders of the Court, the defendant was examined by two psychiatrists, Dr Roberts and Dr Allnutt. Both psychiatrists have assessed the defendant as attracting a diagnosis in accordance with DSM-IV TR of paedophilia and presenting a high risk of committing further serious sex offences. Dr Roberts expressed the view that:
"The level of supervision conferred by an extended supervision order would provide [the defendant] with the best opportunity of a supported reintegration into community living, whilst conferring a degree of protection to the community and supporting on-going therapy beyond the confines of a custodial setting."
Similarly, Dr Allnutt expressed the view that:
"The proposed conditions of the extended supervision order ... are likely to attenuate the [defendant's] risk of committing further sex offences in the future."
Both psychiatrists considered that the conditions proposed by the State are comprehensive and would best manage the defendant.
Objects of the Act
The objects of the Act are stated in s 3 thereof. Section 3 is in the following terms:
"(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of serious sex offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.
Prior to amendments made on 21 December 2007, s 3 had provided for the same objects without giving primacy to either object. Nevertheless, since that date, the primary object of the Act is, as is obvious from the foregoing, to ensure the safety and protection of the community.
Jurisdiction to make orders
The Court may make Extended Supervision Orders pursuant to s 6 of the Act. Section 6 provides:
"(1) The State of New South Wales may apply to the Supreme Court for a continuing detention order against a sex offender who, when the application is made, is in custody in a correctional centre:
(a) while serving a sentence of imprisonment by way of full-time detention:
(i) for a serious sex offence, or
(ii) for an offence of a sexual nature, or
(iii) for another offence which is being served concurrently or consecutively, or partly concurrently and partly consecutively, with one or more sentences of imprisonment referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii), or
(b) pursuant to an existing continuing detention order,
referred to in this Part as his or her current custody.
(2) The State of New South Wales may apply to the Supreme Court for a continuing detention order against a person who is subject to an extended supervision order or an interim supervision order if:
(a) the person is found guilty of an offence under section 12, or
(b) because of altered circumstances, adequate supervision of the person cannot be provided under an extended supervision order or an interim supervision order."
The Act requires threshold conditions to be satisfied before the Court may issue an order. It is important for the Court to be satisfied, even in the present circumstances where issue is not taken with the satisfaction of the pre-conditions, that these conditions are satisfied. The nature of the restrictions on liberty effected by an order issued under the Act, at a time when the defendant has served the sentence imposed for the offences committed, is an important aspect of the legislative regime.
The Act provides that an application for an extended supervision order may be made in respect of a "sex offender" who, at the time the application is made, is in custody or under supervision in respect of a sentence of imprisonment for "a serious sex offence" or "an offence of a sexual nature", whether the sentence is being served by way of full time, periodic or home detention and whether the offender is in custody or on parole: see s 6(1)(a) of the Act. Further, an order may be made if there is in existence a continuing detention order. That latter aspect is irrelevant to the current proceedings, except to the extent that the Court, as presently constituted, is able to rely on the Interim Supervision Order imposed by Adams J, to which reference has already been made.
An application for an Extended Supervision Order may not be made until the last six months of the offender's current custody or supervision: s 6(2) of the Act.
A "sex offender" is defined in s 4 of the Act as "a person who has at any time been sentenced to imprisonment following his or her conviction of a serious sex offence, other than an offence committed while a person was a child". A "serious sex offence" is defined in s 5(1) of the Act to include, relevantly, each of the offences to which reference has been made in the foregoing reasons as offences committed by the defendant.
While the offences under s 78K of the Crimes Act are no longer offences under Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act (and therefore would no longer fit within the definition of "serious sex offence"), if such acts had been committed at the present time, they would constitute an offence under s 66C(3) of the Crimes Act, which is an offence under Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act, punishable by imprisonment for 10 years.
In my view, the offence satisfies the definition of "serious sex offence" in s 5(1)(c1) of the Act.
Further, the sentence being served, either by imprisonment or on parole, that concluded on 15 September 2011 was for an offence committed while an adult and, as a consequence, the defendant is a "sex offender" as defined in s 4 of the Act and was under supervision on parole in respect of a sentence of imprisonment for a serious sex offence at the time these proceedings were commenced.
The earliest time at which the plaintiff could commence proceedings was 6 months prior to 15 September 2011, namely, 16 March 2011, with which time constraint the State has complied. The application, for the foregoing reasons, was made within the required period, in respect of an offender within the prescribed definition, who has offended in relation to prescribed offences. The Court has power to issue the Orders it did on 12 October 2011.
Section 9(2) of the Act allows the Court to make an extended supervision order at a final hearing if and only if it is satisfied "to a high degree of probability" that the defendant "poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he ... is not kept under supervision": see s 9(2) of the Act.
The foregoing requirement is not a requirement, expressly, that the Court needs to determine that the risk of a person committing a serious sex offence is more likely than not: see Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575 at 593, per Gleeson CJ; at 606, per Gummow J and at 657, per Callinan and Heydon JJ, referring to M v M (1988) HCA 68; (1988) 166 CLR 69 at 78.
The notion or meaning of the term "unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence" has been the subject of much recent authority. I accept that an unacceptable risk is a risk that does not ensure adequate protection of the community: see State of New South Wales v Thomas (Preliminary) [2011] NSWSC 118, and that it is necessary for the Court to consider, having regard to the likelihood of the person offending and the offence likely to be committed, whether the risk of that offending is so unacceptable that it is necessary, in the interests of the community, to ensure the person is subject to further control: Thomas at [18].
With great respect to Davies J, I accept the approach taken by his Honour in the State of New South Wales v Richardson(No. 2) [2011] NSWSC 276. In those reasons his Honour stated:
"26 The reasons for the changes made in the 2010 Amendment Act were set out in the Second Reading Speech in relation to that Amendment Act as follows:
There has been considerable case law on the meaning of the word 'likely' in this State and in Victoria, which used the same test in relation to a similar piece of legislation, the Victorian Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005. The interpretation that is currently applied in New South Wales courts is that the word 'likely' should be construed as meaning probable, in the sense of a high degree of probability, but not necessarily involving a degree of probability that is more than 50 percent. The authority for this interpretation is Tillman v Attorney General (New South Wales) [2007] New South Wales Court of Appeal 327, reported also at 70 New South Wales Law Reports 448 and 178 Australian Criminal Reports 133.
Subsequent legislative activity in Victoria, including the repeal of the Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 and the introduction of the Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009, has resulted in the introduction of an unacceptable risk test. In the second reading speech to the Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009 the Victorian Minister for Corrections, the Hon. Bob Cameron, noted that the new test invites courts to consider not only the risk of sexual reoffending of the particular offender but also the nature and gravity of the offences the offender may commit in the future.
As part of the statutory review of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006, many stakeholders acknowledged difficulties with the word 'likely' and called for clarification. The statutory review also noted that recent decisions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales confirm that there is a need to clarify the use of the word 'likely', and accordingly the requisite degree to which a court must be satisfied of risk before making an order. The statutory review recommended that one way of achieving this clarity was not to simply define the word 'likely' but also to clarify the test that is being met, that is, to adopt the unacceptable risk test adopted in Victoria. It is noted that the equivalent Queensland piece of legislation, the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003, contains a similar test and was upheld by the High Court in Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2004] High Court of Australia 46.
The statutory review of the New South Wales Act found that the arguments that preceded the change in Victoria were equally applicable to New South Wales. In addition, it was acknowledged that there was merit in the test in the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 being consistent with the tests used in Victoria and Queensland given that the schemes set up by each of the three States are similar in nature and designed to achieve the same aim, that is, the protection of the community through the management of serious sex offenders. There are also advantages in having a cross-jurisdictional body of case law being developed. As such, item [5] amends the test [ie s.9(3) and s.17(2) and (3)] to require the court to be satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk replacing the likelihood test with a test of unacceptable risk of the offender committing a serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision.
27 The expression 'unacceptable risk' in the corresponding Queensland legislation was referred to by the High Court in Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) [2004] HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575. The judges made reference to Family Court cases where the expression had been used in relation to denying a parent access to a child: M v M ( [1988] HCA 68; 1988) 166 CLR 69 at 78 and In re G (A minor) [1987] 1 WLR 1461 at 1469. The Judges quoted from the passage in M v M where the following appears:
In devising these tests the courts have endeavoured, in their efforts to protect the child's paramount interests, to achieve a balance between the risk of detriment to the child from sexual abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental access. To achieve a proper balance, the test is best expressed by saying that a court will not grant custody or access to a parent if that custody or access would expose the child to an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse: Gummow CJ at [60], Callinan and Heydon JJ at [225], and see also McHugh J at [22].
28 In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams (2007) 176 A Crim R 111 the Western Australian Court of Appeal said this of the same expression, where it appeared in legislation corresponding to that under consideration here, at [63]:
In my view, an 'unacceptable risk' in the context of s 7(1) is a risk which is unacceptable having regard to a variety of considerations which may include the likelihood of the person offending, the type of sexual offence which the person is likely to commit (if that can be predicted) and the consequences of making a finding that an unacceptable risk exists. That is, the judge is required to consider whether, having regard to the likelihood of the person offending and the offence likely to be committed, the risk of that offending is so unacceptable that, notwithstanding that the person has already been punished for whatever offence they may have actually committed, it is necessary in the interests of the community to ensure that the person is subject to further control or detention.
29 A similar approach was adopted by Steytler P and Buss JA in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR (2008) 198 A Crim R 149 at [27]:
The word 'unacceptable' necessarily connotes a balancing exercise, requiring the court to have regard, amongst other things, for the nature of the risk (the commission of a serious sexual offence, with serious consequences for the victim) and the likelihood of the risk coming to fruition, on the one hand, and the serious consequences for the offender, on the other, if an order is made (either detention, without having committed an unpunished offence, or being required to undergo what might be an onerous supervision order). As John Fogarty points out, albeit in a rather different context (Unacceptable risk - A return to basics (2006) 20 AJFL 249, 252), the advantage of the phrase 'unacceptable risk' is that 'it is calibrated to the nature and degree of the risk, so that it can be adapted to the particular case'."
Although not expressed in this way, Davies J, noting the expression by Hume J in Thomas, concluded that the notion of unacceptable risk involved a risk matrix which balances the commission of a serious sexual offence and the likelihood of that risk occurring and the seriousness of the consequences should that risk eventuate.
I adopt the foregoing analysis as applicable to determining whether orders should be made in the current proceedings.
Application of principles
It is unnecessary to repeat the details of the reports by either Dr Roberts or Dr Allnutt. That which I have already extracted is sufficient to establish the high risk of re-offending. I am so satisfied.
Moreover, the defendant has a long history of paedophilia and offences that are now within the definition of "serious sex offences", being committed even while on anti-libidinal medication.
The seriousness of the risk eventuating is such that, even if the risk were lower than is evident on the material currently before the Court, an Extended Supervision Order would be warranted. I so find. And, as a matter of abundant caution, I make clear that the statutory preconditions for the making of an Extended Supervision Order have been satisfied and I conclude that an Extended Supervision Order should issue against the defendant.
The circumstances of the sex offences in evidence before the Court disclose a pattern of behaviour by the defendant, which involve the following features:
(a) The victims were all boys aged between 10 and 15 years;
(b) Although the victims were known to the defendant prior to the offences, in each case the length of the acquaintance was relatively superficial and brief, varying between a matter of weeks to a matter of months, and in no case was it more than one year;
(c) In each case, the offences were committed in circumstances where there was a preceding course of conduct by the defendant that is properly described as "grooming", being the befriending of the victims, taking the victims to enjoyable events and purportedly offering assistance in life, namely, with such things as surfing locations or offering them employment, taking them back to his own residence, and introducing the victim to cigarettes or pornography or the like;
(d) The offences were committed at the defendant's residence when the victim was alone and vulnerable; and
(e) The sexual acts were consistent and involved groping, fondling or masturbating the victim and, occasionally, the performance of oral sex upon the victim.
Conditions of Order
As was made clear in the discussion during the proceedings, I accept most of the conditions suggested by the plaintiff. Generally, those conditions are not the subject of contest.
In relation to paragraph 3, the defendant submits that the conditions should be qualified by allowing the Departmental supervising officer to provide reasonable direction only in circumstances where the direction is "necessary for compliance with these conditions". As stated, there is no evidence before the Court of any unreasonableness in the Department's directions given thus far. In the absence of any such disclosed unreasonableness, the Court considers that there is a need for a condition of this kind, without the qualification suggested by the defendant. No matter how comprehensive other conditions imposed by an extended supervision order, there will be times when directions will be necessary that are not covered by the terms of the conditions but are otherwise within the purposes for which the order has been made.
In the absence of disclosed unreasonableness by the Department, the Court considers that the proposed wording of paragraph 3 of the obligations in the Schedule is appropriate and will be prescribed in the Schedule to the Order as a condition with which compliance is necessary.
Objection is taken to the conditions proposed in paragraph 20 for the defendant to obtain written permission and approval in advance before attending the premises of any club, organisation or group. The defendant proposes that the words "or attending" be deleted from the proposed condition.
As already stated, the proposal of the plaintiff goes too far, but the suggested amendment by the defendant does not go far enough. As a consequence it seems to me that written permission and approval in advance should be obtained from the relevant officer prior to joining or affiliating with any club, organisation or group, but attendance at a club, organisation or group should be treated as is any other activity, namely by providing notification to the Departmental supervising officer in advance. Such a course would meet the objects of the Act and allow the supervision of the defendant in an appropriate manner.
The plaintiff proposes a prohibition on the possession or consumption of alcohol, notwithstanding that the affidavits upon which it relies qualifies that prohibition in circumstances where the Departmental supervising officer permits it. The condition should reflect that qualification so that the possession or consumption of alcohol shall be prohibited unless approved in advance by the Departmental supervising officer.
The condition in paragraph 30 is, subject to the wording thereof, agreed and I propose the wording as included in the Orders made. Further, I have rejected clause 33 insofar as it gives the Department a capacity to search and inspect beyond that which is otherwise contained in the conditions in the Extended Supervision Order.
Lastly, save for the duration of the Extended Supervision Order, I accept that a condition proposed by the plaintiff of the kind contained in paragraph 51 ought be in the Schedule, but that paragraph 52 reflect a review of all conditions at the time that the electronic monitoring equipment review occurs. That review should occur no later than the expiration of 12 months and each 12 months thereafter.
Initially the defendant sought an undertaking from the Commissioner of Corrective Services NSW that the Commissioner would pay for the costs relating to electronic monitoring. The need for such a provision has been abated and it will not be a condition included in the Schedule to the Order to be made.
I fix the period of 3 years as the appropriate period for the Extended Supervision Order. I do so because circumstances alter dramatically in this situation and there is no prohibition on the plaintiff seeking further orders if appropriate. On the other hand, given the restrictions that occur in relation to the provision of legal aid, amongst other things, it is more difficult for the defendant to seek the setting aside of Extended Supervision Orders already made.
The foregoing reasons are those for which the Extended Supervision Order was issued and entered on 12 October 2011.
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SCHEDULE
EXTENDED SUPERVISION ORDER: CONDITIONS FOR PETER WATSON
Oversight
For the purpose of these conditions, the Departmental supervising officer is the person authorised from time to time by the Commissioner of Corrective Services to manage and supervise the defendant pursuant to the extended supervision order. The Department is the Department of Attorney General and Justice ("the Department"). Corrective Services NSW is a division of the Department. The Community Compliance and Monitoring Group ("the CCMG") and Probation and Parole are each part of Corrective Services NSW.
Reporting and monitoring obligations
1. For the duration of the supervision order, the defendant must accept the supervision of the CCMG for so long as the CCMG is involved in the supervision of the defendant and, for any period that the supervision of the defendant is transferred from the CCMG to Probation and Parole, the defendant must accept the supervision of Probation and Parole.
2. The defendant must report personally once a week to the Departmental supervising officer or otherwise as directed by that officer.
3. The defendant must comply with any reasonable direction given by the Departmental supervising officer or any other Departmental officer who may from time to time be allocated to the defendant's case.
4. The defendant must not, for the period of the supervision order, commit any offence punishable by a period of imprisonment.
5. Provided there is no medical reason that makes the wearing of the device inadvisable, the defendant must wear such electronic monitoring equipment as may from time to time be directed by the Departmental supervising officer and comply with all instructions given by a CCMG officer in relation to the operation of such equipment, and must not tamper with or remove such equipment. A direction shall not be made unless the CCMG is satisfied that no adverse medical consequences will result from the wearing of such equipment.
6. If directed by the Departmental supervising officer and at a time directed by that officer, the defendant must inform the Departmental supervising officer of his movements in advance by providing a schedule in writing (or as otherwise directed by the Departmental supervising officer) and except in case of emergency, must notify the Departmental supervising officer of any proposed change at least 24 hours in advance.
6A. If the defendant wishes to amend orally the schedule of movements provided in condition 6 within 24 hours of movement, he must seek the approval of the Departmental supervising officer in person or by telephone.
7. Condition 6 does not apply if the defendant requires urgent medical attention and he is unable to notify the Departmental supervising officer of his proposed movements or any proposed change 24 hours in advance.
8. The defendant must respond truthfully to all enquiries by his Departmental supervising officer, or any other Departmental officer who may from time to time be allocated to the defendant's case, about his whereabouts and movements generally.
Accommodation
9. For the duration of the order the defendant must reside at accommodation approved by the Departmental supervising officer.
10. The defendant must not reside at another place overnight and/or by way of short term accommodation without the permission of his Departmental supervising officer.
11. The defendant must accept visits at his approved accommodation, including visits without prior notice, by the Departmental supervising officer or any other Departmental officer who may from time to time be allocated to the defendant's case.
12. If directed by his Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must be at his approved address between 9pm and 6am (or such other hours as may be specified) unless his presence at another place during those hours has been approved by his Departmental supervising officer.
13. The defendant must not leave the State of New South Wales without the written permission of the Commissioner of Corrective Services ("the Commissioner") or his delegate.
Restrictions on employment and other activities
Employment
14. The defendant must not engage in volunteer work or paid or unpaid employment (including self employment) other than that which has been approved by the Departmental supervising officer.
15. The defendant must notify his Departmental supervising officer of:
(a) the nature of his employment or proposed employment;
(b) any offer of employment;
(c) the hours of work each day;
(d) the name of his employer or proposed employer; and
(e) the address of the premises where he is or will be employed.
16. Without limiting condition 3 above, if directed to do so by the Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must make his employer aware of his offending history and that he is subject to any interim supervision order or extended supervision order and the terms of this order.
Associations
17. The defendant must not associate with any persons specified by the Departmental supervising officer.
18. Without limiting paragraph 17 above, the defendant must not, without the prior permission of the Departmental supervising officer, contact or communicate by any means (directly or indirectly) with, or attempt to contact or communicate by any means (directly or indirectly) with, the victims of the sexual offences for which the defendant was sentenced on 28 March 2008, 24 June 1986, 9 July 1986, 9 February 1988, 11 October 1990, 3 May 1996.
19. Should the defendant enter into a relationship with another person ("the other person"), involving sexual or intimate contact, he must notify the Departmental supervising officer at the earliest opportunity. The Departmental supervising officer may disclose the defendant's offence history to such other person if the officer is satisfied that to do so is necessary or desirable in the interests of the safety of any children of or related to that person or who are likely to be in that person's company from time to time.
20. The defendant must obtain written permission and approval in advance from his Departmental supervising officer prior to joining or affiliating with any club, organisation or group and must not attend the premises of any club or group unless he has notified the Departmental supervising officer in advance.
Non-association with children
21. The defendant must not approach, associate or have any communication with children under the age of 16 years unless in the presence of an appropriate adult (being a person previously approved in writing by the Departmental supervising officer for the purpose of this condition).
22. The defendant must not, without the prior permission of a Departmental supervising officer, attend any schools, pre-schools, day care centres, amusement parlours, caravan parks, children's playgrounds, parks and playing fields.
23. Without limiting paragraph 22 above, the defendant must not attend any such further particular place where a Departmental supervising officer has reasonable grounds to believe that children or a child is likely to be present, as the Departmental supervising officer may direct, unless the defendant is accompanied by a person approved in advance for such purpose by the Departmental supervising officer.
24. The defendant must comply with all requirements under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 and the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 applicable to him.
Alcohol and illicit drugs
25. The defendant must not:
(a) possess or consume any alcohol (including any alcohol-based products such as methylated spirits) unless approved in advance by the Departmental supervising officer;
(b) possess or consume any illicit drugs;
(c) possess any prescription medication other than prescription medication specifically prescribed to the defendant in the quantities prescribed, or abuse prescription medication or other forms of medication.
26. The defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing as directed by the Departmental supervising officer.
27. The defendant must attend and participate in such programs and courses relating to drugs and alcohol (including residential programs), as directed by the Departmental supervising officer.
Access to the Internet and pornography
28. (a) The defendant must not possess or view pornography (including child pornography) and must not access, or attempt to access, pornography by any means.
(b) Without limiting sub-paragraph (a), the defendant must not access the internet to view or to download pornography.
29. The defendant must comply with any direction made by the Departmental Supervising Officer regarding access to the internet by him, and without limitation the Departmental Supervising Officer may direct the defendant to use on any computer or other device (including mobile phone or iPad) a parental lock or other device or software that may restrict access to or permit access only to certain web sites.
30. The defendant must not attempt to gain access, or gain access to, the internet by the use of any computer or other device (including mobile phone or iPad) without prior notification to the Departmental supervising officer of that fact and the reasons or purposes of same.
31. If and as directed by the Departmental Supervising Officer, the defendant must:
(a) permit the Departmental Supervising Officer, and any person ("the technician") employed or engaged by or on behalf of the Department, to access and inspect any computer or other device (including mobile phone or iPad) owned by the defendant, including the temporary removal of the computer or other device from his place of residence for the purpose of inspection;
(b) take all reasonable steps to permit the Departmental Supervising Officer and the technician to have access to and inspect any computer or other device (including mobile phone or iPad) used by but not owned by the defendant;
(c) provide the Departmental Supervising Officer and the technician with any requested assistance to enable either or both of them to access and inspect any computer or other device (including mobile phone or iPad) owned or used by the defendant, including providing them with any required passwords;
(d) permit the Departmental Supervising Officer and the technician to make copies of any files or materials on any computer or other device (including mobile phone or iPad) owned by the defendant that the Departmental Supervising Officer reasonably believes may be relevant to the management of the defendant's risk of re-offending.
Vehicles
32. The defendant must notify his Departmental supervising officer of the make, model, colour and registration number of any vehicle:
(a) owned by him; or
(b) driven or to be driven by him, whether hired or otherwise obtained for his use.
Search and Seizure
33. If directed by the Departmental supervising officer, the defendant must, at any time submit to a:
(a) search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the defendant's approved accommodation;
(b) search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned or rented by the defendant;
(c) search and examination of his person in his approved accommodation.
NOTE: The Departmental supervising officer may only give a direction when he or she reasonably believes that the search is necessary:
a. to monitor the defendant's compliance with the extended supervision order or an interim supervision order; or
b. because the Departmental supervising officer reasonably suspects the defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious sex offence.
34. For the purposes of paragraph 33(c):
(a) a search of the defendant means either or both a garment search or a pat down search; and
(b) to the extent practicable a pat-down search will be conducted by a Departmental supervising officer of the same sex as the defendant, or by a Departmental officer of the same sex as the defendant under the direction of the Departmental supervising officer concerned
NOTE:
"Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the defendant or in the defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body.
"Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched.
35. During a search carried out pursuant to paragraph 33, the defendant must allow the Departmental supervising officer to seize any thing found in the defendant's approved accommodation, vehicle or on the defendant's person, whether in the defendant's possession or not which the Departmental supervising officer reasonably suspects will compromise:
(a) the safety of residents or of staff at the defendant's approved accommodation;
(b) the welfare or safety of any member of the public; or
(c) the defendant's compliance with the extended supervision order or an interim supervision;
or which the Departmental supervising officer reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the defendant committing a serious sex offence.
Personal details and appearance
36. The defendant must not change his name from PETER WATSON, or use any name other than PETER WATSON without the prior approval of the Departmental supervising officer.
37. The defendant must not, without the approval of the Departmental supervising officer, change his appearance to the extent that he cannot be easily recognised.
38. If the defendant's proposed change of appearance is approved, he must allow himself to be photographed by or on behalf of the Departmental supervising officer.
Medical intervention treatment obligations
39. The defendant must undergo a comprehensive assessment (and further assessments from time to time) including medical examination, pathological investigations, psychometric testing and radiological imaging to be conducted and/or arranged by the Forensic Mental Health Network (FMHN), a Local Health District (LHD) or any medical practitioner, to determine what is required for treatment, including in respect of the defendant's potential for alcohol and/or drug abuse and potential for sex offending.
40. The defendant must accept psychological and psychiatric treatment as may be provided by a LHD (or FMHN or Justice Health), including counselling, psychological therapy, and must take any anti-psychotic or other psychiatric medication if and as prescribed.
41. Without limiting paragraph 40 above, the defendant must accept sex drive reduction medical treatment or any other therapy, including anti-libidinal treatment, if prescribed by a medical practitioner, as may be provided by FMHN, Justice Health, a LHD or any medical practitioner, and must not unreasonably refuse his consent to the administering of such prescribed drug or therapy.
42. The defendant must not take any medication or substance which may affect any anti-libidinal medication (including SSRIs) being taken by the defendant unless the defendant's treating doctor following consultation with the defendant's treating psychiatrist prescribes such medication.
43. The defendant must attend regular medical consultations, physical examinations, pathology testing, and medical imaging as directed by the LHD, FMHN, Justice Health or any medical practitioner.
44. The defendant must attend regular consultations with the LHD or FMHN, at such frequencies, venues and times as directed by his treating clinicians.
45. The defendant must consent to the disclosure of confidential medical information as between the general practitioner and any treating psychologist and/or psychiatrist and the Departmental supervising officer.
46. The defendant must forthwith disclose to the Departmental supervising officer the identity of any other medical or mental health practitioner, including psychologists that he consults.
Disclosure of information
47. The defendant must consent to his Departmental supervising officer and other Departmental officers from the CCMG accessing all relevant information regarding the defendant's progress while subject to supervision, which may include confidential medical information disclosed in the course of his treatment.
48. The defendant must agree to the sharing of all information between his Departmental supervising officer, other Departmental officers from the CCMG, officers from Justice Health, the LHD, FMHN, the defendant's general practitioner and any treating psychologist or psychiatrist.
49. The defendant must agree that, if the Departmental supervising officer considers it appropriate to do so, the Departmental supervising officer may provide to any prospective or actual employer of the defendant information relating to the defendant's criminal history and may notify such prospective or actual employer that the defendant is subject to a supervision order and of the terms of the order. In the event that the officer proposes to provide such information, he is first to give reasonable notice to the defendant to enable the defendant to raise the matter with the CCMG.
Review of grievance
50. In the event that the defendant is aggrieved by any decision of the Departmental supervising officer, he may approach the CCMG and that Group, as part of its supervising responsibilities, is to consider his grievance and make appropriate directions as to supervision.
Review of order
51. At the expiration of 6 months from the [date of final order] (and at the end of each six monthly period thereafter, if the defendant is then subject to electronic monitoring), the continued need for the defendant to wear the electronic monitoring equipment will be reviewed by the Departmental supervising officer and, for this purpose, the departmental supervising officer may consult with (either jointly or separately) any treating psychiatrist or psychologist and the defendant.
52. The conditions of the Extended Supervision Order to which the Defendant is subject shall be reviewed by the Commissioner:
(a) on each occasion a review is conducted under clause 51; or
(b) at the expiry of 12 months from the date on which a decision is made (if any) that the Defendant is not required to wear electronic monitoring equipment and at the end of each 12 month period thereafter.
The purpose of a review under this clause 52 is for the Commissioner to consider any possible adjustments of the conditions of the Extended Supervision Order and/or consideration by the State as to whether an application should be made to the Court to vary the conditions if considered appropriate. For the purposes of this review, the Commissioner may consult with (either jointly or separately) any treating psychiatrist or psychologist and the defendant. For the purpose of this condition, the Commissioner may act through an authorised officer.
Decision last updated: 19 October 2012
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