State of New South Wales v Atkins

[2014] NSWSC 292

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	State of New South Wales v Atkins [2014] NSWSC 292
Hearing dates:	14 March 2014
Decision date:	21 March 2014
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Johnson J
Decision:	An extended supervision order is made for a period of five years subject to 58 conditions set out in the Schedule to this judgment
Catchwords:	SERIOUS SEX OFFENDER - application for continuing detention order or extended supervision order - sex offences in 1991 and 2007 - offender with intellectual disability - assessment required concerning suitability for anti-libidinal medication - five-year order appropriate - extended supervision order made
Legislation Cited:	Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 Crimes Act 1900
Cases Cited:	Attorney General for NSW v Gallagher [2006] NSWSC 340 Attorney General for NSW v Hadson [2008] NSWSC 140 Attorney General for NSW v Quinn [2007] NSWSC 873 Cornwall v Attorney General for NSW [2007] NSWCA 374 DCU v State Parole Authority of NSW [2006] NSWSC 526 Kruck v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board [2009] QSC 39 Lee v State Parole Authority of NSW [2006] NSWSC 1225 State of New South Wales v Ali [2010] NSWSC 1045 State of New South Wales v Atkins [2013] NSWSC 1988 State of New South Wales v Cruse (No. 2) [2014] NSWSC 128 State of New South Wales v Fisk [2013] NSWSC 364 State of New South Wales v Richardson (No. 2) [2011] NSWSC 276; 210 A Crim R 220 State of New South Wales v Tillman [2008] NSWSC 1293
Texts Cited:	---
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Bruce Allan Atkins (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: Mr NM Kelly (Plaintiff) Mr PA Johnson (Defendant) Solicitors: Crown Solicitor's Office (Plaintiff) Legal Aid NSW (Defendant)
File Number(s):	2013/359164
Publication restriction:	---

Judgment

1. JOHNSON J: By Further Amended Summons filed on 14 March 2014, the Plaintiff, the State of New South Wales, applies for the Defendant, Bruce Allan Atkins, to be made subject to orders under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 ("High Risk Offenders Act 2006").

1. The Plaintiff seeks an order that the Defendant be the subject of a continuing detention order ("CDO") for a period of two years or, alternatively, an order that the Defendant be subject to an extended supervision order ("ESO") for a period of five years.

1. On 28 August 2008, the Defendant was sentenced for the index offences by English DCJ at the Wagga Wagga District Court after pleading guilty to offences of aggravated indecent assault under s.61M(2) Crimes Act 1900 (two counts) and indecent assault under s.61M(1) Crimes Act 1900 (one count). A total effective sentence of imprisonment of five years and six months, with a non-parole period of three years and six months, was passed. The Defendant was not released on parole and his full sentence expired by effluxion of time on 26 December 2013.

1. Following an application made by the Plaintiff on 28 November 2013, on 20 December 2013, Rothman J made an interim supervision order ("ISO") under the High Risk Offenders Act 2006: State of New South Wales v Atkins [2013] NSWSC 1988. That interim order has been extended and presently operates until 25 March 2014, with no extension beyond that date being open.

1. The hearing of the Plaintiff's application for final relief proceeded before me on 14 March 2014. Mr Kelly of counsel appeared for the Plaintiff and Mr Johnson of counsel appeared for the Defendant at the final hearing.

Issues to be Determined

1. The issues to be determined by the Court on this application are as follows:

(a) whether the Defendant is a "high risk sex offender" for the purpose of s.5B High Risk Offenders Act 2006 - such a finding requires the Court to be satisfied, to a high degree of probability, that the Defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he is not kept under supervision: s.5B(2);

(b) if the Court is so satisfied, whether the Court should make a CDO with respect to the Defendant: s.5D, s.17;

(c) if a CDO is to be made, what should be the duration of such an order: s.18;

(d) if the Court is not satisfied that a CDO ought be made, whether an ESO should be made with respect to the Defendant: s.5C, s.17;

(e) if an ESO is to be made, what should be the duration and conditions of such an order: ss.10-11.

1. The Court has been assisted by the helpful submissions made by counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendant. In light of the evidence relied upon by the Plaintiff, Mr Johnson has submitted that the Defendant does not oppose the making of an ESO, but does oppose the making of a CDO. If the Court determines to make an ESO, there is a controversy relating to the duration of the order and a minor dispute concerning some of the conditions which may apply to it.

1. As Beech-Jones J observed in State of New South Wales v Fisk [2013] NSWSC 364 at [7] and [23], the lack of opposition, or even consent of the Defendant, does not relieve the Court from determining whether orders should be made, given the requirement under the statute for the Court to be so satisfied before an order is made. That said, the practical approach by counsel for the Defendant assists the Court in making relevant statutory findings.

Applicable Legal Principles

1. The (presently relevant) primary object of the High Risk Offenders Act 2006 is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders, so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community: s.3(1). A secondary object is to encourage serious sex offenders to undertake rehabilitation: s.3(2).

1. The purpose of the High Risk Offenders Act 2006 is protective, not punitive: Attorney General for NSW v Gallagher [2006] NSWSC 340 at [21]; State of New South Wales v Tillman [2008] NSWSC 1293 at [57]-[61].

1. If the Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the Defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if not kept under supervision (s.5B), it may make an ESO for the supervision in the community of the Defendant (s.5C) or a CDO if not satisfied that adequate supervision can be provided by an ESO (s.5D).

1. In order to determine whether a person poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence, the Court is not required to determine that the risk is more likely than not: s.5B(3).

1. The standard of proof of "high degree of probability" is higher than the civil standard, but lower than the criminal standard of proof: Cornwall v Attorney General for NSW [2007] NSWCA 374 at [21].

1. The phrase "unacceptable risk" is not defined in the High Risk Offenders Act 2006. In State of New South Wales v Richardson (No. 2) [2011] NSWSC 276; 210 A Crim R 220, Davies J explained the concept of "unacceptable risk" in the following way (at 241 [90]):

"Two things seem to me significant when assessing the evidence and the likelihood of re-offending. The first is the higher standard of proof imposed by the words 'a high degree of probability'. The second is the notion that 'unacceptable risk' involves a balancing exercise between the commission of a serious sexual offence and the likelihood of that risk coming to fruition on the one hand, and the serious consequences for the Defendant either because he will be detained beyond the period of his sentence although he has not committed any further offence or he will be subject to an onerous supervision order, on the other hand. It is because of that balancing exercise that it is open to the Court to be satisfied to a high degree of probability that there is an unacceptable risk but that the result of that finding (either a continuing detention order or a supervision order) may vary in a given situation. That is also because s 17(3) provides for the further assessment that if the Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk a supervision order will not be adequate to meet the risk."

1. This statement of Davies J has been followed in other decisions of the Court, including State of New South Wales v Fisk at [20] and State of New South Wales v Cruse (No. 2) [2014] NSWSC 128 at [9]. I gratefully adopt it as well.

1. In determining whether or not to make a CDO or ESO, the Court must have regard to the matters referred to in s.17(4), as well as any other matter considered relevant. Section 17(4) identifies the following matters:

"(a) the safety of the community,

(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 15 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender's participation in any such examination,

(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further relevant offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender's participation in any such assessment,

(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further relevant offence,

(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,

(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender's participation in any such programs,

(f) the level of the offender's compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an interim supervision order or an extended supervision order,

(g) the level of the offender's compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,

(h) the offender's criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,

(h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,

(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will in future commit offences of a sexual nature (in the case of an application for a high risk sex offender continuing detention order) or serious violence offences (in the case of an application for a high risk violent offender continuing detention order),

(j) in the case of an application made on the basis that the offender has been found guilty of an offence of failing to comply with the requirements of an extended supervision order or interim supervision order - the nature of the failure to comply with those requirements and the likelihood of further failures to comply,

(k) in the case of an application made on the basis that circumstances have altered since the making of an extended supervision order or interim supervision order against the offender - whether circumstances have altered since the making of the order and whether those altered circumstances mean that adequate supervision cannot be provided under an extended supervision order or an interim supervision order."

1. The Court may make a CDO for a high risk sex offender if satisfied that adequate supervision will not be provided by an ESO: s.5D(1). The term "adequate supervision" has been described as supervision that is "commensurate in fitness, sufficient or satisfactory" to the assessed risk: Attorney General for NSW v Quinn [2007] NSWSC 873 at [30].

1. If the Court is satisfied that an ESO should be made, s.11 provides for the imposition of conditions:

"An extended supervision order or interim supervision order may direct an offender to comply with such conditions as the Supreme Court considers appropriate, including (but not limited to) directions requiring the offender:

(a) to permit any corrective services officer to visit the offender at the offender's residential address at any time and, for that purpose, to enter the premises at that address, or

(a1) to permit any corrective services officer to access any computer or related equipment that is at the offender's residential address or in the possession of the offender, or

(b) to make periodic reports to a corrective services officer, or

(c) to notify a corrective services officer of any change in his or her address, or

(d) to participate in treatment and rehabilitation programs, or

(e) to wear electronic monitoring equipment, or

(ea) to reside at an address approved by the Commissioner of Corrective Services, or

(f) not to reside in or resort to specified locations or classes of locations, or

(g) not to associate or make contact with specified persons or classes of persons, or

(h) not to engage in specified conduct or classes of conduct, or

(i) not to engage in specified employment or classes of employment, or

(j) not to change his or her name."

The Defendant's Background

1. The Defendant was born on 26 October 1954 and is now 59 years of age. As a child, he was placed in a child welfare institution. He attended school until 16 years of age.

1. The Defendant is unable to read and write and has been assessed as having a mild intellectual disability. Application of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test indicated an intelligence rating in the mildly retarded range, in the lowest two percent of the population. He has been assessed as having an IQ of 70, which places him in the second percentile.

The Defendant's Criminal History and Views of Sentencing Courts (s.17(4)(h) and (h1))

1. In January 1977, the Defendant (then aged 22 years) and a co-offender broke into a school and stole various items including a portable television and 10 pairs of pantihose. He was convicted in the District Court and sentenced to a three-year good behaviour bond.

1. In May 1981, the Defendant stole four pairs of ladies' and children's underwear from a clothes line. He was convicted and sentenced to a three-year good behaviour bond.

1. In January 1983, the Defendant set fire to premises at Cootamundra, in which he was then living together with other persons. There were seven people asleep in the house at the time. The fire was discovered and personal injury was avoided. The setting of the fire was said to be the Defendant's response to his being tormented by some of the children of his then partner.

1. In September 1983, Roden J sentenced the Defendant, with respect to two counts of setting fire to a house knowing persons were inside, to a term of imprisonment of seven years and six months with a non-parole period expiring on 3 May 1985. In his remarks on sentence, Roden J observed that the conclusion was inescapable that the Defendant was aware that his conduct created a grave risk for the persons in the house, including himself. Roden J noted that the Defendant was a person of limited intellectual capacity and had a disadvantaged background, although his Honour considered that these factors did not detract from the seriousness of the Defendant's conduct.

1. In December 1991, the Defendant committed an act of indecency upon a six-year old female. He exposed his penis and rubbed it on the top of the victim's legs. The Defendant had commenced a relationship with the mother of the child in July 1991. The Defendant was convicted after a trial by jury and, on 16 October 1992, he was sentenced by Shillington DCJ to a term of 18 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of six months, with the non-parole period expiring on 2 March 1993.

1. The Defendant continues to maintain his innocence with respect to the 1991 offence. He continues to have a relationship with Ms R, the mother of the child victim of that offence.

1. The index offences were committed in early 2007. At that time, the Defendant was living in Cootamundra with Ms R. Mrs B and her daughters (then aged five, seven, nine and 12 years) were friendly with the Defendant and Ms R.

1. On 15 January 2007, Mrs B visited with her nine-year old daughter, who was recovering from an operation on her leg and was on crutches. At 3.00 pm, she went with Ms R to collect her other daughters from school, leaving her nine-year old daughter with the Defendant at his home. The Defendant took off his pants and underwear, knelt over the girl and pulled her underwear to her knees and her skirt up. He said, "I love you" and "Don't tell anyone else it's my, our secret". The Defendant laid on top of the girl and rubbed his penis up and down on the outside of her vagina. The girl said to him repeatedly "get off". She pushed him off, he sat up, pulled up his pants and said "If you tell anyone, I'll kill you".

1. The next day, 16 January 2007, Ms R and the Defendant visited Mrs B's home. At about 7.00 pm, Mrs B went to the hospital for about an hour and Ms R accompanied her, whilst the Defendant remained at the house with the children. The Defendant said he had to speak to the 12-year old girl alone and told the others to go to the back room. The Defendant then climbed over the 12-year old girl and lay behind her. He said, "Do not tell anybody or I'll hurt you". He pulled down her pants and rubbed his penis on the outside of her vagina. He told her to go and play with the others. Later that evening, the 12-year old girl went to her bedroom. The Defendant moved the other children outside, locked the doors to the house, and went into the 12-year old girl's bedroom. He took off his pants and said "Don't tell anybody, don't tell mum". He hopped on top of the girl, took off her shorts and underwear, pulled her legs up and laid between her legs rubbing his penis outside her vagina. She said, "Please get off me and go away". He said, "I love you and don't tell anyone".

1. During this time, the other children got back inside with a spare key. The seven-year old girl saw what was happening through a gap in the door. Later that evening, when Mrs B returned, the nine-year old and the 12-year old told their mother what the Defendant had done to each of them. Mrs B rang the police and reported the offences.

1. As mentioned earlier, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated indecent assault (a victim under 10 years) contrary to s.61M(2) Crimes Act 1900 and two counts of indecent assault (a victim under 16 years) contrary to s.61M(1) Crimes Act 1900. At that time, an offence under s.61M(2) carried a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of five years. An offence under s.61M(1) carried a maximum penalty of seven years' imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of five years.

1. The Defendant pleaded guilty to these charges on the day fixed for the trial and was sentenced by English DCJ on 28 August 2008. Notwithstanding his guilty pleas, it is apparent, on the evidence before this Court, that the Defendant denies his guilt with respect to these offences.

1. In her remarks on sentence, English DCJ referred to the Agreed Facts (from which the factual summary set out above has been drawn) together with a report of Ms Young, psychologist, tendered on sentence. Her Honour observed that the offences were objectively serious, having been committed against young and vulnerable victims whose care had been temporarily entrusted to the Defendant. English DCJ concluded that she was unable to find that the Defendant was remorseful or had any insight into his offending behaviour. Her Honour said:

"The community can only hope that attendance at a sex offender's program and strict monitoring upon his release to parole will minimise his risk of reoffending. It is absolutely essential that his support network understands that he is a predatory sex offender who must be kept away from children in situations where he may be tempted to engage in behaviour which is totally inappropriate and totally unacceptable."

1. Whilst noting the level of the Defendant's intellectual deficit, her Honour observed that his threats to the children indicated that he knew what he was doing was wrong.

The Defendant's Compliance with Obligations on Parole or While Subject to an ISO (s.17(4)(f))

1. The Defendant has been subject to conditional liberty by way of parole or good behaviour bond on occasions in the past.

1. Whilst on parole between 1985 and 1990, the Defendant appeared to have responded favourably to counselling, although there was an incident in January 1986 when persons helping him relocate found several pairs of ladies' underwear amongst his belongings.

1. In the period March to September 1993, the Defendant was subject to parole and appears to have complied with his obligations.

1. In relation to the index offences for which he was sentenced in 2008, the Defendant became eligible for parole on 26 February 2012, but remained in custody.

1. Reports provided to the State Parole Authority ("SPA") indicated that the Defendant continued to deny his guilt and that he lacked insight into his offending and posed a risk of reoffending. The Defendant has not been eligible for custodial sex offender treatment programs by reason of the combination of his continued denial of the offences and his intellectual disability. More will be said about this in the next part of the judgment dealing with factors under s.17(4)(e) High Risk Offenders Act 2006.

1. On 19 January 2012, the SPA declined parole on the basis of his risk of reoffending, the need to participate in a therapeutic program to address his offending behaviour and a lack of post-release plans.

1. A supplementary pre-release report dated 20 June 2012 noted that there were continuing difficulties with assessing the Defendant's proposed post-release address at Cootamundra with Ms R as she could not be contacted. On 21 June 2012, the SPA affirmed its decision declining to release the Defendant on parole.

1. In January 2013, an officer of the Probation and Parole Service made contact with Ms R who confirmed her ongoing support for the Defendant, stating that she supported his denial of the offences.

1. Between January and March 2013, efforts were made to assess possible post-release arrangements for the Defendant to reside with Ms R. Concerns were held with respect to the suitability of post-release accommodation with Ms R, who continued to support the Defendant's denial of guilt, with this factor being problematic with respect to controlling the risk to children from the Defendant. Further, continuing difficulties were identified in arrangements for sex offender treatment or counselling should the Defendant reside in the Cootamundra area.

1. On 25 March 2013, the SPA noted that the Defendant no longer sought parole and that he intended to serve his full sentence which, of course, he did.

1. The Defendant has been at liberty subject to the ISO since 26 December 2013. A range of strict conditions have been in place, controlling accommodation, movements and other aspects of his life. He has been living in Community Offender Support Program ("COSP") premises in Sydney. The conditions which have been in place are very close to the conditions sought by the Plaintiff should the Court impose an ESO.

1. The evidence (Exhibit F) indicates that the Defendant has complied with these conditions in the period of some two-and-a-half months which had passed by the time of the hearing.

1. Importantly, the Defendant has been attending upon a psychologist associated with Forensic Psychology Services ("FPS") of the Department of Corrective Services as required. Counselling and treatment of this type have taken place on a number of occasions in February and March 2014. Entries in Exhibit F record that this process is "going well".

The Defendant's Participation in Treatment Including his Willingness to Participate (s.17(4)(e))

1. The Defendant has had no sex offender treatment.

1. During his time in custody from 2 September 1992 to 2 March 1993 for sex offences, the Defendant did not undertake sex offender treatment in custody.

1. At the 2008 sentencing hearing for the index offences, Ms Young, psychologist with the Department of Corrective Services, noted, accurately as it turned out, that the Defendant's limited intellectual ability might have implications for his ability to complete a sex offender treatment program in custody. The prospect that the Defendant may be admitted to a sex offender program was mentioned, and English DCJ referred to this in her remarks on sentence (see [33] above).

1. The relevant forms of treatment programs available for sex offenders in custody are as follows:

(a) the CUBIT program - a residential program for men who have sexually abused adults and/or children;

(b) the Self-Regulation Program ("SRP") for sex offenders identified as having a cognitive impairment;

(c) the Deniers Program for men convicted of sex offences who categorically deny their guilt - risk factors are addressed without the offender having to take responsibility for the offence, but by way of taking responsibility for not putting himself in a position where he could be accused of something similar again.

1. The Defendant maintains a complete denial of any sexual offending with children. This is in the face of his conviction by a jury in 1992 and his own pleas of guilty for such offences in 2008. The scenario of a denial of guilt by an offender, and its relevance to decision making by the SPA, has been considered by the courts. It is not for the SPA (or this Court on an application under the High Risk Offenders Act 2006) to seek to go behind the conviction in some way or to examine the trial process to assess the strength of the Crown case or to review the correctness of the verdict: DCU v State Parole Authority of NSW [2006] NSWSC 526 at [47]; Lee v State Parole Authority of NSW [2006] NSWSC 1225 at [59]ff; Kruck v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board [2009] QSC 39 at [18]. An offender's denial of guilt, and refusal or inability to attend a custodial rehabilitation program, may be relevant factors in the determination as to whether parole ought be granted or refused, although it will be necessary for a decision maker to have regard to all the circumstances of a particular case: DCU v State Parole Authority of NSW at [55].

1. The Department of Corrective Services has developed the Deniers Program since 2006, to provide for a custodial program for those who deny guilt.

1. Similar considerations arise in the present context. The Defendant has committed serious sexual offences against children. His denial of these offences is relevant for the purpose of addressing the statutory factors falling to be considered under s.17 High Risk Offenders Act 2006.

1. In 2008, the Defendant was assessed, as part of the classification process, for placement in CUBIT or another suitable sex offender program. Between 2008 and February 2010, relevant records noted that the Defendant continued to maintain that he had been "set up" in relation to the index offences. In January 2010, the Defendant was found suitable for SRP. Given the lengthy period until his release date, the Defendant was informed that he would need to wait for a place to become available in the SRP, with this delay apparently causing the Defendant some frustration.

1. In August 2010, the Defendant was placed in a facility with the intention of him participating in the Deniers Program. It was noted that he was anxious to undertake a sex offender course, but that he also wished to return to Junee Correctional Centre to facilitate visits from Ms R.

1. In February 2011, the Defendant was found ineligible for SRP as he categorically denied his offences. SRP does not have a Deniers Program.

1. A pre-release report dated 10 April 2012 noted that it was regrettable that, despite the Defendant's stated willingness, he had not made contact with FPS. It was envisaged that, if he were to disclose a change of offence perception (no longer denying the offences), he might be able to engage in SRP. It was also noted that the Defendant wished to return to live in Cootamundra, but that there was no sex offender specific intervention available in that area.

1. On 26 April 2013, the Defendant was interviewed regarding referral for treatment. He indicated he did not consent to being assessed and would not sign the referral form. He stated that he was happy with his current placement in custody and his employment, and wished to serve the remainder of his sentence in custody.

1. On 2 May 2013, the Defendant was again interviewed and denied the offences, stating that he had been convicted erroneously and that he had pleaded guilty as a means of reducing his sentence. He stated that he was content to participate in programs to facilitate his release.

1. In summary, the Defendant has not undertaken treatment in custody because of his consistent denial of the offences, the fact that the Deniers Program does not cater for intellectually disabled offenders and SRP does not cater for persons who deny their guilt.

The Views of Court-Appointed Experts - Dr Anthony Samuels and Dr Jeremy O'Dea (s.17(4)(b))

1. Of considerable importance on this application are the reports of Dr Anthony Samuels dated 10 January 2014 and Dr Jeremy O'Dea dated 13 February 2014. Dr Samuels and Dr O'Dea examined the Defendant and prepared reports as court-appointed experts, pursuant to the orders made by Rothman J on 20 December 2013.

1. Dr Samuels saw the Defendant on 10 January 2014.

1. Dr Samuels described the Defendant as "superficially very co-operative". According to Dr Samuels, the Defendant "essentially denied all offences and had various rationales" for the offences.

1. Dr Samuels found no evidence that the Defendant suffered from a major affective or anxiety disorder, nor a psychotic disorder, nor was there evidence of substance misuse. Dr Samuels stated that the Defendant "certainly does fulfil DSM-IV-TR criteria for Paedophilia, with his sexual interest directed at female children aged between six and 12 years of age. He also appears to fulfil DSM-IV-TR criteria for a Fetishistic Disorder involving female undergarments".

1. In Dr Samuels' view, the Defendant is "at high risk of committing a further sexual offence". Dr Samuels expanded upon this opinion, taking into account:

(a) protective risk factors - Dr Samuels considered that the Defendant had quite limited protective factors, noting that he was in a relationship with Ms R who "colludes with his denial and may, in fact, facilitate offending behaviour";

(b) actuarial risk factors - a score of six on the Static-99 table placed the Defendant in the high range;

(c) dynamic risk factors - Dr Samuels noted these factors in a number of other reports, specifying social isolation, negative social influences, distorted attitudes and problems with self-regulation, including sexual self-regulation, with other factors including victim access, sexual preoccupation and a number of risk scenarios, which would seem feasible if he lived with Ms R in a reasonably isolated regional place;

(d) static risk factors - Dr Samuels pointed to the Defendant's extensive sexual offending behaviour which "is of great concern and predisposes him to further such acts" - despite the Defendant's intellectual disability, Dr Samuels considered that the Defendant had demonstrated "the capacity to groom children, to coerce them into sexual activity" and that there were "strong suggestions that he has threatened these children and that he has managed to convince or manipulate those around him that he does not pose any risk and that he is the victim of false accusations and harassment by the police".

1. Dr Samuels considered the Defendant to be "an untreated sexual offender who was highly unlikely to accept, or benefit from any treatment intervention at this point; given his persistent denial and determination to present himself as the innocent in relation to all of these charges, having no tendency to sexual deviancy, and having no sexual interest or preoccupation in regard to female children aged between six and 12".

1. Dr Samuels noted the possibility that the Defendant's sexual drive and interest and sexual deviancy may decline as he gets older, but that he is presently in reasonable physical health and that it seemed "likely that his risk of sexual violence towards children will be persistent for some time".

1. In Dr Samuels' view, the Defendant's attitude to all of his offences was "highly significant", with his failure to acknowledge responsibility for any of the offences or acknowledge his sexual deviancy suggesting his risk of reoffending was high.

1. With respect to anti-libidinal medication, Dr Samuels considered the Defendant could benefit from this as there is "strong evidence that he has paedophilic and fetishistic inclinations". A separate evaluation by a psychiatrist from Justice Health would be required and Dr Samuels did not discuss with the Defendant his willingness to take such medication.

1. Dr Samuels expressed the view that there was no particular benefit in maintaining the Defendant in custody on a CDO as it was unlikely he would participate in treatment and, even if he did, it was unlikely he would gain great benefit from such a program.

1. Dr Samuels considered an ESO of five years' duration to be appropriate, with the Defendant's offending risk possibly continuing beyond a five-year period.

1. Dr Samuels considered that the COSP facility in which the Defendant was presently housed was well suited to manage his current level of risk, until more suitable accommodation was located. Dr Samuels did not suggest any amendment to the proposed supervision conditions referred to in the Summons.

1. Dr Samuels considered it to be "absolutely inappropriate" for the Defendant to live in Cootamundra, where he would be re-entering into a relationship in which his offending behaviour and denial is actually supported, with a risk that he could gain access through the relationship to young children. In addition, mental health and other resources in the Cootamundra region would not be adequate to address the Defendant's risk issues.

1. Dr O'Dea interviewed the Defendant on 14 January 2014. Dr O'Dea noted the Defendant's Static-99 score of six, placing him in a high-risk category.

1. Given the Defendant's criminal history, intellectual disability, personality and apparent lack of insight into his offending history with persistent problems of denial, Dr O'Dea stated that "It would be reasonable to assume that he has a significant risk of engaging in further sex offending behaviours in the community in the long term". The Defendant's risk of reoffending was "significantly high". Despite the Defendant's age, Dr O'Dea considered the risk of reoffending was likely to be long term, at least five years.

1. Dr O'Dea did not think that a further period in custody was likely to alter the Defendant's risk profile.

1. Dr O'Dea considered that it was unlikely psychological therapies alone would prove effective in adequately managing the Defendant's specific risk of committing a further serious sex offence in the community in the long term. Rather, he considered that a combination of ongoing community support, supervision and monitoring, and anti-libidinal medication was likely to prove the most appropriate and effective intervention in managing and minimising his risk.

1. As to anti-libidinal medication, Dr O'Dea noted that the Defendant said that he did not believe in drugs and did not want to take them.

1. Dr O'Dea considered that the Defendant required implementation and continuation of his risk-management program in the long term, for at least five years' duration.

Other Assessments as to the Likelihood of the Defendant Committing a Further Serious Sex Offence (s.17(4)(c))

1. A number of reports have been prepared over the years concerning the Defendant which fall within this statutory factor. These reports include:

(a) report of Anita Duffy, psychologist, dated 20 September 1983 prepared for the purpose of the Supreme Court sentencing proceedings before Roden J;

(b) report of Dr William Barclay, psychiatrist, dated 23 September 1983 prepared for the Supreme Court proceedings;

(c) report of Anna Robilliard, psychologist, dated 17 September 1992 prepared for the 1992 District Court sentencing hearing;

(d) report of Anne Young, psychologist, dated 18 August 2008 prepared for the 2008 District Court sentencing hearing;

(e) report of Celia Langton, psychologist, dated 6 June 2012 prepared for the SPA;

(f) report of Patrick Sheehan, psychologist, dated 30 September 2013, being a risk-assessment report prepared for the purposes of the present application under the High Risk Offenders Act 2006.

1. It is not necessary to recite in any detail the findings made by the authors of these various reports. It is sufficient to note that their findings are consistent with conclusions that the Defendant has an intellectual deficit, a pattern of denial of his sex offending and that he falls within the high-risk category under Static-99.

1. Specific reference will be made to the report of Mr Sheehan, the most recent report concerning the Defendant. Mr Sheehan noted the Defendant's sex offence history, which implied a capacity to be sexually aroused by pre-pubescent children indicating the existence of a paedophilic disorder. However, the Defendant denied sexual thoughts or fantasies of any kind and, in particular, any sexual attraction to children.

1. With respect to the possible use of anti-libidinal medication, the Defendant stated in interview with Mr Sheehan that he would have no objection to the use of such medication, but could not see how it could provide any advantage given his absence of sexual thoughts and sexual activity.

1. Mr Sheehan pointed to the risk-management concerns which would arise from the Defendant residing with Ms R in a rural area.

1. Mr Sheehan noted that the Defendant's most notable institutional problem had been his failure to address his offending behaviour in a sex offender treatment program. Whilst the Defendant had expressed a desire to undertake treatment for the purpose of being granted parole, he maintained his categorical denial of the offences. Whilst it had been determined that the Defendant would benefit from participation in SRP, he was ineligible to do so.

1. Mr Sheehan identified a Static-99 score of six, indicating a higher risk of reoffending. This was the consistent Static-99 score reached by others who had undertaken the same process.

1. Mr Sheehan noted that the Defendant's ability to self-regulate was impaired, in part due to his intellectual disability.

1. Mr Sheehan considered that an acute high-risk scenario would arise if the Defendant was to return to a similar way of life as he had during previous periods of life in the community. Mr Sheehan considered that, were the Defendant to reoffend, it was likely to be relatively opportunistic, evolving from situational unsupervised contact with potential victims. Alternatively, the Defendant may actively seek out potential victims and engage in grooming.

1. Mr Sheehan concluded that the Defendant was in a high-risk category of sexual offending relative to other adult male sexual offenders. There had been no identifiable resolution of factors associated with his previous offending.

1. Mr Sheehan noted that, if a CDO was made by the Court, the Defendant could potentially engage in the SRP if he took at least partial responsibility for his sexual offences, and he would require at least 18 months to complete the program. Alternatively, the Defendant could engage in individual treatment in the form of a Deniers Program adjusted to cater to his intellectual disability, but that was contingent upon staff availability. Mr Sheehan observed that, even if the Defendant did commit to undertake SRP or the Deniers Program, his ability to benefit from treatment was questionable.

1. In the event that the Defendant was subject to an ESO, Mr Sheehan noted that it was likely that he would be subject to intensive supervision and case management by Corrective Services NSW, with the goal being to encourage the development and maintenance of a stable and sustainable lifestyle. He noted that a reintegration plan could feasibly commence in the Sydney metropolitan area, where supervision and containment could be maximised. In effect, these are the steps which have been taken so far as part of the ISO.

1. A possible adjustment within an ESO could then prompt a controlled transfer to a rural location, where the Defendant could reside with his partner under less intensive supervision arrangements.

1. Mr Sheehan expanded upon treatment programs and risk management of the Defendant in his affidavit affirmed 13 February 2014. The contents of this affidavit are also relevant to the statutory factor under s.17(4)(f) considered earlier.

1. Mr Sheehan noted that the Defendant had consented to a referral to FPS on 9 January 2014. As at 13 February 2014 (when the affidavit was affirmed), his referral was in the assessment phase with consideration being given to the form of service which might be suitable. Whilst indicating that psychological intervention may have the best chance to assist in managing the Defendant's risk in the community, Mr Sheehan observed that the constellation of attitudinal, personality and cognitive impairment factors present with the Defendant suggested a very guarded prognosis of treatment gain. As mentioned earlier, the evidence indicates that the Defendant's engagement with FPS is "going well".

1. Mr Sheehan considered that the cornerstone of risk management with the Defendant would be intensive supervision to monitor who he spends time with and where he goes.

1. On 10 February 2014, the Corrective Services NSW Statewide Disabilities Services completed and submitted a comprehensive referral package to the Community Justice Program on behalf of the Defendant. The processes of acceptance and service delivery design may take some months.

1. Because the Defendant's history involves offending against people he knows as opposed to strangers, Mr Sheehan considered that the monitoring of his associates will be the single most important aspect of successful supervision. Monitoring of this type will be significantly more challenging if and when the Defendant moves into housing which does not have 24-hour staffing.

Statistical Assessment of the Likelihood of Persons Similar to the Defendant Committing a Further Serious Sex Offence (s.17(4)(d))

1. As noted, a Static-99 actuarial risk assessment has been undertaken by a number of persons with respect to the Defendant. Ms Langdon, Mr Sheehan, Dr Samuels and Dr O'Dea each returned a score of six, placing the Defendant in the high-risk category relative to other male sex offenders.

1. The rates of sexual recidivism for sexual offenders within the normative sample who had the same total score as the Defendant were between 14.7%-31.2% over five years and 26.7%-41.9% over 10 years. The recidivism rates of individuals convicted of sexual offences with the same score as the Defendant would be expected to be 3.77 times higher than the "typical" sexual offender as identified in the same population.

Reasonable and Practicable Management of the Defendant in the Community (s.17(4)(d1))

1. Community Corrections Officer George Denton and Manager Zouheir (Ziggy) Abedine have provided a report dated 25 October 2013 which outlines a risk-management plan for the Defendant, if an ESO was made. That plan touched upon a number of issues including reporting obligations, residence and other matters which gave rise to conditions which form part of the ISO fixed by Rothman J on 20 December 2013.

1. The affidavit of Mr Abedine sworn 14 February 2014 addresses what has happened since the Defendant was released from custody on 26 December 2013 by way of the ISO. The Defendant had been compliant with the conditions of that order and there have been no reports of concern. The Defendant has been accepted into COSP and has resided there since his release. He has been subject to electronic monitoring, and it appears that he is comfortable using the equipment and providing a schedule of movements in advance as required.

1. As mentioned earlier, this pattern of satisfactory compliance remained the position as at the date of the hearing on 14 March 2014.

Victim Statements (s.21A(4))

1. In accordance with s.21A High Risk Offenders Act 2006, the Plaintiff provided written notice of the application to each of the Defendant's victims. A statement dated 27 February 2014 has been received from the victims of the 2007 index offences, and has been placed before the Court for consideration on the application under s.21A(4).

1. The statement has been written by the mother of the victims, one of whom apparently has an intellectual disability and the other is still under 18 years of age. The statement details the harm caused by the offences, together with the supervision conditions which the victims would wish to be imposed on the Defendant, which generally coincide with the ESO conditions sought by the Plaintiff on this application.

Safety of the Community (s.17(4)(a))

1. All of the matters referred to so far bear, in one way or another, upon the first statutory factor mentioned in s.17(4)(a), being the safety of the community. As mentioned earlier, the primary object of the statute is to provide for extended supervision and continuing detention of high-risk sex offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community: s.3(1).

Consideration and Findings

1. I record at this point several findings which have not been resisted by the Defendant.

1. I am satisfied that the Defendant is a sex offender as defined in s.4. Applying the principles set out earlier in this judgment, I am satisfied to a high degree of probability that the Defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing a serious sex offence if he is not kept under supervision: s.5B(2). The Defendant's history of sex offending and the matters referred to in the various reports before the Court, and in particular, the reports of Dr Samuels, Dr O'Dea and Mr Sheehan, provide a solid foundation for this finding.

1. I turn to areas which are in contest.

1. The Plaintiff's primary submission is that a CDO should be made with respect to the Defendant. It is submitted that the Court should be satisfied that adequate supervision will not be provided by an ESO.

1. Particular emphasis was placed upon the apparent need for anti-libidinal medication as part of any regime, as expressed by Dr Samuels and Dr O'Dea.

1. Mr Johnson submitted that an ESO should be utilised and not a CDO. There had been no assessment as yet that the Defendant was suitable medically for anti-libidinal medication. Counsel submitted that it should not be taken that the Defendant would not give informed consent for this purpose. Mr Johnson informed the Court that the Defendant's reservations expressed so far were "based on ignorance", and related to anecdotal material that an inmate put on this medication had died of prostate cancer (T32.1, 14 March 2014). It was submitted that the Defendant's position was not based on an attitude of defiance, and that consultation with a medical practitioner for the purpose had not taken place.

1. I have given careful consideration to these submissions, keeping in mind the primary object of the statute to ensure the safety and protection of the community. I have taken into account the substantial evidence concerning supervision of the Defendant in the community, which has been tested now for a period in excess of two months. I have considered, as well, the opinions of Dr Samuels, Dr O'Dea and Mr Sheehan as to what may, and may not, be achieved with the Defendant if a CDO is ordered.

1. The affidavit of Mr Sheehan affirmed 13 February 2014 (at paragraph 58) indicates that the previously existing facility of assessment concerning suitability for anti-libidinal medication by the Community Forensic Mental Health Network is no longer available. The process now adopted by Corrective Services NSW is for the ESO supervising officer to facilitate the attendance by the offender upon a general practitioner, who can refer the person to a suitable psychiatrist for assessment as to suitability for anti-libidinal medication. This process has not yet occurred for the Defendant, but would be considered during the course of supervision if an ESO is ordered by the Court.

1. The attitude of the Defendant to the taking of anti-libidinal medication was touched upon briefly by Dr O'Dea (at [79] above) and Mr Sheehan (at [84] above). Dr Samuels did not discuss the issue with the Defendant (see [70] above). Mr Johnson's submission on this issue was mentioned at [112] above.

1. Conditions of any ESO which the Court orders will include Conditions 44-51 (as set out in the Schedule to this judgment).

1. The Defendant has not been assessed yet as being a suitable person to take anti-libidinal medication. The question of "informed consent" (under Condition 51) has not yet arisen. The obtaining of informed consent from the Defendant would need to take into account his intellectual disability, with a clear explanation to be given to him as part of that process.

1. There is a proper foundation in the evidence for any conditions of an ESO to extend to the use of anti-libidinal medication. The Defendant cannot be forced to take anti-libidinal medication against his will: State of NSW v Cruse (No. 2) at [105]. However, it is highly desirable that the assessment of the Defendant concerning use of anti-libidinal medication proceed at an early time. The Court should proceed upon the basis that if the Defendant is assessed as suitable, informed consent is likely to be given. It would not be appropriate to proceed upon an assumption that it will not be given.

1. Also important to this question is the evidence that the Defendant has been complying with the conditions of the ISO since his release on 26 December 2013, including undertaking counselling with FPS.

1. If the Defendant is released by way of ESO, he may become a "supervised sex offender" for the purpose of s.13B(4) High Risk Offenders Act 2006 if, because of altered circumstances, he cannot be provided with adequate supervision under an ESO. It would be open to the Plaintiff to make an application for the Defendant to be the subject of a CDO. Section 13B(6) states:

"In determining an application in respect of a person referred to in subsection (4) (b), the Supreme Court must not make a continuing detention order unless it is satisfied that circumstances have altered since the making of the extended supervision order or interim supervision order and those altered circumstances mean that adequate supervision of the offender cannot be provided under an extended supervision order or an interim supervision order."

1. If it be the case that the Defendant declines to give informed consent to the use of anti-libidinal medication, and this aspect was considered to be a critical aspect of risk management of the Defendant under the ESO, such that "adequate supervision" could not be achieved, the Plaintiff could approach the Court again under s.13B. In raising this, I am not stating that this is the course which ought be taken, let alone what the decision of the Court would be if it was. All I am saying is that there is in the statutory scheme an element of flexibility which can be brought into operation if circumstances change in the course of an ESO.

1. On the evidence, although it is possible that a sex offender program may be undertaken by the Defendant in custody, it may, of itself, not prove particularly effective, having regard to the Defendant's intellectual disability.

1. Dr Samuels and Dr O'Dea do not advocate the use of a CDO in this case. Although, of course, it is a matter for the Court to determine what order should be made, the opinions of the two court-appointed psychiatric experts are of considerable weight with respect to this aspect of the case.

1. The evidence reveals the capacity to fashion supervision of the Defendant in the community subject to an intensive set of conditions. Careful attention has been given to this by Mr Denton and Mr Abedine, with the evidence pointing to the successful use of conditional community supervision of the Defendant since December 2013.

1. To keep someone incarcerated on a CDO because they might commit another offence at some time in the future is a serious matter: State of New South Wales v Richardson (No. 2) at 245 [113]. I am not satisfied that the protection and safety of the community requires the detention of the Defendant under a CDO.

1. By reference to the evidence, I am satisfied that adequate supervision of the Defendant will be provided by the use of an ESO. Accordingly, I do not accept the Plaintiff's primary submission that a CDO should be utilised in this case.

1. The Plaintiff seeks an ESO for a term of five years. Mr Johnson submits that an order for a period of three years should be utilised in this case.

1. The evidence of Dr Samuels, Dr O'Dea and Mr Sheehan demonstrates the need for a guarded long-term approach to be taken with respect to the Defendant.

1. Mr Johnson submitted that an ESO for a period of three years would itself foster the Defendant's rehabilitation and provide him with an incentive in that respect. I keep in mind the protective nature of the jurisdiction which the Court is exercising. I am satisfied that a similar approach is appropriate in this case, and a similar rationale to that taken in State of New South Wales v Tillman, where I said at [62], [64]-[66]:

"62 In fixing the term of an extended supervision order, the Court is guided by the objects in s.3 of the Act to ensure the safety and protection of the community and to encourage serious sex offenders to undertake rehabilitation. Unlike a sentence of imprisonment, an extended supervision order may be varied or revoked under s.13 or a second or subsequent supervision order may be made against the same person: s.10(3). This reflects the different objects of the Act and the measures which the Act allows to achieve those objects.

...

64 The conditions of the extended supervision order which I propose to make in this case will themselves contain an element of flexibility. The Act provides incentive or encouragement for a person to maintain progress towards rehabilitation. The conditions of the order will provide a framework in which an objective measurement of rehabilitation may be made. At the same time, the terms of the order will serve to protect the community. All of this will occur, in this case, in the context of a person released from a decade in custody facing a range of challenges which will test the progress he has made, and allow him to demonstrate progress in a non-custodial, but nevertheless supervised context. This will be a long-term project.

65 In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that an extended supervision order should be made for a period of five years. I do not consider that such a term will have a negative impact on the Defendant's prospects of rehabilitation.

66 As Fullerton J observed in Attorney-General for NSW v Hadson at [32], much will depend on how the Defendant responds to the current program and whether any variation to the risk-management strategy is called for as assessed by those who manage him and monitor his progress."

1. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken into account the submissions on behalf of the Defendant that an ESO would see him required to live in the Sydney metropolitan area for a considerable period, before any possible move to a country centre, where he could live with Ms R, could be entertained. I do not consider that this function ought lead the Court to fix a period less than that which is necessary in aid of the protection of the community.

1. There will be scope for the operation of conditions which would commence with the present strict set of conditions, with scope for modification and relaxation as time passes as the Defendant demonstrates compliance and co-operation. Much will depend on how the Defendant responds and whether any variation to the risk-management strategy is called for as assessed by those who manage him and monitor his progress: Attorney General for NSW v Hadson [2008] NSWSC 140 at [32]; State of New South Wales v Tillman at [66].

1. I am well satisfied that the ESO should be put in place for a period of five years.

1. With respect to conditions, it is necessary to bear in mind that the effect of their inclusion is to expose the Defendant to criminal sanctions if they are breached. A proper basis needs to be demonstrated for including the conditions in the first place: State of New South Wales v Ali [2010] NSWSC 1045 at [88]; State of New South Wales v Fisk at [96].

1. I am satisfied that the conditions sought by the Plaintiff are reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances of this case. The only debate with respect to conditions related to aspects of Conditions 19, 55 and 56. Condition 19 will be subject to the general reasonableness test mentioned in Condition 3. The Departmental Supervising Officer must ensure that the Defendant understands the term "carriage service" as used in Conditions 55 and 56.

1. I am satisfied that the conditions as sought by the Plaintiff ought be imposed.

Conclusion and Orders

1. I have determined that a CDO should not be made in this case, but that adequate supervision of the Defendant will be provided by the making of an ESO. The ESO will be for a term of five years. The order will be subject to Conditions 1 to 58 in the form of the Schedule to this judgment.

1. I make the following order. Pursuant to s.17(1)(a) Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006, I order that the Defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of five years from today, subject to Conditions 1 to 58 which follow as a Schedule to this judgment. I note the matters contained in paragraphs 59 to 62 of the Order.

Schedule

EXTENDED SUPERVISION ORDER:

CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO

BRUCE ALLAN ATKINS

Oversight

For the purpose of these conditions, the Departmental Supervising Officer is the Corrective Services officer authorised from time to time by the Commissioner of Corrective Services ("the Commissioner") to manage and supervise the Defendant pursuant to the extended supervision order. The Department is the Department of Attorney General and Justice ("the Department"). Corrective Services NSW is a division of the Department.

Reporting and monitoring obligations

1.   For the duration of the supervision order, the Defendant must accept the supervision of Corrective Services NSW.

2.   The Defendant must report personally once a week to the Departmental Supervising Officer or otherwise as directed by that officer.

3.   The Defendant must comply with any reasonable direction given by the Departmental Supervising Officer or any other Corrective Services officer who may from time to time be allocated to the Defendant's case.

4.   The Defendant must wear such electronic monitoring equipment as may from time to time be directed by the Departmental Supervising Officer and comply with all instructions given by a Corrective Services officer in relation to the operation of such equipment, and must not tamper with or remove such equipment.

5.   If directed by the Departmental Supervising Officer, the Defendant must inform the Departmental Supervising Officer of his movements in advance by providing a schedule. The schedule must be:

a. in writing;

b. for a period of seven days ("the schedule period"), unless a shorter schedule period is approved by the Departmental Supervising Officer; and

c.   given to the Departmental Supervising Officer at least three days in advance of the schedule period.

6.   The Defendant must notify the Departmental Supervising Officer of any change to the schedule at least 24 hours in advance, unless a shorter period is approved by the Departmental Supervising Officer.

7.   Condition 6 does not apply in the case of emergency, including if the Defendant requires urgent medical attention, and he is unable to notify the Departmental Supervising Officer.

8.   The Defendant must respond accurately to the best of his knowledge and ability to all enquiries by his Departmental Supervising Officer, or any other Corrective Services officer who may from time to time be allocated to the Defendant's case, about his whereabouts and movements generally.

Accommodation

9.   For the duration of the order, the Defendant must reside at accommodation approved by the Departmental Supervising Officer.

10.   Except with the prior approval of the Departmental Supervising Officer, the Defendant must not permit any person to reside, either temporarily or on a permanent basis, for any period at the Defendant's approved accommodation.

11.   Except with the prior approval of the Departmental Supervising Officer, the Defendant must not stay overnight, or for any other temporary period, at a place other than approved accommodation.

12.   The Defendant must permit entry and accept visits at his approved accommodation, including visits without prior notice, by the Departmental Supervising Officer or any other Corrective Services officer who may from time to time be allocated to the Defendant's case.

13.   If directed by his Departmental Supervising Officer, the Defendant must be at his approved address between 9.00 pm and 6.00 am (or such other hours as may be specified by the Departmental Supervising Officer) unless his presence at another place during those hours has been approved by his Departmental Supervising Officer.

14.   The Defendant must not leave the State of New South Wales without the written permission of the Commissioner or his delegate.

Restrictions on employment and other activities

Employment

15.   The Defendant must not engage in volunteer work, practical training as part of an educational or vocational course, or paid or unpaid employment (including self employment) other than that which has been approved by the Departmental Supervising Officer.

16.   The Defendant must notify his Departmental Supervising Officer of:

a. the nature of his employment or proposed employment;

b. any offer of employment;

c. the hours of work each day;

d. the name of his employer or proposed employer; and

e. the address of the premises where he is or will be employed.

17.   Without limiting Condition 3 above, if directed to do so by the Departmental Supervising Officer, the Defendant must make his employer aware of his offending history and that he is subject to any interim supervision order or extended supervision order and the terms of the order.

18.   The Defendant must agree that, if the Departmental Supervising Officer considers it appropriate to do so, the Departmental Supervising Officer may disclose to any prospective or actual employer of the Defendant information relating to the Defendant's criminal history and may notify such prospective or actual employer that the Defendant is subject to a supervision order and the terms of the order.

Non-associations generally

19.   The Defendant must not associate with any persons specified by the Departmental Supervising Officer.

20.   Without limiting Condition 19 above, except with the prior permission of the Departmental Supervising Officer, the Defendant:

a. must not knowingly associate with any person convicted of a "serious sex offence" or an "offence of a sexual nature" as defined by the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (except in the course of living in the COSP Centre or other Departmental facility or attending the community-based maintenance program conducted by the Forensic Psychology Services section of Corrective Services NSW);

b. must not contact or communicate by any means (directly or indirectly) with, or attempt to contact or communicate by any means (directly or indirectly) with, the victims of the sexual offences for which the Defendant was sentenced on 28 August 2008.

21. Should the Defendant resume or enter into a relationship with another person ("the other person"), involving sexual or intimate contact, he must notify the Departmental Supervising Officer at the earliest opportunity. The Departmental Supervising Officer may disclose the Defendant's offence history to the other person if the officer is satisfied that to do so is necessary or desirable in the interests of the safety of the other person or any child of or related to that person, or who from time to time be in that person's care, custody or control.

22. Should the Defendant become a friend of a person whom he knows to be the parent or guardian (or otherwise a person with care and control - for example, a teacher) of a child under the age of 16 years or whom he knows to be a sibling of a child under that age, he must notify the Departmental Supervising Officer as soon as reasonably possible. The Departmental Supervising Officer may disclose the Defendant's offence history to the other person, if the officer is satisfied that to do so is necessary or desirable in the interests of the safety of the children under the age of 16 years being related to that person, or who from time to time be in that person's care, custody or control.

23.   The Defendant must obtain written permission and approval in advance from his Departmental Supervising Officer prior to joining or affiliating with any club or organisation.

24.   The Defendant must not frequent or visit any place or district specified by the Departmental Supervising Officer.

Non-association with children

25. The Defendant must not:

a. approach, associate, initiate, encourage, request or maintain any contact with a child under the age of 16 years;

b. use any other person to approach, associate, initiate, encourage, request or maintain any contact with any child under the age of 16 years;

c. attend any schools, pre-schools, day care centres, amusement parlours, amusement parks, theme parks, camping groups, caravan parks, children's playgrounds, parks and playing fields; or

d. attend any such further place, where children or a child may from time to time be present, as the Departmental Supervising Officer may direct,

unless the Defendant:

e. has prior written permission of the Departmental Supervising Officer; and

f. is in the presence of an appropriate adult, being a person previously approvedin writing by the Departmental Supervising Officer for the purpose of this condition.

Alcohol and drugs

26. The Defendant must not, without prior approval of the Departmental Supervising Officer:

a. possess or consume any alcohol (including any alcohol-based products such as methylated spirits);

b. possess or consume any illicit drugs;

c. possess any prescription medication other than prescription medication specifically prescribed to the Defendant by a medical practitioner in the quantities prescribed, or abuse prescription medication or other forms of medication.

27.   The Defendant must submit to drug and alcohol testing as directed by the Departmental Supervising Officer or any other officer, who from time to time is allocated to his supervision.

28.   The Defendant must attend and participate in such programs and courses relating to drugs and alcohol (including residential programs), as directed by the Departmental Supervising Officer.

29.   The Defendant must not go to any licensed premises, excluding restaurants and cafes, but including hotels, bars, licensed clubs and racecourses, without the prior approval of the Departmental Supervising Officer.

Access to the Internet and pornography

30. (a) The Defendant must not possess or view pornography (including childpornography) and must not access, or attempt to access, pornography by any means.

(b) Without limiting sub-paragraph (a), the Defendant must not access the internet to view or to download pornography.

31.   The Defendant must comply with any direction made by the Departmental Supervising Officer regarding access to the internet by him, and without limitation, the Departmental Supervising Officer may direct the Defendant to use on any computer or other device (including mobile phone or tablet computer) a parental lock or other device or software that may restrict access to or permit access only to certain web sites.

32.   If and as directed by the Departmental Supervising Officer, the Defendant must:

a. permit the Departmental Supervising Officer, and any person ("thetechnician") employed or engaged by or on behalf of the Department, to access and inspect any computer or other device (including mobile phone or tablet computer) owned by the Defendant, including the temporary removal of the computer or other device from his place of residence or his person for the purpose of inspection;

b. take all available steps to permit the Departmental Supervising Officer and the technician to have access to and inspect any computer or other device (including mobile phone or tablet computer) used by or owned by the Defendant;

c. provide the Departmental Supervising Officer and the technician with any requested assistance to enable either or both of them to access and inspect any computer or other device (including mobile phone or tablet computer) owned or used by the Defendant, including providing them with any required passwords;

d. permit the Departmental Supervising Officer and the technician to make copies of any files or materials on any computer or other device (including mobile phone or tablet computer) owned by the Defendant that the Departmental Supervising Officer reasonably believes may be relevant to the management of the Defendant's risk of re-offending.

33. The Defendant;

a. must not access, join and/or connect to any internet based social networking service, including web-based, e-mail, instant messaging services and on-line community services, without approval from the Departmental Supervising Officer; and

b.   in circumstances where the Defendant accesses, joins and/or connects to any internet based social networking service, the Defendant must inform the Departmental Supervising Officer of any login identification name and password for any internet based social networking service he joins and/or connects to, including web-based , e-mail, instant messaging services and on-line community services.

Access to classified material

34. The Defendant must not purchase, possess, access, obtain, view, participate or listen to material classified as Refused Content, X18+, Restricted Category 1 and Restricted Category 2, or any other material as directed by the Departmental Supervising Officer.

Vehicles

35. The Defendant must notify his Departmental Supervising Officer of the make, model, colour and registration number of any vehicle:

a. owned by him; or

b. driven or to be driven by him, whether hired or otherwise obtained for his use.

Recording images

36. The Defendant must not use or attempt to use equipment for the purposes of recording still or moving photographic images of persons reasonably known by the Defendant to be the age of 16 years or under.

Search and Seizure

37. If the Departmental Supervising Officer reasonably believes that a search (of the type referred to in sub-paragraphs d to f below) is necessary:

a. for the safety and welfare of residents or staff at the Defendant's approved accommodation;

b. to monitor the Defendant's compliance with the extended supervision order or an interim supervision order; or

c. because the Departmental Supervising Officer reasonably suspects the Defendant of behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the Defendant committing a serious sex offence;

then the Departmental Supervising Officer may direct, and the Defendant must submit to, a:

d. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, the Defendant's approved accommodation;

e. search and inspection of any part of, or any thing in, any vehicle owned or hired by the Defendant; and/or

f. search and examination of his person in his approved accommodation.

38. For the purposes of paragraph 37.f:

a. a search of the Defendant means either or both a garment search or a pat-down search.

b. to the extent practicable, a pat-down search will be conducted by aDepartmental Supervising Officer of the same sex as the Defendant, or by a Corrective Services officer of the same sex as the Defendant under the direction of the Departmental Supervising Officer concerned.

NOTE:

"Garment search" means a search of any article of clothing worn by the Defendant or in the Defendant's possession, where the article of clothing is touched or removed from the person's body.

"Pat-down search" means a search of a person where the person's clothed body is touched.

39. During a search carried out pursuant to paragraph 37, the Defendant must allow the Departmental Supervising Officer to seize any thing found in the Defendant's approved accommodation, any vehicle owned or hired by the Defendant, or on the Defendant's person, whether in the Defendant's possession or not, which the Departmental Supervising Officer reasonably suspects will compromise:

a. the safety of residents or of staff at the Defendant's approved accommodation;

b. the welfare or safety of any member of the public; or

c. the Defendant's compliance with the extended supervision order or an interim supervision;

or which the Departmental Supervising Officer reasonably suspects relates to behaviour or conduct associated with an increased risk of the Defendant committing a serious sex offence.

Personal details and appearance

40.   The Defendant must not change his name from Bruce Allan Atkins, or use any name other than Bruce Allan Atkins without the prior approval of the Departmental Supervising Officer.

41.   The Defendant must not, without the approval of the Departmental Supervising Officer, change his appearance to the extent that he cannot be easily recognised.

42.   If the Defendant's proposed change of appearance is approved, he must allow himself to be photographed by or on behalf of the Departmental Supervising Officer.

43.   The Defendant must provide his Departmental Supervising Officer with information regarding any tattoos or permanent distinguishing marks that the Defendant has (including details of any tattoo or mark that has been removed).

Medical intervention treatment obligations

44.   The Defendant must undergo a comprehensive assessment, as recommended by a treating or consulting clinician, to determine what is required for treatment in respect of the Defendant's potential for sex offending.

45.   The Defendant must accept psychological and psychiatric treatment as may be provided by a treating clinician.

46.   The Defendant must take any anti-psychotic, anti-libidinal (including SSRI's) or other prescribed medication if and as prescribed by a medical practitioner. The note at paragraph 51 below applies.

47.   The Defendant must not take any medication or substance which, to the Defendant's knowledge, may affect the effectiveness of any medication prescribed under Condition 46 being taken by the Defendant, unless the Defendant's treating medical practitioner prescribes such medication.

48.   If the Defendant knowingly ceases to take medication that has been prescribed, either on a temporary or permanent basis, he is to notify his Departmental Supervising Officer within 24 hours of ceasing to take the medication.

49.   The Defendant must attend regular medical consultations, physical examinations, pathology testing, and medical imaging as directed by a treating clinician.

50.   If directed by his Departmental Supervising Officer, the Defendant must accept and participate in maintenance or other rehabilitation programs as may be offered to him, including the maintenance program provided by the Forensic Psychology Services.

51.   It is noted that the "reasonable directions" (in Condition 3) and the participation in treatment (in Conditions 45 and 46) do not include participation in treatment, or requiring the Defendant to take any medication that may be prescribed, without his informed consent.

Disclosure of information

52.   The Defendant must disclose to the Departmental Supervising Officer the identity of any treating or consulting clinician that he consults, as soon as reasonably practicable.

53.   The Defendant must consent to his Departmental Supervising Officer and other officers from the Department (including from Corrective Services NSW) collecting and using all relevant information regarding the Defendant's progress while subject to supervision, which may include confidential medical information disclosed in the course of his treatment.

54.   (a) The Defendant must agree to the disclosure of all information between:

(i) his Departmental Supervising Officer, and/or

(ii) other officers from the Department (including from Corrective Services NSW), and/or

(iii) any treating or consulting clinicians,

(b) The disclosure by any treating or consulting clinician is limited to circumstances where that treating or consulting clinician believes the Defendant is at risk of:

(i) committing a further serious sex offence, or

(ii) is demonstrating behaviours that may lead to the commission of a further serious sex offence; or

(iii) is at risk of breaching a condition of his supervision relevant to (i) and (ii) above; or

(iv) is with the consent of the Defendant.

55.   The Defendant must provide his Departmental Supervising Officer details of any carriage service (within the meaning of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)) used, or intended to be used, by the Defendant.

56.   The Defendant must provide his Departmental Supervising Officer details of any internet service provider or provider of a carriage service (within the meaning of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)) used, or intended to be used, by the Defendant.

57.   The Defendant must provide his Departmental Supervising Officer with details of the type of any internet connection used, or intended to be used, by the Defendant, including whether the connection is a wireless, broadband, ADSL or dial-up connection.

58.   The Defendant must provide his Departmental Supervising Officer with details of any email addresses, internet user names, instant messaging user names, chat room user names or any other user name or identity used, or intended to be used, by the Defendant through the internet or other electronic communication service.

FURTHER THE COURT NOTES AND RECOMMENDS Review of grievance

59. In the event the Defendant is aggrieved by any decision of the Departmental Supervising Officer, he may set out his grievance, in writing, to the Commissioner who is to consider his grievance and make appropriate directions as to supervision, if required.

Review of order

60. At the expiration of six months from the date of this order (and at the end of each six-monthly period thereafter, if the Defendant is still then subject to electronic monitoring), the continued need for the Defendant to wear the electronic monitoring equipment will be reviewed by the Departmental Supervising Officer and, for this purpose, the Departmental Supervising Officer may consult with (either jointly or separately) any treating or consulting clinician and must consult with the Defendant.

61. The conditions of the extended supervision order to which the Defendant is subject shall be reviewed by the Commissioner:

a. on each occasion a review is conducted under Condition 60; and

b. at the expiry of 12 months from the date on which a decision is made (if any)that the Defendant is not required to wear electronic monitoring equipment and at the end of each 12-month period thereafter.

The purpose of a review under Condition 61 is for the Commissioner to consider any possible adjustments of the conditions of the extended supervision order and/or consideration by the State as to whether an application should be made to the Court to vary the conditions if considered appropriate. For the purposes of this review, the Commissioner may consult with (either jointly or separately) any treating or consulting clinician and the Defendant. For the purpose of this condition, the Commissioner may act through an authorised officer.

62.   Following a review under Condition 60 or Condition 61, the reviewer must notify the Defendant in writing of the result of the review.

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Decision last updated: 21 March 2014