Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Hadson

[2008] NSWSC 140

CITATION:	Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Hadson [2008] NSWSC 140
HEARING DATE(S):	14 February 2008
JUDGMENT DATE :	26 February 2008
JUDGMENT OF:	Fullerton J
DECISION:	Order made pursuant to s 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of five years.
CATCHWORDS:	Serious sex offender - Application for extended supervision order
LEGISLATION CITED:	Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006
CASES CITED:	Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Gallagher [2006] NSWSC 340 Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374 Tillman v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 327
PARTIES:	Attorney General for the State of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Neville Francis Hadson (Defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 2007/15473
COUNSEL:	P Menzies QC/S Callan (Plaintiff) D Dalton SC (Defendant)
SOLICITORS:	Crown Solicitor of New South Wales (Plaintiff) Ross Hill & Associates (Defendant)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
CIVIL LIST

FULLERTON J

26 FEBRUARY 2008

2007/15473 ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR NEW SOUTH WALES v NEVILLE FRANCIS HADSON

JUDGMENT

HER HONOUR :

1 By amended summons filed on 14 November 2007, the Attorney General for the State of New South Wales seeks final relief in the form of an order that the defendant be subject to extended supervision pursuant to s 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 (the “Act”) for a period of five years and by ordering his compliance with a number of conditions for that same period.

2 In support of the orders sought, the plaintiff relies on the following affidavit evidence:

(a) the affidavit of Jillian Mears affirmed on 10 October 2007 and Exhibit JM1; and
(b) the affidavit of Bradley Dean affirmed on 29 October 2007 and Exhibit BD1.
I note that Exhibit BD1 contains documents obtained from various government departments and agencies, primarily the Department of Corrective Services, pursuant to s 25(1) of the Act. This section provides that the Attorney General may, by order in writing served on any person, require that person to provide any document, report or other information in that person’s possession, or under that person’s control, that relates to the behaviour, or physical or mental condition, of any sex offender. Subsection (3) provides that any document or report of a kind referred to in subsection (1) is admissible in proceedings under the Act.

3 In circumstances where the defendant does not resist the order for his extended supervision, and has ultimately sought only to persuade me that the term of the order should be shortened from five years to three years, it is not necessary that I refer to the evidence upon which the plaintiff relies in any detail. I will however refer to some of the most recent reports concerning the defendant in order to make patent the reasons for the orders that I have resolved ought be made.

4 At the defendant’s request, Drs O’Dea and Wilcox, both of whom examined the defendant for the purposes of these proceedings, and Ms Sutton and Ms Dumasia, both of whom are psychologists employed by the Department of Corrective Services, were made available for cross-examination. By agreement they gave their evidence concurrently. I will refer to their evidence later in the course of this judgment.

History of the proceedings

5 The matter first came before this court for a preliminary hearing on 14 November 2007. On that occasion, Barr J made interim supervision orders pursuant to s 8(1) of the Act. These orders were in identical terms to those sought in the proceedings before me for final relief subject only to the fact that the orders for final relief are sought for a period of five years whilst the interim orders were for the statutory period of 28 days. Pursuant to s 8(3) of the Act, interim orders may be renewed for a further 28 day period but may not be renewed for a period totalling more than three months. The orders made by Barr J were renewed by Hamilton J on 3 January 2008 for a period of 28 days from 7 January 2008. On 31 January 2008, Johnson J renewed the interim supervision order for a further period of 28 days from 4 February 2008. Accordingly, the orders of Johnson J will expire on 3 March 2008 whereupon the power to order interim supervision will be exhausted.

6 It is in this context that I am asked to make final orders for the defendant’s extended supervision for a period of five years commencing from 26 February 2008 as provided for in s 10 of the Act. The making of final orders effective from today overtakes the interim supervision order made by Johnson J on 31 January 2008.

The defendant’s criminal history as a serious sex offender

7 Prior to his release from custody on 9 December 2007, the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment as a result of convictions in 1995 and 1998 for serious sex offences involving his stepdaughter and his stepson. The offences involved oral, anal and vaginal intercourse over an extensive period. In respect of the offences involving the young boy, the defendant was sentenced to a minimum term of 10 years with an additional term of three years and four months. This sentence reflected the objective seriousness of those particular offences in the context of the defendant’s history of sexual offending against children and adults over more than 30 years, offences which have attracted lengthy terms of imprisonment in the past.

8 I note that when the defendant was interviewed by Professor Greenberg for the purposes of a confidential psychiatric report in October 2004, he acknowledged that the sexual assaults upon his stepdaughter occurred over a period of five years and that on average he had sexual intercourse with her three times a week and that he “sexually abused her on hundreds of occasions”. When Dr Wilcox interviewed the defendant in December 2007 for the purposes of these proceedings, he stated that the sexual assault of his stepdaughter began approximately nine months after he began living with the family. He told Dr Wilcox that he had convinced himself that the young girl wanted to have sex with him and that a degree of planning went into arranging situations where he could be alone with her. He admitted to bribing her, conning her and at times threatening her by saying that they would all get into trouble if she told anyone about his actions. Whilst his primary attraction was to his stepdaughter, his seven-year-old stepson was drawn into the abuse both for his own pleasure and as a form of punishment.

9 This brief summary of the defendant’s criminal antecedents, elaborated upon by his disclosures to treating psychiatrists, more than adequately enlivens the jurisdiction of this court to make an extended supervision order. An order of this kind, which has the effect of extending the period of control over the defendant as a serious sex offender beyond the sentence of imprisonment imposed in consequence of his being convicted, is for purposes that are protective and not punitive (see McClellan CJ at CL in Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v Gallagher [2006] NSWSC 340 at [21]).

The legislative scheme

10 Since the defendant does not oppose the making of an extended supervision order per se, it is not necessary for me to set out, other than in a summary way, the legislative scheme pursuant to which the orders are sought and the reasons why I am satisfied the orders should be made.

11 Section 9(2) (and section 17(2)) of the Act lay down the statutory test for making an extended supervision order. Those sections provide that:

“An extended supervision order may be made if and only if the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender is likely to commit a further serious sex offence if he or she is not kept under supervision.”

12 In the context of this test, “likely” means probable, denoting a degree of probability at the upper end of the scale but not necessarily exceeding 50 per cent (see Tillman v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 327). Tillman was quoted with approval by the Court of Appeal in Cornwall v Attorney General for New South Wales [2007] NSWCA 374, where the Court considered the expression, “high degree of probability”, and found (at [21]) that:

“The expression “a high degree of probability” indicates something “beyond more probably than not”, so that the existence of the risk, that is the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious sex offence, does have to be proved to a higher degree than the normal civil standard of proof, though not to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the risk or likelihood itself does not have to be a probability to the civil standard of proof, but rather a sufficiently substantial probability to satisfy the criterion “likely” as explained TSL v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2006) 14 VR 109.”

13 The Attorney General has submitted that having regard to the supporting documentation, I should be satisfied to a high degree of probability that the defendant is likely to commit a further serious sex offence if he is not kept under supervision. I am comfortably satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged that burden of proof. In coming to that view, I take into account the matters listed in s 9(3) of the Act. I also note that the offender’s compliance with reporting obligations under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004 as provided for in s 9(3)(g), are not relevant as he has at no time been subject to the registration and reporting regime under these Acts given his extended custody over the last 10 years.

14 In my view those matters under s 9(3) of the Act that are of greatest weight are:

(a) the safety of the community;
(b) the reports received from Dr Wilcox and Dr O’Dea, psychiatrists appointed by the Court to conduct psychiatric examinations of the defendant and his participation in those examinations;
(c) the results of other assessments addressing the likelihood of the defendant committing a further serious sex offence;
(d) the results of statistical and other assessments as to the likelihood of the defendant committing a further serious sex offence;
(e) the treatment programs in which the defendant has had the opportunity to participate, his willingness to participate and the level of his participation in any such treatment programs;
(f) the level of the defendant’s compliance with obligations to which he has been subject under an earlier extended supervision order; and
(g) the defendant’s criminal history and the pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history .

The likelihood of the defendant committing a further sex offence: ss 9(3)(b), (c) and (d) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act

15 Notwithstanding advances in the progress that have been made in minimising the risk of the defendant re-offending on his release, in Dr O’Dea’s view, the level of risk is still significantly high in the longer term. He was of the view that the specific risk factors pointing to that level of risk, in addition to the defendant’s history of past sexual offending, centered around his reported deviant sexual arousal. That said, Dr O’Dea was not of the view that he could predict with sufficient accuracy the defendant’s precise likelihood of engaging in sex offending behaviours on release into the community. Whilst the risk was appreciably high, Dr O’Dea did not consider a further period in custody was likely to significantly reduce his risk of engaging in a serious sex offence. However, he was of the view that supervision in the community should continue in the long term with a suitably qualified and experienced forensic psychiatrist to explore, from a psychotherapeutic perspective, the defendant’s sexuality in general and his sexual offending behaviour in particular. Dr O’Dea was also of the view that with an entrenched history of sexual deviance, ongoing testosterone lowering medication in the form of Androcur, in conjunction with psychotherapy, is likely to prove the most effective means of managing the risk whilst the defendant is in the community. Dr O’Dea considered this management plan would need to be in place in the long term.

16 Drs Kumar and Elllis considered that the defendant met diagnostic criteria for paedophilia and hebophilia (an unspecified paraphilic disorder where people with such disorders are sexually attracted to pubertal children). Professor Greenberg made a similar diagnosis.

17 Ms Mears reached the same conclusion as to the high level of risk of the defendant re-offending after undertaking a risk assessment in June 2007 prior to the defendant’s release from custody in December 2007. She was of the view that in addition to static and dynamic risk factors, rendering the defendant in a high-risk category, there were additional concerns by reason of the defendant’s own attitude to the risk of his re-offending. Most notably she said:

“He is externalising the responsibility to manage his risk by relying on a partner. While in some cases, with a motivated person this ‘teamwork’ may be effective in Mr Hadson’s case there are a number of significant issues. Mr Hadson has never had an equal and successful relationship with a partner. All of his four long-term relationships have ended because of some kind of sexual abuse. He continues to demonstrate a strong need for control and his, at times, highly reactive resistance to being challenged about his attitudes and opinions makes it very unlikely that a partner would be in a position to seek to question or confront his attitudes or behaviour.”

The defendant’s participation in treatment programs in custody: s 9(3)(e) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act

18 Notwithstanding the fact that the defendant has been offered treatment programs of various kinds over the last 12 years, and that he has participated in what is described as a preparatory program between September and December 2006 at Kirkconnell Correctional Facility and a program described as a maintenance program at that same facility from January 2007 up until the date of his release in December 2007, he has not completed these programs to a level of satisfaction such that the risk of his re-offending can with any confidence be said to be reduced.

19 It would appear that whilst he did not at any time deny committing the offences for which he was convicted, during the course of the various custody-based programs he continued to minimise and to attempt to justify his behaviour without displaying any clear understanding of the issues that led to his sexual offending. In her report of August 2004, Ms Vitler noted that the defendant described the children who were the victims of his sexual offending as “willing participants” often seeking him out for sex, and in addition, that he “used sexual thoughts and behaviour to cope with uncomfortable feelings and to avoid dealing with personal problems”. At this time Ms Vitler encouraged the defendant to work on his individual treatment needs to prepare him for entry into a program for low-risk offenders. Initially, he was deemed unsuitable for acceptance into that program as his unwillingness to take more responsibility for his offending behaviour continued. He also continued to minimise the offences for which he was convicted. It was therefore again recommended that he participate in the Custody Based Intensive Treatment (CUBIT) program. He participated at an acceptable level in CUBIT before entry into the two programs preparatory to his release to which I have already referred.

The anti-libidinal medication

20 In April 2004, the defendant commenced taking the anti-libidinal medication known as Androcur. I note that this was at his request since he was desirous of reducing his libido and suppressing his sexual desire and deviant sexual fantasies. The drug is prescribed and administered in oral form and, as noted by Professor Greenberg when the regime commenced, the defendant’s compliance and motivation was seen as a major factor in maintaining the regime into the future. In a pre-release report dated 15 September 2006, it was noted that the medication had been reviewed by the visiting psychiatrist on a number of occasions since it was first prescribed and that the dose had been continuously reduced in response to observed side effects since that time. In Dr O’Dea’s report of 31 December 2007, he noted that the steady reduction in the dosage over the last four years has reached a point where adverse side effects have been controlled whilst the suppression of the defendant’s sexual urges and sexual fantasies has been maintained. In Dr O’Dea’s view, a free testosterone level of at least one third of the defendant’s pre-treatment level should be the objective subject only to the re-presentation of unacceptable side effects. For this reason, it was Dr O’Dea’s view that the defendant should maintain his attendance at the Community Forensic Mental Health Service on a regular basis for ongoing management of his medication for the foreseeable future.

21 Drs Kumar and Ellis expressed concern that the defendant has stated his desire to withdraw the anti-libidinal medication if he enters an adult female relationship. He was advised by both doctors that it would still be possible for him to achieve arousal whilst using the medication to suppress deviant sexual desires. Ms Mears was of the view that even if the defendant were to cease using anti-libidinal medication it would be reasonable to regard him as remaining at a high risk of offending unless and until his skills in managing his offending behaviour were entrenched by his engagement in various community-based treatment.

22 In summary, it was the unanimous opinion of each of the various healthcare professionals that have administered the anti-libidinal medication and reviewed the defendant’s response to it over the last three years, that despite concerns about the side effects of the drug, the defendant has achieved positive outcomes as reflected in his subjective reporting of a reduction in sexualised thoughts and in his improved participation in treatment programs in custody and the maintenance programs in the community. It was Ms Mears’ view that the defendant’s improved performance and participation in custody-based treatment programs leading up to his release might well have been because the anti-libidinal medication suppressed his previously all-consuming sexual preoccupation enabling him to concentrate and focus on relevant issues and his interactions with others. She remained concerned, however, that he appeared reliant on the medication to manage his risks and that he lacks the necessary awareness of how cognitive and emotional factors might heighten his risk. As she notes:

“At this stage we have no evidence of how effective the anti-libidinal medication will be when he is exposed to sexual stimuli in the community be that children through people he meets or children, for example, engaged in play at the beach during his planned travels around the country.”

The defendant’s participation in treatment and maintenance programs in the community: s 9(3)(f) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act

23 The Forensic Psychology Services Branch of the Department of Corrective Services provides therapeutic treatment for sex offenders in the community and conducts the maintenance program the defendant has attended since his release on 9 December 2007. Ms Sutton, who gave evidence before me, is the therapeutic manager of that branch. Her evidence is to the effect that the Department’s community maintenance program was set up to promote successful reintegration of offenders by providing follow-up services for sexual offenders in the community. The program involves relatively unstructured group-based sessions which are supportive in nature and where the content of each group session is guided by the needs of the offenders rather than by a scripted or set program. I understand that since his release, the defendant has attended sessions on a weekly basis and that the frequency of his participation in the future will depend on his progress as monitored by his case managers.

24 In an affidavit affirmed on 13 February 2008, Ms Sutton highlighted a concern that has already emerged in the maintenance group in which the defendant has participated since his release, a concern which has been the subject of discussion with the various individuals who contribute to the defendant’s case management. That issue concerns the fact that the defendant’s criminal history indicates that his closest friendships are with women and that it is in the context of these relationships that his sexual assault of children has occurred in the past. To address this risk, the defendant’s case managers are keen to encourage him to develop what are described as “non-risk friendships” such as friendships with other men. Self-evidently, it is too early to determine whether or not the defendant will be receptive to developing appropriate friendships and whether he can maintain them. It was Ms Sutton’s view that the defendant should be subject to close supervision for at least the first year after his release and that he should be required to participate in treatment on a weekly basis with a view to making and maintaining appropriate relationships. Although she expected that over a two-year period supervision might gradually reduce, and that treatment might shift to fortnightly or monthly sessions, that would very much depend upon the progress the defendant makes in the short to medium term.

25 Ms Dumasia leads the maintenance group that the defendant attends on a weekly basis. She reported that the defendant’s attendance and participation in the maintenance group has been positive in that he has been attentive during group sessions, has behaved appropriately and has been involved in a positive and assertive manner. She also reported that the defendant was willing to accept that the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter has caused long-term harm and that in the past he had hoped to rekindle a sexual relationship with his daughter, but now appreciated this was neither possible nor desirable. This is in contrast to what Dr Wilcox reported following an examination of the defendant in December 2007 for the purposes of these proceedings. At best, Dr Wilcox gained the impression that the defendant was somewhat ambivalent about whether his stepdaughter may have suffered long-term harm. She also regarded it as telling that he knew that he would “get into trouble” if he said that she had ever been in love with him and that this may explain his denials of any current feelings towards her. Whilst Dr Wilcox felt that the defendant had acquired genuine remorse, he still rationalised and to a degree minimised his actions. Dr Wilcox also observed, importantly in my view:

“[That] it is relevant that [the defendant] was convicted of sexual offences on a number of occasions prior to the index offence. On these occasions, incarceration did not deter him from reoffending. One then has to ask, has anything changed now to reduce the risk of reoffending? He does not have a grasp of the offence cycle or the emotions associated with his offending behaviour, however, I suspect that he will never comprehend this.”

She went on to say:

“He has some awareness of risk factors and has indicated he would terminate a future potential relationship if he discovered the woman had children. He also understands the need to inform his treating doctor or counselor if he has any deviant sexual ideas or desires and he understands the importance of seeking out support.”

Current accommodation

26 The defendant is currently residing at a house at an undisclosed location. The house comprises several bedrooms, living, dining and kitchen areas and a garden. It is maintained by the department at all times and has at least two officers available to supervise and assist the residents. It is anticipated that the defendant will continue to reside in this accommodation up until at least June of 2008, although whether it extends beyond that time will depend upon his response to treatment and the viability of the arrangements for his ongoing supervision. If it is considered appropriate for the defendant to move to other accommodation he will be assisted to locate suitable accommodation taking into account the risk of his re-offending should he reside in the community unsupervised.

27 I refer to the defendant’s consent to his current accommodation arrangements and the plans for his future accommodation as an indication of his willingness to comply with final orders. I also note that he has complied with identical conditions made on an interim basis, a relevant matter, as provided for in s 9(3)(f) of the Act. Those conditions relating to his accommodation are as follows:

“…the defendant must reside at an address approved by an officer of the Commissioner’s Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer and must not change address without permission of an officer of the Commissioner’s Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer.”

28 A further order made on an interim basis and sought by way of final relief is in the following terms:

“The defendant must not travel in excess of 50 km from his residence without the permission of an officer of the Commissioner’s Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer.”

29 In advance of the hearing for final relief, Mr Dalton SC, who appears for the defendant, indicated that I would be invited to relax a further and related condition prohibiting the defendant from “residing in a caravan park”. An order that the defendant must not reside in a caravan park was made on an interim basis and is a condition the plaintiff seeks as part of the final orders. I was invited to relax or delete that condition on the basis of the defendant’s stated intention, at some time in the future, to fulfill a long held wish to drive around Australia in a caravan staying in caravan parks whilst completing his journey.

30 In the course of argument, it became apparent that the condition prohibiting him from residing in a caravan park did not prohibit him from undertaking a journey around Australia so long as he did not take up residence in a caravan park within the currency of any order of this Court prohibiting him from so doing. The Attorney General does not otherwise seek to prohibit the defendant travelling in car, caravan or mobile home around Australia. Given the relief sought by summons, I proceed on the basis that the Attorney General is content that the defendant obtain the permission of an officer of the Community Compliance Group (formerly known as the Commissioner’s Compliance Group) or a Probation and Parole officer before he undertakes a journey of that kind since it would necessitate him travelling in excess of 50 km from his residence. If the defendant ultimately wished to travel by these means, it would be entirely a matter for the relevant officer to assess whether or not it posed any unacceptable risk to the community. It does not form any part of my task to trespass on the discretion and judgment of officers of the Department in the event that the defendant wishes to travel by these means at some future time and seeks permission to do so. Suffice for me to note that Ms Sutton, Dr Wilcox and Dr O’Dea have observed that there is a particular vulnerability to which residents of caravan parks might be subject were the defendant to frequent those areas unsupervised. At this time, with the need to strike a balance between the protection of the community and the rehabilitation of the defendant, it is sufficient to note that stable and appropriate accommodation is available to the defendant and that he appears to be compliant with the conditions that were made on an interim basis.

The term of the order for extended supervision

31 As I noted earlier, both Ms Sutton and Ms Dumasia gave evidence before me concurrently with the evidence of Drs O’Dea and Wilcox. Their evidence was directed principally to the period of years during which the defendant ought be subject to supervision. Mr Dalton submitted that a reasonable period for the duration of any extended supervision order should be three years and that five years was an unnecessarily restrictive and punitive period. He also submitted that were an order to be made for three years and the defendant did not in that period demonstrate to an acceptable level that the risk of his re-offending had reduced, the plaintiff could move the Court, pursuant to s 10 of the Act, for a second or subsequent extended supervision order so as to effectively maintain a regime of supervision beyond the maximum statutory period of five years. While each of the witnesses conceded that a period of three years, with a review of the defendant’s progress at the expiration of that period was a reasonable approach, I am not satisfied that the question of reasonableness is an appropriate test for me to apply.

32 The term of the extended supervision order is just one factor I need to consider in the context of applying the test provided for in s 9 of the Act. In any event, each of the witnesses sought to emphasise that the supervision to which the defendant is currently subject has only just commenced, and, whilst he has been compliant to date, he continues to have less than full insight into his offending. For that reason alone, it is their view that he is likely to require long-term supervision. Whilst it may be that his clinical needs change as the duration of the order extends into the future, the extent to which that might occur is dependant on how he responds to the current program and whether any variation to the risk management strategy is called for as assessed by those who manage him and monitor his progress. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that there ought be any reduction in the term of the order the plaintiff seeks.

The safety of the community: s 9(3)(a) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act

33 The safety of the community is a primary object of the Act. Notwithstanding the fact that each of the various healthcare professionals regard the defendant as in the high-risk category of re-offending, an assessment which has remained relatively unchanged by reference to static and dynamic risk factors over some years, there remains evidence before me that at least points favourably in the direction of risk minimisation as a result of the positive advances the defendant has made since being at his liberty since December 2007. Whilst I am cautious in giving undue weight to his reported response to the anti-libidinal medication, I cannot ignore it entirely given the fact that the medication does reduce testosterone levels and is known to suppress sexual desire.

Conclusion

34 In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the orders for final relief ought to be made in accordance with those sought by the summons (as amended and agreed between the parties). In coming to that conclusion, I am conscious that if the defendant breaches a supervision order he is liable to be convicted of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment for two years or 100 penalty units or both and that this in some measure serves to protect legitimate community interests. I also note that were any breach to be considered by the Attorney General to be serious enough to warrant revocation of the extended supervision order, that s 13 of the Act entitles the Attorney General to make an application of that kind. I also note that the Commissioner for Corrective Services must provide the Attorney General with a report on the defendant at intervals of not more than 12 months so as to enable consideration to be given to either varying or revoking the extended supervision order.

Orders

35 For these reasons, I am satisfied that the following orders should be made: An order pursuant to s 9(1)(a) of the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 that the defendant be subject to an extended supervision order for a period of five years from today, 26 February 2008, by complying with the following conditions:

(a) the defendant must comply with any reasonable direction given by an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;
(b) the defendant must participate in treatment and rehabilitation as directed by an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;

(c) the defendant must not reside in a caravan park;

(d) the defendant must reside at an address approved by an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer and must not change address without the permission of an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;
(e) the defendant must not travel in excess of 50 km from his residence without the permission of an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;
(f) the defendant must accept home visits, including unannounced home visits, by an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;
(g) the defendant must report to an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer as directed by that officer;
(h) the defendant shall not change his place of residence without prior approval of an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;
(i) the defendant must not associate or make contact with children aged 16 years and under;
(j) the defendant must not attend public places regularly frequented by children and in which children are present at the time including, but not limited to, schools and amusement parlours, and such places as an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer may direct;
(k) the defendant must wear electronic monitoring equipment if directed by an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;
(l) the defendant must not consume alcohol or illicit drugs or abuse prescription medication;
(m) the defendant shall submit to drug and alcohol testing as directed by an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;
(n) the defendant must not be present at any licensed premises, including but not limited to hotels, bars and race courses, without prior approval of an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer;
(o) at the expiration of three months from today, 26 February 2008, the continued need for the defendant to wear any electronic monitoring equipment will be reviewed before any further direction for the wearing of any such equipment is made;
(p) the defendant must not change his appearance without the approval of an officer of the Community Compliance Group or a Probation and Parole officer, and, in the event that the change of appearance is approved, must be photographed; and

(q) the defendant must not change his name.

**********