State Central Authority and Jazeer
[2014] FamCA 1059
•29 August 2014
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| STATE CENTRAL AUTHORITY & JAZEER | [2014] FamCA 1059 |
FAMILY LAW – Hague Convention application – child wrongfully removed from New Zealand – vulnerable child (7 years old) – potential separation from sibling – father not adequately prepared to assume care of child if child returned alone, either physically or emotionally – conditions to return – very delayed return – role of independent children’s lawyer – direct judicial communication – hearing arranged in New Zealand with specified judge manager – parenting orders to be obtained in New Zealand and in Australia to support return six months hence
| APPLICANT: | State Central Authority |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Jazeer |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms K Hams |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 2389 | of | 2014 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 29 August 2014 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Bennett J |
| HEARING DATE: | 29 August 2014 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Ms Porrit |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Department of Human Services, State Central Authority, Legal Services Branch |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms Harris |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Victoria Legal Aid |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Carter |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER | Glezer Lanteri & Associates |
Orders
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym SCA & Jazeer has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 2389 of 2014
| State Central Authority |
Applicant
And
| Ms Jazeer |
Respondent
And
Independent Children’s Lawyer
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ex-tempore
I reserve the right to augment these reasons for decision subsequently, but not with anything that’s inconsistent with what I am about to say.
These proceedings concern the child B who was born in 2007 who, it is conceded, was removed by his mother to Australia on or about 10 April 2013. The State Central Authority seeks that the child be returned to New Zealand pursuant to Regulation 16 of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.
The mother left New Zealand with the child and his younger brother, J, born in 2010. J is the biological child of the parents, but the father was apparently not living with the mother at the time of J’s birth. So the father has not been recognised as a guardian or joint guardian of J to date. Arguably, there is not the requisite right of custody to support an application.
It is conceded by the mother that the removal of the child was wrongful within the meaning of Regulation 16(1A)[1]. The father does not assert any rights in relation to J and the mother’s removal of him from New Zealand.
[1] Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (‘the 1980 Convention’) art 3.
When this matter was transferred to me by Cronin J, it appeared more complex than it has turned out to be. The mother alleged that the father had consented or acquiesced to the removal of the child within the meaning of Regulation 16(3)(a)[2]. The mother made reference to domestic violence but not necessarily in the context of Regulation 16(3)(b)[3]. Most significantly, the mother alleged that J (whose return the father does not seek) required medical treatment which is not available in New Zealand to the same standard as it is available in Australia and which raised as a distinct possibility that the child may have to be separated from his brother and return to New Zealand and be placed in the care of the father who he has not seen for more than a year. It was contended that separation of the child from his brother and/or mother would constitute a grave risk of harm and place him in an intolerable situation within the meaning of Regulation 16(3)(b).
[2] Ibid art 13(a).
[3] Ibid art 13(b).
There has been two days of evidence in the case, and I must say diligent preparation of this matter for a final hearing. That included the independent children’s lawyer arranging for a three-day specialised paid mediation of the matter, and obtaining evidence from the hospital where surgeons have treated J with some reconstructive surgery for burn injuries he sustained in New Zealand. The proceedings have been made very much easier, in my view, by the involvement of the independent children's lawyer.
The father participated in the hearing by video link as a witness for the State Central Authority. The father’s presence allowed the applicant State Central Authority to provide instruction to Ms Porrit without the delay usually associated with contacting a requesting parent.
The mother does not press any exception to return. The matters which now remain in issue relate only to the financial support which the mother will require to return to New Zealand for the purpose of preparing a family report in anticipated family law proceedings in New Zealand, and to return in time for the final hearing of those proceedings. I will say later in these reasons why it is the case that the mother is not being required to return the child forthwith to New Zealand.
RECORDED : NOT TRANSCRIBED
The mother seeks $3,000 to assist her with the expenses of herself and the two children to return to New Zealand for preparation of a family report, and seeks $8,000 for her eventual return in March 2015. That is a total of $11,000.
The father has communicated through the State Central Authority that he would “pay half of the mother’s expenses”. After having heard the father cross-examined at some length, I am satisfied that he has little appreciation of what expenses are actually involved when taking two dependent children to another country and not having a regular source of income from employment. I can’t say how much half the expenses would have amounted to but I expect it would be far greater than the father was, in fact, contemplating.
RECORDED: NOT TRANSCRIBED
The power to make conditions on a return order derives from Regulation 15(1) which provides that the court may make such orders as are appropriate to give effect to the Convention. These are conditions which are stand-alone conditions and need not be conditions which are used to ameliorate or assuage an otherwise intolerable situation, or a grave risk of harm in the context of Regulation 16(3)(b). These concepts were discussed by me in SCA & Detres (No 2) [2011] FamCA 774.
On 7 August 2014 the mother swore an affidavit setting out the conditions she seeks be imposed and implemented before the child is required to return. They are predicated on the mother accompanying the child. On 15 August 2014 the father responded to the conditions sought by the mother. His affidavit is annexed to the affidavit of Ms K sworn 15 August 2014. The requesting parent deposes, inter alia, “I do not consider it is reasonable that I be required to effectively ensure mother be protected from any of the inevitable costs of return”. He also deposes that he does not “have the resources to fund this matter”. The difficulty with the father’s objection to payment is that there is no public fund out of which airfares and emergency expenses can be met and the return order may be frustrated or thwarted if funds are not found to meet necessary and “inevitable costs”. In the interests of pragmatism, the certainty of implementing the return will need to take precedence over what the requesting parent perceives to be the fairness (and unfairness) of the situation.
The requesting parent was cross examined. The mother was not cross-examined.
Any pre-conditions to return should be proportional. I will not usurp the correct role of the courts of New Zealand. Conditions should be operative only so long as it takes for the New Zealand court to be seized of the matter.
The effect of conditions must not be to frustrate my return order by making it too expensive or impossible to implement. What I’m trying to do is to ease the return of the children, in particular the child, to New Zealand in accordance with the philosophy of the Convention. The conditions should permit the return of the child to be effected. I do not wish to delay the return unnecessarily or stymie the return.
The mother bears the onus of establishing that the conditions are appropriate to give effect to the Convention.
A Hague Convention report was published on 27 June 2014. It paints a picture of the child as a very vulnerable child. I take it into account when concluding, as I do, that there should be some conditions around his return to New Zealand.
I will deal first with the disputed issue of how much the father should pay to assist the mother to return to New Zealand and the expenses associated with that return.
The father was cross examined extensively about his financial situation. His evidence was not impressive. He was vague in relation to his income to a degree that his evidence was not credible. He is clearly a man who is admirably careful with money and has been extremely industrious, diligent and quite outstandingly successful since he arrived in New Zealand with his 10-year old dependent brother when he was only 15 years old himself. That history does not sit comfortably with someone who doesn’t know how much he currently earns or the quantum of his recent pay rise. I do not accept that he has forgotten how much he has in the bank or how much cash he has deposited with his grandmother.
Yesterday, the father gave evidence that he had $4,000 in a bank account, that he only had one bank account, and that he had given his grandmother some $2,000 in cash. The purpose of depositing the moneys with his grandmother was so that he wouldn’t be tempted to spend it by having it in his possession.
Today, the father says that the moneys in the bank are far less than $4,000 and that he has had to transfer some of the moneys out of that account into another account of his own. I took him also to say that he had recently paid some expenses he had forgotten about. The evidence was not, as I the child, credible.
I am satisfied that the father has at least $6,000 at his disposal. Those funds have, in part, been accumulated because he hasn’t been paying adequate child support for the children whilst they have been in Australia, and it would appear even for some of the time whilst they were in New Zealand. It’s also the case that he has been able to devote himself to full time employment, whereas the mother has not been able to do so.
On the father’s evidence given yesterday, I calculated that there was some $260 per week that he had been able to save, on average, up to now but prior to his recent unquantified pay rise. The return of the child to New Zealand is to be delayed by six months. That will give the father the capacity to save a considerable amount, close to another $4,000, before the child is required to return to New Zealand. Then there can be added unspecified sums which I’m not able to quantify, but which derive from a greater income earning capacity than the father is currently prepared to admit and, in all probability, greater cash reserves than he is prepared to acknowledge he now has.
In the circumstances of the case, it seems to me that the wife will need not less than $3,000 to return to New Zealand with both children for approximately one week for preparation of any family report. During that week the children must be able to see their father and, indeed, there’s agreement between the parties that that occur. I trust that I have made clear that the father is to spend as much time as possible with the children whilst they are in New Zealand, something like two out of each three days, but not so that he is entitled to require the mother and the children to remain in New Zealand for more than seven nights in total unless she wishes to do so.
When the mother returns to New Zealand, either by 11 March 2015 or not less than one week prior to the commencement of any final hearing of parenting matters in New Zealand, she is going to need access to more funds because she may have to take and secure semi-permanent accommodation for herself and the children. It is the concern of the courts in New Zealand (and not mine) as to whether the mother will be able to return to Australia between the end of any final hearing of the parenting matters in New Zealand and the delivery of a decision in that respect. It seems to me that the further sum of $6,000 is a sum within the means of the husband to pay in anticipation of the mother’s final return. So I will order that that amount be $6,000.
I confirm that the $9,000 which I have ordered be paid does not equate, in my view, to all of the expenses which the mother will face. She will have to make provision herself or she or the children will do without or be in hardship. The $9,000 is not child support or a transfer of property. It is provision for immediate and unusual expenses which the Courts in New Zealand should be aware that the father has paid/will pay for the benefit of the mother and the children in order to facilitate the child’s return to that jurisdiction.
I will say something generally about the timing of the child’s return. The general philosophy under the Convention is that it is a hot pursuit remedy and the return of children to their rightful place of habitual residence is usually prompt. Australia’s obligation is to make a return in a timely way[4]. That does not always necessarily mean immediately. However, a delay of six months, as will occur in this case, is extraordinary.
[4] C v C (Minor: Abduction: Rights of Custody Abroad) [1989] 2 All ER 465; [1989] 1 WLR 654 at 659; Department of Child Safety & Bates [2007] FamCA 570.
I have been prepared to entertain an extraordinary delay in the child’s return for a number of reasons, all of which relate to the particular vulnerability of the child. They are as follows.
First, since the mother came to Australia with the two children, her mother has moved here and resides here permanently. One of her sisters was already residing here. The mother has no family support in Auckland; that is, no actual blood relatives in Auckland. Her evidence is that she has no friends upon whom she could rely; the one friend that she referred to through her counsel yesterday has a family of four living in a two bedroom dwelling in Auckland. The father referred to clans and intimated that the mother’s clan would assist her. However, that is too vague for me to take into account.
The mother has given quite extensive evidence that she has been the major bread winner for her family which comprise the children, her sister and her mother. The mother has now lost her job and so she will be dependent upon social security payments in Australia. The mother may look for employment but it will take the mother some time to accumulate moneys with which to return to New Zealand.
Second, a further element of the child’s vulnerability is that he may need to be separated from his younger sibling.
In about June 2012, J was involved in an accident and badly scalded around his neck with boiling water; a cup of tea. He received immediate medical treatment in New Zealand, but that resulted in bad scarring which required further medical treatment. By the time the parents were discussing, or were present at discussions, about whether there would be superior medical care for J in Australia, J did not have free movement of his head. Because of the restriction of scar tissue, his head was bent towards his shoulder.
Initially, the mother’s case was that J could not obtain adequate medical treatment in New Zealand, and she felt constrained that she would have to stay with J in Australia and the child would need to return by himself unless the court was satisfied that it would be intolerable for him to do so within the meaning of Regulation 16(3)(c)[5]. As indicated, the independent children’s lawyer obtained evidence from the medical practitioners that, following very recent surgical intervention, J does require ongoing therapy, and attention and medical treatment which could be administered also in New Zealand. So that is not too much of a problem in the long term. However, in the short term, the mother feels constrained to stay in Australia with J for treatment which is scheduled for the immediate future and it seems reasonable that she be able to do so for the rest of the year.
[5] 1980 Convention art 13.
The father’s evidence demonstrated that he has little insight into the effects on the child of separation from his brother and/or his mother. That is in spite of the father having read the family consultant’s report in which the psychologist, Ms L, opined (my emphasis):
There were no formal parenting arrangements or Court Orders in force or being executed in New Zealand prior to the children being removed to Australia. Whilst it appears clear that New Zealand was historically [the child’s] habitual place of residence, and whilst a return under the Hague Convention is a possibility, the issue remains whether the Court should exercise discretion about his return. This relates specifically to the potential risk to [the child] psychologically, in being separated from his mother and sibling.
In the event [Ms Jazeer] was to return to New Zealand with the child, the impact may be considerably mitigated. If the maternal family were to return intact, there may be limited disruption to the child, other than to any social connections developed in Australia.
There may be a profound impact to the child socially, emotionally and psychologically however, in the event he is returned to New Zealand and his mother and brother remain in Australia. In this respect, he will also be separated from his extended maternal family who have also played a noteworthy role in his development to date. Although disputed, the father does not appear to have played a primary role in the child’s development or care historically. Thus, the child’s connection to his father is likely to be less close than with his mother and maternal family. [The child’s] foundation years developmentally appear to have been spent primarily with his mother or maternal grandmother, with his father as a secondary parental figure.
Although [Mr F] claims to have had a close and loving relationship with [the child], it is difficult to hypothesise how either he or [the child] would cope in the event of the father assuming primary care. The potential absence of significant paternal time both post-separation and during the latter part of the parental relationship is likely to have significantly impacted the strength of the father-son relationship. Given the historical care arrangements and likely attachments of this child, it is possible that the cost of [the child] returning to New Zealand without his mother and brother may outweigh the benefit of reintroducing the paternal relationship at this point in time.
Similarly, [Mr F] has had limited contact with the child since the children moved to Australia 14 months ago. Although the reason for this is disputed between the parents, this is likely to have further impacted upon the child’s relationship with his father. Separating [the child] from his mother, brother and maternal family to live with his father in an unfamiliar primary care arrangement, with a parent he has not lived with since 2011, may be a very confronting and a potentially traumatic experience for the child. This may place [the child] in an intolerable position psychologically. He may experience difficulties in being separated from his mother or assimilating into his new care environment.
[B] is a young child who appears introverted and quietly spoken, and thus he is likely to internalise any difficulties he experiences rather than externalising them. In this respect, any impact borne by either the Court’s decision or his parent’s actions, may be difficult to determine. [The child] will benefit from counselling assistance to provide him with additional support and to evaluate his emotional state, regardless of the Court outcome.
It is highly possible that the child’s relationship with one of his parents will be fractured by the outcome of the current proceedings. [The child] and his parents will require appropriate support in this respect. There is also risk to [the child’s] relationship with his maternal grandmother and aunts if he was to return to New Zealand, and they remain in Australia. These appear relationships of significant importance to him.
Without adequate supports to assist the child’s transition in this respect, there is a risk to him regressing developmentally and emotionally. It will be incumbent on the father to make appropriate provisions for [the child] if he is placed in his primary care, and to be aware of the potential impact of being separated from his mother, brother and maternal family. The gravity of which, currently appears ill considered by [Mr F], as it is his belief that [Ms Jazeer] will not leave the child behind.
In determining the best interests for the child, consideration should be made towards the mother’s capacity and/or willingness to return to New Zealand, as it would be in his best interests to remain in his mother’s primary care, regardless of which destination. The mother is citing financial hardship as constraining her from being able to return to New Zealand in the event the Court orders the child’s return. Furthermore, the outcome of the current dispute also has a potential bearing on whether the extended maternal family is able to remain in Australia, given [Ms Jazeer’s] purported financial responsibility within the maternal family.
The father’s evidence was that the child would be alright if the child was with him.
Third, I am concerned about the father’s immediate living arrangements. He gave evidence from in front of his computer which is in his home which he shares with his brother. There is only one bedroom. I asked the father to direct the webcam so we could see around his apartment. He refused to do so saying that it was not a good time to look at the apartment and that he would have prepared the apartment for inspection if he had known it would be seen, or words to that effect. The father’s evidence was that he has saved $6,000 so as to be able to obtain other accommodation for the child. However, that $6,000 (and more) will now go to the mother and not be available to the father. The father gave evidence that his brother could sleep elsewhere whilst the child is with the father but that does not sound satisfactory to me and the father’s refusal to allow us to see his home allows me to infer, as I do, that the images that could have been transmitted would not have assisted the State Central Authority’s case[6].
[6] Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298.
Fourth, for whatever reason, the child has been a very long time out of New Zealand. The father’s documents in support of the application to the appropriate authorities in New Zealand appear to have been signed in or about early February 2014. That is some 10 months after the children were removed from New Zealand. The effect of that delay is that the mother’s ability to pick up life in Auckland where she left off has become less and less with the effluxion of time.
Through counsel for the State Central Authority, I was informed that the New Zealand Central Authority would verify that they were contacted by the father in the same month as the children were removed from New Zealand, but that any request by him was not actioned. There appears that there might have been some inordinate and unfortunate delay as a result of legal advice which he received or did not receive about his entitlement to seek the return of J. I am at a loss to know why the application for the child was not immediate.
The father’s evidence about accessing advice and accessing help was as vague and as unsatisfactory as his advice about his financial position. I found his history of what he had done to get the children back, or to put himself in a position where he could come to Australia to see the children, or pursue some regular and dependable communication with the children by electronic means from New Zealand to be unsatisfactory. I take into account the apparent inactivity of the father to reconnect with the children when assessing how prompt the child’s return should be.
I trust that this explains why there is an extraordinarily long delay before the child goes back to New Zealand. It is a most unusual case.
In these reasons, I have been critical of elements of the father’s evidence. I note, however, that the mother swore affidavits but was not cross examined. The matter resolved prior to the mother being cross examined. The mother’s affidavit evidence is quite extensive and, quite frankly, it does not add up in a number of respects. So my criticism of the husband, whilst based on the fact that he has been the sole witness whose evidence has been tested, should not be looked at in isolation. The mother’s credibility stood to be impugned as well.
The other aspect which is very important in my decision to delay the child’s return is that any hearing in Auckland will not occur until about March 2015. This is based on communications between me and the Hague Network judge for New Zealand and, in his absence, McHardy J who is the Administrative Family Court judge for the northern region of New Zealand and, as such, one of the judges who manage long cause fixtures in Auckland. Those communications were conducted in accordance with the Emerging Guidance regarding the development of the International Hague Network of Judges and General Principles for Judicial Communications, including commonly accepted safeguards for Direct Judicial Communications in specific cases, within the context of the International Hague Network of Judges published by The Hague Conference of Private International Law Permanent Bureau in 2013[7] and have resulted in me being informed that his Honour will be able to accommodate this matter for a hearing of some five days in March or April 2015. The direct judicial communication would not have been undertaken without the express consent of the parties to the proceedings, which consent was given.
[7] >
A summary of the direct judicial communications is as follows:
·On 16 July 2014 I contacted Ryan J, the Hague Network Judge for New Zealand, setting out the background of the matter and requesting what, if any, priority the mother could obtain if she were to issue a relocation application in Auckland in the following circumstances:
oWhere the child is ordered to be returned to New Zealand and returns alone with the mother to follow as and when she is required to give evidence in and run her relocation case;
oWhere the child is ordered to be returned to New Zealand and returns alone and the mother remains in Australia and seeks to participate in the hearing by video link or other electronic means; or
oWhere the child is ordered to be returned to New Zealand but the return is delayed until such time as the mother and the child are required by a judge of the Court in New Zealand to return to New Zealand for the purpose of participating in any social science assessment and then the hearing. I also requested an estimate of the delay between the assessment process and the hearing.
·On 16 July 2014 I also sent a copy of each of the parties’ affidavits and the family report dated 27 June 2014 to Ryan J.
·On 21 July 2014, Ryan J responded as follows:
I refer to your email of 16 July 2014. I have made enquiries of the Auckland Registry and the case management Judge, Judge (redacted).
I am going to assume the hearing will take 3 days so with preparation and judgment writing, 5 days will be needed in total. I can ensure that one judge tightly manages the proceeding and, I can make myself available to sit in Auckland to allow that judge to preside over the matter as soon as it is ready for hearing. You mention the possibility of a specialist report from a clinical psychologist. If that is ordered experience tells us that senior psychologists in Auckland are difficult to get at short notice. There could be a 6 to 8 week delay in arranging one then a further delay while the specialist completes the assessment and report. Pre trial judicial conferences and the like, assuming cooperative counsel, could take another 6 to 8 weeks on the basis that directions for filing further evidence upon receipt of the specialist’s report, are made.
I can therefore respond to your communication by saying whether scenario (a) or (b) applies, priority can be given in the context of what I have noted above. Referring to scenario (c), the likely time frame from ordering the specialist assessment to hearing would be in the vicinity of 18 to 24 weeks.
I cannot see any impediment to the mother issuing relocation proceedings in New Zealand whilst resident in Australia however, if she is legally represented, an agent (NZ lawyer) will need to be instructed by her counsel. I cannot answer the question about legal aid eligibility from the New Zealand authorities.
I hope this is of assistance.
·On 21 July 2014 I queried whether the mother could participate in the hearing in New Zealand by video link in circumstances where she refused to return to New Zealand.
·On 21 July 2014, Ryan J confirmed that the mother could participate in the hearing in the New Zealand court by video link from Australia.
In the event that the proceedings are not to be instituted in New Zealand by the end of September, I would anticipate that any entitlement or expectation of a hearing in March 2015 will evaporate. If that occurs, the mother will still be required to return by 11 March 2015. Accordingly, the responsibility is very largely hers to make sure that proceedings are instituted immediately. The mother has the forms to apply to the Ministry of Justice for legal assistance for family proceedings in New Zealand and I expect that she will be advised to complete those promptly.
The assistance rendered by the Hague Network Judge for New Zealand, Judge Ryan, and McHardy J has removed some uncertainties in this case. It is an outcome which the mother does not want but one which, I am confident, has been made appreciably less daunting for her than it might have been. I express my appreciation to Judge Ryan and to Judge McHardy.
The mother is going to return with the two children to New Zealand for the preparation of a family report. So at least on one, if not two, occasions the parties contemplate that she will be going back to New Zealand, and then returning to Australia. That is not normally what would happen. The parties understand that it is necessary for the mother to have orders made by the courts in New Zealand which sanction her return to Australia at least once pending her final return to New Zealand. McHardy J has indicated that there is no difficulty in him taking an oral application to that effect and making orders which complement the orders that the parents are prepared to agree.
RECORDED: NOT TRANSCRIBED
I will not pronounce final orders in the Hague Convention proceedings until the necessary mirror order has been or can be made in New Zealand. The matter can be listed at the parties’ convenience next week for that purpose. In all respects, I would like to see this matter wrapped up within the next two working days.
RECORDED: NOT TRANSCRIBED
I cannot at this stage release the independent children’s lawyer from either set of proceedings. It is contemplated that the independent children’s lawyer will, if she can, hold the funds which are to be disbursed in payment of the tickets. It is of particular concern that the mother is likely to be not in receipt of any legal assistance in the fairly near future, so there needs to be some lawyer in Australia with conduct of this matter. At the very most, the independent children’s lawyer would be required to remain appointed until the wife leaves the jurisdiction with the child on or about 11 March 2015.
Finally, if the requesting parent does manage to get to Australia whilst the child and/or J are here, it will be very important that he gets to spend time with the boys. If arrangements between the father or mother break down or time spent looks like it cannot proceed, both parents should consider that these reasons make clear that I will accept an urgent listing in this matter, without a written application, to see what needs to be done to facilitate the father spending time with his sons. I request that any Registrar who becomes aware that one or both parents want attention urgently, bring it to my attention and accord the matter priority. In the meantime, I will stand the matter over so that the mother, independent children’s lawyer and the requesting parent can work on the parenting orders which will need to be made here and in New Zealand to support the eventual return of the child to New Zealand.
I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett delivered on 29 August 2014.
Associate:
Date: 5 September 2014
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