State Central Authority and Detres (No 2) - [2011] FamCA 774

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

STATE CENTRAL AUTHORITY & DETRES (NO 2)

[2011] FamCA 774

FAMILY LAW – CHILD ABDUCTION – Child brought to Australia from the United Kingdom – Both parents consent to the child’s return – Court to determine conditions on the return of the child – Requesting parent to pay for the abducting parent and child’s flight to the United Kingdom and limited living expenses for the abducting parent and the child upon the child’s return – Requesting parent to provide undertakings to the Principal Registry in the High Court in the United Kingdom.

Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth)
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction

State Central Authority & Daker [2008] FamCA 1271

APPLICANT:

State Central Authority

RESPONDENT:

Ms Detres

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Ms M Lonergan

FILE NUMBER:

MLC

11920

2010

DATE DELIVERED:

6 April 2011

PLACE DELIVERED:

Melbourne

PLACE HEARD:

Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF:

Bennett J

HEARING DATE:

6 April 2011

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Nemy

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

In person

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Ms Stewart

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Victoria Legal Aid

Orders

BY CONSENT IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The child B born … April 2005 (‘the child’) be returned to United Kingdom pursuant to the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.
For the purpose of giving effect to the return provided for in paragraph 1 of this Order:-
(a)The respondent mother be at liberty to accompany the child on the child’s return to the United Kingdom;
(b)The respondent mother attend with the child at Tullamarine Airport in sufficient time to have baggage check in procedures completed by, and to attend at the customs entrance for departing passengers, by not later than 5.00 pm on 19 April 2011;
(c)Until the child arrives in London the respondent mother not cause suffer or permit the child to be removed from the transit area of a terminal during any period of disembarkation in Hong Kong or any unscheduled port.
Paragraph 10 of the order made on 23 December 2010 be discharged and the child’s passports be released to an officer of the Department of Human Services in Victoria.

AND IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The child’s return to the United Kingdom pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Order is conditional upon:
(a)the requesting father, Mr L, immediately paying in full the airline tickets of the child and respondent mother on flight …, departing Tullamarine, Melbourne at … on 19 April 2011 and estimated to arrive at Heathrow, London at … on 20 April 2011;
(b)the requesting father, within 72 hours, depositing the sum of $4,000 AUD (four thousand Australian dollars) in clear funds into the bank account of his lawyers in the United Kingdom, Law Hurst and Taylor Solicitors, and irrevocably instructing his lawyers to pay such sum into an account nominated by the respondent mother once the child has arrived in the United Kingdom, such monies to be utilised by the mother for the day to day expenses of the child and herself; and
(c)orders being made by, and the requesting father providing undertakings to, the Principal Registry of the High Court in the United Kingdom in terms of the minute of proposed consent orders signed by the respondent mother and requesting father and dated 6 April 2011 with the attached undertakings in the form of Exhibit “C2” which is attached hereto.
AND IT IS REQUESTED that the Registrar of the Principal Registry of the High Court provide a sealed copy of the orders made on 6 April 2011 and a copy of the undertakings given by the requesting father to the parties in these proceedings and to my Chambers (email … @familycourt.gov.au).
An officer of the Department of Human Services in Victoria attend outside the entry to Customs in the International Terminal at Tullamarine, Melbourne at … on 19 April 2011 and hand the child’s passport to the mother immediately prior to the mother and child entering the restricted customs area.
Immediately prior to the departure of the child from Australia, paragraphs 8 and 9 of the orders made on 23 December 2010 be and are hereby discharged.
Liberty is reserved to the parties to apply in relation to the implementation of this Order.
The application of the State Central Authority filed 22 December 2010 and the answer and cross application of the respondent mother filed 2 March 2011 be otherwise dismissed.
The order for the appointment of the Independent Children’s Lawyer is hereby discharged as and from the arrival of the child in London.
The solicitors for the applicant State Central Authority be responsible for serving a sealed copy of this Order on the proper officer of Qantas for the information of Qantas (particularly as to paragraph 2(c)) and do so by electronic means.
The parties have liberty to apply on short notice in the event of alleged non-compliance with this Order or the non-appearance of the child at the airport at … on 19 April 2011 and, for that purpose, if contact with the Court must be made outside Court sitting hours counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer be at liberty to contact my Associate, …, and request that any consequential application be considered immediately.
The evidence given on 5 April 2011 be transcribed and be made available to the parties and the requesting parent.
My reasons for judgment this day be transcribed and when settled copies be made available to the parties.
The facsimile transmissions between this Court and the Office of the Honourable Lord Justice Thorpe be marked Exhibit “C1” and remain on the Court file.
A copy of the minute of consent order signed by the mother and the father and dated by me as 6 April 2011 be marked Exhibit “C2” and remain on the Court file.
The memorandum from Christine Dooley of Counsel be marked Exhibit “C3” and remain on the Court file.

AND IT IS NOTED that the respondent mother led no further evidence nor made any submissions in opposition to the child’s return to the United Kingdom, and returns herself and the child to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom voluntarily.

AND IT IS FURTHER NOTED that the respondent mother’s address for service is Unit …, … A Street, Melbourne Suburb 1, Victoria 3020, and her email address is … .

AND IT IS FURTHER NOTED that the father’s lawyers will arrange for the pending proceedings in the United Kingdom to be listed on 6 April 2011 for the purpose of serving the orders and providing the undertakings described in paragraph 4(c) of this Order.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym State Central Authority & Detres is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 11920 of 2010

STATE CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Applicant

And

Ms Detres

Respondent

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This matter comes before me pursuant to the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), it being alleged that the respondent mother wrongfully removed the child, B born in April 2005, from the United Kingdom to Australia. Yesterday, the mother conceded that the child would have to be returned to the United Kingdom. She seeks to accompany him. The issue requiring determination by me is under what conditions (if any) the child is to be returned to the United Kingdom.
The respondent mother is Ms Detres. She was born in the Philippines in 1968. The documents suggest that the requesting parent, at whose behest the application is made, is Mr L, and that he was born in England in 1971. The mother states that, to her knowledge, the father was born in the Philippines and did not arrive in England until he was approximately 17 years of age. In any event, the mother and father share the same cultural heritage.
The applicant in this proceeding is the State Central Authority for the State of Victoria (“SCA”). The SCA has specific duties pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the 1980 Convention”).
As best I can discern from the documents which I have read in anticipation of this hearing, the mother and father met and commenced a relationship in England in about 2000. They cohabitated in England from 2003 until mid 2006. They never married. B is the only child of their relationship and remained in the care of the mother following the parents’ separation.
On 22 January 2007, the father instituted proceedings in the local Family Proceedings Court, the Magistrates Court, seeking defined contact orders. There were various hearings before a bench of three Justices of the Peace. On 2 March 2007, the parents sought orders by consent which were made. Subsequently, the mother said the orders were ambiguous and did not reflect the parents’ agreement.
The mother’s position, that the orders were ambiguous, prompted ongoing disputes rather than determinations. On 3 July 2007, the court adjourned the matter for hearing on 7 August 2007. The order made on 3 July 2007 included a “warning” in the following terms:
Where a residence order is in force, no person may cause the child to be known by a new surname or to remove the child from the United Kingdom without the written consent of every person with parental responsibility for the child or the leave of the court. However this does not prevent the removal of a child from for a period of less than one month, by a person in whose favour the residence order is made (Sections 13 subsection (1) and subsection (2) Children Act 1989). It may be a criminal offence under the Child Abduction Act 1984 to remove a child from the United Kingdom without leave of the court.
The above warning appeared in all subsequent orders contained in the papers which have been filed by the parties. It does not appear from the documents which accompany the request that an order was made that the child reside with the mother, however, a number of orders were made or continued pursuant to which the mother was to afford contact of the child with the father.
A number of further adjournments followed. However, the requesting parent was exercising fortnightly contact with B when he was advised, on 18 March 2008, that the mother had that day taken the child to the Philippines for the purpose of visiting her sick mother and that the mother and child were expected to return to England in two weeks, at which time the mother would allow the requesting parent some make up contact.
The mother did not return the child within two weeks.
The mother’s solicitor, Rose Hunt, of White & Co Solicitors of Southend-on-Sea, ceased to act on behalf of the mother.
On 7 April 2008, the mother was ex parte ordered to provide information about her visit to the Philippines and also her residence in England.
On 4 September 2008, Deputy District Judge Scarlett, sitting in the Principal Registry of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice, made certain declarations ex parte the mother. These included that the father had parental responsibility for the child along with the mother, that the mother had not been granted a residence order at any time and that her removal of B from England and Wales was unlawful.
The requesting parent said that he thought the mother retained the child in the Philippines and/or else not within a party state to the 1980 Convention and, accordingly, believed that there was nothing else that he could do to recover the child.
It is common ground that on or about 18 August 2010, the mother contacted the requesting parent and said that she and the child were living in Melbourne, Australia, and that she wanted the requesting parent to sign documents so the child could remain here permanently and go to school.
On 9 October 2010, the requesting parent made his application to the ICACU, which in due course was transmitted to the SCA, which in turn commenced proceedings in this Court. The matter first came before me on 23 December 2010 on an ex parte basis.
When the mother appeared before me in January 2011, she said that the child had been located in the following places since her removal of the child from the United Kingdom in March 2008:-
a)from 11 March to June 2008 in the Philippines;
b)from June 2008 to September 2008 on a tour around Hong Kong, Macau and China;
c)from September 2008 to just before Christmas 2008 in Malaysia;
d)from Christmas 2008 to July 2009 in the Philippines;
e)from July 2009 to 3 August 2010 in Dundee, Scotland; and
f)from 3 August 2010 to that date in Australia.
It was alleged in the application that the presence of the child in Scotland for over a year in 2009/10 was unbeknownst to the requesting parent. The mother says that she could not contact the father. She said that she tried to do so by email. The mother says further that the requesting parent was aware of her address as her family is of some prominence in the Philippines, and that if the father had wanted to contact her, he would have been able to do so with ease.
Subsequently, in a response to the application, the mother alleged that the father had initially consented and subsequently acquiesced to her retention of B in the Philippines or at least out of the United Kingdom.
The mother represents herself. However, when the mother appeared before me on the first inter-party date in January 2011, she was about to seek legal advice from a firm of solicitors called Hogg and Reid who retained a barrister to advise her. Subsequently the mother changed the solicitors to Nicholes Family Lawyers. Nicholes Family Lawyers represented the mother up until approximately 23 March 2011, some 10 days or so before this matter was due to commence before me for final hearing.
An outline of argument prepared for the mother by Nicholes Family Lawyers, reads at paragraph 12:
The mother will voluntarily consent to return to the United Kingdom with the child without conceding that the child has been wrongfully removed as alleged by the father but nonetheless, the mother seeks that any such return be subject to prior satisfaction by the father of the conditions set out in paragraph 16 herein.
When the matter commenced before me yesterday, I required the mother to elect as to whether or not she conceded that the removal was wrongful and therefore that the child could be returned and an order could be made pursuant to reg 14 of the Regulations or, alternatively, whether she wished to argue the whole of the case. She chose the former. The conditions sought by the mother appear in paragraph 16 of her outline as follows:
a.That the father pay for the airfares of the mother and the child from Australia to the relevant airport in the United Kingdom;
b.That the father pay the cost of shipping the child’s belongings from Australia to the United Kingdom;
c.That the father pay a lump sum of $12,000 into the mother’s bank account to ensure that the mother can arrange for reasonable accommodation in the United Kingdom for her and the child as well as provide for hers and the child’s basic needs in the United Kingdom (including health and education costs) until the mother can secure full time employment or receive adequate government income assistance;
d.That the father undertake to not verbally abuse or physically assault the mother;
e.That the father undertake not to pursue any form of criminal proceedings or sanctions against the mother pursuant to the Child Abduction Act 1984 or under common law in relation to the removal of the child from the United Kingdom either in Australia or in the United Kingdom;
f.That the mother and child be allowed to stay in Australia for six (6) weeks from the date of the Final Hearing of this matter on 4 April 2011 to enable the mother to settle outstanding debts in Australia, including payment of the mother’s legal fees as a result of these proceedings.

Frequently in matters under the 1980 Convention, conditions are considered in the context of reg 16(3) as part of the Court’s consideration of an exception to mandatory return, such the return resulting in a grave risk of harm to the child. In this case, however, the mother seeks the imposition of conditions independently of any exceptions to return and does so pursuant to reg 15(1). Accordingly, it is not necessary for me to direct any conditions to the amelioration of any alleged risk of harm. I need only be satisfied that the conditions are “appropriate to give effect to the Convention.” I will do so.
The Regulations (and the Convention) are silent on the matters to be taken into account in determining whether conditions are necessary to give effect to the convention. No one made submissions contrary to the utility of conditions being to ease the returning mother and B back into the United Kingdom.
The operation of the abduction provisions in the 1980 Convention are a means to an end, not an end to themselves. B is to be returned to the United Kingdom so that the parents can there access a court for a determination of any parenting issues upon which they cannot agree. It is obviously for the benefit of B that the transition between countries be as smooth and as comfortable as the circumstances of the case will allow. That said, any attempt by this Court to regulate the conduct, or circumstances of the parents once the child has left Australia and arrives in the United Kingdom, should operate only until a court of competent jurisdiction in the United Kingdom can be seized of the matter.
I am mindful that conditions should not impinge on the powers of the courts in the United Kingdom to make relevant orders on the proper and timely applications that could and should be made by the parties.
The conditions which can properly be imposed on return orders made under the 1980 Convention should be marked as much by appropriate restraint and respect for the operation of law in the requesting state as they are for the reasonable needs of the mother and the child in the immediate to short term (see State Central Authority & Daker [2008] FamCA 1271 at [70]).
If, upon considering the matter, I find that the conditions are warranted, it is important that the conditions be formulated so as not to create more problems than they seek to address.
Many of the orders sought by the mother relate to a financial accommodation which she seeks from the father, but I need to be mindful that preconditions cannot be permitted to sabotage the return by reason of being too onerous or incapable of being met. The State Central Authority had the father complete a statement of financial circumstances and some narrative affidavit material directed to his financial situation and I will comment upon that in a moment.
I note that as part of the proceedings, the parents underwent mediation with a very experienced mediator, Mr F. This mediation was without cost to the parents or to the applicant State Central Authority. It was provided by Melbourne City Family Relationship Centre, which has agreed to make its services available at very short notice to accommodate parties in Hague matters, where the proceedings will not be postponed to permit mediation to occur. The Independent Children’s Lawyer had some participation in the process. I gather that negotiations ensued after the mediation concluded because the Independent Children’s Lawyer asked for an extension of time in which to submit her preliminary position, so as to permit the parties to conclude their negotiations.
I commend the parties for having agreed to mediate the matter. These Hague cases usually involve children whose relationship with one parent has been dislocated. More often than not the mediation is the first instance of the parents communicating with each other about future parenting issues, rather than exchanging self justifications and recriminations over past actions. In this case I suspect it directed the parents to focus on the practical needs of B if and when he returns to England.

Not all mediations result in a consensual resolution of issues. However, a mediation is a forum for parties to reflect upon their respective positions, engage in some reality testing, consider outcomes which are different than those for which they contend and consider what their options will be in those circumstances.
The matter proceeded with affidavit evidence common to all parties and the mother giving some oral evidence and being cross-examined. The father was then called as a witness of the State Central Authority, gave some evidence, and was cross-examined by the mother. At an early date in the management of the proceedings, arrangements had been made for the father to attend the Royal Courts of Justice in London for the purpose of a video link between the High Court and the Melbourne Registry of this Court. However, last week upon the matter being contained to conditions on return, all parties conceded that it was appropriate that the father be cross-examined by telephone although at a reasonable hour, not earlier than 7 am (London time).
The mother gave her evidence before me quietly, with a sense of resignation and disappointment at the prospect of B’s return to the United Kingdom. She raised a lack of satisfaction with undertakings which had been offered by the father. It is noteworthy that she raised this lack of satisfaction very late in the proceedings in circumstances where it may not have been able to have been cured.
The father gave evidence from the office of his solicitors. He was cross-examined on the contents of his financial statement. I am satisfied that he completed his financial statement both inadequately and incorrectly and for the purpose of portraying a financial situation which is considerably more dire than what is actually the case. For instance, he did not mention any income derived by him from boarders or tenants who lodge in his home. He refers to this property as “my second home.” He did not mention financial assistance provided by his mother. These omissions were in spite of specific sections in the printed document requiring the disclosure of such information. The father’s answers were in part non-responsive and evasive. He spoke of “official income” and “unofficial income”.
I am confident that the father has access to much more money than his written evidence suggests. I am satisfied that the material which he did provide was crafted to conceal his true situation.
I am satisfied that the father is heavily subsidised by his family and his mother. However, the issue of whether that gives him extra capacity to provide for the mother and B, or is to be disregarded, is a matter for the courts in the United Kingdom.
The State Central Authority, sensibly in my view, conceded that I need not be unduly cautious about the father’s evidence about his financial situation and his capacity to pay. In addition to the air-fares which he has agreed he will borrow for and pay, it was submitted by counsel for the State Central Authority that the father has the capacity to raise approximately $500 to $1000 extra in a similar way. I accept that submission. The father says that he can pay $2,000 or $3,000. I will require that he pay $4,000 as a pre-condition to B’s departure. It is to be paid to his solicitors in the United Kingdom, in clear funds, for payment out to the mother once she and B are within English borders.
The evidence was taken in this Court from approximately 4.15 pm to about 7.45 pm. It is likely in my view to be of some assistance to the parents in their proceedings in the United Kingdom. I will order a transcript. I will also order that once it is received, a copy be sent to the parties and to the prothonotory or proper officer of the Principal Registry of the High Court in London.
RECORDED : NOT TRANSCRIBED
So, the first issue for me to decide is the date of return of B to the United Kingdom. The mother seeks that the return be in August or September this year and if it needs to be sooner, then it be no earlier than 28 April 2011. She gave evidence that she had signed a four year contract of employment which she speculated could give rise to a damages claim against her for failure to remain in this employment in Australia. She mentioned that she was on a two-week pay cycle and speculated that she would be required to give not less than two weeks notice.
The mother bears the onus of persuading me that the conditions that she seeks are necessary. The evidence which she presents on the issue of her contractual obligations to her employer is too vague to form the basis of a condition “necessary to give effect to the Convention”.
The mother also said that a delayed departure date would enable her to work and accumulate income which would be at her disposal once she and B return to London. Again, this is rather vague. The mother lived and worked in London (and subsequently in Scotland). She has made enquiries about employment and accommodation. She will have to order her affairs as best she can. It should not come as any surprise that B is to be returned to the United Kingdom. She has participated in these proceedings for the last four months.
The mother has known since January that there was a distinct possibility, if not a high probability, that B would be ordered to be returned to England. She has during this time incurred a significant debt, by far the largest of her liabilities, to a firm of solicitors, Nicholes Family Lawyers who represented her in these proceedings. It approximates $21,000 or $25,000. The mother contends that a delayed departure would permit her time to accumulate some income with which she could settle her debts. I do not give weight to the financial implications for Nicholes Family lawyers of the mother being required to return to the United Kingdom.
The Independent Children’s Lawyer submitted that the mother was resourceful and had never been without employment for a significant period. I accept those submissions. I also note that the mother is returning to a state which has an advanced welfare and social security structure.
Most significantly in relation to the proposal to return the child on 28 April 2011 or afterwards, is the submission of the Independent Children’s Lawyer and that of the States Central Authority, that B should be returned to the United Kingdom in time to start the next school term, that is on 26 April 2011. The wife in cross-examination indicated that she had made inquiries or caused inquiries to be made of S Primary School in County 1, South England, as the school which B could attend.
I find that his attendance at school at the beginning of a school term rather than after the school term has started to be of significant benefit to him. I will require that B be returned in sufficient time so that his enrolment at that school can be organised before the start of the school term and he can attend, having recovered from any travel fatigue, on the first day of the next school term.
I make the decision as to the timing of B’s return after balancing the need for a prompt return against the disruption to B and the mother.

RECORDED: NOT TRANSCRIBED

The next issue to be decided is the mother’s request that the father pay for the airfares of the mother and the child from Australia to a relevant airport in the United Kingdom. The requesting parent has agreed to this condition. It appears that the airfares on Qantas will cost approximately $3,350. The requesting parent says he will have to borrow funds to meet that payment, but that the payment will be made.
The next issue is that the mother has requested that a condition precedent to the return of B be that the father pay the cost of shipping the child’s belongings from Australia back to the United Kingdom. The belongings apparently occupy some 10 boxes and have already been transhipped from London to the Philippines and from the Philippines to Scotland and then Scotland to Melbourne. The last cost borne by the mother to get B’s toys to Australia was in the vicinity of GBP£3,500. The mother’s evidence was that B’s toys include a large collection of model cars, to which the mother says he has become very attached. The mother’s evidence was that she has raised B in “a luxurious lifestyle” and with toys, which he requires be around him.
As her evidence progressed, she said that she would be making an application to the appropriate court in the United Kingdom to be able to relocate to Australia. Furthermore, she has found some storage space with a friend for all of these possessions of B’s in the meantime. I will not make payment of shipping the child’s belongings back to the United Kingdom a condition precedent to his return. In so doing, I understand that B may, hereafter, have to do without the toys which he cannot take with him in his usual luggage allowance on the aeroplane.
The next issue is the mother’s request for a lump-sum payment of $12,000 into a bank account, with which she could arrange reasonable accommodation in the United Kingdom and provide for the basic needs of herself and B, until she can secure full time employment or receive government income assistance.
The mother gave evidence that she has made arrangements to stay at P Street at County 1, South England, with a friend whom she met whilst working in Melbourne. The friend, Ms V, has apparently agreed for the mother and B to stay at her home for approximately a month. The mother will be required to contribute to utility accounts, water bills and electricity bill. Ms V has a son who is the same age as B, named C, who goes to S Primary School in County 1, South England. Ms V has suggested to the mother that the mother apply for a job where she currently works.
County 1, South England is on the other side of London to where the father is located. Insofar as the mother sought assistance from the father for reasonable accommodation, the father’s response was to provide her with rent free accommodation of the apartment in which he and she previously resided, on the basis that she would pay the outgoings and utility expenses. The mother declined that arrangement because she perceives it to be situated in too close proximity to the father’s family and where the father will be residing, which is in a home owned by his mother.
Insofar as the mother says that there will be a time-lag before she gets adequate government income assistance, she says that the longest period would be approximately three months, based on her previous experience. It appears that the mother’s ability to obtain employment in her chosen field may not be as difficult as her evidence initially indicated. She has completed all of the qualifying aspects for re-registration in London in her field of employment and does not, she reflected in cross-examination, expect a significant delay. In the meantime, she conceded that she could obtain unskilled employment, but necessarily lesser paid, employment.
Taking all matters into account, I am far from satisfied that the sum of $12,000 is necessary to ease the reintegration of B and the mother back into life in London. Immediately upon her return, if not sooner, the mother has access to the English Courts. Whereas the father may wish to proceed there as soon as possible to seek parenting orders about B, the mother can proceed there as soon as possible for orders for her financial support including, it appears, an application for financial relief under Schedule I of the Children Act 1989, which would cover any periodical payments, secured periodical payments, lump sums, settlements, or transfers of property which the court was satisfied ought to be made in favour of the mother to meet the needs of the child. In relation to the financial support of the mother’s household, clearly an issue will be the father’s capacity to pay. That might be somewhat clarified by reference to a transcript of his evidence given yesterday.
I have absolute confidence that the English Courts are equipped to deal with the needs of the family.
The mother sought various undertakings, all of which the father has agreed to give, including an undertaking that he will not institute any ex parte proceedings or require the mother’s attendance at court for an application which is allocated a hearing date earlier than 16 days after B leaves Australia. Based on the orders which I will pronounce, that would be not before the 5^th or 6^th May 2011. The form of undertaking and the minute of order which the mother and requesting parent have agreed to can apparently be made orders in the family division of the High Court in London, in some hours time, having regard to the time difference, that is still on 6 April 2011.
I express my appreciation to the office of the Right Honourable Lord Justice Thorpe, Head of International Family Justice for England and Wales, who overnight, Australian time, provided information to the State Central Authority and to the solicitors for the requesting parent and which has indicated that there ought be no difficulty in having the file put before the Applications Judge in the London High Court on the afternoon of 6 April (see exhibit “C1”).
The communication with the Network Judge Thorpe L J was done with the consent of all parties to the proceedings and they have seen all communications from this court to his Honour’s chambers and those in response.
For these reasons, I pronounce the orders, which are set out at the beginning of these reasons.

RECORDED : NOT TRANSCRIBED

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett delivered on 6 April 2011.

Associate:

Date: