JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT 2004 (WA)
CITATION: STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL and TEMPLAR LEGAL [2024] WASAT 75
MEMBER: PRESIDENT GLANCY
HEARD: 27 JUNE 2024
DELIVERED : Ex tempore
FILE NO/S: SAT Act 1 of 2024
BETWEEN: STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
Applicant
AND
TEMPLAR LEGAL
First Respondent
DAVID JAMES KIRCHNER
Second Respondent
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Referral of possible contempt to Supreme Court under s 100 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) - Disclosure of documents contrary to order - Where breach was unintentional and inadvertent - Exercise of discretion - Principles relevant to referral
Legislation:
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 100
Result:
No referral to Supreme Court
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Applicant | : | In Person |
| First Respondent | : | E Greaves |
| Second Respondent | : | E Greaves |
Solicitors:
| Applicant | : | N/A |
| First Respondent | : | Templar Legal Pty Ltd |
| Second Respondent | : | Templar Legal Pty Ltd |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Attorney General v Morrison [No 2] [2022] WASC 295
Bott v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2017] NSWCATCD 88
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
CFMU v Grocon [2014] VSCA 261; (2014) 47 VR 527
Hinch & Macquarie Broadcasting Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General (Vic) [1987] HCA 56; (1987) 164 CLR 15
International Land Development Pty Ltd v Diamo Nominees Pty Ltd [2007] WASC 96
Re Ruah Legal Services Limited Trading as the Mental Health Law Centre [2021] WASAT 28
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously and edited from the transcript to include headings and complete references and to correct grammatical errors or infelicity of expression.)
Introduction
This proceeding was commenced following the receipt by the Tribunal of a letter dated 12 April 2024 from David Kirchner (Second Respondent) who informed the Tribunal that he had breached orders made by the Tribunal on 16 February 2024 (Conduct). The Second Respondent is the principal of and sole legal practitioner of Templar Legal Pty Ltd (First Respondent).
This proceeding has been brought pursuant to s 100 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). That section permits the President to consider whether an act or omission of a person should be referred to the Supreme Court to be dealt with as a contempt. In order to make such a referral, s 100 requires that the President be satisfied that the act or omission of the person would constitute a contempt of the Supreme Court if the proceeding of the Tribunal were a proceeding of the Supreme Court.
Joinder of any other party
I have considered whether any other person should be joined as a party to the proceeding. I have come to the view that it is not necessary or appropriate for that to occur. The proceeding here concerns the release to the Second Respondent's client, in breach of the Tribunal's confidentiality orders, of a…
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- Case
- [2024] WASAT 75
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court involved determining whether the conduct in question could be considered a contempt and, if so, whether it was of sufficient gravity to warrant referral to the Supreme Court. The court also had to consider the principles that should guide the Tribunal in deciding whether to refer a case of possible contempt. This included the standard of proof required and the elements that needed to be established to prove contempt. The Deputy President, in making these determinations, referred to previous judicial decisions and statutory provisions.
In reaching its decision, the Deputy President considered the nature of the alleged contempt, the standard of proof, and the implications of the conduct as outlined in Bott v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation. The Deputy President also took into account the Briginshaw standard, which requires a balance of probabilities to be met in establishing contempt. The Deputy President concluded that the alleged contempt was not of a grave, serious, and weighty nature that required referral to the Supreme Court. The decision emphasized that the breach was unintentional and inadvertent, and thus did not meet the required threshold.
The Tribunal determined that the conduct did not warrant referral to the Supreme Court, and thus the matter was dismissed. This decision was based on the lack of deliberate or voluntary breach of the order, as well as the absence of evidence that the contempt was of sufficient gravity to merit the Supreme Court's intervention.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In DC, President Pritchard also discussed the standard to be met when answering the question of whether conduct was capable of constituting a contempt, and thus whether the contempt should be referred to the Supreme Court, by reference to what was said by the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal in Bott v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation.[3] Her Honour noted that the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal had stated in Bott that it 'might be thought sufficient to determine that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent's conduct was capable of constituting contempt',[4] but having regard to Briginshaw,[5] its implications would need to be considered as well.[3] DC at [14] citing Bott v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2017] NSWCATCD 88 (Bott) at [63].[4] Bott at [63].[5] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 (Briginshaw). Her Honour also observed that a second consideration was relevant. That consideration is whether the Tribunal is satisfied that an alleged contempt was of such grave, serious and weighty nature that it would, on balance, require the Supreme Court to do something positive about it, rather than treating the conduct as a technical contempt, which would be unlikely to attract a penalty. The contempt principles concerning breaches of orders and undertakings given to the Tribunal itself were also considered by Curthoys J in Attorney General v Morrison [No 2].[6] In that case, his Honour observed that where contempt proceedings concerned a breach of an order of a court (and the same considerations would arise in relation to a breach of an order of the Tribunal) the following elements had to be met:•first, the order was made by the court or the Tribunal, as the case may be;•secondly, the terms of the order needed to be clear, unambiguous and capable of compliance;•thirdly, the order must have been served on the alleged contemnor or service must have been excused or dispensed with in the circumstances;•fourthly, the alleged contemnor must have had knowledge of the terms of the order; and•finally, the alleged contemnor must have been found to have breached the terms of the order.[6] Attorney General v Morrison [No 2] [2022] WASC 295 (Morrison). His Honour observed that it was necessary in a contempt proceeding for proof of each element beyond reasonable doubt,[7] and that it also be proved that the act or omission which constituted the breach of the order was deliberate and voluntary. [7] Morrison [15]. In CFMEU v Grocon,[8] the Victorian Court of Appeal said that a deliberate act or omission will usually be found to be wilful disobedience unless the alleged contemnor is able to show, by way of exculpation, that the breach was accidental, and/or unintentional. It was submitted that the onus of doing so was upon the alleged contemnor and was to the civil standard. [8] CFMU v Grocon [2014] VSCA 261; (2014) 47 VR 527. The Respondents submit that this might ultimately be the law in Western Australia.