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Stanford v R

Stanford v R

Case [2018] NSWCCA 249 7 November 2018

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Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation: Stanford v R [2018] NSWCCA 249
Hearing dates: 12 October 2018
Decision date: 07 November 2018
Before: Simpson AJA at [1]
Walton J at [69]
Wilson J at [70]
Decision:
1. Leave to appeal against conviction granted.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. Verdicts of guilty set aside.
4. Verdicts of not guilty entered.

Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – appeal – indictment containing multiple counts of sexual offences with respect to one complainant – verdicts of guilty on two counts and acquittal on third count – whether verdicts unreasonable – significance of acquittals when considering unreasonableness of guilty verdicts – whether rational basis existed for the difference in the verdicts returned
CRIMINAL LAW – appeal – indictment containing multiple counts of sexual offences with respect to one complainant – verdicts of guilty on two counts and acquittal on third count – whether verdicts unreasonable – significance of jury’s rejection of complainant’s evidence on one count on the assessment of reliability in respect of other counts – whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty
Legislation Cited: Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(b)
Evidence Act 1995, s165
Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Cases Cited: Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487
MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348; [1996] HCA 35
MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53
MG v R [2017] NSWCCA 14
Morris v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 454; [1987] HCA 50,
R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 38; [2016] HCA 35
R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450; [1999] NSWCCA 279.
R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; [2001] NSWCCA 290
SKA v R [2009] NSWCCA 186
SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13
Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Ronald Kevin Stanford (Appellant)
The Crown
Representation:
Counsel:
K H Averre (Appellant)
B Hatfield (Crown)
Solicitors:
Nyman Gibson Miralis Lawyers (Appellant)
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)

File Number(s): 2015/228419
Decision under appeal

Court or tribunal:

District Court of NSW

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Date of Decision:

10 November 2016

Before:

Her Honour Judge Payne

File Number(s):

2015/228419

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

The appellant was arraigned on an indictment that charged three offences of sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10. The appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each count and a jury trial proceeded. The appellant was found guilty on the first and second counts, and not guilty on the third.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal against the convictions. First, that the trial judge erred in failing to give the jury a warning that the evidence of the complainant may have been unreliable pursuant to s 165 of the

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Stanford v R

Details

AGLC: Stanford v R [2018] NSWCCA 249
Case: [2018] NSWCCA 249
Decision Date: 07 November 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Stanford, appealed against his conviction for two counts of sexual offences against a single complainant. The trial judge had directed the jury that they could return different verdicts on each count, and they did so, finding Stanford guilty on two counts and acquitting him on a third. Stanford argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, particularly in light of the acquittal on one count. The central issue for the court was whether the jury's differing verdicts were unreasonable and whether the acquittal on one count influenced the jury's assessment of the reliability of the complainant's evidence on the other counts.

The court examined the principles governing the assessment of the reasonableness of jury verdicts. It noted that a jury is entitled to accept some but not all of a complainant's evidence and that an acquittal on one count does not necessarily mean that the jury rejected all of the complainant's evidence. The court held that the jury's verdicts were open to them if they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt on the two counts for which he was convicted. The court found that the jury could have reasonably believed the complainant's evidence on two counts but not on the third, provided there was a rational basis for the difference in their verdicts. The court concluded that the jury's verdicts were reasonable and therefore not subject to appeal.

The court rejected Stanford's contention that the acquittal on one count undermined the reliability of the complainant's evidence on the other counts. It found that the jury could have accepted the complainant's evidence on two counts while rejecting it on the third, as long as there was a rational basis for their differing conclusions. The court emphasised that the jury's role is to assess the evidence and determine the guilt or innocence of the accused on each count individually, and it was open to the jury to accept some but not all of the complainant's evidence. The appeal was dismissed, and Stanford's convictions on the two counts were upheld.

Orders