that the effect of the learned trial judge's
directions infringe what will be submitted to be a
rule in R v Robinson, (1991) 2 ALJR 644.
Your Honours, the direction may be conveniently
found at page 7 of the application book.

DEANE J:

Mr Herbert, you can take it that all members of

the Court have carefully read the judgment, and are
well aware of the basic factual matters.

MR HERBERT:

Thank you, Your Honours.

Your Honours, that

being so, it is submitted that this direction had
the effect of permitting greater, or close,
scrutiny of the evidence of the applicant merely by
reason of the fact that he was the accused in the

case. By placing him in that position, it is
submitted, this direction then took from him, or
was capable of taking from him, creditability, only
by reason of that. If I may - - -

DEANE J:

Now, the Court of Appeal accepted, that on one
reading of the critical passages, what was said

would be a misdirection.

But Their Honours

concluded that in all the circumstances of this particular case, the relevant passages did more good than harm, from the accused point of view.

Now, there are two aspects of that. One is,

if that is what the case turned on, there is a bit
of a problem about seeing that it is an appropriate

case for special leave. The other is, were

Their Honours mistaken in any event in the

circumstance of this case. I am not trying to
discourage you, but it does seem to me that they
may be the matters to which you might most usefully
direct some attention.

MR HERBERT:

I will deal with them immediately.

MR HERBERT:

I will deal with them immediately.

Firstly as

to the characterization of the directions by the
learned judges of appeal, it it principally what
was, with respect, thought to be perhaps the
motivation of the trial judge that Their Honours

dealt. They took the view, it would seem from the
record, that His Honour may have perceived - that
is the learned trial judge - some hostility or
difficulty on the part of the jury with the
evidence of the applicant. At page 11 of the

Stafford

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Stafford v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Stafford v The Queen [1993] HCATrans 41
Case: [1993] HCATrans 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Graham Stuart Stafford applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia against a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. The applicant's complaint concerned the directions given by the trial judge to the jury.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge's directions to the jury had the effect of permitting greater scrutiny of the applicant's evidence solely because he was the accused, thereby potentially diminishing his credibility. This was framed by reference to a rule established in *R v Robinson*. The Court of Appeal had acknowledged that the directions could be read as a misdirection but concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, they did more good than harm from the accused's perspective.

The applicant submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in its characterisation of the trial judge's motivation and in its reasoning that the strength of the Crown's case excused a less stringent application of the *Robinson* rule. The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal's approach, which appeared to measure the required judicial direction against the strength of the prosecution's case, was flawed. The Court of Appeal's reasoning suggested that if the trial judge perceived hostility from the jury towards the accused's evidence, the directions could be seen as an attempt to ensure fairness, and that in cases with a strong Crown case followed by the accused giving evidence, there was a risk of the jury summarily rejecting that evidence regardless of judicial warnings.

Orders