Stafford v Automotive Distributors Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stafford v Automotive Distributors Limited [2019] FCA 2068

Appeal from: Stafford v Automotive Distributors Limited [2018] FCCA 2768
File number: WAD 593 of 2018
Judge: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 6 December 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for leave to appeal from summary dismissal of appeal by Federal Circuit Court of Australia - where primary judge summarily dismissed appeal on the basis that it had no reasonable prospects of success - where in the alternative primary judge dismissed appeal on the basis of failure to comply with orders and on the basis the points of claim should be struck out with no leave to re-plead - where appeal to Federal Circuit Court from decision of delegate of Registrar of Trade Marks to remove trade mark from Register - where applicant did not meet onus to rebut allegation that the trade mark had not been used during relevant three year period - whether primary judge's decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration - leave to appeal refused
Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 92, 100, 101, 104, 197

Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 (Cth) rr 1.05, 13.03B, 13.10

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 36.01

Cases cited:

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2018] FCA 1908

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564

Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125

Professional Administration Service Centres Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCAFC 180

Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118

Date of hearing: 6 December 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Trade Marks
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 61
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr WCJ Zappia
Solicitor for the Respondent: ChrysLegal Pty Ltd

ORDERS

WAD 593 of 2018
BETWEEN:

MICHAEL JOHN STAFFORD

Applicant

AND:

AUTOMOTIVE DISTRIBUTORS LIMITED

Respondent

JUDGE:

BANKS-SMITH J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BANKS-SMITH J:

  1. Mr Stafford seeks leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia summarily dismissing his claim relating to the removal of a trade mark from the Trade Marks Register.

    Background

  2. The facts and procedural history are set out in detail in the reasons of the primary judge and it is not necessary to repeat them all.  The following are of…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 2068
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mr Stafford sought leave to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia that summarily dismissed his claim in relation to the removal of a trade mark from the Trade Marks Register. The Federal Circuit Court had dismissed the appeal on the basis that it had no reasonable prospects of success and had dismissed the appeal on alternative grounds. The primary judge had found that Mr Stafford had not rebutted the allegation that the trade mark had not been used during the relevant three year period, and that he had failed to comply with procedural orders and that the points of claim should be struck out with no leave to re-plead. Mr Stafford's application for leave to appeal focused on a number of alleged errors made by the primary judge in dismissing his appeal. However, the Federal Circuit Court found that Mr Stafford had not identified any error on the part of the primary judge that would warrant reconsideration of the decision to summarily dismiss the appeal. The Court held that there was no foundation to Mr Stafford's contention that he was not given time to put on evidence relevant to the appeal. The Court also found that Mr Stafford had evinced an ongoing intention not to prosecute the actual case before the Court for determination.

The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. It found that Mr Stafford had not identified any error on the part of the primary judge that would warrant reconsideration of the decision to summarily dismiss the appeal. The Court noted that Mr Stafford had not rebutted the allegation that the trade mark had not been used during the relevant three year period, and that he had failed to comply with procedural orders and that the points of claim should be struck out with no leave to re-plead. The Court also found that Mr Stafford had evinced an ongoing intention not to prosecute the actual case before the Court for determination. As a result, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Stafford seeks leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia summarily dismissing his claim relating to the removal of a trade mark from the Trade Marks Register.Background The facts and procedural history are set out in detail in the reasons of the primary judge and it is not necessary to repeat them all. The following are of particular relevance. In May 2015 a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks (Registrar) decided that the respondent, Automotive Distributors Limited, had successfully established a case to remove Australian Trade Mark No. 713318 (Trade Mark) from the Trade Marks Register under s 92(4) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). That section provides:(1)Subject to subsection (3), a person may apply to the Registrar to have a trade mark that is or may be registered removed from the Register.…(4)An application under subsection (1) or (3) (non-use application) may be made on either or both of the following grounds, and on no other grounds:(a)that, on the day on which the application for the registration of the trade mark was filed, the applicant for registration had no intention in good faith:(i)to use the trade mark in Australia; or(ii)to authorise the use of the trade mark in Australia; or(iii)to assign the trade mark to a body corporate for use by the body corporate in Australia;in relation to the goods and/or services to which the non-use application relates and that the registered owner:(iv) has not used the trade mark in Australia; or(v) has not used the trade mark in good faith in Australia;in relation to those goods and/or services at any time before the period of one month ending on the day on which the non-use application is filed;(b)that the trade mark has remained registered for a continuous period of 3 years ending one month before the day on which the non-use application is filed, and, at no time during that period, the person who was then the registered owner:(i) used the trade mark in Australia; or(ii) used the trade mark in good faith in Australia;in relation to the goods and/or services to which the application relates. Relevantly, s 100(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act provides:(1)In any proceedings relating to an opposed application, it is for the opponent to rebut:…(c)any allegation made under paragraph 92(4)(b) that the trade mark has not, at any time during the period of 3 years ending one month before the day on which the opposed application was filed, been used, or been used in good faith, by its registered owner in relation to the relevant goods and/or services. Under s 101(1) of the Trade Marks Act, if the Registrar is satisfied that the grounds of an application are established then the Registrar may decide to remove the trade mark from the Register. In this matter the Registrar relevantly found that:(a)the Trade Mark had a priority date of 19 July 1996 and its owner was registered as 'Australian Carburettors and Fuel Injection'. That name was a business name only. Mr Stafford was the holder of the business name at the time of registration of the Trade Mark;(b)the business name was cancelled on 4 July 1997. Therefore, it was not in force during the three year period for the purpose of s 92(4)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, a period which ended on 14 May 2012;(c)a business name is not a legal entity and cannot own a trade mark and in any event, because of its cancellation, Mr Stafford could not have held the business name for the relevant three year period; and(d)Mr Stafford did not rebut the allegation of non‑use of the trade mark, having regard to the evidence and submissions before the Registrar.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, having regard to the fact that Mr Stafford is unrepresented, I have considered carefully the primary judge's reasons, each of the matters in the proposed notice of appeal, the content of three affidavits that Mr Stafford has filed in this application and his submissions.Consideration As to the grounds in the notice of appeal, ground 1 does not assert error on the part of the primary judge. There was no evidence as to the manner in which the proceedings before the Registrar progressed, whether there was any unreasonable delay or whether or how any prejudice arose through any delay, such that the appeal before the primary judge was in any way compromised. It appears from the primary judge's reasons that the only matter relied upon by Mr Stafford as to delay was alleged delay on the part of the respondent and an assertion that it had not complied with orders: [21] of reasons. There was no evidence evinced in that regard and it is not at all clear that the reference is to alleged non-compliance before the Registrar or the primary judge. Ground 2 is not relevant to any appeal from the decision of the primary judge. Ground 3 is not supported by any evidence. Mr Stafford asserts generally that he was not provided with the opportunity to provide evidence, but that is not the case. He clearly had an opportunity to provide evidence before the Registrar. The fact that evidence may have been rejected does not disclose an absence of opportunity to provide it. The primary judge noted that although Mr Stafford was entitled to adduce evidence on the appeal in that Court he did not do so. Rather, according to the primary judge:[51]… Mr Stafford made it apparent at hearing that what he seeks to do is not argue the Appeal, but to have an initial hearing to determine ownership of the Trade Mark … Mr Stafford has therefore evinced an ongoing intention not to prosecute, either at all or with due diligence, the actual case before the Court for determination … Mr Stafford has not suggested he would seek leave to rely on new evidence on any appeal and has not identified or produced any such proposed relevant new evidence. He was granted the opportunity to file affidavits in support of his application for leave in this Court. In my view, there is no foundation to Mr Stafford's contention that he was not given time to put on evidence relevant to the appeal. Relevant evidence would have been evidence that would have assisted him in rebutting the respondent's allegation that the trade mark had not, at any time during the three year period, been used by Mr Stafford, as referred to in s 100(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act. Ground 4 is not relevant to any appeal from the decision of the primary judge. Ground 5 lacks any clarity and in any event does not appear to have been a matter raised before the primary judge. To the extent it is a reference to matters being undertaken in the name of Bilstein Ltd, then the assertion was addressed as part of 'claim 6' as enumerated by the primary judge, and there is no error disclosed in the primary judge's description of that claim (as a whole) as 'irrelevant, vague, discursive …'.