FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Stafford v Automotive Distributors Limited [2019] FCA 2068
Appeal from: Stafford v Automotive Distributors Limited [2018] FCCA 2768 File number: WAD 593 of 2018 Judge: BANKS-SMITH J Date of judgment: 6 December 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for leave to appeal from summary dismissal of appeal by Federal Circuit Court of Australia - where primary judge summarily dismissed appeal on the basis that it had no reasonable prospects of success - where in the alternative primary judge dismissed appeal on the basis of failure to comply with orders and on the basis the points of claim should be struck out with no leave to re-plead - where appeal to Federal Circuit Court from decision of delegate of Registrar of Trade Marks to remove trade mark from Register - where applicant did not meet onus to rebut allegation that the trade mark had not been used during relevant three year period - whether primary judge's decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration - leave to appeal refused Legislation: Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17A
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 92, 100, 101, 104, 197
Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 (Cth) rr 1.05, 13.03B, 13.10
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 36.01
Cases cited: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397
Dennis v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2018] FCA 1908
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1572; (2000) 104 FCR 564
Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125
Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238
Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118
Date of hearing: 6 December 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Trade Marks Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 61 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr WCJ Zappia Solicitor for the Respondent: ChrysLegal Pty Ltd ORDERS
WAD 593 of 2018 BETWEEN: MICHAEL JOHN STAFFORD
Applicant
AND: AUTOMOTIVE DISTRIBUTORS LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGE:
BANKS-SMITH J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 DECEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BANKS-SMITH J:
Mr Stafford seeks leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia summarily dismissing his claim relating to the removal of a trade mark from the Trade Marks Register.
Background
The facts and procedural history are set out in detail in the reasons of the primary judge and it is not necessary to repeat them all. The following are of…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 2068
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal. It found that Mr Stafford had not identified any error on the part of the primary judge that would warrant reconsideration of the decision to summarily dismiss the appeal. The Court noted that Mr Stafford had not rebutted the allegation that the trade mark had not been used during the relevant three year period, and that he had failed to comply with procedural orders and that the points of claim should be struck out with no leave to re-plead. The Court also found that Mr Stafford had evinced an ongoing intention not to prosecute the actual case before the Court for determination. As a result, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
However, having regard to the fact that Mr Stafford is unrepresented, I have considered carefully the primary judge's reasons, each of the matters in the proposed notice of appeal, the content of three affidavits that Mr Stafford has filed in this application and his submissions.Consideration As to the grounds in the notice of appeal, ground 1 does not assert error on the part of the primary judge. There was no evidence as to the manner in which the proceedings before the Registrar progressed, whether there was any unreasonable delay or whether or how any prejudice arose through any delay, such that the appeal before the primary judge was in any way compromised. It appears from the primary judge's reasons that the only matter relied upon by Mr Stafford as to delay was alleged delay on the part of the respondent and an assertion that it had not complied with orders: [21] of reasons. There was no evidence evinced in that regard and it is not at all clear that the reference is to alleged non-compliance before the Registrar or the primary judge. Ground 2 is not relevant to any appeal from the decision of the primary judge. Ground 3 is not supported by any evidence. Mr Stafford asserts generally that he was not provided with the opportunity to provide evidence, but that is not the case. He clearly had an opportunity to provide evidence before the Registrar. The fact that evidence may have been rejected does not disclose an absence of opportunity to provide it. The primary judge noted that although Mr Stafford was entitled to adduce evidence on the appeal in that Court he did not do so. Rather, according to the primary judge:[51]… Mr Stafford made it apparent at hearing that what he seeks to do is not argue the Appeal, but to have an initial hearing to determine ownership of the Trade Mark … Mr Stafford has therefore evinced an ongoing intention not to prosecute, either at all or with due diligence, the actual case before the Court for determination … Mr Stafford has not suggested he would seek leave to rely on new evidence on any appeal and has not identified or produced any such proposed relevant new evidence. He was granted the opportunity to file affidavits in support of his application for leave in this Court. In my view, there is no foundation to Mr Stafford's contention that he was not given time to put on evidence relevant to the appeal. Relevant evidence would have been evidence that would have assisted him in rebutting the respondent's allegation that the trade mark had not, at any time during the three year period, been used by Mr Stafford, as referred to in s 100(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act. Ground 4 is not relevant to any appeal from the decision of the primary judge. Ground 5 lacks any clarity and in any event does not appear to have been a matter raised before the primary judge. To the extent it is a reference to matters being undertaken in the name of Bilstein Ltd, then the assertion was addressed as part of 'claim 6' as enumerated by the primary judge, and there is no error disclosed in the primary judge's description of that claim (as a whole) as 'irrelevant, vague, discursive …'.