TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Square, Inc to registration of trade mark application number 1858135 (class 35) – Tax Square – in the name of J Plus S Pty Ltd.
Delegate: Katrina Brown Representation: Opponent: Kate McHaffie of AJ Park
Applicant: Self-representedDecision: 2020 ATMO 47
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – opposition under section 52 – s 44 established – registration refused.Background
This decision relates to an opposition under s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘the Act’) by Square, Inc (‘the Opponent’) to the registration of the following trade mark:
Trade Mark No: 1858135
Trade Mark: Tax Square (‘the Trade Mark’)
Applicant: J Plus S Pty Ltd (‘the Applicant’)
Filing Date: 11 July 2017
Services:Class 35 - Preparation of documents relating to taxation; Preparation of income tax returns; Preparation of tax returns; Tax assessment (accounts) preparation; Tax consultancy (accountancy); Tax filing services; Tax planning (accountancy); Tax preparation; Tax return advisory (accountancy) services; Tax return preparation; Taxation (accountancy) advice; Taxation (accountancy) consultancy (‘the Applicant’s Services’)
The trade mark application was examined as required by s 31 of the Act and its acceptance for possible registration was advertised in the Official Journal of Trade Marks on 7 December 2017.
The Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose on 7 February 2018 followed by a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) on 7 March 2018.
The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 4 May 2018.
The Opponent filed the following declaration as evidence in support:
·Declaration of Kirupa Pushparaj (Director of Intellectual Property at the Opponent) made on 12 August 2018 with Exhibits KP-1 to KP-41.
The Applicant filed the following declaration as evidence in answer:
·Declaration of Pardeep Kumar (Director of Applicant) made on 12 November 2018.
The Opponent did not file any evidence in reply.
The matter was heard by way of written submissions. The Applicant’s written submissions contain new material which is properly characterised as evidence. This material was not filed during the evidence periods, nor was a request made for the material to be considered under reg 21.19 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’). As such, I have not considered the new material in reaching my determination in this matter. Notwithstanding, the new material would not have altered the outcome of this matter.
Grounds of opposition and onus
In the SGP, the Opponent nominated grounds of opposition under ss 42(b), 44 and 60 of the Act. In its written submissions, the Opponent withdrew the ground under s 42(b). Therefore, I proceed on the basis that the only grounds being pursued are s 44 and s 60.
The Opponent bears the onus of establishing at least one of the remaining nominated grounds of opposition.[1] The standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard of the balance of probabilities.[2]
[1] Food…
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- Case
- [2020] ATMO 47
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Hearing Officer was whether the ground of opposition under section 44 of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth) had been established. This required a determination of whether the services specified in the Applicant's application were similar to the services covered by the Opponent's registered trade marks, and whether the Opponent's registrations were held by a person other than the Applicant.
The Hearing Officer reasoned that section 14(2) of the Act defines services as similar if they are the same or of the same description. In assessing similarity, the Hearing Officer considered the essential characteristics of the services, applying established principles used for comparing goods. These principles involve examining the nature and characteristics of the services, their origin, purpose, and the trade channels through which they are bought and sold. The Hearing Officer found that the Opponent's registrations were held in a name other than that of the Applicant and shared an earlier priority date. Crucially, the Hearing Officer concluded that the services were similar when judged in a business sense, as they could be provided to the same consumers, by the same provider, through the same channels, and for similar purposes.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer found that the ground of opposition under section 44 of the Act had been established. The application to register the trade mark was refused. Costs were awarded against the Applicant in accordance with the usual principle that costs follow the event.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Opponent relies on the following trade marks (‘the Opponent’s Registrations’) as the basis for this ground of opposition: From the information set out above, it is evident that the Opponent’s Registrations are held in a name other than that of the Applicant and both share a priority date that is earlier than that of the Trade Mark. My next consideration is whether the goods and services of the Opponent’s Registrations are closely related, or similar, to the Applicant’s Services. The Opponent submits that the Applicant’s Services are similar to:at least the provision of analytic tools and software and e-commerce services covered by the Opponent’s Registrations, because, when judged in a business sense, the respective services would or at least could be provided to the same consumers, by the same provider, through the same channels and for the same, similar or related purposes.[3][3] Opponent’s submissions [5.32].Comparison of services The comparison of services for the purposes of s 44 is between the Applicant’s Services and the services claimed in the Opponent’s Registrations as set out at [16] of this decision. The comparison is not between the Applicant’s Services and what the Opponent has used its Registrations for in the marketplace.[4][4] Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Co Inc (1973) 129 CLR 353, 362. Section 14(2) of the Act provides:For the purposes of this Act, services are similar to other services: (a) if they are the same as the other services; or (b) if they are of the same description as that of the other services. Determining whether services are similar involves examining the ‘essential characteristics’[5] of the relevant services bearing in mind that it:ought not to be given too restricted a construction; at least not so as to be limited to [services] substantially analogous in kind, or commonly used as mere substitutes or alternatives the one for the other.[6][5] Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 56 [337].[6] Dr August Wolff GmbH & Co. KG Arzneimittel v Combe International Ltd [2020] FCA 39 [28]. The factors for determining the similarity of goods are applicable, with necessary modification, to the question of whether services are similar.[7] The factors for determining if goods are similar are well-established and involve a consideration of:the nature and characteristics of the goods, their origin, their purpose, whether they are usually produced by one and the same manufacturer or distributed by the same wholesale houses, whether they are sold in the same shops over the same counters during the same seasons and to the same class or classes of customers, and whether by those engaged in their manufacture and distribution they are regarded as belonging to the same trade. In the case of Jellinek's Application, Romer, J. classified these various factors under three heads, viz., the nature of the goods, the uses thereof, and the trade channels through which they are bought and sold.[8][7] MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd [1998] 90 FCR 236, 241; E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2009] FCAFC 27 [70].[8] Application by John Crowther & Sons (Milnsbridge) Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 369, 372.