Spedding v State of New South Wales

Case

[2022] NSWSC 503

27 April 2022

No judgment structure available for this case.

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Spedding v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 503
Hearing dates: 27 April 2022
Date of orders: 27 April 2022
Decision date: 27 April 2022
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Harrison J
Decision:

Order that the documents described in the Schedule be admitted over objection

Catchwords:

EVIDENCE – where plaintiff seeks to rely on evidence filed in other proceedings – whether tender of evidence offends UCPR 31.9 – whether documents subject to Harman undertaking

Legislation Cited:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 31.9

Cases Cited:

British Thomson-Houston Company Ltd v British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd [1924] 2 Ch 160

Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280

Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36

Printing Telegraph & Construction Co of Agents AGE & Havas Ltd v Drucker [1894] 2 QB 801

Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217; (1992) 110 ALR 685; 38 FLR 217; [1992] FCA 72

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties: William Harrie Spedding (Plaintiff)
State of New South Wales (Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
A Canceri with T O’Rourke (Plaintiff)
A Williams with B Searson (Defendant)

Solicitors:
O’Brien Criminal and Civil Solicitors (Plaintiff)
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2019/00289937
Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment

  1. HIS HONOUR: Mr Spedding seeks to tender a large series of documents. For present purposes it is sufficient to describe them in general terms as documents produced for or in the course of two sets of proceedings in the Family Court of Australia. The documents are particularised in the Schedule attached to these reasons. One of the documents is an affidavit sworn by Mr Spedding in litigation in which he was a party.

  2. The tender of the documents is opposed by the State of New South Wales upon two bases. The first is that they offend UCPR 31.9, which is as follows:

31.9 Earlier evidence in other proceedings

(1) In any proceedings, evidence taken, or an affidavit filed, in other proceedings may not be used as evidence, saving all just exceptions and unless the court orders otherwise.

(2) Leave may not be granted under subrule (1) except to allow the evidence taken, or affidavit filed, in the other proceedings to be used in relation to the proof of particular facts.

  1. The second is that they are subject to an implied undertaking that the documents shall not be used for any purpose other than prosecution of the proceeding in or for which the document was created: Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280. In Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ described the obligation in these terms:

“[96] Where one party to litigation is compelled, either by reason of a rule of court, or by reason of a specific order of the court, or otherwise, to disclose documents or information, the party obtaining the disclosure cannot, without the leave of the court, use it for any purpose other than that for which it was given unless it is received into evidence. The types of material disclosed to which this principle applies include documents inspected after discovery, answers to interrogatories, documents produced on subpoena, documents produced for the purposes of taxation of costs, documents produced pursuant to a direction from an arbitrator, documents seized pursuant to an Anton Piller order, witness statements served pursuant to a judicial direction and affidavits…”

  1. Mr Spedding wishes to tender these documents in aid of his contention that they constitute material that his prosecutor on historical sexual assault charges in the District Court should have been aware of and which should relevantly have informed the decision to prosecute him. Mr Spedding maintains that these documents, in combination with other circumstances, demonstrate that his prosecutor could not have had reasonable or probable cause to commence or maintain the proceedings against him and that the prosecution was demonstrably malicious.

  2. Importantly, Mr Spedding does not seek to rely upon any of these documents as proof of the facts to which they refer. He is content to limit his reliance upon them as material that was, or should have been, in the hands of his prosecutor at the time the criminal proceedings were commenced against him and throughout the period over which they were maintained.

UCPR 31.9

  1. This rule presupposes the general inadmissibility of testimonial evidence called by a party in previous proceedings: British Thomson-Houston Company Ltd v British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd [1924] 2 Ch 160. The rule does not permit the court to grant leave to use the evidence of witnesses in other proceedings between other parties on a similar issue: Printing Telegraph & Construction Co of Agents AGE & Havas Ltd v Drucker [1894] 2 QB 801.

  2. In order to be within the rule the evidence must have been in proceedings between the same parties or their privies, must otherwise be admissible and must go to the same fact situation in each set of proceedings, although the relief sought may differ. However, those limitations appear to draw their strength from the requirement in rule 31.9(2) relating to use “in relation to the proof of particular facts”.

  3. In the present proceedings, Mr Spedding sues the State of New South Wales on a series of causes of action including malicious prosecution. Mr Spedding maintains that his prosecution on a series of alleged historical sex offences was commenced and maintained without reasonable or probable cause. One of the ways in which he seeks to establish this is by reference to the fact that the allegations of sexual abuse were first raised in the context of family law proceedings between him and his wife in which it was alleged that he had sexually abused two of his children. Mr Spedding maintains that a comparison between the evidence led in support of those allegation at that time and the later versions of events given by the alleged victims, among other things, as well as the doubts cast upon the veracity of the complaints evident in the judgment of his Honour Gee J, support the contention that any prosecutor should have held significant doubts about the viability of the prosecution.

  4. In that setting it will be obvious that Mr Spedding does not wish to tender the record of the proceedings in the Family Court or affidavits or other documents “in relation to the proof of particular facts” that might be referred to or drawn from the various sources in question. The truth or otherwise of any issue contested or adjudicated in the Family Court is not directly in issue in these proceedings. Far from that, Mr Spedding seeks only to show that the documents he wishes to tender were in existence and were available for use in the assessment of the charges against him by his prosecutor. Mr Spedding tenders the documents as facts, not as documents capable of being used to prove particular facts.

  5. In any event, the two sets of proceedings in the Family Court are not proceedings between the same parties or their privies: the State of New South Wales was not a party in those matters and is otherwise entirely independent of anyone who was.

Harman

  1. Mr Spedding’s tender of the documents is also not caught by any so-called Harman undertaking. This is not a case of potential misuse or abuse of material that has been provided or disclosed to a party under compulsion of litigation by an opponent in the same proceedings. The Family Court matters are obviously separate and discrete pieces of litigation. The submission that some implied undertaking applies to the use of the material that came into existence in other proceedings should be rejected.

  2. However, there is a more fundamental problem with this submission. All of the material that Mr Spedding wishes to tender was utilised in the Family Court proceedings. It lost any character that it may otherwise have had as material impliedly subject to an obligation not to publish or use it.

  3. In Hearne v Street at [98], the majority adverted to this as follows:

“[98] It may be noted that the general law protection is often buttressed by protection from rules of court. Thus until 15 August 2005, the New South Wales Supreme Court Rules 1970, Pt 65 r 7, prevented strangers to litigation from having access to documents or things on the court file without the leave of the Court: see also Practice Note No 97. From 1 March 2006, Practice Note SC Gen 2 prescribed procedures in relation to access to Supreme Court files. The most important paragraphs are:

‘6. Access to material in any proceedings is restricted to parties, except with the leave of the Court.

7. Access will normally be granted to non-parties in respect of:

• pleadings and judgments in proceedings that have been concluded, except in so far as an order has been made that they or portions of them be kept confidential;

• documents that record what was said or done in open court;

• material that was admitted into evidence; and

• information that would have been heard or seen by any person present in open court,

unless the Judge or registrar dealing with the application considers that the material or portions of it should be kept confidential. Access to other material will not be allowed unless a registrar or Judge is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist."

  1. It is not suggested that this rule applies directly to the material in question in the Family Court. However, as a matter of practical reality, all of the material in question relates to proceedings that have been concluded, no confidentiality orders having been made in respect of any of the material. The documents include those that record what was said in open court and material admitted into evidence, all of which could have been seen or heard by any person present in open court.

  2. In general terms, the following considerations are relevant in cases where it is arguable that the Harman restriction applies:

  1. what is the nature of the document and information in the document (for example how private and/or confidential the contents of the document are);

  2. what are the circumstances under which the document came into existence;

  3. whether any prejudice might be occasioned to the author of the document if it is permitted to be used for another purpose;

  4. whether the document pre-dated the litigation or was created for the purpose of litigation and hence was intended eventually to enter the public domain;

  5. how the document came into the hands of the party seeking leave to use the document;

  6. the contribution that the document might make to achieving justice in the second proceedings.

  1. In Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217; (1992) 110 ALR 685; 38 FLR 217; [1992] FCA 720, the contribution that the document might make to achieving justice in the second proceedings was called “perhaps the most important [consideration] of all” per Wilcox J at [26] as follows:

“[26] … The matter then becomes one of the proper exercise of the Court's discretion, many factors being relevant. It is neither possible nor desirable to propound an exhaustive list of those factors. But plainly they include the nature of the document, the circumstances under which it came into existence, the attitude of the author of the document and any prejudice the author may sustain, whether the document pre-existed litigation or was created for that purpose and therefore expected to enter the public domain, the nature of the information in the document (in particular whether it contains personal data or commercially sensitive information), the circumstances in which the document came into the hands of the applicant for leave and, perhaps most important of all, the likely contribution of the document to achieving justice in the second proceeding.”

  1. In the present case, none of these matters, if raised on a hypothetical application to be relieved of the Harman undertaking, would appear to operate against permitting their use. The documents quite obviously have the potential to make an essential and fundamental contribution to Mr Spedding’s litigation. Moreover, for reasons already referred to, the tender seeks to establish the existence of the documents as the important fact, not the resolution of any dispute concerning the facts to which they refer.

Conclusion

  1. It was for these reasons that I permitted Mr Spedding to tender the documents referred to in the Schedule.

SCHEDULE

Joint Court Book tab number

Nature of document/s

Date/period

79

Affidavit of the Plaintiff in Kearns v Kearns

6 October 1988

75

Affidavit of the Plaintiff in Kearns v Kearns

12 May 1988

50

Affidavit of Cathryn Spedding in Spedding v Spedding

26 May 1987

104

Affidavit of Cathryn Kearns in Spedding v Spedding

15 August 1990

103

Affidavit of the Plaintiff in Spedding v Spedding

24 May 1990

51

Affidavit of the Christine Guthrie in Spedding v Spedding

26 May 1987

59

Affidavit of the Plaintiff in Spedding v Spedding

24 July 1987

65

Affidavit of Cathryn Spedding in Kearns v Kearns

19 January 1988

43

Affidavit of Cathryn Spedding in Kearns v Kearns

28 January 1987

76

Affidavit of Cathryn Spedding in Kearns v Kearns

26 August 1988

61

Affidavit of Christine Guthrie in Kearns v Kearns

14 January 1988

100

Chronologies of allegations

Unknown

92

Affidavit of the Plaintiff in Kearns v Kearns

4 April 1989

62

Affidavit of Daniel Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

14 January 1988

64

Affidavit of Hilary Wilson in Kearns v Kearns

18 January 1988

80

Affidavits of Margaret Myers and Lesley Turner in Kearns v Kearns

6 October 1988

84

Affidavit of Edna Hillsley in Kearns v Kearns

17 October 1988

39

Affidavit of Irene Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

13 January 1987

69

Affidavit of Irene Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

20 January 1988

73

Affidavit of Irene Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

10 May 1988

70

Affidavit of Daniel Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

23 March 1988

71

Affidavit of Cathryn Spedding in Kearns v Kearns

25 March 1988

74

Affidavit of Dr Lim in Kearns v Kearns

11 May 1988

60

Letter of Dr L W Lambert

4 January 1988

40

Affidavit of Dr Hazeldine in Kearns v Kearns

23 January 1987

63

Affidavit of Daniel Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

15 January 1988

44

Affidavit of Daniel Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

28 January 1987

41

Affidavit of Lesley Hessey in Kearns v Kearns

23 January 1987

42

Affidavit of Lucknel Pearce in Kearns v Kearns

23 January 1987

66

Affidavit of Bronwyn Cintio in Kearns v Kearns

19 January 1988

67

Affidavit of Anne Kennedy in Kearns v Kearns

19 January 1988

102

Judgment in Kearns v Kearns by his Honour Justice Gee

17 May 1989

281

Pre-trial transcript

24 February 2017

300

Trial Transcript

20 February 2018

301

Trial Transcript

21 February 2018

303

Trial Transcript

26 February 2018

307

Trial Transcript

5 March 2018

309

Judgment on the Application by the Plaintiff for no case to answer

5 March 2018

310

Revised Transcript on Plaintiff’s application for costs

5 March 2018

304

Transcript of Trial

27 February 2018

278

Pre-trial transcript

9 February 2017

279

Pre-trial Transcript

14 February 2017

305

Trial Transcript

28 February 2018

54

Affidavit of Irene Kearns in Kearnsv Kearns

17 June 1987

57

Affidavit of Daniel Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

1 July 1987

45

Letter from Joanne Griffith of the Child Protection Unit at Ballarat

3 March 1987

58

Undertaking in Kearns v Kearns

1 July 1987

85

Transcript of proceedings, Kearns v Kearns

17 October 1988

86

Transcript of proceedings, Kearns v Kearns

18 October 1988

87

Transcript of proceedings, Kearns v Kearns

19 October 1988

88

Transcript of proceedings, Kearns v Kearns

20 October 1988

78

Affidavit of Lesley Norman Hessey in Kearns v Kearns

22 September 1988

81

Affidavit of Joanne Mary Griffith in Kearns v Kearns

7 October 1988

83

Affidavit of Margaret Ruth Jarvis in Kearns v Kearns

8 October 1988

82

Affidavit of Lucknel Avril Pearce in Kearns v Kearns

7 October 1988

77

Affidavit of Lucknel Avril Pearce in Kearns v Kearns

19 September 1988

89

Affidavit of Magie Lewis-Borgwardtin Kearns v Kearns

20 October 1988

106

Affidavit of Daniel Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

19 July 1991

105

Affidavit of Daniel Kearns in Kearns v Kearns

11 June 1991

72

Further Affidavit of Dr Ann Banning in Kearns v Kearns

6 May 1988

101

Document titled “Involvement of Christine Guthrie” in Kearns v Kearns

12 May 1989

99

Document titled “Chronology and Statement of Material Facts” in Kearns v Kearns

9 May 1989

98

Affidavit of Senior Constable Peter Jeffrey Mills in Kearns v Kearns,

26 April 1989

94

Affidavit of Dr Brent G.H. Waters in Kearns v Kearns

20 April 1989

96

Affidavit of Judith Mary Houston in Kearns v Kearns

21 April 1989

95

Affidavit of Dr J.W. Shand in Kearns v Kearns

20 April 1989

93

Affidavit of S.P. Grosvenor in Kearns v Kearns

5 April 1989

97

Affidavit of P.M. Innes in Kearns v Kearns

21 April 1989

91

Affidavit of Vera Zuylen in Kearns v Kearns

6 February 1989

107

Affidavit of Kevin Zibell in Kearns v Kearns

18 October 1991

68

Affidavit of Michael J Dunne in Kearns v Kearns

19 January 1988

306

Trial Transcript

1 March 2018

277

175B - Transcript of the evidence of Leonnie Robbins and Janelle Dalliday

8 February 2017

**********

Decision last updated: 30 June 2022

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Cases Citing This Decision

4

R v Dawson [2022] NSWSC 861
Nicolosi & Faron (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 146
Cases Cited

4

Statutory Material Cited

1

Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36
Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36
Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36