FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Nicolosi & Faron (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 146
Appeal from: Faron & Nicolosi [2025] FCWA 57 Appeal number: NAA 153 of 2025 File number: PTW 937 of 2017 Judgment of: ALDRIDGE, HARPER & SCHONELL JJ Date of judgment: 20 August 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL – Where the applicant seeks leave to appeal from an interlocutory determination by the primary judge – Allegations of denial of procedural fairness and apprehended bias without merit – Where the applicant contends the primary judge erred in an application of the Harman undertaking as to affidavits and a transcript – Where the primary judge found the affidavit and transcript were impressed with an implied undertaking which necessitated consideration as to whether special circumstances existed permitting their use – Where the primary judge fell into error as the affidavit and transcript were not caught by the common law restrictions as to use – Where the Full Court is not satisfied substantial injustice would be occasioned if leave were not granted – Leave to appeal refused – Appeal dismissed. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt XIVB, s 114UB
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 35(b)
Family Court Act 1997 (WA) Pt 11A
Cases cited: Candle & Falkner (2021) FLC 94-069; [2021] FedCFamC1A 102
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 67
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Medlow & Medlow(2016) FLC 93-692; [2016] FamCAFC 34
Nada & Nettle (Costs) (2014) FLC 93-612; [2014] FamCAFC 207
Nicolosi & Faron (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 160
Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164; [2019] HCA 25
Perdicari & Perdicari (2019) FLC 93-914; [2019] FamCAFC 147
Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33
Spedding v New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 503
Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217
Number of paragraphs: 71 Date of hearing: 29 July 2025 Place: Heard in Perth, delivered in Sydney The Applicant: Litigant in person The Respondent: Litigant in person ORDERS
NAA 153 of 2025
PTW 937 of 2017FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MR NICOLOSI
Applicant
AND: MS FARON
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ALDRIDGE, HARPER & SCHONELL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
20 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Notice of Appeal filed 4 April 2025 is dismissed.
2.The Application in an Appeal filed 29 May 2025 is dismissed.
3.The respondent’s oral application for costs is dismissed.
Note: The form of…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC1A 146
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that while there was merit to Mr. Nicolosi's contention that the primary judge had erred in permitting the use of the affidavit and transcripts, he had not demonstrated that a substantial injustice would be occasioned if leave to appeal were not granted. The court noted that the affidavit and transcripts were not subject to the implied undertaking and were therefore not restricted from use, provided they fell within the exceptions under Pt XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and Pt 11A of the WA Act. The court further found that Mr. Nicolosi had not established that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case. The Full Court was not satisfied that substantial injustice would be occasioned if leave to appeal were not granted.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the Notice of Appeal and the Application in an Appeal, and refused leave to appeal. The court also dismissed the respondent’s oral application for costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
NAA 153 of 2025
PTW 937 of 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BETWEEN:
MR NICOLOSI
Applicant
AND:
MS FARON
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ALDRIDGE, HARPER & SCHONELL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
20 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The Notice of Appeal filed 4 April 2025 is dismissed.
2. The Application in an Appeal filed 29 May 2025 is dismissed.
3. The respondent’s oral application for costs is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As with her Honour, we likewise consider such an approach is apposite to this appeal. Ground 2: Apprehended bias – prior adverse credibility findings prevented fresh consideration By Ground 2, the applicant contends that the primary judge, by reason of prior determinations reflecting on the credibility of the applicant, should have recused himself. The Summary of Argument contends:8.…His Honour erred in failing to recuse himself despite having previously formed and expressed clear adverse views about the [applicant’s] credibility, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Primary Judgment Paragraphs: Implied across 20–25 (contextual), originating from FCWA 60 [5 April 2024] (As per the original) To establish apprehended bias, the applicant must demonstrate objectively two things. First, what it was that was said by the primary judge that might give rise to an apprehension that the judge might decide the case other than on its merits, and second, and of no less significance, an articulation of the logical connection between what was said and the possibility, real not remote, of a “feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits” as per Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 (“Ebner”) at [8]. As their Honours observed in Ebner, to succeed on a ground of apprehension of bias, the applicant must establish that:6.… a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide…(Footnote omitted) The observations of the High Court of Australia are not without qualification and are subject to the conduct of the person who asserts an apprehension of bias within the rubric of waiver (Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 (“Vakauta”)). In that respect, in Vakauta, Dawson J observed at 576:There can, I think, be no doubt that an objection upon the ground of bias can be waived. Even where it is a question of the public apprehension of bias, the parties themselves must be competent to waive the objection. Although justice must manifestly be seen to be done, where a party, being unaware of his right to object, waives that right, there will be little danger of the appearance of injustice… Likewise, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ observed at 572 as follows:…It would be unfair and wrong if failure to object until the contents of the final judgment were known were to give the party in default the advantage of an effective choice between acceptance and rejection of the judgment and to subject the other party to a situation in which it was likely that the judgment would be allowed to stand only if it proved to be unfavourable to him or her. We are satisfied that the observations of their Honours are apposite to what occurred before the primary judge and what is now asserted in this appeal. The applicant appealed the primary judge’s orders made 5 April 2024. The first ground of appeal in that appeal asserted “perceived bias” on the part of the primary judge.