Nicolosi & Faron (No 3)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Nicolosi & Faron (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1A 146

Appeal from: Faron & Nicolosi [2025] FCWA 57
Appeal number: NAA 153 of 2025
File number: PTW 937 of 2017
Judgment of: ALDRIDGE, HARPER & SCHONELL JJ
Date of judgment: 20 August 2025
Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – LEAVE TO APPEAL – Where the applicant seeks leave to appeal from an interlocutory determination by the primary judge – Allegations of denial of procedural fairness and apprehended bias without merit – Where the applicant contends the primary judge erred in an application of the Harman undertaking as to affidavits and a transcript – Where the primary judge found the affidavit and transcript were impressed with an implied undertaking which necessitated consideration as to whether special circumstances existed permitting their use – Where the primary judge fell into error as the affidavit and transcript were not caught by the common law restrictions as to use – Where the Full Court is not satisfied substantial injustice would be occasioned if leave were not granted – Leave to appeal refused – Appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt XIVB, s 114UB

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 35(b)

Family Court Act 1997 (WA) Pt 11A

Cases cited:

Candle & Falkner (2021) FLC 94-069; [2021] FedCFamC1A 102

CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 67

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63

Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40

Medlow & Medlow(2016) FLC 93-692; [2016] FamCAFC 34

Nada & Nettle (Costs) (2014) FLC 93-612; [2014] FamCAFC 207

Nicolosi & Faron (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 160

Northern Territory v Sangare (2019) 265 CLR 164; [2019] HCA 25

Perdicari & Perdicari (2019) FLC 93-914; [2019] FamCAFC 147

Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33

Spedding v New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 503

Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217

Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; [1989] HCA 44

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; [1979] HCA 9

Number of paragraphs: 71
Date of hearing: 29 July 2025
Place: Heard in Perth, delivered in Sydney
The Applicant: Litigant in person
The Respondent: Litigant in person

ORDERS

NAA 153 of 2025
PTW 937 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTION

BETWEEN:

MR NICOLOSI

Applicant

AND:

MS FARON

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ALDRIDGE, HARPER & SCHONELL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Notice of Appeal filed 4 April 2025 is dismissed.

2.The Application in an Appeal filed 29 May 2025 is dismissed.

3.The respondent’s oral application for costs is dismissed.

Note:   The form of…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC1A 146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nicolosi & Faron (No 3) involved an appeal by Mr. Nicolosi against an interlocutory determination by the primary judge in the Family Court of Western Australia. The primary judge had ruled on an application by Ms. Faron for access to certain documents, including transcripts and affidavits, for use in other proceedings. Mr. Nicolosi sought leave to appeal, arguing that the primary judge had erred in allowing the use of these documents and that there were issues of procedural fairness and apprehended bias. The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge had correctly applied the Harman undertaking, whether the primary judge had erred in permitting the use of certain documents, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were not granted.

The court found that while there was merit to Mr. Nicolosi's contention that the primary judge had erred in permitting the use of the affidavit and transcripts, he had not demonstrated that a substantial injustice would be occasioned if leave to appeal were not granted. The court noted that the affidavit and transcripts were not subject to the implied undertaking and were therefore not restricted from use, provided they fell within the exceptions under Pt XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and Pt 11A of the WA Act. The court further found that Mr. Nicolosi had not established that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case. The Full Court was not satisfied that substantial injustice would be occasioned if leave to appeal were not granted.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the Notice of Appeal and the Application in an Appeal, and refused leave to appeal. The court also dismissed the respondent’s oral application for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

NAA 153 of 2025

PTW 937 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTION

BETWEEN:

MR NICOLOSI

Applicant

AND:

MS FARON

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ALDRIDGE, HARPER & SCHONELL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The Notice of Appeal filed 4 April 2025 is dismissed.

2. The Application in an Appeal filed 29 May 2025 is dismissed.

3. The respondent’s oral application for costs is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

For reasons that will become apparent, leave to appeal will be refused and the Notice of Appeal dismissed.BACKGROUND The parties have been engaged in litigation before the Family Court of Western Australia and other courts in Western Australia since shortly after their separation in 2017. The litigation before the Family Court of Western Australia concluded with reasons for judgment delivered by the primary judge on 5 April 2024. The applicant, unhappy with the result, appealed those orders which appeal was dismissed by a differently constituted Full Court of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia on 17 September 2024. The parties remain engaged in proceedings before the Magistrates Court of Western Australia where each seeks restraining orders against the other, and proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia commenced by the applicant on 11 March 2024 in which he seeks damages for defamation. On 13 February 2025, the respondent filed an application seeking access to certain documents for use in the proceedings before the Magistrates Court of Western Australia and the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The documents were identified by the primary judge, as follows:11The [respondent] seeks to leave to use all or part of the following documents:1.Reasons for decision published 5 April 2024: [2024] FCWA 60 (trial judgment).2.Reasons for decision published 5 April 2024: [2024] FCWA 89 (leave to use documents in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia in alleged breach of Family Violence Restraining Order proceedings).3.Affidavit of [the applicant] filed on 29 May 2023.4.Trial transcripts from 6 to 10 November 2023.5.Transcript dated 25 January 2024 (the [applicant’s] closing submissions). 6.Transcript dated 5 April 2024 (leave to use documents in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia).7.Single Expert Witness Reports of [Dr B] dated 7 December 2018 (sic) (annexed to an affidavit filed on 17 January 2018) and dated 16 November 2018 (annexed to an affidavit filed on 22 November 2018). Relevant in part to the determination of this appeal was the position of the applicant identified by the primary judge in his reasons as follows:6The [applicant] does not object to the [respondent] using the documents she particularises, provided that in each case the entire document is available and not simply extracts, and all other documents referred to in each document is available, and all documents referred to in the transcripts are available. The breadth of the material sought by the applicant included every document on the court file as well as every document subpoenaed. The applicant’s position can be crudely expressed as “all or nothing”. The applicant in addition sought a further suite of orders. It is useful to in part explain why leave is refused and the Notice of Appeal is dismissed to record in full the additional relief sought by the applicant which was in the following terms:3.That the Court formally reviews the credibility of the [respondent’s] evidence based on findings from prior courts.(A)The Court must reassess previous determinations where the [respondent’s] credibility was found to be unreliable.(B)The Court should consider whether past findings were made on misleading or incomplete evidence and if they warrant reconsideration.4.That the Court acknowledges and corrects procedural unfairness resulting from contradictions and inconsistencies in [the primary judge’s] rulings.(A)The Court must reconsider rulings where [the primary judge] found the [respondent] to be unreliable but still relied on her evidence.(B)The Court must reassess financial orders and parenting arrangements where misleading evidence was relied upon.5.That, in light of these concerns, the matter be relisted for judicial reconsideration, with an independent judge appointed if necessary.(A)If there is a reasonable apprehension of bias or failure to apply judicial comity, the case should be reconsidered by a judge who was not previously involved in these proceedings.6.That the Court refers the conduct of [the respondent] to the Western Australian Police for investigation into whether she has committed perjury or attempted to pervert the course of justice.(A)If [the respondent] knowingly provided false statements under oath, this should be investigated under Section 124 of the Criminal Code (WA).(B)If [the respondent] knowingly withheld or manipulated evidence, this may constitute attempting to pervert the course of justice under Section 143 of the Criminal Code (WA).7.That the Court refers the conduct of [Ms. C] and [Ms. D] to the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia and WA Police for investigation.(A)If [Ms. C] and [Ms. D] failed to correct false evidence, knowingly allowed misleading testimony, or withheld key evidence, this constitutes a breach of their professional duties under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA).(B)If they knowingly misled the Court or assisted in misleading the Court, this may also require criminal investigation under Sections 124 and 143 of the Criminal Code (WA).8.That, if necessary, the Court lists the matter for a rehearing to properly consider new evidence, procedural fairness concerns, and the impact of misleading testimony.(A)This includes the reconsideration of financial orders based on false declarations by the [respondent].(B)The Court should assess whether any changes to parenting orders are required to ensure the best interests of the child.9.That all previously excluded evidence, including subpoenaed materials and financial documents, be considered in full. (Emphasis added)(Form 2A Response to an Application in a Case filed 12 March 2025)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant in addition sought a further suite of orders. It is useful to in part explain why leave is refused and the Notice of Appeal is dismissed to record in full the additional relief sought by the applicant which was in the following terms:3.That the Court formally reviews the credibility of the [respondent’s] evidence based on findings from prior courts.(A)The Court must reassess previous determinations where the [respondent’s] credibility was found to be unreliable.(B)The Court should consider whether past findings were made on misleading or incomplete evidence and if they warrant reconsideration.4.That the Court acknowledges and corrects procedural unfairness resulting from contradictions and inconsistencies in [the primary judge’s] rulings.(A)The Court must reconsider rulings where [the primary judge] found the [respondent] to be unreliable but still relied on her evidence.(B)The Court must reassess financial orders and parenting arrangements where misleading evidence was relied upon.5.That, in light of these concerns, the matter be relisted for judicial reconsideration, with an independent judge appointed if necessary.(A)If there is a reasonable apprehension of bias or failure to apply judicial comity, the case should be reconsidered by a judge who was not previously involved in these proceedings.6.That the Court refers the conduct of [the respondent] to the Western Australian Police for investigation into whether she has committed perjury or attempted to pervert the course of justice.(A)If [the respondent] knowingly provided false statements under oath, this should be investigated under Section 124 of the Criminal Code (WA).(B)If [the respondent] knowingly withheld or manipulated evidence, this may constitute attempting to pervert the course of justice under Section 143 of the Criminal Code (WA).7.That the Court refers the conduct of [Ms. C] and [Ms. D] to the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia and WA Police for investigation.(A)If [Ms. C] and [Ms. D] failed to correct false evidence, knowingly allowed misleading testimony, or withheld key evidence, this constitutes a breach of their professional duties under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA).(B)If they knowingly misled the Court or assisted in misleading the Court, this may also require criminal investigation under Sections 124 and 143 of the Criminal Code (WA).8.That, if necessary, the Court lists the matter for a rehearing to properly consider new evidence, procedural fairness concerns, and the impact of misleading testimony.(A)This includes the reconsideration of financial orders based on false declarations by the [respondent].(B)The Court should assess whether any changes to parenting orders are required to ensure the best interests of the child.9.That all previously excluded evidence, including subpoenaed materials and financial documents, be considered in full. (Emphasis added)(Form 2A Response to an Application in a Case filed 12 March 2025) The primary judge in ex tempore reasons granted part of the relief sought by the respondent permitting her to use two decisions of the primary judge delivered 5 April 2024 and otherwise dismissed each party’s relief.

Decision

Reasons for decision

We are satisfied that there is merit to Grounds 4 and 7 in so far as it relates to the applicant’s affidavit and the transcripts.Ground 6: Failure to give reasons for key judicial decisions In support of this ground, the applicant contends as follows:42.Ground 6: Failure to Give Reasons for Key Judicial Decisions His Honour failed to provide reasons for the refusal of procedural applications, including the dismissal of the [applicant’s] subpoena request, depriving the [applicant] of an intelligible basis for appellate review… (As per the original) Numerous authorities, including those cited by the applicant in his Summary of Argument, make obvious that the extent of reasons depends upon the particular case under consideration and the matters in issue (Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33). Here, the issue involved a discrete ex tempore determination as to whether certain documents were available to the parties to use in other proceedings and the determination of various incompetent orders sought by the applicant as addressed in earlier grounds. It is specious to contend that the applicant or this Court could not divine the basis of the primary judge’s decision (Candle & Falkner (2021) FLC 94-069 at [97]).Ground 9: Error of law – improper judicial encroachment into other court proceedings In support of this ground, the applicant contended that the primary judge erred at law in granting part of the respondent’s application and by making observations that, “appear directed toward influencing how other judicial officers should interpret those materials” (applicant’s Summary of Argument filed 11 June 2025, paragraph 63). The Summary of Argument otherwise repeated submissions made in aid of other grounds and included a rambling discursive narrative of numerous complaints about the conduct of the respondent which were the subject of the primary judge’s final orders made 5 April 2024 from which the applicant unsuccessfully appealed. None of these matters have any relevance to the determination by the primary judge and none point to, let alone establish, error. No part of the primary judge’s determination could possibly be interpreted as an attempt to influence another judicial officer.DISPOSITION We are satisfied for the reasons above that the applicant has established error on the part of the primary judge in the terms of Grounds 4 and 7 in so far as it relates to the use of the applicant’s affidavit and the transcripts. An applicant for a grant of leave to appeal must do more than just establish error, they must demonstrate that a substantial injustice would be occasioned if leave were not granted. We are not satisfied that the applicant has established that he would suffer a substantial injustice. The affidavit and transcripts are not caught by “the implied undertaking” and there is no order restraining their use. Consequently, there is no restriction, providing they fall within the exceptions under Pt XIVB of the Act and Pt 11A of the WA Act. Where the applicant has not demonstrated that he would suffer a substantial injustice, there is no warrant to grant leave.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As with her Honour, we likewise consider such an approach is apposite to this appeal. Ground 2: Apprehended bias – prior adverse credibility findings prevented fresh consideration By Ground 2, the applicant contends that the primary judge, by reason of prior determinations reflecting on the credibility of the applicant, should have recused himself. The Summary of Argument contends:8.…His Honour erred in failing to recuse himself despite having previously formed and expressed clear adverse views about the [applicant’s] credibility, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Primary Judgment Paragraphs: Implied across 20–25 (contextual), originating from FCWA 60 [5 April 2024] (As per the original) To establish apprehended bias, the applicant must demonstrate objectively two things. First, what it was that was said by the primary judge that might give rise to an apprehension that the judge might decide the case other than on its merits, and second, and of no less significance, an articulation of the logical connection between what was said and the possibility, real not remote, of a “feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits” as per Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 (“Ebner”) at [8]. As their Honours observed in Ebner, to succeed on a ground of apprehension of bias, the applicant must establish that:6.… a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide…(Footnote omitted) The observations of the High Court of Australia are not without qualification and are subject to the conduct of the person who asserts an apprehension of bias within the rubric of waiver (Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 (“Vakauta”)). In that respect, in Vakauta, Dawson J observed at 576:There can, I think, be no doubt that an objection upon the ground of bias can be waived. Even where it is a question of the public apprehension of bias, the parties themselves must be competent to waive the objection. Although justice must manifestly be seen to be done, where a party, being unaware of his right to object, waives that right, there will be little danger of the appearance of injustice… Likewise, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ observed at 572 as follows:…It would be unfair and wrong if failure to object until the contents of the final judgment were known were to give the party in default the advantage of an effective choice between acceptance and rejection of the judgment and to subject the other party to a situation in which it was likely that the judgment would be allowed to stand only if it proved to be unfavourable to him or her. We are satisfied that the observations of their Honours are apposite to what occurred before the primary judge and what is now asserted in this appeal. The applicant appealed the primary judge’s orders made 5 April 2024. The first ground of appeal in that appeal asserted “perceived bias” on the part of the primary judge.