Spears v South Australian Wine Group Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Spears v South Australian Wine Group Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 948  

Appeal from: Spears v South Australian Wine Group Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 1031
File number(s): SAD 197 of 2023
Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN J
Date of judgment: 23 August 2024
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — application for extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court –— where applicant mistakes process within which to institute an appeal –— where explanation for the delay is fair and equitable in the circumstances — where extension of time to file application for leave to appeal does not cause prejudice to respondent — where proposed grounds of appeal have no merit — leave for an extension of time within which the applicant may file an application for leave to appeal refused
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 69

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 24(1)(d), 25(1AA)(a), 25(2)(a) & (b), 119, 125(1), 536(1)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), s 155(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(d)

Federal Court Rules 2022 (Cth), rr 36.01(1) & (2), 36.03(a)(i)

Evidence Act 1929 (SA)

Work, Health & Safety Act 2012 (SA)

Protection for Public Participation Bill 2008 (SA)

Cases cited:

AYB19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 442

Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28, (2022) 276 CLR 579

Quach v RU [2024] FCAFC 32

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195

Spears v South Australian Wine Group Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 1031

SZQBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1388

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 74
Date of last submission/s: 30 May 2024
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J Roder with Mr N Melios
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

SAD 197 of 2023
BETWEEN:

ALANA SPEARS

Applicant

AND:

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN WINE GROUP PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O'SULLIVAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 AUGUST 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal is refused.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’SULLIVAN J:

  1. The respondent, the South Australian Wine Group Pty Ltd (SAWG), is a wine broker which sells wine on behalf of grape growers who have had grapes processed by Riverland Vintners Pty Ltd.  In early 2016, it employed the applicant, Ms Spears, as Training and Compliance Manager.  By the end of December 2019, Ms Spears was employed as sales manager…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCA 948
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Spears v South Australian Wine Group Pty Ltd concerned an application by Ms Spears for an extension of time to file an application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court. The Federal Circuit and Family Court dismissed Ms Spears' claims on 10 November 2023, and Ms Spears applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court on 8 December 2023, within the 28-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal to the Federal Court. However, Ms Spears subsequently applied for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal to the Federal Court on 22 December 2023. The court had to determine whether Ms Spears should be granted an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal.

The court considered the principles relevant to the exercise of the discretion to grant an extension of time for an appeal. These principles are underpinned by a consideration of where the best interests of justice lie. The court considered the reasons for the delay in filing the notice of appeal but may also consider the merits of the appeal at a reasonably impressionistic level. The court noted that an extension of time will not be granted unless the court is positively satisfied that it is proper to do so. The length of the delay is a relevant factor. The appellant must show an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time. Any prejudice to the respondent is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension, although the absence of prejudice does not, without more, suffice to justify the grant of an extension of time. The merits of the substantive appeal, if leave were granted, are properly to be taken into account.

The court considered the submissions on the extension of time and the consideration. The delay was 12 days, which the respondent submitted was significant. The court did not accept that submission. In the circumstances, a delay of that magnitude was not significant. Ms Spears submitted it was fair and equitable to extend the time because she lacked the resources to obtain legal representation and therefore had to represent herself. In addition, due to her lack of legal knowledge, she filed an application for special leave to appeal with the High Court by mistake not knowing that pursuant to s 155(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) that was not the appropriate procedure and she must exhaust all appeal options in this Court first.

The court refused the application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal. The applicant was to pay the respondent's costs of the application to be agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal is refused.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Whereas the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) did not apply to the proceedings before the primary judge, the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which did apply, provides for the admission into evidence of business records: s 69. On the basis of the matters deposed to by Mr Harris in his affidavit at [18] and annexure DH- 5 to that affidavit, the Business Impact Analysis was admitted properly into evidence. I accept the respondent’s submission that this ground does not identify an error made by the primary judge. Accordingly, there is no merit in this ground. For completeness, I note that on 5 February 2024, Ms Spears attempted unsuccessfully to file a subpoena in this Court for the respondent to produce a dated copy of the Business Impact Analysis. She now applies to the Court for leave to issue a subpoena to the respondent seeking production of “computerised evidence of the creation date”. I note further that Ms Spears also raises in her submissions mixed matters of evidence and a submission that an inquiry should be made on appeal as to whether Mr Harris has committed perjury. To the extent these matters are raised, they do not alter my view that there is no merit in this ground.Ground two – Full review of claims Ms Spears contends that the respondent breached laws in three separate jurisdictions: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth); Work, Health & Safety Act 2012 (SA) and Protection for Public Participation Bill 2008 (SA), and she is aggrieved by the fact that she is required to “initiate legal proceedings in three different jurisdictions with regards to the same workplace legal matter”. Ms Spears submits that due to her lack of experience, health issues and financial hardship, a full review of each of the claims should be carried out in one jurisdiction. The respondent submits that no error is identified in this proposed ground. I accept the respondent’s submission. There is no merit in this ground.Ground three – Ineffective legal counsel Ms Spears seeks to add new claims and submits that her legal representatives at the time of filing her initial claim failed to include particular complaints and thus “did not provide effective counsel” which jeopardised her initial claim. Ms Spears asserts three alleged failures, the first being the omission of a complaint she made in relation to her pay in December 2019. Ms Spears contends that that resulted in her suffering mental and emotional shock, thereby causing a psychological injury as a consequence of the respondent’s actions. Second, the omission of a bullying complaint she made about Mr Harris’ aggressive behaviour towards her. Third, the omission of a bullying complaint she made about Mr Hourigan. The respondent submits that this ground fails as it does not identify any error made by the primary judge but is a complaint about advice and representation she had received by her then legal representatives. I accept that submission. This ground has no merit.Ground four – Work Health and Safety Act 2012 (SA)

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 10 November 2023, save for in respect of s 125(1) of the FWA, the FCFCOA dismissed Ms Spears claims: Spears v South Australian Wine Group Pty Ltd [2023] FedCFamC2G 1031 (Decision). Ms Spears was self-represented before the primary judge.EXTENSION OF TIME On 8 December 2023, Ms Spears applied for special leave to appeal from the Decision to the High Court of Australia. At that time, Ms Spears was not aware that an appeal from Division 2 of the FCFCOA lies to this Court: Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(d). A notice of appeal must be filed within 28 days after the date of which the judgment appealed from was pronounced or the order was made: Federal Court Rules 2022 (Cth) (FCR) 36.03(a)(i). The application for special leave to appeal to the High Court was made within the 28 day time limit prescribed for the filing of a notice of appeal to this Court. Since the Decision was pronounced on 10 November 2023, any notice of appeal was due to be filed by Monday 11 December 2023, such that the application was made 12 days out of time. On 22 December 2023, Ms Spears filed an application in this Court for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal from the Decision: FCR 36.05. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn 21 December 2023. Accordingly, the issue for determination is whether Ms Spears should be granted an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal. At the first case management hearing Ms Spears was self-represented. SAWG appeared by counsel. The parties agreed that the application for an extension of time could be considered on the papers.Principles The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal from the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) pursuant s 24(1)(d) of the Act. That appellate jurisdiction may be exercised by a single judge: s 25(1AA)(a) of the Act. Further, s 25(2)(a) and (b) of the Act provides that the exercise of jurisdiction encompasses applications for leave to appeal or for an extension of time within which to institute an appeal. An application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal needs to be accompanied by, amongst other things, a draft notice of appeal that complies with FCR 36.01(1) and (2). In considering the application, the Court considers the reasons for the delay in filing the notice of appeal but may also consider the merits of the appeal at a reasonably impressionistic level, and if the circumstances warrant, the Court may engage in a more than impressionistic assessment of the merits: Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579, [17]-[18] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ). In Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195 at [20]-[21], Perram, Farrell and Perry JJ said:20.The principles relevant to the exercise of discretion to grant an extension of time for an appeal are well established and are underpinned by a consideration of where the best interests of justice lie. Those principles may be summarised as follows.(1)An extension of time will not be granted unless the Court is positively satisfied that it is proper to do so.(2)The length of the delay is a relevant factor.(3)The appellant must show an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time.(4)Any prejudice to the respondent is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension, although the absence of prejudice does not, without more, suffice to justify the grant of an extension of time.(5)The merits of the substantive appeal, if leave were granted, are properly to be taken into account.(See e.g. BAO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 214 at [19]; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348–349.)21.As to the fifth of these matters, the proposed grounds should be considered on their face and examined at a “reasonably impressionistic level”; the Court should not descend into a fuller consideration of the arguments for and against each ground (see MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391 at [62] (Mortimer J) (approved on appeal in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110 at [38]).See also SZQBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1388 at [16]-[25] (Cowdroy J); SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6] (Flick, Griffiths and Perry JJ); AYB19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 442 at [30] (Markovic J).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Quach v RU [2024] FCAFC 32, [24]-[25], the Full Court (Perry, Meagher and Shariff JJ) said:24.An extension of time will not be granted unless the Court is positively satisfied that it is proper to do so. The discretion to extend time under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules is not confined by express criteria. However, there are a range of considerations which may appropriately be taken into account in the exercise of discretion, and which are of varying weight depending on the circumstances of the particular case, namely:(1)the length of the delay;(2)whether the applicant has demonstrated an acceptable explanation for the delay;(3)whether the respondent would suffer prejudice if the extension of time were granted; and(4)the merits of the substantive appeal, if the extension of time was granted.See, eg, Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 (Wilcox J) and Bechara v Bates [2018] FCA 460 at [17] (Perry J).25With respect to the last of these factors, it will generally be the case that the merits of the proposed appeal should be approached in a reasonably impressionist manner. Thus, in Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 178 ALD 573, Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained at [17] that:“[I]t may be accepted that, in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477A(2) [of the Migration Act 1978 (Cth) ] (or s 477(2)) [powers to extend time], it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a ‘reasonably impressionistic level’. That is because the interests of justice are likely to be advanced by granting an extension of time to an application with some merit, depending, of course, on other relevant factors. In this regard, it may be relevant, as Mortimer J observed, that an extension of time will confer upon the applicant not only the right to a determination of their substantive application on the merits but also a right of appeal from that judgment, if adverse to the applicant.”(Citations omitted)SUBMISSIONS ON EXTENSION OF TIME AND CONSIDERATION Ms Spears attached a draft notice of appeal to her application for an extension of time. The application is supported by an affidavit sworn 21 December 2023 and filed 22 December 2023 to which she annexed her application for special leave to appeal to the High Court. She also relies on her written submissions which were filed under cover of an affidavit sworn and filed on 30 May 2024 (written submissions). SAWG relies upon its written submissions filed 29 April 2024.Length of the delay The delay is 12 days which the respondent submits is significant. I do not accept that submission. In the circumstances, a delay of that magnitude is not significant.Explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time Ms Spears submits it is fair and equitable to extend the time because she lacked the resources to obtain legal representation and therefore had to represent herself. In addition, due to her lack of legal knowledge, she filed an application for special leave to appeal with the High Court by mistake not knowing that pursuant to s 155(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) that was not the appropriate procedure and she must exhaust all appeal options in this Court first.