Spano v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Spano v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 389

Appeal from: Administrative Appeals Tribunal 2020/4510
File number(s): ACD 26 of 2022
Judgment of: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 28 April 2023
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – judicial review – application for partner visa – appeal against decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Tribunal found the visa applicant did not meet the character test in s 501 of the Migration Act – where Tribunal exercised its discretion not to grant a partner visa – whether procedural unfairness, legal unreasonableness or bias amounting to jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.

HELD – application dismissed – no jurisdictional error by the Tribunal established.

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 33(1)(c)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499(2A), 501(1), 501(6)

Cases cited:

Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76

Commonwealth of Australia v Snell [2019] FCAFC 57; (2019) 269 FCR 18

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Mailau v Minister for Immigration [2023] FCAFC 12

Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; [2020] 95 ALJR 54

Minister for Immigration v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713

Minister of Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 93; (2014) 266 FCR 555

Division: General Division
Registry: Australian Capital Territory
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 99
Date of hearing: 27 March 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H. Heuzenroeder
Solicitor for the Applicant: Masothy Yin
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R. Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Christopher Matthies

ORDERS

ACD 26 of 2022
BETWEEN:

MIRELLA SPANO

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 APRIL 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

  1. These reasons concern an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (The Tribunal), made on 8 June 2022: Spano and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2022] AATA 1537. That decision affirmed a decision of a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (the Minister) to refuse the applicant’s spouse, referred to in these reasons as Mr…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 389
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where Ms Spano, the wife of Mr P, challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to refuse Mr P’s application for a partner visa under section 501 of the Migration Act. The central issue was whether Mr P satisfied the Character Test, and if not, whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to refuse the visa application. The AAT had concluded that Mr P did not meet the Character Test, primarily due to his history of entering Australia on fraudulent documents, and therefore affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse the visa.

The court examined several grounds of appeal, including whether the AAT's decision was procedurally unfair, legally unreasonable, or biased. The court found that the AAT did not commit any jurisdictional errors. Regarding procedural fairness, the court noted that the AAT provided Mr P with multiple opportunities to respond to the allegations and evidence against him. The court also found that the AAT did not mischaracterise Mr P’s contentions and provided a genuine consideration of his submissions. The court held that there was no apprehension of bias or legal unreasonableness in the AAT's decision-making process.

The Federal Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, affirming the AAT's decision to refuse Mr P’s partner visa application. The court concluded that the AAT had properly exercised its discretion and followed the relevant legal principles in reaching its decision. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.

This case underscores the stringent requirements for meeting the Character Test under the Migration Act and the thoroughness with which the AAT must review visa applications, particularly when significant character concerns are raised. The court's decision highlights the importance of providing procedural fairness and ensuring that decisions are legally sound and unbiased.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below, the application is dismissed.Factual background Mr P is a 30-year-old citizen of Albania. On 27 May 2010, Mr P lodged an application for a student visa. On 26 July 2010, that application was refused. On 23 August 2010, Mr P lodged a second application for a student visa. On 14 December 2010, that application was also refused. On 29 February 2012, Mr P arrived in Australia, landing in Brisbane, under a false name and with a fraudulently altered Italian passport, issued in the name of another person. He also presented a boarding pass and incoming passenger card in that false name. Mr P subsequently applied for a protection visa, which a delegate of the Minister refused in May 2012. In November 2012, Mr P was released into the Australian community and lived with his brother. In July 2014, the Federal Court dismissed Mr P’s appeal regarding his protection visa application and in August 2014, Mr P was taken into immigration detention. In 2015, the High Court dismissed his application for special leave to appeal. Mr P met the applicant in June 2014 and they married later that year while Mr P was in immigration detention. He was removed from Australia in June 2015. On 7 July 2015, Mr P applied for a partner visa. On 3 June 2016, a delegate of the Minister refused the application because they were not satisfied Ms Spano and Mr P were in a spousal relationship. Following an appeal to the Federal Circuit Court and remittal to a differently constituted Tribunal, the Tribunal directed the delegate to reconsider the application on the basis Mr P was and remained a spouse of an Australian citizen, Ms Spano. On 23 April 2020, the Department of Home Affairs notified Mr P that it intended to consider refusing his application on the basis he did not pass the Character Test, citing information regarding Mr P’s previous travel to Australia on fraudulent travel documents. Mr P was invited to comment on the information and provide reasons why the visa application should not be refused even if he did not pass the Character Test. Mr P made written submissions to the delegate via his representative responding to this notice. On 16 July 2020, the delegate refused Mr P’s application for a partner visa under s 501(1) of the Migration Act because they were not satisfied that he passed the Character Test. On 27 July 2020, Ms Spano applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision to refuse Mr P’s partner visa application. After a differently constituted Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision, on 29 September 2021, the Federal Court made consent orders quashing the Tribunal’s decision and requiring the Tribunal to reconsider its review of the delegate’s decision according to law. On 8 June 2022, a differently constituted Tribunal again affirmed the decision of the delegate to refuse Mr P’s partner visa. It is that decision which is the subject of this appeal.The Tribunal’s reasons The issues for the Tribunal’s determination were whether Mr P passed the Character Test; and if not, whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion pursuant to s 501(1) of the Migration Act to refuse to grant Mr P a partner visa: at [41].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This ground is not established. Ground 7: The decision gave rise to an apprehension of bias This submission contends that the Tribunal emphasised the age difference between Mr P and Ms Spano at [4]-[5] of its reasons. The applicant submitted this was at the beginning of the reasons and these paragraphs gave and continue to give the impression that the age difference took on an unjustified importance in this matter. It was submitted it set the tone for the remainder of the judgment. Further, the reference at [232] that the Tribunal did not question the state of the relationship did not remedy the earlier observation. An appropriately informed, reasonable and fair-minded lay observer would be aware that there are illegitimate pejorative attitudes towards couples with a large age difference, and might apprehend a position of prejudice in the way that the decision had been articulated. The relevant legal principles are uncontroversial: see for example, Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6]; CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76 at [20] – [21]. This ground is based on the mere statement of the ages of Ms Spano and Mr P in the part of the reasons that recited the background to the application, nothing more. That is, a statement of objective fact. Nothing in the reasons of the Tribunal provides any support for the applicant’s submission. There is no basis for the submission that a “tone” was set by the reference to the ages. To the contrary, it is plain the Tribunal accepted the relationship as a loving one. The Tribunal found at [191] that Mr P was a loving husband. The passage relied on by the applicant at [232] must be put in its context. The Tribunal found:Ms Spano has been married to Mr P for almost eight years. She has visited him in Albania 10 times since he was removed from Australia approximately seven years ago, noting that since early 2020 Ms Spano was unable to travel internationally due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal, it is satisfied that Ms Spano has suffered mental, emotional and financial hardship due to being physically separated from her husband and from the continued uncertainty about the Visa. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal does not dispute the genuine nature of Ms Spano’s relationship with Mr P or the strength of that union. Ms Spano is plainly deeply in love with Mr P and has experienced significant stress at their current situation, including due to the numerous associated Tribunal and court processes.…The couple have also lost valuable time together since Mr P left Australia almost eight years ago and their desire to be together will likely impact their living arrangements into the future.…This prospective situation would undoubtedly be difficult, but she would have the love and support of her husband were they to live together in Albania. Having regard to all of the relevant factors, the Tribunal is satisfied that a decision not to grant Mr P the Visa would have a significant adverse impact on Ms Spano and finds that this factor weighs heavily in favour of not exercising the discretion to refuse to grant Mr P the Visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant has not established this ground.Ground 8: The Tribunal acted in a manner which is legally unreasonable by mischaracterising, and failing to give genuine consideration to, Mr P’s contention that a higher level of satisfaction was necessary before findings of fabrication were made against Mr P, given the severe consequences The applicant submitted that Mr P contended a higher level of satisfaction was necessary before findings of fabrication were made against him, given the severe consequences to Mr P, but that he did not rely upon Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 (Briginshaw) as identifying a rule of evidence that bound the Tribunal. She submitted that at [189], after recording the submission made, the Tribunal mischaracterised the submission as relating to a rule of evidence, in circumstances where the Tribunal was not bound by the rules of evidence. A genuine consideration of the contention advanced required that before being satisfied as to findings of fabrication against Mr P, the Tribunal take into account the consequences to Mr P. It was said, accordingly, a genuine consideration was not made of the contention, and the Tribunal acted in a manner that was legally unreasonable. The applicant’s submission in opening was this: … We would like to refer to the decision in Briginshaw v Briginshaw. We note that any decision that would result in Ms Spano not being with her husband would be devastating to her. We submit that in the circumstances where there are serious allegations and severe consequences that a very high standard of proof needs to be established. We would submit that in this case if the respondent is submitting that Mr Pllumbi has been dishonest about fearing harm, that that would require a very high standard of proof and one that cannot be shown in these circumstances in a country as of anywhere there is a history of blood feuds and revenge killings and people being locked in, and where this occurred some time ago, we would submit that the high standard of proof cannot be reached in this case. Shortly thereafter, the first respondent submitted that Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 93; (2014) 266 FCR 555 (Sullivan) at [115] set out the relevant position:Yes, Member. Can I start with Briginshaw? Could you turn up the case of Sullivan that I sent you yesterday, please, and in particular paragraph 115, and the three dot points in that paragraph. So, the proposition we take from that is that Briginshaw doesn’t apply to the tribunal proceedings. It would be wrong of you to proceed on the basis that the seriousness of any findings I may ask you to make about [P]’s conduct instils some higher threshold on me of proof or some onus of proof. That’s all I need to say about Sullivan. In Sullivan at [115], Flick and Perry JJ said:The attempt on the part of Mr Sullivan to side-line the fundamental importance of provisions such as ss 2A, 33 and 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act — and to shift the focus of attention to the ultimate task of the Tribunal in making the “correct or preferable” decision as to whether it is “satisfied” for the purposes of reg 269(1)(d) of the Civil Aviation Regulations — should be soundly rejected. Such a submission, with respect, fails to recognise that:· the rule in Briginshaw is a rule of evidence derived from curial proceedings;· the Tribunal is not “bound by the rules of evidence”; and · a party to proceedings before the Tribunal has no “onus of proof”, let alone an “onus” to establish facts to any particular or pre-determined standard.Moreover, the submission fails to also recognise the fact that the procedure of the Tribunal is within its own discretion.