FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Spano v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 389
Appeal from: Administrative Appeals Tribunal 2020/4510 File number(s): ACD 26 of 2022 Judgment of: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 28 April 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – application for partner visa – appeal against decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Tribunal found the visa applicant did not meet the character test in s 501 of the Migration Act – where Tribunal exercised its discretion not to grant a partner visa – whether procedural unfairness, legal unreasonableness or bias amounting to jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.
HELD – application dismissed – no jurisdictional error by the Tribunal established.
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 33(1)(c)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499(2A), 501(1), 501(6)
Cases cited: Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 50; (2019) 268 CLR 76
Commonwealth of Australia v Snell [2019] FCAFC 57; (2019) 269 FCR 18
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
Mailau v Minister for Immigration [2023] FCAFC 12
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46; [2020] 95 ALJR 54
Minister for Immigration v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713
Minister of Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332
Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 93; (2014) 266 FCR 555
Division: General Division Registry: Australian Capital Territory National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 99 Date of hearing: 27 March 2023 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H. Heuzenroeder Solicitor for the Applicant: Masothy Yin Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R. Francois Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Christopher Matthies ORDERS
ACD 26 of 2022 BETWEEN: MIRELLA SPANO
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 APRIL 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
These reasons concern an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (The Tribunal), made on 8 June 2022: Spano and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2022] AATA 1537. That decision affirmed a decision of a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (the Minister) to refuse the applicant’s spouse, referred to in these reasons as Mr…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 389
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined several grounds of appeal, including whether the AAT's decision was procedurally unfair, legally unreasonable, or biased. The court found that the AAT did not commit any jurisdictional errors. Regarding procedural fairness, the court noted that the AAT provided Mr P with multiple opportunities to respond to the allegations and evidence against him. The court also found that the AAT did not mischaracterise Mr P’s contentions and provided a genuine consideration of his submissions. The court held that there was no apprehension of bias or legal unreasonableness in the AAT's decision-making process.
The Federal Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, affirming the AAT's decision to refuse Mr P’s partner visa application. The court concluded that the AAT had properly exercised its discretion and followed the relevant legal principles in reaching its decision. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.
This case underscores the stringent requirements for meeting the Character Test under the Migration Act and the thoroughness with which the AAT must review visa applications, particularly when significant character concerns are raised. The court's decision highlights the importance of providing procedural fairness and ensuring that decisions are legally sound and unbiased.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent to be agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant has not established this ground.Ground 8: The Tribunal acted in a manner which is legally unreasonable by mischaracterising, and failing to give genuine consideration to, Mr P’s contention that a higher level of satisfaction was necessary before findings of fabrication were made against Mr P, given the severe consequences The applicant submitted that Mr P contended a higher level of satisfaction was necessary before findings of fabrication were made against him, given the severe consequences to Mr P, but that he did not rely upon Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 (Briginshaw) as identifying a rule of evidence that bound the Tribunal. She submitted that at [189], after recording the submission made, the Tribunal mischaracterised the submission as relating to a rule of evidence, in circumstances where the Tribunal was not bound by the rules of evidence. A genuine consideration of the contention advanced required that before being satisfied as to findings of fabrication against Mr P, the Tribunal take into account the consequences to Mr P. It was said, accordingly, a genuine consideration was not made of the contention, and the Tribunal acted in a manner that was legally unreasonable. The applicant’s submission in opening was this: … We would like to refer to the decision in Briginshaw v Briginshaw. We note that any decision that would result in Ms Spano not being with her husband would be devastating to her. We submit that in the circumstances where there are serious allegations and severe consequences that a very high standard of proof needs to be established. We would submit that in this case if the respondent is submitting that Mr Pllumbi has been dishonest about fearing harm, that that would require a very high standard of proof and one that cannot be shown in these circumstances in a country as of anywhere there is a history of blood feuds and revenge killings and people being locked in, and where this occurred some time ago, we would submit that the high standard of proof cannot be reached in this case. Shortly thereafter, the first respondent submitted that Sullivan v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCAFC 93; (2014) 266 FCR 555 (Sullivan) at [115] set out the relevant position:Yes, Member. Can I start with Briginshaw? Could you turn up the case of Sullivan that I sent you yesterday, please, and in particular paragraph 115, and the three dot points in that paragraph. So, the proposition we take from that is that Briginshaw doesn’t apply to the tribunal proceedings. It would be wrong of you to proceed on the basis that the seriousness of any findings I may ask you to make about [P]’s conduct instils some higher threshold on me of proof or some onus of proof. That’s all I need to say about Sullivan. In Sullivan at [115], Flick and Perry JJ said:The attempt on the part of Mr Sullivan to side-line the fundamental importance of provisions such as ss 2A, 33 and 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act — and to shift the focus of attention to the ultimate task of the Tribunal in making the “correct or preferable” decision as to whether it is “satisfied” for the purposes of reg 269(1)(d) of the Civil Aviation Regulations — should be soundly rejected. Such a submission, with respect, fails to recognise that:· the rule in Briginshaw is a rule of evidence derived from curial proceedings;· the Tribunal is not “bound by the rules of evidence”; and · a party to proceedings before the Tribunal has no “onus of proof”, let alone an “onus” to establish facts to any particular or pre-determined standard.Moreover, the submission fails to also recognise the fact that the procedure of the Tribunal is within its own discretion.