Spalla v St George Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Spalla v St George Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1566

RECEIVERS – motor car dealers – default under floor plan agreements – appointment of receivers – whether default in payment – whether insolvency – whether chargees estopped by reason of earlier indulgences granted

CHEQUES – cheque delivered to payee on express oral condition that it not be presented on that day and not on any subsequent day unless advised by drawer that funds were in the account – whether condition effective

CHATTEL SECURITIES – vehicles bailed by financier to dealer – obligation to pay proceeds of sale to financier within three days of receipt – whether dealer acquired title – whether financier became unsecured creditor – whether right of subrogation under Chattel Securities Act 1987 (Vic) s 7(7)

Chattel Securities Act 1987 (Vic) ss 3,7
Cheques and Payment Orders Act 1986 (Cth) s 27
Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) s 26(2)(b)

Carlos v Fancourt (1794) 5 TR 482 at 486; 101 ER 272 at 274 referred to
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 referred to
Goeldner v Marshall (1913) 15 WALR 50 referred to
Commercial Bank of Windsor v Angus Morrison (1902) 32 SCR 98 referred to
Jones v Thomas and Norman (1922) 65 DLR 491 referred to
Equitable Securities Ltd v Neil [1987] 1 NZLR 233 at 239-40 referred to
New London Credit Syndicate v Neale [1898] 2 QB 487 referred to
Jeffries v Austin (1725) 1 Stra 674 referred to
Hitchings and Coulthurst Co v Northern Leather Co of America [1914] 3 KB 907 referred to
Thusi Pty Ltd v Neonbrook Pty Ltd [1999] 1 Qd R 429 referred to
Macdonald v Whitfield (1883) LR 8 App Cas 733 at 745 referred to
Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472 at 479 referred to
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588 referred to
Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 at 581-2 referred to

Byles on Bills of Exchange (26th ed) (at 399)

ANTHONY PATRICK SPALLA & ORS v ST GEORGE WHOLESALE FINANCE PTY LTD

V 261 of 1999

HEEREY, SUNDBERG and WEINBERG JJ
12 NOVEMBER 1999
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 261 OF 1999

On appeal from a judgment of a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

ANTHONY PATRICK SPALLA, IRLMOND PTY LTD (ACN 006 313 870) (Receivers and Managers appointed) and APS (WHOLESALE) PTY LTD (ACN 062 248 962) (Receivers and Managers appointed)
Appellants

ST GEORGE WHOLESALE FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 001 834 886), ST GEORGE MOTOR FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 007 656 555) and ANDREW STEWART HOME and ANDREW WILLIAM BECK
Respondents

AND:

ST GEORGE WHOLESALE FINANCE PTY LTD (ACN 001 834 886), and ST. GEORGE MOTOR FINANCE LIMITED (ACN 007 656 555)
Cross Appellants

ANTHONY PATRICK SPALLA, IRLMOND PTY LTD (ACN…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1566
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Spalla v St George Wholesale Finance Pty Ltd involved the appellants contesting the validity of an appointment made by the respondent, St George Wholesale Finance. They argued that the grounds for the appointment did not exist and sought declarations that the appointment was invalid. Alternatively, they claimed that St George was estopped from making the appointment due to an agreement reached in February 1999 or that it would be unconscionable for St George to proceed with the appointment. The respondents, on the other hand, sought declarations as to the validity of the appointment and judgment for money claims. The primary legal issues before the court were whether the appointment was valid and if St George was estopped or acting unconscionably by making the appointment.

The court examined the terms of the facilities between the parties, specifically the bailment plan agreements, the letter of offer, and the deferred payment agreement. The court noted that the bailment plan agreements allowed for the ordering of new vehicles on behalf of St George, with the purchase price to be paid to St George. The letter of offer set a limit on this facility, and the deferred payment agreement provided for the deferral of payment under certain conditions. The court found that the letter of offer's provisions took precedence over any inconsistent terms in the bailment plan agreement. The court also considered the definition of a cheque under the Cheques Act and whether the instruments in question met the criteria.

In its reasoning, the court concluded that the appointment was valid and dismissed the appellants’ claims for relief. The court found that the terms of the facilities did not provide grounds for the appointment to be deemed invalid. Furthermore, the court held that St George was not estopped from making the appointment and that it was not unconscionable for St George to proceed with the appointment. The court gave judgment for St George on the cross claim.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, the cross appeal be dismissed, the appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal, and the respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the cross appeal. This decision effectively upheld the validity of the appointment made by St George and dismissed the appellants’ claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The cross appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

4. The respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the cross appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants claimed that the grounds relied on for the appointment did not exist. Their alternative case was that in the circumstances, having regard to the general course of dealing and in particular to an agreement said to have been reached in February 1999, St George was estopped from appointing receivers and managers and/or it would unconscionable for it to do so. The appellants sought declarations that the appointment was invalid and appropriate injunctions. St George brought a cross claim seeking declarations as to validity of the appointments and judgment for money claims. Finkelstein J dismissed the appellants’ claims for relief and gave judgment for St George on the cross claim.FACTUAL BACKGROUNDFebruary 1994 arrangements For some years up to 1993 the Spalla companies dealt with St George and incurred liabilities. The details of this are not relevant for present purposes. In February 1994 new arrangements were made with St George. It is accepted that the terms of the facilities are to be found in or are constituted by the following documents: a bailment plan agreement with Irlmond dated 21 February 1994, a bailment plan agreement with APS dated 21 February 1994, a deferred payment agreement dated 21 February 1994, a demonstrator plan agreement dated 21 February 1994, a letter of offer dated 11 February 1994, a supplementary letter of offer dated 12 April 1994 and a deferred retail delivery agreement dated 21 February 1994. The nature and effect of these facilities can be summarised as follows. The principal agreement is the bailment plan agreement between the first respondent (“St George Wholesale”) and APS. By that agreement St George Wholesale agreed that APS could order new vehicles on behalf of St George Wholesale and that those vehicles would be bailed to APS. The letter of offer sets the limit of this facility at $3.5 million. Upon a sale of a vehicle the bailment plan agreement provided (by cl 17) that the purchase price (less commission) should belong to St George Wholesale and that APS must account for that money to St George Wholesale in specie. However, the letter of offer stated that “all vehicles on floor plan are to be paid out in full within 48 hours from the time of delivery to a customer”. It is accepted that the provisions of the letter of offer override any inconsistent provisions in the bailment plan agreement. The bailment plan agreement with Irlmond was in the same terms as the APS agreement. It was entered into to finance the purchase of used and demonstrator vehicles. According to the letter of offer, the limit on the facility for the purchase of used vehicles was $1.45 million and for demonstrator vehicles the limit was $350,000. The deferred payment agreement related to the bailment plan agreement with APS. Under the terms of that agreement APS was obligated to pay St George Wholesale for vehicles that had been bailed to it forthwith upon those vehicles being delivered to a customer. However, it was understood that vehicles would be sold on terms where the purchase price was not payable on delivery. Accordingly, the deferred payment agreement provided that in respect of such sales, provided they were made to an approved customer, the payment of the price to St George Wholesale could be deferred until the customer paid for the vehicle or the expiry of thirty days from the date of the delivery of the vehicle to the customer, whichever first occurred. The letter of offer stated that the limit of the deferred payment facility was $800,000 which amount was to be deducted from the new vehicle facility limit.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants were content to adopt his Honour’s reasoning as their submission in opposition to this aspect of the respondents’ cross appeal.Conclusion Prior to the enactment of the Cheques Act in 1986 the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) applied to all bills of exchange including, of course, cheques. Thereafter, a specific statutory regime governed all aspects of the law relating to cheques. A convenient starting point in dealing with the issues arising out of this part of the cross appeal is s 10 of the Cheques Act. This provides that a cheque is an unconditional order in writing with the following characteristics:·it is addressed by a person to another person (being a bank);·it is signed by the person giving it;·it requires the bank to pay on demand a sum certain in money. An instrument that does not have all of these characteristics, or that orders an act to be done in addition to the payment of money, is not a cheque for the purposes of the Cheques Act, though it may still be a negotiable instrument. Section 12 of the Cheques Act expands upon the definition contained in s 10. It provides that an order to pay on a contingency is not an unconditional order to pay. The happening of the event does not make the order an unconditional order to pay. This section follows closely s 16 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1909. The effect of s 12 of the Cheques Act is that a cheque must not be expressed to be payable upon a contingency. The classic formulation of the underlying principle is to be found in Carlos v Fancourt (1794) 5 TR 482 at 486; 101 ER 272 at 274:“Certainty is a great object in commercial instruments, and unless they carry their own validity on the face of them they are not negotiable: on that ground bills of exchange which are only payable on a contingency, are not negotiable, because it does not appear on the face of them whether or not they will ever be paid.” In Rosenhain v The Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1922) 31 CLR 46 a document purporting to be a bill of exchange drawn by a company in the United States of America upon the defendants in Melbourne was in the following terms:“Sixty days after sight … pay to the order of [the company a specified sum of money] with interest at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum until arrival of payment in London to cover ….” It was held that the document was not a bill of exchange within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 since it was not an order in writing requiring a sum certain in money to be paid at a fixed or determinable future time. The order to pay money was conditional upon documents being handed over on acceptance, and this operated against the requirements of the relevant legislation. Section 14 of the Cheques Act provides that an order to pay is an order to pay on demand if:·the order is expressed to require payment on demand, at sight or on presentation; or·no time for payment is expressed in the instrument containing the order. Section 14(2) also provides that an order to pay is not an order to pay on demand if the order is expressed to require, or requires by implication, payment otherwise than on demand, at sight or on presentation, or is expressed to require or requires by implication payment only at or before a particular time or where the instrument containing the order is presented at or before a particular time.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established