FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Spain v Commonwealth of Australia [2011] FCA 223
Citation: Spain v Commonwealth of Australia [2011] FCA 223 Parties: ERIC RAYMOND SPAIN v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA File number: WAD 298 of 2010 Judge: GILMOUR J Date of judgment: 16 March 2011 Legislation: Banking Act 1959 (Cth) s 69E
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 69C, 69E, 588G
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(2)
Federal Court Rules Order 20 rule 5
Financial Sector Reform (Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act (No 1) 1999 (Cth) Item 74 of Schedule 2Cases cited: Spain v National Australia Bank [2004] FCA 87 Date of hearing: 8 February 2011 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 28 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Macliver Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 298 of 2010
BETWEEN: ERIC RAYMOND SPAIN
ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 MARCH 2011
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion dated 25 November 2010 and the costs of the application generally, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 298 of 2010
BETWEEN: ERIC RAYMOND SPAIN
ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE:
16 MARCH 2011
PLACE:
PERTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant, Mr Eric Spain, commenced proceedings against the Commonwealth of Australia by application dated 22 October 2010, in which he seeks an order that the respondent "pay compensation for unjust property acquisitions, under s 69E of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth) (the Banking Act), of fifteen million six hundred and thirty two thousand nine hundred and twenty dollars" ($15,632,920).
By notice of motion dated 25 November 2010, the respondent sought orders that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay its costs by reason of the Court having no jurisdiction in respect of this matter, alternatively by way of summary judgment pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ("the Federal Court Act") and Order 20 rule 5 of the Federal Court Rules. The respondent abandoned the jurisdictional ground at the hearing of the motion.
Factual background
Most of this factual background is deposed to in the applicant’s affidavit sworn 21 October 2010 in support of his substantive application but read in opposition to the respondent’s motion. This affidavit, which runs to some 65 pages with a significant number of attachments, is discursive and is almost entirely irrelevant. It does betray, however, what is I believe a genuinely held catalogue of complaints, whether justified or…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 223
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court held that the applicant's claims did not engage the Court's federal jurisdiction, as they arose under the general law and not a federal statute. The Court found that the applicant's reliance on the repealed sections 69C(1) and (2) of the Banking Act did not provide a basis for the Court's jurisdiction. The Court also found that the applicant's claims were frivolous and vexatious, as they were based on irrelevant and speculative assertions. The Court concluded that the applicant had failed to establish any basis for the Court's jurisdiction and that his claims were an abuse of the Court's process. Therefore, the application was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the motion dated 25 November 2010 and the costs of the application generally, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
According to the applicant, he did not know, before he executed the Deed of Settlement, that Mr Jacobs was actually employed by Ferrier Hodgson, a firm of chartered accountants and that Mr Jones, who had earlier been appointed by the Bank as Investigative Accountant to examine the business affairs of Burymore and who later became Administrator of Jack Corporation, was Mr Jacob’s boss at that firm. Mr Jacobs was on secondment to the Bank at the relevant times. He says that if he had known these facts he would not have agreed to Mr Jones being appointed to either of those two positions in relation to Burymore and Jack Corporation respectively. It is to be remembered that there was no contractual or other relationship between the Bank and Jack Corporation.Demands by liquidator of Jack Corporation Mr Martin Jones was appointed liquidator of Jack Corporation and by letters dated 2 December 2002, in that capacity, he wrote to the applicant advising that he considered that there were strong grounds to show that the directors including the applicant had breached s 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in relation to Jack Corporation as Trustee for the Daniels Unit Trust formerly trading as "Liars Saloon", and as Trustee for the Coke Unit Trust formerly trading as "E Bar", and that he had quantified the claims against the applicant for insolvent trading in the sums of $136,061.87 and $389,522 respectively. Applicant's previous Federal Court proceedings On 10 November 2003 the applicant commenced proceedings in this Court against the Bank and Ferrier Hodgson alleging that both respondents had breached terms and conditions of the Deed of Settlement in that both had falsely accused the applicant in the letters dated 2 December 2002 to which I earlier referred. This proceeding was dismissed for reasons of lack of jurisdiction as disclosing no Federal matter: Spain v National Australia Bank [2004] FCA 87. Keifel J concluded that any claim in connection with the Deed of Settlement would appear to arise only under the general law, and that the "lack of explanation of the applicant's case against the respondents does not make it possible to see any connection between it and a federal statute": Spain v National Australia Bank at [14]. After quoting this passage from her Honour's judgment, the applicant deposed in this proceeding that "[t]he federal statutes referred to were most likely the repealed sub-s 69C of the Banking Act, which provided the rules to establish the state of mind of a body corporate in relation to conduct of its directors, servants and agents". The applicant contends that under the repealed ss 69C(1) and (2) of that Act, the only fact he needed to establish to prove his claim was the relationship of agency and seconded employee between the Bank, Ferrier Hodgson, Mr Jacobs and Mr Jones, and by doing this it would have been impossible for Mr Jones to claim that he was acting in his own capacity. The applicant in the present proceedings submits that, by reason of these letters of demand by the Liquidator of Jack Corporation, the Bank had breached the terms of the Deed of Settlement, and that he, the applicant, was therefore entitled to receive back the Hope Valley property. He alleged that Mr Lorraway, in the context of concluding the Deed of Settlement, had agreed that the Bank would ensure that he would never be contacted again and that this included contact by its former agents or servants. There is no responsive affidavit from the respondent. I will assume, for present purposes, that Mr Lorraway said this on behalf of the Bank. This gives rise to a number of observations. First, it was a statement made which reflects clause 2 of the Deed of Settlement by which the parties agree to resolve all matters between them. Second, it was not a statement made in relation to the affairs of Jack Corporation which was not a party to the Deed of Settlement nor a company with which the Bank had dealings. Third, even if the letters of demand constituted a breach of the Deed of Settlement, and in my opinion they did not, this does not give rise to a claim under s 69E of the Banking Act against the respondent.