Spain v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Spain v Commonwealth of Australia [2011] FCA 658

Citation: Spain v Commonwealth of Australia [2011] FCA 658
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Spain v Commonwealth of Australia [2011] FCA 223
Parties: ERIC RAYMOND SPAIN v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: WAD 107 of 2011
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 9 June 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeals – Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A) – Federal Court Rules (Cth) O 52 r 10 – application for extension of time – application for extension of time to lodge leave to appeal from interlocutory judgment – whether sufficient grounds to grant an extension of time
Legislation: Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 10, O 52 r 10(2A)
Cases cited: Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Kalaba, Lazar v The Queen [1996] FCA 908
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 16 May 2011
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 23
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant represented himself
Counsel for the Respondent: PR Macliver
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 107 of 2011

BETWEEN:

ERIC RAYMOND SPAIN
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 JUNE 2011

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time to file and serve an application for leave to appeal is refused.

2.The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed or agreed. 

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 107 of 2011

BETWEEN:

ERIC RAYMOND SPAIN
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE:

9 JUNE 2011

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant (Mr Spain) seeks an extension of time to file and serve an appeal from summary judgment in favour of the respondent (the Commonwealth) in the primary judgment (Spain v Commonwealth of Australia [2011] FCA 223). For the reasons which follow, the application for an extension of time is refused.

    BACKGROUND

  2. On 22 October 2010, Mr Spain sought an order that the Commonwealth pay him compensation for unjust property acquisitions ‘under section 69E of the (Cth) Banking Act 1959’ in the amount of $15,632,920.

  3. Pursuant to a notice of motion brought by the Commonwealth, Mr Spain’s primary application was dismissed with costs either on the basis of lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, on the basis of s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 658
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Mr Spain brought a case against the Commonwealth of Australia concerning an interlocutory judgment. The primary dispute revolves around the denial of Mr Spain's motion for summary dismissal and the court's interpretation of a deed of settlement between Mr Spain and the National Australia Bank. Mr Spain sought an extension of time to lodge a leave to appeal from this interlocutory judgment.

The court had to decide whether there were sufficient grounds to grant Mr Spain an extension of time to appeal the interlocutory judgment. This involved assessing whether the reasons for the delay were sufficient to excuse the delay and considering the prospects of the appeal being successful. The court considered several factors, including the explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the proposed grounds of appeal.

The court found that while Mr Spain's reasons for the delay were not contested by the Commonwealth, the more fundamental issue was whether the appeal had sufficient prospects of success. The court examined the proposed grounds of appeal, which included arguments about the interpretation of the deed of settlement and alleged breaches by the bank. The court concluded that the proposed grounds of appeal were incomprehensible and did not demonstrate any arguable error in the interlocutory judgment. The primary judge's decision was well-reasoned, and there was no error or even arguable error in dismissing Mr Spain's application.

Consequently, the court refused the application for an extension of time to file and serve an application for leave to appeal. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time to file and serve an application for leave to appeal is refused.

2. The applicant is to pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed or agreed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Relevantly, O 52 r 10 FCR provides:10 Leave to appeal from interlocutory judgments of the Court(1)An application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Court may be made orally to the Judge who has pronounced the judgment at the time of its pronouncement.(2)If an application has not been made in accordance with subrule (1), an application may be made by motion on notice.(2A)Order 19 applies to an application under subrule (2), and the notice of motion must be filed:(a)if the interlocutory judgment is in the nature of a decision on a question under Order 29 — within 21 days after the date on which the interlocutory judgment was pronounced; and(b)in any other case — within 7 days after the date on which the interlocutory judgment was pronounced;or within such further time as the Court or a Judge may allow.… No point is taken by the Commonwealth about the delay. As Mr Spain is unrepresented, the Commonwealth does not submit that Mr Spain’s explanation for that delay is such as to justify the Court refusing to allow him to institute an appeal out of time. Were that the only issue, the extension of time would be granted. However, there is a more fundamental issue. On an application pursuant to O 52 r 10(2A) FCR, not only does the Court need to consider whether the reasons advanced for delay are sufficient to excuse or explain the delay but the Court must also consider and assess the prospects of such leave being obtained: Kalaba, Lazar v The Queen [1996] FCA 908 per Finn J. In Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133, the Full Court (at [6]) endorsed the comments of Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344, (at 348-349) where his Honour indicated that five factors should be considered in determining whether relief ought to be given. These factors can be summarised as follows:(a)Applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislative time limits are not to be ignored. (b)There must be some acceptable explanation for the delay.(c)Any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings, caused by the delay, is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension.(d)The mere absence of prejudice to the respondent is not enough to justify the grant of an extension. (e)The merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension is to be granted. The well known tests in Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 (at 398) govern whether or not a Court should grant leave to appeal. Those tests are:1.whether, in all the circumstances, the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by a court on appeal; and2.whether substantial injustice would result if leave was refused supposing the decision at first instance was wrong. The proposed grounds of appeal To understand both the nature of the proposed appeal grounds and how the primary judge dealt with Mr Spain’s claims, there is little option other than to set each out in some detail. The grounds proposed by Mr Spain are these:In relation to favouring the respondent’s motion for summary dismissal, I appeal this decision primarily based on [the primary judge’s] opinion that my application is a genuine log of complaints, whether rightly or wrongly, against the bank and its directors, servants and agents. And I appeal the decision, which supports that the dispute is between the bank and me only and does not involve the Commonwealth. The visible grounds are:a) No consideration to clause 11 of the deed of settlementb)Premature dismissal because a question of rightly or wrongly requires answeringc)Under the deed, it’s impossible for civil remedy against the bank directlyd)Narrow interpretations of the (Cth) Banking Act 1959 (“the Act”)e)No consideration of the (Cth) Corporations Act 2001f)Inconsistency with High Court decisions concerning the (Cth) Federal Court of Australia 1976Primarily, my claim was made by way of the current provisions of [the Act], and a deed of settlement with the National Australia Bank. Essentially, the claim is that the bank has breached the deed by not providing information under clauses 10 and 11. And because it has not done so, and refused to do so for over eight years, in effect the deed is an instrument that has facilitated an unjust acquisition under section 69C of the Act, which qualifies for compensation under section 69E.The bank has facilitated an unjust acquisition by breaching the effects of the deed because the contract, with bank support if needed; was supposed to allow me to commence proceedings against the bank’s directors, servants and agents individually, but the bank has prevented this from happening. Hence, grounds supporting this appeal and points a) through f) are;1.By way of clauses 5, 10, and 11, I will be able to establish that the acquisition in the deed settlement between the bank and me was under an operation of the [Act] and particularly, section 69C being conduct of directors, servants, and agents. This would satisfy the parameters of section 69E and provide the Court reasons to allow this appeal. And it would also:i)Prove clause 11 of the deed has not been considered, but should be because it is a written term in the contractii)Prove a summary judgement (sic-judgment) was prematureiii)Prove the Banking Act has been interpreted and applied narrowly2.By way of clauses 5, 10, and 11, I will be able to establish that the bank has breached the deed and so by law, must provide truthful answers to questions that will also prove an unjust acquisition has occurred, via the guidelines according to section 69E of the Act. Therefore, as a result the appeal should be allowed because;i)An application and affidavit with a genuine log of complaints, whether rightly or wrongly, can’t be dismissed summarily because further evidence may prove the claim. ii)Inherently, in law the term ‘whether rightly or wrongly’ infers a decision can only be made after all factors are considered, and a genuine log of complaints would most likely lead one to the conclusion that a reasonable person believes a crime has been committed.iii)Summary dismissal of my application is outside the High Court’s judgments and decisions relating to section 31A of the (Cth) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976.iv)A person should not be forced to apply to the High Court for permission to seek justice by way of the (Cth) Criminal Code only because a civil claim has been dismissed. 3.In relation to the Recitals in the deed, I will establish that the reasons for summary dismissal relied too heavily on these clauses because in reality they are irrelevant to the cause for an unjust acquisition. It will also be proven that the Recitals primary purpose was to establish ease of acquisition and value of property; not a summary of negotiations that caused the reasons for a settlement in the first instance. This will also support reasons why summary dismissal was made without lawful foundation. 4.In relation to the decision concerning ownership of property, by the Recitals in the deed and (Cth) Corporations Act 2001, I will also establish my rights to the property and thereby, prove I am entitled to compensation via section 69E in the Banking Act.5.In conclusion, I will also establish that because of the deed’s effect or purpose it is impossible for me to gain civil remedies against the bank directly. This will prove that the judgement (sic-judgment) for summary dismissal is unreasonable and at cross purposes with the High Court’s ruling on section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The Federal Court does not have the power to be in conflict with High Court decisions. (emphasis added)The primary judgment

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Commonwealth submits that what are referred to by Mr Spain as the ‘visible grounds’ as set out at paras a) to f) of the proposed notice of appeal are incomprehensible. The Commonwealth complains that Mr Spain’s submissions are difficult to understand, and do not attempt to or properly address any of the grounds of appeal. They are not grounds of appeal that are capable of demonstrating that Mr Spain’s appeal has sufficient prospects of success or that there is an arguable error in the interlocutory judgment to make it just that his appeal should now be allowed to proceed. CONSIDERATION His Honour concluded that there had not been any acquisition of Mr Spain’s property by reason of the operation of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth) (at [22]) (the Banking Act). It follows that Mr Spain’s claim against the Commonwealth for compensation pursuant to s 69E of the Banking Act was bound to fail. There was no error or even arguable error by his Honour in dismissing the application. I accept the submission of the Commonwealth that Mr Spain’s claim in para 1 of the proposed notice of appeal that cll 5, 10 and 11 of the deed of settlement with the National Australia Bank established that the acquisition of the Hope Valley property by the Bank under the deed of settlement was under an operation of the Banking Act, namely, s 69C, is misconceived. Although Mr Spain relies upon the conduct of directors, servants and agents under s 69C(1) and s 69C(2), those provisions simply provided a means of showing the state of mind of a body corporate for the purposes of the Banking Act, and that any conduct engaged in by such persons is also deemed to have been engaged in by the body corporate. In any event as the Commonwealth observes, those provisions were repealed with effect from 17 June 1999, well before the events in relation to the deed of settlement of which Mr Spain complains. Further, his Honour found as a fact (at [23]) that the Hope Valley property (the property that Mr Spain claimed had been acquired from him by reason of the operation of the Banking Act) was acquired by the Bank from Burymore Pty Ltd, which was deregistered on 26 June 2005. For that further reason alone, Mr Spain had no standing to bring the application. In my view, his Honour did well to distil as much as he did from the 65 pages of affidavit (plus annexures) relied upon by Mr Spain. At [3] of his Honour’s reasons he said:Most of this factual background is deposed to in the applicant's affidavit sworn 21 October 2010 in support of his substantive application but read in opposition to the respondent's motion. This affidavit, which runs to some 65 pages with a significant number of attachments, is discursive and is almost entirely irrelevant. It does betray, however, what is I believe a genuinely held catalogue of complaints, whether justified or not, against the National Australia Bank Limited (the Bank) and some of its employees and agents. Mr Spain has seized on the words ‘genuinely held’ in the last sentence of this paragraph but his Honour did not for a moment and could not possibly conclude that whatever confidence Mr Spain ‘genuinely’ appeared to have in his claims, that they could ever succeed.