[2016] HCATrans 173
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S222 of 2015
B e t w e e n -
SOUTHERN HAN BREAKFAST POINT PTY LTD
Applicant
and
LEWENCE CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD ACN 155 305 507
First Respondent
IAN HILLMAN
Second Respondent
AUSTRALIAN SOLUTIONS CENTRE
Third Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KEANE J
NETTLE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT BRISBANE ON THURSDAY, 28 JULY 2016, AT 9.31 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR M. CHRISTIE, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.P. HUME, for the applicant. (instructed by CCS Legal Pty Ltd)
MR S. ROBERTSON: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.F. SANTUCCI, for the first respondent. (instructed by Maddocks Lawyers)
KEANE J: Mr Christie, you have a summons to amend the name of the appellant?
MR CHRISTIE: That is so, your Honour.
KEANE J: Is there any opposition?
MR ROBERTSON: No opposition to that, your Honour.
KEANE J: Very well. There will be an order in terms of the summons filed on 25 July 2016. Yes, Mr Christie.
MR CHRISTIE: Your Honours, I also mention the matter on behalf of the second and third respondents, who have filed submitting appearances.
KEANE J: Thank you.
MR CHRISTIE: Your Honours, this application concerns the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (NSW). There is legislation relevantly to the same effect in all States except for Western Australia. The Act has assumed great commercial significance. Billions of dollars’ worth of claims have been adjudicated under this legislation. The legislation extends beyond the construction industry to related industries and to related occupations. Statutory adjudication under this legislation now sits alongside arbitration and litigation as a primary form of dispute resolution in the construction industry, and I should add that this Court has yet to consider this scheme.
This application raises two narrow points of statutory construction of fundamental importance to the operation of the Act. The first concerns the concept of “reference date” which is found in section 8 of the Act which I will take your Honours to in a moment. The question is whether the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact. There is now divergence between the Queensland and New South Wales courts on this issue.
The Queensland approach, if I might call it that, is to the effect that it is a jurisdictional fact, and that was the approach adopted by single instance decisions in New South Wales until the decision of the court below. In our respectful submission, consistency in the operation of these Acts is important, given the significance of the construction industry to the national economy.
The second issue is whether certiorari is available for non‑jurisdictional error on the face of the record. The New South Wales Court of Appeal has held in a line of authority referred to in our supplementary submissions that it…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd v Lewence Construction... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2016] HCATrans 173
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was asked to determine two principal legal issues. The first concerned whether the existence of a "reference date" under section 8 of the Act is a jurisdictional fact, a point on which there was a divergence of authority between Queensland and New South Wales courts. The second issue was whether the writ of certiorari is available for non-jurisdictional error on the face of the record, a question that the New South Wales Court of Appeal had consistently held in the negative. The applicant argued that consistency in the interpretation of this significant legislation was crucial for the national economy.
The applicant's primary submission was that the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact, meaning that an adjudicator lacks the power to make a determination if no valid reference date exists. This was contrasted with the Court of Appeal's reasoning, which focused on section 13(1) of the Act and suggested that a claim to entitlement was sufficient for an adjudicator to have jurisdiction, rather than an actual entitlement. The applicant contended that the Court of Appeal, like the adjudicator, had erred by applying the wrong test, focusing on the absence of a contractual provision precluding a reference date rather than the presence of a contractual provision creating one. This error, it was argued, meant that both the adjudicator and the Court of Appeal had incorrectly determined that reference dates continued to arise after the termination of a construction contract where the contract itself made no provision for such continuation. Regarding the second issue, the applicant argued that the New South Wales Court of Appeal's position on certiorari for non-jurisdictional error was inconsistent with the broader jurisprudence of the High Court, which generally allows such review unless expressly excluded by statute.
The Court granted special leave to appeal on the first ground, concerning the reference date, and refused special leave on the second ground, concerning certiorari for non-jurisdictional error. The Court indicated that the primary question of the operation of the legislation was the central issue.
Background
Background to the litigation
Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd & Ors was an application for special leave to appeal against a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The matter had originated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales where Southern Han sought a declaration that it was entitled to a progress payment under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW). Lewence Construction and others opposed the application. The Supreme Court found in favour of Southern Han but this decision was overturned on appeal. Southern Han then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court, arguing that the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of the Security of Payment Act. The key issues were whether the existence of a "reference date" was a jurisdictional fact and whether certiorari was available for non-jurisdictional errors of law on the face of the record. The High Court granted special leave to appeal limited to certain grounds, and ordered that Southern Han provide security for costs of the appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (NSW).
2. Whether certiorari is available for non-jurisdictional error on the face of the record in the context of adjudications under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (NSW).
Held
1. Whether the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (NSW). The court concluded that the existence of a reference date is not a jurisdictional fact. As such, the appeal was dismissed with respect to this issue.
2. Whether certiorari is available for non-jurisdictional error on the face of the record in the context of adjudications under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (NSW). The court concluded that certiorari is not available for non-jurisdictional error on the face of the record. As such, the appeal was dismissed with respect to this issue.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In considering whether the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (NSW), the Court began by examining the text and structure of the Act. The applicant argued that the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact because it is an essential aspect of the entitlement to payment. The applicant submitted that an adjudicator does not have the power to award an amount where no entitlement arises because there is no reference date. The Court of Appeal had found that the existence of a reference date was a jurisdictional fact, but the applicant argued that the Court of Appeal made an error in adopting the wrong test for determining whether there was a reference date. The Court observed that the Act draws a distinction between questions of the amount of the progress payment, which is solely a matter for the adjudicator, and questions of entitlement in the first place. However, the Court found that the respondent had a valid argument that the distinction between substantive entitlement under section 8 and procedural mechanism under section 13 meant that questions of entitlement were intended to be determined by adjudicators rather than by courts on judicial review.
Turning to whether certiorari is available for non-jurisdictional error on the face of the record, the Court noted that the New South Wales Court of Appeal had held in a line of authority that it was not. The applicant argued that this position was incorrect and should be revisited by the High Court. The Court granted special leave to appeal on this issue, finding that it was an interesting question of statutory interpretation that required clarification. The Court observed that there was a divergence of authority between New South Wales and Queensland on this issue, and that consistency in the operation of the Act was important given the significance of the construction industry to the national economy.
In summary, the Court found that the existence of a reference date may not be a jurisdictional fact under the Act, and that the question of whether certiorari is available for non-jurisdictional error on the face of the record under the Act was an interesting issue that required clarification by the High Court. The Court granted special leave to appeal on these two issues in order to resolve the divergence of authority between New South Wales and Queensland, and to provide guidance on the proper interpretation of the Act.