SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court: Application)
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v TEACHERS APPEAL BOARD AND ANOR
[2011] SASCFC 3
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Gray and The Honourable Justice White)
25 February 2011
EDUCATION - SCHOOLS - GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS - TEACHERS' EMPLOYMENT AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE - OTHER MATTERS
PUBLIC SERVICE - BOARDS, TRIBUNALS AND APPEALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA
The second defendant, a member of the teaching service under the Education Act 1972 (SA), appealed to the Teachers Appeal Board (the first defendant) against a decision of the Chief Executive of the Department of Education and Children's Services transferring her from her position within the Department - the State sought a declaration that the Teachers Appeal Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, contending that s 54 of the Education Act and reg 31 of the Education Regulations 1997 (SA) provide only for appeals against determinations by Chief Executives of appeals to them and not against first instance decisions of Chief Executives.
Held: the Teachers Appeal Board does have jurisdiction to hear the second defendant's appeal - Declaration made accordingly.
Education Act 1972 (SA) s 5, s 12, ss 15-17, s 26, s 45, s 53, s 54; Education Regulations 1997 (SA) reg 31, reg 32; Public Sector Act 2009 (SA) s 3, Sch 3; Education Act Amendment Act 1986 (SA), referred to.
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70, discussed.
Cava & Ors v Marshall (2003) LSJS 347; Cusack v Parsons (1988) 48 SASR 364; Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 148; R v Ninnes [2009] SASC 40; Nguyen v Nguyen (199) 169 CLR 245; State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344; Barbaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1; Campbell College, Belfast (Governors) v Northern Ireland Valuation Commissioner [1964] 1 WLR 912; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; Vardon v Promotion and Grievance Appeal Board [2007] SASC 137; Australian Education Union v Department of Children's Services [2010] SASC 161; Jeffs v New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing Board [1967] 1 AC 551; Ringrose v College of Physicians and Surgeons [1977] 1 SCR 814; Law Society of Upper Canada v French [1975] 2 SCR 767; R v Peterborough Police Commissioners; Ex parte Lewis [1965] 2 OR 577; R v Howard [1902] 2 KB 363; R v The Corporation of the City of Whyalla (1979) 20 SASR 386; Builders' Registration Board of Queensland v Rauber (1983) 57 ALJR 376, considered.
THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v TEACHERS APPEAL BOARD AND ANOR
[2011] SASCFC 3Full Court: Doyle CJ, Gray and White JJ
DOYLE CJ: I have had the advantage of considering the proposed reasons of Gray and White JJ in this matter. I agree with the reasons that White J gives for…
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- Case
- [2011] SASCFC 3
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was the proper construction and application of regulation 31 of the Education Regulations, specifically whether it provided a right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board against a decision made directly by the Chief Executive, or if the Chief Executive’s decision to transfer Ms Burtenshaw was inextricably linked to the disciplinary proceedings, thereby falling within the conceded appealable matters. The Court also considered the weight to be given to previous decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly *Cava v Marshall*, where a similar issue regarding the scope of regulation 31 was touched upon, albeit without full argument on the jurisdictional point.
The Court reasoned that an interpretation of regulation 31 which prevented an appeal when the Chief Executive made the initial decision would be artificial and implausible, likely frustrating the statutory purpose of providing appeal rights. It noted that such a construction would mean that appeal rights could be defeated by the fortuity of the Chief Executive making the decision personally, rather than through a delegate. The Court also applied the principle of precedent, stating that it would only depart from its previous decision in *Cava v Marshall* if it were satisfied that the earlier decision was clearly wrong.
Ultimately, the Court found that the State's submission regarding the restriction of appeal rights was artificial and implausible, and did not give effect to the statutory purpose of the regulation. The Court declined to uphold the State's submission, implicitly affirming the jurisdiction of the Teachers Appeal Board to hear the appeal against the transfer decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: WHITE J
The Education Act creates a scheme to enable the provision and regulation of primary and secondary education in South Australia. The scheme addresses both public and private education. The scheme addresses the appointment of teachers and other public officers necessary for the education and welfare of school students and for the proper administration of the Act. The Act provides the Minister with relevant powers to achieve these purposes.[9][9] See Australian Education Union v Department of Children’s Services [2010] SASC 161 at [13].Consideration Against the background provided by the facts and the statutory scheme, it is to be understood that Ms Burtenshaw’s complaints which she seeks to advance before the Teachers Appeal Board, relate to decisions made by the Chief Executive exercising administrative responsibilities under the Education Act. When the factual circumstances are explored, they reveal an inextricable link between, on the one hand the disciplinary proceedings, and on the other, the decisions to reprimand and transfer. In my view, a question arises as to whether both decisions should be properly characterised as being part of the one disciplinary process. It is conceded by the State that Ms Burtenshaw had a right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board from decisions taken in disciplinary proceedings by the Chief Executive. There is no challenge to the jurisdiction of the Teachers Appeal Board in this respect. The challenge to jurisdiction only arises when there is a separation of the two decisions, and the decision to transfer is treated as being a separate and distinct decision from those decisions taken as part of the disciplinary process. This now brings me to a consideration of the challenge to jurisdiction in the present proceeding. The contention of the State is that Ms Burtenshaw’s rights of appeal with respect to the decision to transfer are restricted to those rights that arise under regulation 31. It is said that regulation 31 contemplates a two-stage process: a right of appeal to the Chief Executive against a decision or action of an officer of the Department, and then a further right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board against the determination of the Chief Executive. In the present proceeding, the officer of the Department making the original decision, that is the decision to transfer, was the Chief Executive. It was said that in that circumstance, there was no right of appeal to the Chief Executive from a decision of the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive could not, it was said, sit on appeal from his own decision. As a consequence, it was submitted that the further right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board could not arise. The precondition contained in the regulation could not be fulfilled. To my mind, this would be a most unfortunate interpretation. The regulation contemplates two rights of appeal; the second conditional on the first. On the State’s contention, the right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board would be avoided if the Chief Executive were to make the initial decision. It is unlikely that Parliament intended that rights of appeal should depend upon such a fortuity. It is to be noted that counsel for the State accepted that all decisions could be taken by the Chief Executive and that this could frustrate all rights of appeal under regulation 31. However, counsel acknowledged that a person acting as a delegate of the Chief Executive would be subject to review or appeal under regulation 31. A consideration of the above matters would suggest that the construction advanced by the State is artificial, implausible, and cannot be understood to give effect to the statutory purpose behind the regulation.