South Australia v Teachers Appeal Board

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Application)

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v TEACHERS APPEAL BOARD AND ANOR

[2011] SASCFC 3

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Gray and The Honourable Justice White)

25 February 2011

EDUCATION - SCHOOLS - GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS - TEACHERS' EMPLOYMENT AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE - OTHER MATTERS

PUBLIC SERVICE - BOARDS, TRIBUNALS AND APPEALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA

The second defendant, a member of the teaching service under the Education Act 1972 (SA), appealed to the Teachers Appeal Board (the first defendant) against a decision of the Chief Executive of the Department of Education and Children's Services transferring her from her position within the Department - the State sought a declaration that the Teachers Appeal Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, contending that s 54 of the Education Act and reg 31 of the Education Regulations 1997 (SA) provide only for appeals against determinations by Chief Executives of appeals to them and not against first instance decisions of Chief Executives.

Held:  the Teachers Appeal Board does have jurisdiction to hear the second defendant's appeal - Declaration made accordingly.

Education Act 1972 (SA) s 5, s 12, ss 15-17, s 26, s 45, s 53, s 54; Education Regulations 1997 (SA) reg 31, reg 32; Public Sector Act 2009 (SA) s 3, Sch 3; Education Act Amendment Act 1986 (SA), referred to.
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70, discussed.
Cava & Ors v Marshall (2003) LSJS 347; Cusack v Parsons (1988) 48 SASR 364; Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 148; R v Ninnes [2009] SASC 40; Nguyen v Nguyen (199) 169 CLR 245; State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344; Barbaniaris v Lutony Fashions Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 1; Campbell College, Belfast (Governors) v Northern Ireland Valuation Commissioner [1964] 1 WLR 912; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; Vardon v Promotion and Grievance Appeal Board [2007] SASC 137; Australian Education Union v Department of Children's Services [2010] SASC 161; Jeffs v New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing Board [1967] 1 AC 551; Ringrose v College of Physicians and Surgeons [1977] 1 SCR 814; Law Society of Upper Canada v French [1975] 2 SCR 767; R v Peterborough Police Commissioners; Ex parte Lewis [1965] 2 OR 577; R v Howard [1902] 2 KB 363; R v The Corporation of the City of Whyalla (1979) 20 SASR 386; Builders' Registration Board of Queensland v Rauber (1983) 57 ALJR 376, considered.

THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v TEACHERS APPEAL BOARD AND ANOR
[2011] SASCFC 3

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Gray and White JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ:     I have had the advantage of considering the proposed reasons of Gray and White JJ in this matter.  I agree with the reasons that White J gives for…

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Details
Case
[2011] SASCFC 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Doyle CJ, Gray and White JJ, considered the jurisdiction of the Teachers Appeal Board. The dispute arose when Ms Burtenshaw, a principal, sought to appeal both a reprimand and a subsequent transfer decision made by the Chief Executive of the Education Department. The State of South Australia challenged the Teachers Appeal Board's jurisdiction to hear the appeal against the transfer decision, arguing that regulation 31 of the Education Regulations did not permit an appeal against a decision made by the Chief Executive himself.

The central legal issue before the Court was the proper construction and application of regulation 31 of the Education Regulations, specifically whether it provided a right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board against a decision made directly by the Chief Executive, or if the Chief Executive’s decision to transfer Ms Burtenshaw was inextricably linked to the disciplinary proceedings, thereby falling within the conceded appealable matters. The Court also considered the weight to be given to previous decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly *Cava v Marshall*, where a similar issue regarding the scope of regulation 31 was touched upon, albeit without full argument on the jurisdictional point.

The Court reasoned that an interpretation of regulation 31 which prevented an appeal when the Chief Executive made the initial decision would be artificial and implausible, likely frustrating the statutory purpose of providing appeal rights. It noted that such a construction would mean that appeal rights could be defeated by the fortuity of the Chief Executive making the decision personally, rather than through a delegate. The Court also applied the principle of precedent, stating that it would only depart from its previous decision in *Cava v Marshall* if it were satisfied that the earlier decision was clearly wrong.

Ultimately, the Court found that the State's submission regarding the restriction of appeal rights was artificial and implausible, and did not give effect to the statutory purpose of the regulation. The Court declined to uphold the State's submission, implicitly affirming the jurisdiction of the Teachers Appeal Board to hear the appeal against the transfer decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

My reasons for agreeing with the intimation and joining in the subsequent declaration now follow. Background Prior to 8 July 2010 Ms Burtenshaw was a member of the teaching service. That service was established by section 15 of the Education Act. Ms Burtenshaw held the position as principal of the Coober Pedy Area School. Matters of concern had arisen in regard to that school and disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the Chief Executive Officer[1] of the Education Department against Ms Burtenshaw. The facts and circumstances surrounding these disciplinary proceedings are set out in affidavits on file including in particular an affidavit of Ms Burtenshaw exhibiting extensive documentation. [1] The Director-General is the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Education and Children’s Services: see section 5(1) of the Education Act 1972 (SA). These terms are often used interchangeably in this context. For the purposes of consistency, I will now refer to the ‘Chief Executive’. The Chief Executive reached certain conclusions in the disciplinary proceedings. He decided to discipline Ms Burtenshaw. A reprimand was imposed and shortly thereafter, Ms Burtenshaw was advised that a decision had been made to transfer her to another position in the Department. Ms Burtenshaw was notified of the reprimand by letter dated 1 July 2010, and was notified of the decision to transfer her by letter dated 8 July 2010. Ms Burtenshaw has sought to appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board both the decision to reprimand and the decision to transfer her. The State of South Australia challenges the jurisdiction of the Teachers Appeal Board to address the decision to transfer. The scope and effect of regulation 31 of the Education Regulations arises for consideration. This brief introduction underscores the primary issue in this proceeding – the jurisdiction of the Teachers Appeal Board. The challenge to jurisdiction, as will be discussed later in these reasons, has relevance well beyond the present proceeding. The challenge raises important matters of statutory interpretation and of administrative law. It has profound implications for members of the teaching service whose rights under the Education Act are the subject of administrative decisions and actions. I should at the outset address the decision of a Judge of this Court in Cava v Marshall.[2] That case involved judicial review proceedings, where a denial of procedural fairness had been alleged. Teachers had been transferred from their positions, without notice or any opportunity to be heard in relation to the transfers. In the decision, Mullighan J, after referencing earlier decisions of the Teachers Appeal Board on the scope and effect of regulation 31 of the Education Regulations,[3] observed: “The Board could see no reason to conclude that “any officer of the Department” in Reg 31(1) could not include the Director-General, and I agree.”[4] The issue currently before this Court was not argued in Cava. Jurisdiction was conceded. The question of the construction of regulation 31 was not developed in the Judge’s reasons. It is to be accepted that the Full Court in State of South Australia v McDonald[5] cited the relevant passage in Cava v Marshall with approval. However, the issue arising in the present proceeding was not in question at all in McDonald. These factors, in my view, materially limit the weight that can be accorded to the observations made in Cava. [2] Cava v Marshall (2003) 230 LSJS 347.[3] And the predecessor to regulation 31.[4] Cava v Marshall (2003) 230 LSJS 347, 368.[5] State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, 393.Tender of Evidence on the Hearing

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I should at the outset address the decision of a Judge of this Court in Cava v Marshall.[2] That case involved judicial review proceedings, where a denial of procedural fairness had been alleged. Teachers had been transferred from their positions, without notice or any opportunity to be heard in relation to the transfers. In the decision, Mullighan J, after referencing earlier decisions of the Teachers Appeal Board on the scope and effect of regulation 31 of the Education Regulations,[3] observed: “The Board could see no reason to conclude that “any officer of the Department” in Reg 31(1) could not include the Director-General, and I agree.”[4] The issue currently before this Court was not argued in Cava. Jurisdiction was conceded. The question of the construction of regulation 31 was not developed in the Judge’s reasons. It is to be accepted that the Full Court in State of South Australia v McDonald[5] cited the relevant passage in Cava v Marshall with approval. However, the issue arising in the present proceeding was not in question at all in McDonald. These factors, in my view, materially limit the weight that can be accorded to the observations made in Cava. [2] Cava v Marshall (2003) 230 LSJS 347.[3] And the predecessor to regulation 31.[4] Cava v Marshall (2003) 230 LSJS 347, 368.[5] State of South Australia v McDonald (2009) 104 SASR 344, 393.Tender of Evidence on the Hearing On the hearing of the application before the Full Court, counsel for the State initially proceeded as though the Court was addressing a question of law on referral. When it was pointed out that the full hearing of the summons was under consideration, the question of the tender of evidence arose. At this point the submissions of counsel for the State were interrupted to allow the evidentiary state of the proceedings to be addressed. The State tendered two affidavits. Ms Burtenshaw did not oppose the tender and did not seek to cross-examine on the affidavits. The State then closed its case. Ms Burtenshaw then tendered an affidavit dated 21 October 2010, and the exhibits to that affidavit. This tender was opposed by the State. The Court marked the affidavit and exhibits for identification, giving leave to the State to correspond with the Court in due course about its considered attitude to the tender. The State has advised that it does not object to paragraph 41 of the affidavit and exhibit SB 17 to the affidavit being received as part of the evidence in the trial. The exhibit is a letter, of 5 July 2010, written to the Chief Executive from Ms Burtenshaw, requesting that the Chief Executive not proceed to transfer Ms Burtenshaw to another position in the Department. However the State has advised that it does not admit the truth of all of the contents of the exhibit. The State has not informed the Court as to what portions of the exhibit the qualification relates. It is my view the affidavit of Ms Burtenshaw and the exhibits thereto are relevant and probative and should be admitted in their entirety. The affidavit and exhibits set out the factual framework against which the declaration sought by the State is to be determined. I have drawn on the affidavit and exhibits to set out the chronology of events and to identify the assertions by the parties of their respective positions. I make it plain that I have not considered that the assertions of the parties as to their dispute are correct or justified. They are matters to be determined by the Teachers Appeal Board.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WHITE J
I regard these considerations as being of some substance. If the present issue was before the Court for the first time, they may well justify the grant of the declaration which the State sought. However, there are other considerations and, for the reasons which follow, I consider that this Court should not uphold the State’s submission unless it is satisfied that the contrary view of reg 31 adopted by Mullighan J in Cava v Marshall is clearly wrong.The Significance of Previous Decisions This Court applies the principle that the doctrine of precedent requires it to follow its own previous decisions unless satisfied that the previous decision in question was clearly wrong. In Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Ltd,[32] King CJ, with whom Jacobs, White, Matheson and Prior JJ agreed, spoke of the proper approach:The question remains whether this Court should now cease to follow Honeychurch v Honeychurch. It is a settled rule that this Court regards itself as bound by its own previous decisions, subject only to the qualification that it may depart from a previous decision if satisfied that that decision is plainly wrong … Honeychurch v Honeychurch has stood as an authority in this Court for 46 years and there is a strong presumption against departing from it. Nevertheless I have reached the clearest of conclusions that the reasoning by which the decision was arrived at is fallacious and that there is a strong tide of authority contrary to both the decision and the reasoning upon which it is based. I think that it would be wrong for this Court to continue to follow it. I consider that the case should not be regarded in future as good authority in this State.[33]This approach is consistent with the decision of the High Court in Nguyen v Nguyen.[34] Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ (with whom Brennan and Deane JJ agreed on this point) said:The extent to which the Full Court of the Supreme Court of a State regards itself as free to depart from its own previous decisions must be a matter of practice for the court to determine for itself. …Where a court of appeal holds itself free to depart from an earlier decision it should do so cautiously and only when compelled to the conclusion that the earlier decision is wrong. The occasions upon which the departure from previous authority is warranted are infrequent and exceptional and pose no real threat to the doctrine of precedent and the predictability of the law … [N]ow that appeals to the High Court are by special leave only, the appeal courts of the Supreme Courts of the States and of the Federal Court are in many instances courts of last resort for all practical purposes. … In these circumstances, it would seem inappropriate that the appeal courts of the Supreme Courts and of the Federal Court should regard themselves as strictly bound by their own previous decisions. In cases where an appeal is not available or is not taken to this Court rigid adherence to precedent is likely on occasions to perpetuate error without, as experience has shown, significantly increasing the corresponding advantage of certainty.[35][32] (1989) 52 SASR 148. See also R v Ninnes [2009] SASC 40 at [35].[33] Ibid at 157.[34] (1990) 169 CLR 245.[35] Ibid at 268-70.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WHITE J

The Education Act creates a scheme to enable the provision and regulation of primary and secondary education in South Australia. The scheme addresses both public and private education. The scheme addresses the appointment of teachers and other public officers necessary for the education and welfare of school students and for the proper administration of the Act. The Act provides the Minister with relevant powers to achieve these purposes.[9][9] See Australian Education Union v Department of Children’s Services [2010] SASC 161 at [13].Consideration Against the background provided by the facts and the statutory scheme, it is to be understood that Ms Burtenshaw’s complaints which she seeks to advance before the Teachers Appeal Board, relate to decisions made by the Chief Executive exercising administrative responsibilities under the Education Act. When the factual circumstances are explored, they reveal an inextricable link between, on the one hand the disciplinary proceedings, and on the other, the decisions to reprimand and transfer. In my view, a question arises as to whether both decisions should be properly characterised as being part of the one disciplinary process. It is conceded by the State that Ms Burtenshaw had a right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board from decisions taken in disciplinary proceedings by the Chief Executive. There is no challenge to the jurisdiction of the Teachers Appeal Board in this respect. The challenge to jurisdiction only arises when there is a separation of the two decisions, and the decision to transfer is treated as being a separate and distinct decision from those decisions taken as part of the disciplinary process. This now brings me to a consideration of the challenge to jurisdiction in the present proceeding. The contention of the State is that Ms Burtenshaw’s rights of appeal with respect to the decision to transfer are restricted to those rights that arise under regulation 31. It is said that regulation 31 contemplates a two-stage process: a right of appeal to the Chief Executive against a decision or action of an officer of the Department, and then a further right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board against the determination of the Chief Executive. In the present proceeding, the officer of the Department making the original decision, that is the decision to transfer, was the Chief Executive. It was said that in that circumstance, there was no right of appeal to the Chief Executive from a decision of the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive could not, it was said, sit on appeal from his own decision. As a consequence, it was submitted that the further right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board could not arise. The precondition contained in the regulation could not be fulfilled. To my mind, this would be a most unfortunate interpretation. The regulation contemplates two rights of appeal; the second conditional on the first. On the State’s contention, the right of appeal to the Teachers Appeal Board would be avoided if the Chief Executive were to make the initial decision. It is unlikely that Parliament intended that rights of appeal should depend upon such a fortuity. It is to be noted that counsel for the State accepted that all decisions could be taken by the Chief Executive and that this could frustrate all rights of appeal under regulation 31. However, counsel acknowledged that a person acting as a delegate of the Chief Executive would be subject to review or appeal under regulation 31. A consideration of the above matters would suggest that the construction advanced by the State is artificial, implausible, and cannot be understood to give effect to the statutory purpose behind the regulation.