Somers and Somers (No.2)
[2013] FCCA 1992
•11 November 2013
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SOMERS & SOMERS (NO.2) | [2013] FCCA 1992 |
| Catchwords: CHILD SUPPORT – COSTS – Application for costs – indemnity costs – whether costs should be paid on an indemnity basis – whether party who is a (omitted) is entitled to costs for appearing as a litigant in person – whether either party wholly unsuccessful – where the parties made settlement offers in writing. |
| Legislation: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth), ss.84, 100 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s.117 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 Sch. 1 Part 2 |
| A & D Douglas Pty Ltd v Lawyers Private Mortgages Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 690 Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2001] HCA 26; (2001) 179 ALR 406 Cachia v Hanes [1994] HCA 14; (1994) 179 CLR 403 Colgate Palmolive Pty Ltd v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 536; (1993) 46 FCR 225 Commonwealth Bank v Hattersley [2001] NSWSC 60 Guss v Veenhuizen (No 2) (1976) 136 CLR 47 Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340 Laurent & Laurent [2013] FMCAfam 100 Prantage & Prantage [2013] FamCAFC 105; (2013) 49 Fam LR 197 Somers & Somers [2013] FCCA 162 |
| Applicant: | MS SOMERS |
| Respondent: | MR SOMERS |
| File Number: | SYC 3026 of 2008 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Scarlett |
| Hearing date: | 5 August 2013 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 5 August 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 11 November 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | KDB Holmes |
ORDERS
The Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs fixed in the sum of $23,993.89.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Somers & Somers (No.2) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYC 3026 of 2008
| MS SOMERS |
Applicant
And
| MR SOMERS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Application
This is an application for costs arising out of a decision of this Court made on 3 May 2013. As a result of that decision, an Order was made that if either party sought to press an order for costs, that party should file and serve an affidavit setting details of the costs and disbursements claimed within 28 days.
The Applicant filed an affidavit seeking an Order for costs in her favour on an indemnity basis in the sum of $62,609.75.
The application for costs is opposed by the Respondent.
Issues
The issues in this case are:
a)Whether an order for costs should be made in favour of the Applicant at all;
b)If so, whether costs should be calculated on an indemnity basis, as the Applicant claims, or on a party and party basis; and
c)Whether the Applicant, a (omitted) by profession, is able to seek costs for acting for herself from the time that she was no longer represented.
Background
The proceedings commenced as an Application to enforce a child support agreement to provide support for the parties’ three children. In the alternative, the Applicant sought an order for departure from administrative assessment of child support.
The Respondent, the father of the three children and the Applicant’s former husband, denied that he had an obligation under the child support agreement, asserting that it had been terminated. He also sought a departure order.
The three children the subject of the agreement, whose names will not be published, are:
a)A, a boy who was born on (omitted) 1993, and is now an adult;
b)B, a boy who was born on (omitted) 1996, and
c)C, a girl who was born on (omitted) 1999.
The proceedings were commenced by way of an Enforcement Summons, filed on 12 March 2010, seeking to enforce the payment of arrears amounting to $14,929.60 and continuing. The Enforcement Summons was returnable on 4 May 2010, on which date it was listed for hearing on 8 June 2010. The description of the progress of the proceedings has been taken from the Reasons for Judgment by this Court handed down on 3 May 2013 (Somers & Somers[1]).
[1] [2013] FCCA 162
The following day, the Respondent filed an Application in a Case seeking a declaration that the child support agreement entered into between the parties had been terminated.
On 8 June, when the matter was listed for hearing, both parties were represented by counsel. They told the Court that, in their mutual opinion, the matter required about a day and a half to hear. The proceedings were then adjourned to 18 and 19 November 2010 for hearing.
The hearing did not proceed on 18 November, because senior counsel for the Respondent had been admitted to hospital. The Respondent sought an adjournment due to the inability to brief other counsel at short notice. The Applicant’s solicitor, Mr Karras, submitted that the parties should prepare written submissions on the issue of whether or not there was a valid child support agreement still in force. Mr Holmes, the Respondent’s solicitor, submitted that there was another leg to the Respondent’s argument that may not be appropriate for written submissions, which was the discretionary power of the Court to exercise the power to enforce, which would also be the subject of some contested argument and may well need some cross-examination of the parties.
Mr Karras told the Court:
I should say, so there is no misunderstanding, the only part that I am contending should be dealt with by way of submissions is that neat point under s. 84(3), which is whether or not an event can be specified as a terminating event, as opposed to date being specified as a terminating event.[2]
[2] Somers & Somers [2013] FCCA 162 at [39]
The matter was stood out of the list, with liberty to restore on seven days’ notice.
On 14 February 2011 the Applicant sought to have the matter re-listed before the Court. The matter came back to Court on 16 March and, on that date, was listed for final hearing on 5 August 2011.
On 5 August 2011, the Court was told that the Applicant’s solicitor’s instructions had been withdrawn. The hearing proceeded with the Applicant appearing in person.
The proceedings were adjourned part-heard and were not able to resume until 2 December, due to my own hospitalisation. The hearing concluded on 2 December 2011 and the parties were directed to file written submissions.
On 3 May 2013 judgment was delivered. The following Orders were made:
(1) The Court declares that the Child Support Agreement entered into by the Applicant and the Respondent on 2 November 2005 remains in force in respect of the children B and C.
(2) The Court declares that the Child Support Agreement entered into by the Applicant and the Respondent on 2 November 2005 has been terminated in respect of A with effect from 15 March 2011.
(3) The Applicant is to file and serve an affidavit setting out details of the arrears currently claimed under the Enforcement Summons filed on 12 March 2010 within 21 days.
(4) The Respondent is given leave to file and serve any affidavit setting out the facts upon which he seeks to rely in respect of the claimed arrears within a further period of 14 days.
(5) If either party seeks to press an order for costs that party is to file and serve an affidavit setting details of the costs and disbursements claimed within 28 days.
(6) The proceedings are otherwise adjourned to Monday 17 June 2013 for further mention at 10:00 am.
On 31 May 2013 the Respondent filed an affidavit disputing the details of the arrears which the Applicant claimed but agreeing that he was “liable for the balance of nanny costs up to a maximum of $42,280.”[3]
[3] Affidavit of Mr Somers 31.5.2013 at paragraph [14]
On 17 June 2013 the Respondent was ordered to pay the amount of $42,280.00 on account of nanny costs within seven days.
Submissions and Evidence
The Applicant relies on the following:
a)her affidavit of 31 May 2013 entitled Section 117 Family Law Act factors;
b)her affidavit of 31 May 2013 entitled Chronology, costs agreements and costs claimed affidavit;
c)her affidavit of 8 July 2013; and
d)her written Submissions on costs of 22 July 2013.
The Respondent relies on the following:
a)his affidavit of 27 June 2013;
b)Written Submissions of 8 July 2013;
c)Costs Submissions in Reply of 5 August 2013.
The Applicant is seeking an order for costs on an indemnity basis totalling $62,609.75. This amount is made up as follows:
a)The sum of $38,755.53 paid to her former solicitors Karras Partners, who represented her up until she withdrew their instructions on or about 4 August 2011;
b)Her costs, as a (omitted), of attending Court and representing herself on the following dates:
i)5 August 2011;
ii)16 November 2011;
iii)2 December 2011; and
iv)3 May 2013.
c)Her costs and disbursements of preparing for hearing including preparing the necessary documents; and
d)Out of pocket expenses, such as transcripts, parking and loss of 9 days’ annual leave.
The Applicant relies on the decision of the High Court of Australia in Guss v Veenhuizen (No 2)[4] as authority for the proposition that a litigant in person does not recover costs in the capacity of a (omitted), but because he or she happens to be a (omitted), his or her costs are able to be quantified by the Court. She also relies on the decision of Dowsett J in A & D Douglas Pty Ltd v Lawyers Private Mortgages Pty Ltd[5] for that purpose.
[4] (1976) 136 CLR 47
[5] [2006] FCA 690
Further, the Applicant cites the decision of Commonwealth Bank v Hattersley[6] in support of the proposition that costs of lawyers who work for corporations or as employees of the Crown or a statutory authority are regarded in the same way as independent solicitors.
[6] [2001] NSWSC 60
The Applicant identifies the factors that the Court is required to consider under s.117(2A) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) when considering whether to make an order for costs and submits that the following factors support her claim for a costs order:
a)The financial circumstances of each of the parties – there is a significant discrepancy between the income of the parties;
b)The conduct of the Respondent, as a party of greater wealth attempting to wear her out by a process of attrition;
c)The fact that the proceedings were necessitated by the Respondent’s failure to comply with a binding child support agreement, which, she submits, should be treated in the same way as an order of the Court;
d)The fact that the Respondent was wholly unsuccessful whilst she was wholly successful; and
e)The fact that she had made written offers of settlement to the Respondent which he had failed to accept.
The Applicant relies on the decision of Foster FM[7] in Laurent & Laurent[8]in support of the proposition that the categories of cases in which an award of indemnity costs can be made are not closed. She submits that the circumstances of this case are such as to warrant the Court in departing from the usual practice of awarding costs on a party and party basis, as set out in Colgate Palmolive Pty Ltd v Cussons Pty Ltd.[9]The applicant submits that there are grounds for the Court to exercise its discretion to award indemnity costs in her favour, as this case is of the exceptional kind described in Kohan & Kohan.[10]
[7] As his Honour then was
[8] [2013] FMCAfam 100
[9] [1993] FCA 536; (1993) 46 FCR 225
[10] (1993) FLC 92-340
The Applicant submits that indemnity costs are justified because:
a)The Respondent had an ulterior and improper motive for purporting to terminate the child support agreement, to dissuade her from seeking to enforce it;
b)The Respondent made a number of false or irrelevant allegations;
c)The Respondent engaged in conduct so reckless as to be characterised as misconduct;
d)The Respondent made groundless contentions that the child support agreement had been terminated; and
e)The Respondent imprudently refused offers to settle the proceedings.
The Respondent submits that there is no basis for a costs order and the application should be dismissed on the following bases:
a)Both parties are in receipt of substantial incomes although it is acknowledged that the Respondent’s income is substantially more than the Applicant’s;
b)There is nothing of sufficient significance in the Respondent’s conduct such as would amount to justifying circumstances to award costs against him;
c)It was the Applicant who filed “voluminous and unnecessary material” which the Respondent was required to consider and respond;
d)The proceedings were commenced in relation to an asserted breach of an agreement rather than a breach of Orders of the Court;
e)Both parties made offers to settle the matter; and
f)These proceedings have continued over a significant period of time, lengthened by the need to vacate two final hearing dates due to the illness of counsel and the trial judge, being circumstances that were beyond either party’s control; and
g)The parties’ eldest child, A, has resided with the Respondent since shortly after the hearing concluded; he is not in paid employment and is financially dependent on the Respondent.
The Respondent submits that the Applicant is not entitled to “out of pocket expenses”, citing the High Court decision of Cachia v Hanes[11]
[11] [1994] HCA 14; (1994) 179 CLR 404
The Respondent also submits that the Applicant is not entitled to seek costs for her own efforts in appearing as a litigant in person, submitting that the decision in Guss v Veenhuizen should be distinguished. It is further submitted that this Court is not bound by decisions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales or the NSW Court of Appeal.
It is also the Respondent’s submission that there is no basis for an order for indemnity costs, as any departure from the usual practice should not be done lightly and only in circumstances of an “exceptional kind” (see Kohan & Kohan[12]).
[12] supra
In the Respondent’s Submissions in reply, he criticises the Applicant’s “dramatic, misleading” claims and her practice of filing a plethora of material, which was unnecessary:
It remains unclear why the Applicant felt the need to file 11 Affidavits, rather than simply respond to the Father’s solicitor’s letter.[13]
[13] Page 4 at [38]
The Respondent reiterates his contention that there is nothing in the circumstances of the case that would justify an award of indemnity costs, citing Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation[14] and Prantage & Prantage[15].
[14] [2001] HCA 26; (2001) 179 ALR 406
[15] [2013] FamCAFC 105
Applications for Costs
The substantive proceedings concerned a child support agreement under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth). Section 100 of that Act provides that the Family Law Act 1975 and the related Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 apply to proceedings under the Act.
The question of costs is governed by the provisions of s.117 of the Family Act, which sets out the general principle in s.117(1) that each party to proceedings under the Act shall bear their own costs.
However, subsection 117(2) provides:
If, in proceedings under this Act, the court is of opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so, the court may…make such order as to costs and security for costs, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise, as the court considers just.
However, in considering what order (if any) should be made, the Court is required by s.117(2A) to have regard to the matters in paragraphs (a) to (g) of that subsection. Accordingly, the Court must consider those matters before deciding whether to make an order for costs at all.
Turning first of all to the financial circumstances of each of the parties, it is conceded that both were in employment at all relevant times but that the income of the Respondent is significantly higher than that of the Applicant. Whilst a disparity in the parties’ financial circumstances may be of some relevance, in this case it is sufficient to note that the Respondent’s income is sufficient to enable him to meet an order for costs of the nature sought by the Applicant. However, the Respondent’s income is not of itself a reason to make an order for costs against him.
Neither party is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid.
The Applicant submits that the conduct of the Respondent in relation to the proceedings is of significance, describing it as “a clear example of one party with greater wealth being in a position whereby he can wear out the other by simple attrition”.[16] The Respondent is critical of the Applicant’s tendency to provide a number of affidavits in order to support her case, no less than 11 of them being provided for the hearing.
[16] Applicant’s submission, paragraph [25]
What appears clear is that the hearing on the particular issue could have been avoided had the Respondent agreed to the course proposed by Mr Karras, the Applicant’s former solicitor, on 18 November 2010, that the particular point could be dealt with by written submissions. Unfortunately, the Respondent chose not to agree to this suggestion and the matter went to hearing instead.
The proceedings were not necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous Orders of the Court. The Summons was issued to enforce compliance with a child support agreement, which is not a Court Order.
Whether or not either party has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings has been a matter of some discussion. The Applicant submits that the Respondent has been wholly unsuccessful, whereas the Respondent submits that:
Neither party was wholly unsuccessful. The matter constituted a legitimate adjudication of an argument with respect to the continued operation of the Agreement.
The Mother sought child support departure orders in respect of the child (A). She was unsuccessful in that application.[17]
[17] Respondent’s Submissions 8.7.2013 at page 8
The proceeding before the Court was an Application to enforce a child support agreement for the parties’ three children. The Respondent asserted that the agreement had been terminated. The Applicant sought a departure order in the alternative to a finding that the agreement was still in force.[18]
[18] Somers & Somers [2013] FCCA 162 at [1]-[2]
The decision of the Court was that the child support agreement remained in force in respect of the children B and C. Consequently, there was no need for a departure order in respect of those children. Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that the Applicant was unsuccessful in her application for a departure application.
It is true that the decision of the Court was that the child support agreement in respect of the child A had been terminated with effect from 15 March 2011. However, the reason why the Court found that the agreement had been terminated was that the child had attained the age of 18 years on 15 March 2011. The proceedings had been commenced by way of an Enforcement Summons filed on 12 March 2010, when the child concerned was still three days short of his seventeenth birthday. The proceedings had continued well past 15 March 2011, so the reason why the Court found that the agreement did not apply to the parties’ eldest child was entirely due to the effluxion of time since the proceedings had been commenced.
In my view, the Applicant was successful in the proceeding. It is not the case that the Respondent was successful.
The Applicant has provided evidence in her affidavit of 31 May 2013 of having made offers in writing to the Respondent to settle the proceedings.
Annexed to the Applicant’s affidavit and marked with the letter “F” is a copy of an email from her to the Respondent dated 14 May 2009, before the proceedings commenced, in which she stated:
In relation to the arrears, I note they are now more than $9,286. I have been carrying this debt for fifteen months. I am prepared to compromise the claim in the following terms. If you remit the sum of $5,747.00 to me so that it is in my account next Friday I will not seek enforcement of the total outstanding sum, plus interests and costs.
The offer was not accepted and the Applicant commenced court proceedings on 12 March 2010.
On 28 September 2010, the Applicant’s then solicitors, Karras Partners, wrote to the Respondent’s solicitors and, in a letter, headed “without Prejudice save as to costs”, made this offer to settle the child support proceedings:
A. That your client agree to pay arrears totalling $28,053.76 to the 13th September, 2010, plus interest, together with accrued amounts as from that date.
B. That your client make a contribution to our client’s legal costs in relation to the Enforcement proceedings, presently estimated at $23,675.50.
C. That there be a Departure Order made in terms of Order 1 of the Orders sought by our client in her Application filed on 8th June 2010, subject to the following variations:-
A.1 The amount referred to in proposed Order 1.1 becomes $500.00 per week per child.
A.2 Proposed Order 1.6 is deleted.[19]
[19] Affidavit of Ms Somers 31 May 2013 Annexure “G”
The Respondent’s solicitors replied on 18 October 2010, also in a letter marked WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAVE AS TO COSTS, saying:
Our client is prepared to settle the matter on a full and final basis with Orders by Consent being made in the following terms:
1. That a Declaration be made that the Child Support Agreement dated 2 November 2005 was terminated as at 30 June 2009.
2. That the Enforcements Summon be dismissed with no Order as to costs.
3. That there be a Child support Departure Order for payment by our client of child support in relation to the children in the following terms:
3.1 A periodic sum of $200.00 per child per week such amount to be indexed annually in accordance with movements in the Consumer Price Index Sydney (or groups) published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (CPI);
3.2 All educational expenses for the children including tuition fees, books, school uniforms and otherwise any additional amounts as may be agreed between the parties;
3.3 All insurance premiums payable in relation to private, medical and hospital insurance at the highest coverage;
3.4 All medical expenses of the children, including expenses in relation to orthodontic procedures and private hospital fees and otherwise any other or further expenses as may be agreed between the parties, such payments to be made within 28 days of any tax invoice or receipt received by the Husband.
…
The usual terminating events would apply including, that in the event any of the children shall attain the age of 18 years during a calendar year in which they are undertaking year 12 secondary school studies, then our client’s obligations pursuant to the Consent Orders would continue until 31 December of that year.[20]
[20] Affidavit of Ms Somers 31.5.2013 Annexure “H”
It can be seen that there were some settlement proposals discussed between the parties but no settlement was reached and the hearing on the issue of the child support agreement proceeded. The Applicant was successful.
The Respondent has now paid to the Applicant the sum of $42,280.00 on account of nanny fees outstanding.
For the above reasons, I am satisfied that there are circumstances that justify making an order for costs in favour of the Applicant.
Indemnity Costs
The Applicant seeks an order that costs should be assessed on an indemnity basis.
In Colgate Palmolive v Cussons[21], Sheppard J commented that costs provided by the relevant rules were costs on a party and party basis and said:
It is a matter of notoriety that the indemnity for costs which one party recovers from another pursuant to the common order that one party pay the costs of the other does not very often provide the party entitled to the benefit of the order with anything approaching a full indemnity for the costs which have in fact been incurred.[22]
[21] supra
[22] [1993] FCA 536 at [4]
After a review of the authorities, his Honour set out some principles or guidelines, saying:
In consequence of the settled practice which exists, the Court ought not usually make an order for the payment of costs on some basis other than the party and party basis. The circumstances of the case must be such as to warrant the Court in departing from the usual course…Most judges dealing with the problem have resolved the [particular case before them by dealing with the circumstances of that case and finding in it the presence or absence of factors which would be capable, if they existed, of warranting a departure from the usual rule….
…(I)t is useful to note some of the circumstances which have been thought to warrant the exercise of the discretion. I instance the making of allegations of fraud knowing them to be false and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud…; evidence of particular misconduct that causes loss of time to the Court and to other parties…; the fact that the proceedings were commenced or continued for some ulterior motive…or in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law…; the making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions…; an imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise…and an ward of costs against a contemnor…The question must always be whether the particular facts and circumstances of the case in question warrant the making of an order for payment of costs other than on a party and party basis.[23]
[23] [1993] FCA 536 at [24]
In Kohan & Kohan[24], the Full Court of the Family Court held that “Indemnity costs orders are still an exception in this and other jurisdictions…Insofar as an unaccepted offer of compromise which exceeds a judgment may justify an order for costs, the general practice in this jurisdiction so far has been to order no more than costs on a party and party basis”.
[24] (1993) FLC 92-340
More recently, in Prantage & Prantage[25], the Full Court of the Family Court reconsidered the authorities since the 1993, when both Colgate-Palmolive and Kohan were decided. Their Honours held that the usual rule, that costs be ordered on a party and party basis, was “well entrenched”.
[25] [2013] FamCAFC 105; (2013) 49 Fam LR 197
The Applicant claims that the Court should exercise its discretion to award costs on an indemnity basis because:
a)The Respondent had an ulterior and improper motive for purporting to terminate the child support agreement, to dissuade her from seeking to enforce it;
b)The respondent made a number of false or irrelevant allegations;
c)The Respondent engaged in conduct so reckless as to be characterised as misconduct;
d)The Respondent made groundless contentions that the child support agreement had been terminated; and
e)The Respondent imprudently refused offers to settle the proceedings.
I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s contentions are sufficient to warrant an order for indemnity costs. It is clear from the decision that the Respondent had an arguable case on the issue of whether or not the child support agreement had been terminated, although it was ultimately unsuccessful.
I am not satisfied that failure to respond to correspondence, including letters of demand, in a timely manner can be characterised as reckless misconduct, as the Applicant submits.
It is certainly the case that the Respondent could have settled the matter for lesser amounts in 2010. It is not relevant, in my view, that the Respondent could have settled the matter for $5,700.00 in May 2009, prior to proceedings being commenced. However, as the Full Court held in Kohan, the general practice in matters being heard under the Family Law Act is that unaccepted offers of compromise on more favourable terms would normally only lead to an order for costs on a party and party basis.
I am not satisfied that the Applicant has made out her claim that there are circumstances in this matter that warrant an order for costs being made on an indemnity basis. The usual practice, which I propose to follow, is to order costs on the party and party and party basis.
What the Applicant does submit is that, as she is a (omitted), an order for her costs should be made for her efforts in conducting the litigation as a self-represented litigant once her lawyers’ instructions were withdrawn. The Applicant relies on various authorities, including Guss v Veenhuizen (No 2)[26], A & D Douglas Pty Ltd v Lawyers Private Mortgages Pty Ltd[27] and Commonwealth Bank v Hattersley.[28] In my view, the authorities support her position.
[26] supra
[27] supra
[28] supra
The Applicant has calculated her own costs in accordance with Part 2 of Schedule 1 of the Rules, which is the correct scale. However, in preparing her estimate of professional costs for work done for the costs claim, the Applicant sets out this schedule:
24/05/2013 Preparing and filing Updating Affidavit *
31/05/2013 Preparing and filing s 117 affidavit *
31/05/2013 Preparing and filing Chronology, Costs *$2,100
agreements and Offers affidavit
TBA Enforcement hearing $2,100
TBA Daily Hearing fee $1,924
Sub Total $6,124[29]
[29] Affidavit of Ms Somers 31.5.2013 at [14(C)]
The claims for the Enforcement hearing are curious, in that the hearing is yet to occur. Consequently, the amounts claimed cannot be allowed.
Disbursements
The Applicant seeks disbursements and out of pocket expenses, being:
a)Transcripts of proceedings on 5 August, 16 November and 18 November 2011, totalling $1,681.42;
b)Parking costs at (omitted) Car Park $476.00; and
c)Loss of 9 days’ annual leave at a net cost of $3,500.00.
Court transcripts are clearly an allowable disbursement. However, the Court does not allow car parking fees, any more than it would allow taxi fares or fares on public transport.
The Applicant’s claim for the loss of nine days’ annual leave is not an allowable disbursement, especially in the circumstances where the Applicant has made a claim for her own costs as a (omitted).
Conclusions
In the circumstances, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, I allow a total of $23,993.89 for costs, including the sum of $1681.42 by way of disbursements.
I certify that the preceding seventy-two (72) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Scarlett
Date: 25 November 2013
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