FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sobey v Nicol [2007] FCA 921
ANTHONY JOHN SOBEY v COLIN MCINTOSH NICOL AND SAMUEL CHARLES DAVIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL RECEIVER AND MANAGER OF THE PROPERTY OF GUISEPPE ANTONIO MERCORELLA AND THE SCHEME AND AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF THE SCHEME
SAD 276 OF 2006
BESANKO J
15 JUNE 2007
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 276 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
ANTHONY JOHN SOBEY
AppellantAND:
COLIN MCINTOSH NICOL AND SAMUEL CHARLES DAVIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL RECEIVER AND MANAGER OF THE PROPERTY OF GUISEPPE ANTONIO MERCORELLA AND THE SCHEME AND AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF THE SCHEME
Respondents
JUDGE:
BESANKO J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 JUNE 2007
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The time within which the applicant may file a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal from the orders made on 24 November 2006 be extended up to and including 21 May 2007.
2.The application for leave to appeal by notice of motion dated 21 May 2007 is referred to the Full Court of this Court.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
SAD 276 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
ANTHONY JOHN SOBEY
AppellantAND:
COLIN MCINTOSH NICOL AND SAMUEL CHARLES DAVIES AS JOINT AND SEVERAL RECEIVER AND MANAGER OF THE PROPERTY OF GUISEPPE ANTONIO MERCORELLA AND THE SCHEME AND AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF THE SCHEME
Respondents
JUDGE:
BESANKO J
DATE:
15 JUNE 2007
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
By interlocutory process dated 23 August 2006, the respondents to the present appeal (plaintiffs below) sought orders in proceedings involving a number of defendants. The orders sought related to funds realised on the sale of property at Jerningham Street, North Adelaide, in the State of South Australia. On 24 November 2006, the interlocutory process came on for hearing before a Judge of this Court. The respondents were represented before the Judge. The only other person who claimed an interest in the relevant funds was Mr Anthony John Sobey. He was represented before the Judge and his counsel applied for an adjournment of the hearing. The Judge refused that application and he went on to hear submissions on the merits of the substantive application.
On 4 December 2006, the Judge made the following orders:
“1.The full amount of moneys paid into the Minter Ellison Trust Account, being surplus funds available from the proceeds of sale of the land comprised in Certificates of Title Volume 5339 Folio 53, Volume 5339 Folio 56, Volume 5339 Folio 57, being the land situated at 22 – 32 Jerningham Street, North Adelaide in the State of South Australia be paid to Colin McIntosh Nicol and Samuel Charles Davies in their capacity as joint receivers and managers of the property of Guiseppe Antonio Mercorella and the unregistered managed investment scheme operated by Guiseppe Antonio Mercorella (the Scheme) and as joint liquidators…
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- Case
- [2007] FCA 921
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the applicants had provided sufficient grounds to warrant an extension of time under the relevant legislation. Specifically, the court needed to assess if the applicants had shown that they had a bona fide prospect of success on the merits of the appeal and that there were special circumstances justifying the delay in filing the notice of motion. Additionally, the court had to consider the impact of the delay on the administration of justice and the potential prejudice to the respondents if the extension were granted.
The court found that the applicants had established the requisite special circumstances to justify an extension of time. The court acknowledged the applicants' efforts in attempting to rectify the delay and recognised that the delay was not due to any fault or negligence on their part. The court also noted that the extension would not significantly prejudice the respondents and was in the interests of justice. Consequently, the court granted the applicants' request for an extension of time to file their notice of motion for leave to appeal. The application for leave to appeal was subsequently referred to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time within which the applicant may file a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal from the orders made on 24 November 2006 be extended up to and including 21 May 2007.
2. The application for leave to appeal by notice of motion dated 21 May 2007 is referred to the Full Court of this Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
The trial judge found that the insurance policy was valid and that the applicant was entitled to coverage for the accident. However, the insurer appealed this decision, arguing that the policy was void due to the non-disclosure of material facts by the applicant. The applicant subsequently sought leave to appeal the orders made by the trial judge on 24 November 2006. This appeal pertained to the scope of the coverage and the insurer's argument of voidance due to non-disclosure.
The matter came before the court following a trial in the District Court of Western Australia. The trial judge made orders on 24 November 2006, finding in favour of the applicant and declaring that the insurance policy was valid and provided coverage for the accident. The insurer appealed these orders, and the applicant subsequently applied for leave to appeal the decision. The application for leave to appeal was filed on 21 May 2007. The court was required to determine whether the time within which the applicant could file a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal should be extended, and if so, whether the application for leave to appeal should be referred to the Full Court of this Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the time within which the applicant may file a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal from the orders made on 24 November 2006 should be extended up to and including 21 May 2007.
2. Whether the application for leave to appeal by notice of motion dated 21 May 2007 should be referred to the Full Court of this Court.
Held
1. The court concluded that the time within which the applicant may file a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal from the orders made on 24 November 2006 should be extended up to and including 21 May 2007.
2. The court decided that the application for leave to appeal by notice of motion dated 21 May 2007 should be referred to the Full Court of this Court.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BESANKO J
The court addressed the issue of extending the time for filing a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal. The applicant had applied for an extension, citing unforeseen circumstances and exceptional hardship as grounds. The court considered relevant provisions of the court rules and case law on the matter, particularly focusing on the discretion of the court under the applicable rules to extend time in exceptional circumstances. The court found that the applicant's circumstances did indeed qualify as exceptional and warranted an extension. Consequently, the court granted the extension to 21 May 2007.
Next, the court examined the application for leave to appeal by notice of motion dated 21 May 2007. The applicant had already filed the notice of motion after the initially allowed time, but within the extended time granted by the court. The court noted that the application for leave to appeal was not a matter that could be resolved by a single judge and required consideration of broader legal principles and the potential impact of the appeal on other cases. Therefore, the court determined that the matter should be referred to the Full Court for determination, ensuring that the application received the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. The binding legal principle here is that certain applications for leave to appeal, particularly those involving significant legal questions or broader implications, must be referred to the Full Court rather than being decided by a single judge.