JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: SMITH -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2021] WASCA 17
CORAM: BUSS P
MAZZA JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 9 NOVEMBER 2020
DELIVERED : 5 FEBRUARY 2021
FILE NO/S: CACR 4 of 2020
BETWEEN: ANDRE KEVIN SMITH
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: STAVRIANOU DCJ
File Number : IND 1109 of 2018
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Appellant convicted after trial of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm - Whether the verdict of guilty was unreasonable or not supported having regard to the evidence - Whether a miscarriage of justice occurred because the prosecutor, in cross-examination and in his closing address, sought impermissibly to discredit a defence witness on the basis that the witness had received a certificate under s 11 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA)
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 297(1)
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 11
Result:
Leave to appeal on ground 1 refused
Leave to appeal on ground 2 granted
Appeal dismissed
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr C M Townsend |
| Respondent | : | Mr B M Murray |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Lewis Blyth & Hooper |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412
Attorney‑General (WA) v Cockram (1990) 2 WAR 477
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v ABC Fund Managers Ltd [2001] VSC 383; (2001) 39 ACSR 443
BCM v The Queen [2013] HCA 48; (2013) 88 ALJR 101
Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253
Brebner v Perry [1961] SASR 177
C v T (1995) 58 FCR 1
Coco v The Queen [1994] HCA 15; (1994) 179 CLR 427
Dolan v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1993) 42 FCR 206
Fitzgerald v The Queen [2014] HCA 28; (2014) 88 ALJR 779
GAX v The Queen [2017] HCA 25; (2017) 91 ALJR 698
Hugo v The Queen [2000] WASCA 199; (2000) 113 A Crim R 484
Jackson v Gamble [1983] 1 VR 552
M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487
Markovina v The Queen [No 2] (1997) 19 WAR 119
Morris v The Queen [1987] HCA 50; (1987) 163 CLR 454
Pappas v New World Oil Developments Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 594
Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12; (2020) 94 ALJR 394
Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission [1983] HCA 9; (1983) 152 CLR 328
R v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) 258 CLR 308
R v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618
R v Hood (1997) 91 A Crim R 526
R v Nguyen [2010] HCA 38; (2010) 242 CLR 491
R v Roberts [2004] VSCA 1; (2004) 9 VR 295
Re Gordon (1988) 18 FCR 366
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- Case
- [2021] WASCA 17
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered various precedents and legal authorities, including decisions from Dolan v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation, Pappas v New World Oil Developments Pty Ltd, C v T, R v Hood, Australian Securities & Investments Commission v ABC Fund Managers Ltd, and R v Roberts. The court also referenced academic commentary from Heydon JD's Cross on Evidence. The court explored differing judicial opinions on whether an inference could be drawn from a refusal to answer on grounds of privilege against self-incrimination. Some authorities held that no inference could be drawn, while others suggested that an inference could be made if it was reasonably open. Ultimately, the court found that the protection provided by the privilege against self-incrimination would be undermined if a refusal to answer could be treated as an admission against interest.
The court concluded that no adverse inference could be drawn from the refusal of a witness to answer a question on the basis of privilege against self-incrimination. The rationale for this conclusion was that the protection afforded by the privilege would be compromised if such a refusal were treated as an admission. The court emphasised that the protection provided by the privilege is not merely to shield the guilty but also to protect the innocent. Allowing an inference from a refusal to answer would negate the protective purpose of the privilege. Therefore, the court held that the jury were not entitled to draw any adverse inference from the witness's refusal to answer. The decision underscored the importance of upholding the privilege against self-incrimination to safeguard both the innocent and the guilty from undue prejudice.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Numerous decisions support the view that no inference may be drawn from the refusal of the witness to answer a question on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination. See, for example, Dolan v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation;[27] Pappas v New World Oil Developments Pty Ltd;[28] C v T;[29] R v Hood;[30] Australian Securities & Investments Commission v ABC Fund Managers Ltd;[31] R v Roberts.[32] See also Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (12th Aust ed 2020), [25040].[27] Dolan v Australian & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1993) 42 FCR 206, 212 ‑ 216 (Spender J).[28] Pappas v New World Oil Developments Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 594, 595 (Lee J).[29] C v T (1995) 58 FCR 1, 16 ‑ 17 (Burchett J).[30] R v Hood (1997) 91 A Crim R 526, 528 (Hunt CJ at CL).[31] Australian Securities & Investments Commission v ABC Fund Managers Ltd [2001] VSC 383; (2001) 39 ACSR 443 [109] ‑ [112] (Warren J).[32] R v Roberts [2004] VSCA 1; (2004) 9 VR 295 [83] (Batt JA; Buchanan & Chernov JJA agreeing). In Thompson v Bella-Lewis,[33] Davies JA, after noting the difference of opinion among judges and jurists as to whether any inference may be drawn from the refusal of a witness to answer a question on the ground of privilege against self-incrimination, said:The view that [no inference] may be drawn has sometimes been expressed without any reason being given for it (See for example Ex parte Symes (1805) 11 Ves. Jr. 521 at 523; 32 ER 1191; R v Watson (1817) 2 Stark. 116 at 158; 171 ER 591 at 606 per Holroyd J; Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110 at 114). In other cases it has been said, in effect, that to draw any such inference would be to deny the protection which the privilege is designed to give without saying what that protection is or how it would thereby be denied (Lloyd v Passingham (1809) 16 Ves 59 at 64; 33 ER 906 at 908; Rose v Blakemore (1826) Ry & Mood 382 at 384; 171 ER 1057; Wentworth v Lloyd (1864) 10 HLC 589 at 590, 592; 11 ER 1154, 1155; R v Petrie (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 20 at 29; Dolan v AOTC (1993) 42 FCR 206 at 214; Pappas v New World Oil Developments (1993) 43 FCR 594 at 595; Cross on Evidence, Australian ed, par 25040; Phipson on Evidence (14th ed) at par 20‑05). In others again it is said, in effect, that the purpose of the rule is not just to shield the guilty but also to protect the innocent; and that that protection would be lost if a refusal to answer were to be taken as an admission against interest (Adams v Lloyd (1858) 3 H & N 351 at 363; 157 ER 506 at 510; Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110 at 114).It is plain that no inference drawn by the jury could turn the refusal to answer into an admission and the witness would be protected from later prosecution whatever inference the jury may draw. That protection is surely the purpose of the rule (See the note to Rose v Blakemore at 384 ‑ 385; 1058). The better view in my opinion therefore is that, in such a case, the jury are entitled to draw whatever inference is reasonably open (R v Watson at 153; 605 per Bayley J; Boyle v Wiseman (1855) 10 Ex 647 at 651; 156 ER 598 at 600 per Baron Parke, Bardon Alderson; Bartlett v Lewis (1862) 12 CB (NS) 249 at 257; 142 ER 1139 at 1142; Stone & Wells at 571 ‑ 572; Wilkinson, The Scottish Law of Evidence, (1986) at 90).[33] Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd R 429, 436 ‑ 437.