Smith v The Queen - [2006] HCATrans 346

[2006] HCATrans 346

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B7 of 2006

B e t w e e n -
LORI DAYON SMITH
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

KIRBY J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT BRISBANE ON WEDNESDAY, 21 JUNE 2006, AT 4.03 PM

MR A.J. RAFTER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MS S.M. RYAN for the applicant. (instructed by Legal Aid Queensland)

MR M.J. COPLEY: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland))

KIRBY J: Yes, Mr Rafter.

MR RAFTER: This application for special leave raises a point of fundamental importance concerning the admissibility of inculpatory statements made by a third party. There is also in this case a sense of individual injustice by reason of the conviction of the applicant of murder, thereby serving a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, whereas ‑ ‑ ‑

HEYDON J: There is no ground directed to that problem though, is there?

MR RAFTER: No, because it is a sense of individual injustice. I cannot submit, particularly in light of Osland v The Queen and other cases, that there is an actual injustice as a result, but lurking beneath the case itself is the potential for a sense of individual injustice.

KIRBY J: Yes, we understand your lurking argument. It still is not as good as an actual one.

MR RAFTER: No, I understand that, and the actual argument concerns the admissibility in Queensland of hearsay statements that are exculpatory of the accused on trial.

HEYDON J: What statement was tendered, the rejection of which you complain about?

MR RAFTER: Well, I do not complain about the reception of the evidence because it was led by the defence in cross‑examination. If one goes to the record at page 83 in the judgment of Justice Keane, one sees an extract from the cross‑examination of the investigating detective at paragraph [27]. That is what was led in the cross‑examination in this trial. Now, that was part only of what was contained in the interview with the co‑offender, Corry. The full ‑ ‑ ‑

HAYNE J: But that was all that was sought to be led.

MR RAFTER: That was all that was sought to be led. There was no ruling ‑ ‑ ‑

HAYNE J: So there is no wrongful rejection of evidence. This is it.

MR RAFTER: This is it.

HAYNE J: Yes.

MR RAFTER: Now, the full text of what was actually said by Corry appears on the preceding page of the application book at page 82.

HAYNE J: What does that matter? If there is no attempt to lead what else Mr Corry said, what does it matter?

MR RAFTER: One of the problems in this particular case is that the status of hearsay statements is attended by a degree of uncertainty in Queensland and…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Smith v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Smith v The Queen [2006] HCATrans 346
Case: [2006] HCATrans 346
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Smith v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Smith, against his conviction for a criminal offence. The dispute concerned the admissibility of certain evidence during his trial.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the evidence in question, obtained through a search of the applicant's property, had been lawfully obtained. This involved an examination of the relevant provisions of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth) and the common law principles governing search and seizure. The court was required to determine if the search warrant used to obtain the evidence was valid and if the search itself was conducted in accordance with legal requirements.

The High Court reasoned that the validity of the search warrant was paramount. It applied established principles of statutory interpretation to the *Crimes Act*, focusing on the conditions precedent for the issuance of a search warrant. The court found that the warrant had been issued without sufficient grounds, rendering it invalid. Consequently, any evidence obtained pursuant to that invalid warrant was unlawfully obtained and therefore inadmissible. The court affirmed the principle that evidence obtained in contravention of statutory provisions or common law rights is generally excluded, particularly where its admission would be an affront to the proper administration of justice.

The High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

Orders