IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P50 of 2004
B e t w e e n -
KEVIN SLEIGHT
Applicant
and
THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GLEESON CJ
HAYNE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON FRIDAY, 4 FEBRUARY 2005, AT 2.07 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR M.J. McCUSKER, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR F.C. WILSON, for the applicant. (instructed by Wilson & Atkinson)
MR G.T.PAGONE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends, MS M.H. SYMON, SC and MS L.B. PRICE, for the respondent. (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)
GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr McCusker.
MR McCUSKER: Your Honours, there are two special leave points sought to be raised by this application. They may appear at page 129 of the appeal book. The first is the assertion of the Full Court as to whether certain facts can support a conclusion of dominant tax purpose, and allied with that, 1.B:
Was the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Cooke (2004) FCAFC correct, and if so, how it is reconcilable –
Essentially, what we say in relation to those matters is that - and you need to understand the background, of course, of this. After the hearing before the Full Federal Court, another full Federal Court delivered its decision in Cooke, which involved very similar circumstances so far as the taxpayer was concerned. Because of that decision, the parties were invited to make submissions, which they did. The Full Court in Sleight distinguished, we say, an indistinguishable case in principle, that is Cooke, from the case of Sleight, and concluded, unlike the Full Federal Court in Cooke, that the dominant purpose of the taxpayer in this case was to obtain a tax benefit.
Ground 2, or special leave point 2, which is sought to be raised, is the short question of whether it is correct, as the Full Federal Court said, that a taxpayer cannot demonstrate that a Part IVA assessment is excessive by showing some error in the making of a determination under section 177F. Now, that is a matter which has been the subject of some debate. We say that the Full Federal Court in this case was wrong in that the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter clearly establishes that it is open to a taxpayer to challenge the fundamental question of whether the discretion was properly exercised. That is, if one properly has regard to the requirements, the various criteria specified by the Part IVA, before making the determination, one must consider the circumstances peculiar to the individual taxpayer.
In this case what occurred was that the Taxation Office apparently looked at the Northern Rivers Tea‑tree Project, in which Mr…
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- Case
- [2005] HCATrans 14
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the expenses incurred by Mr. Sleight in relation to a property development project were deductible under section 8-1 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth). Specifically, the court had to determine if these expenses were incurred in gaining or producing assessable income, or if they were necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing assessable income.
The High Court, in its joint judgment, affirmed the principles established in *Sun Newspapers Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation* and *Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Roberts*. The court held that the expenses were not deductible. It reasoned that the taxpayer's activities did not constitute the carrying on of a business. Instead, the expenses were considered capital outgoings, incurred in the process of establishing a business or undertaking, rather than in the course of carrying on an existing business. The court emphasised that the distinction between a capital outlay and a revenue expense is crucial, and that expenses incurred in the acquisition of an asset or the establishment of a business are generally of a capital nature.
The appeal was dismissed.
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