Skinner v Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited
[2010] FMCA 321
•5 May 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SKINNER v FORD MOTOR COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED | [2010] FMCA 321 |
| ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – An application to be made to the court to review the exercise by the registrar – refusal of the registrar to accept application for filing – abuse of process where the courts processes and procedures employed for fairness and impartiality are used for injustice or unfairness. |
| Federal Magistrates Act 1999 Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 |
| Hunter v The Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1981] 3 All ER 727 Skinner v Ford Motor Company Australia (2009) FMCA 924 Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 |
| Applicant: | GRANT JASON SKINNER |
| Respondent: | FORD MOTOR COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED |
| File Number: | BRG 222 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Burnett FM |
| Hearing date: | 5 May 2010 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 5 May 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 5 May 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | The Applicant appears in person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited |
ORDERS
That the application filed 16 March 2010 be dismissed.
That there be no order as to costs.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 222 of 2010
| GRANT JASON SKINNER |
Applicant
And
| FORD MOTOR COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Ex Tempore
This application purports to be an application under rule 20.02 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules to review a decision of a registrar. The relevant decision was a decision pursuant to rule 2.06(1)(a) of the rules to refuse to accept for filing an application that Mr Skinner was attempting to file against Ford Motor Company of Australia. There is in this instance a serious question concerning that matter. Rule 20.02 is referable back to section 104 subsection (2) of the Act, which allows for an application to be made to the court to review the exercise by the registrar of any of the powers listed under section 102(2), or as delegated under section 103(1) of the Act.
In refusing to accept the document for filing under rule 2.02(1)(a) a registrar is not exercising a power that arises under section 102(2) or 103(1) of the Act. So the issue of review under section 104(2) of the Act, accordingly, does not appear to arise. The decision is in fact one which is of an administrative character and which may well be subject to a judicial review, including a review under the AD(JR) Act, but except under that Act is not one which is amenable to review by this court.
It follows that the application which is presently prosecuted amounts to an abuse of process in the sense referred to by the High Court in Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, particularly at 393, where the majority stated:
“…that the inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Court to stay proceedings on grounds of abuse of process, extends to all those categories of cases in which the processes and procedures of the court which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted in to instruments of injustice or unfairness. Thus, it has long been established that regardless of the purpose of the person responsible for their institution and maintenance, proceedings will constitute an abusive process if they can be clearly seen to be doomed to fail.
Again, proceedings within the jurisdiction of a court will be unjustifiably oppressive and vexatious of an objecting defendant and will constitute an abuse of process if that court is, in all of the circumstances of the particular case, clearly an inappropriate forum to entertain them. Yet again, proceedings before a court should be stayed as an abuse of process if, notwithstanding that the circumstances do not give rise to an estoppel, their continuance would unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it sought to litigate a new case which has already been disposed of by earlier proceedings.
The jurisdiction of a Superior Court in such a case was correctly described by Diplock L in Hunter v The Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police as:
“Inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, well, not inconsistent with the little application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a part to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice in to disrepute at the moment, right thinking people.””
It follows, in my view, that having regard to the nature of the application, it is one which would amount to an abuse of process, because on its face, it purports to revive an earlier application that had already been dismissed by this court. See this court’s decision in Skinner v Ford Motor Company Australia (2009) FMCA 924 (18 September 2009). That is that the application annexed as a one page document titled, “Application to the Federal Magistrates Court Brisbane Registry” bearing eight paragraphs, the first of them notes as follows:
“That the application is an application to hear and decide the matter in Grant Skinner v Ford Motor Company that was dismissed in Melbourne on 18 September 2009 by Phipps FM that an application for leave to appear from that judgment was dismissed by the Federal Court and I see that the decision of Sundberg J in Skinner v Ford Motor Company Australia Limited (2009) FCA 1554.”
It seems on that occasion that Mr Skinner again was seeking to re-agitate maters that had previously been raised before the court and/or his application for leave to appeal which was dismissed. The registrar had informed him in correspondence on 5 March this year that he did not intend to enter into debate with Mr Skinner or to provide him with any commentary in relation to his decision not to accept the application for filing because he considered it inappropriate to do so. Respectfully, I think the registrar’s remarks were appropriate. Mr Skinner was, on that occasion, informed of his rights and, again, I think the registrar’s approach was appropriate.
It follows then, as I have already noted, that this is not a matter which is appropriately commenced before the court. It is more appropriately – if it is to be subject to any review – as one that would be subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of the AD(JR) Act, and it follows in the circumstances that the application ought be dismissed. And I so order. The respondent does not seek costs.
The orders will simply be that the application is dismissed, no order as to costs. I should note for the record that I proceeded to hear the application in the absence of Mr Skinner, who has informed the court by an email forwarded to the court on 30 April, that he was unable to attend by telephone conference this morning, and that all he required were written reasons to be emailed to him at an address he has provided. That will happen in due course.
I certify that the preceding seven (7) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Burnett FM
Associate: B Schmidt
Date: 11 May 2010
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