JUDGE:	BEACH J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	15 May 2013
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	20 May 2013
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Attorney-General v Skinner
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2013] VSC 259

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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Vexatious litigant – Requirements for declaring a person to be a vexatious litigant – Whether defendant habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings – Exercise of discretion - Supreme Court Act 1986, s 21.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Ms CM Harris	Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office
For the Defendant	No appearance

HIS HONOUR:

Introduction

In March 2000, Grant Jason Skinner, the defendant, entered into a hire purchase agreement in respect of a Ford commercial motor vehicle (“the vehicle”). On 25 May 2001, the defendant commenced a County Court proceeding against B.S. Stillwell Motor Company Pty Ltd (“Stillwell”) for damages alleging, amongst other things, that Stillwell had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to the plaintiff’s purchase of the vehicle. On 17 October 2003 that proceeding was settled upon terms that involved Stillwell indemnifying the defendant in respect of the defendant’s obligations under the hire purchase agreement; Stillwell paying the defendant a sum of money; and the defendant transferring the vehicle into Stillwell’s name at the expense of Stillwell.

Since that time, on various dates between 2004 and the present, the defendant has issued or sought to issue multiple proceedings in, variously, the former Legal Profession Tribunal, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“VCAT”), the Federal Magistrates’ Court,[1] and the County Court. All of these proceedings arise out of, in one way or another, the defendant’s purchase of the vehicle back in March 2000. In none of these proceedings has the defendant been successful.
[1]As that Court was formerly called.

Section 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 relevantly provides:

21 Vexatious litigants
(1)The Attorney-General may apply to the Court for an order declaring a person to be a vexatious litigant.
(2)The Court may, after hearing or giving the person an opportunity to be heard, make an order declaring the person to be a vexatious litigant if it is satisfied that the person has—
(a)habitually; and
(b)persistently; and
(c)without any reasonable ground—

instituted vexatious legal proceedings (whether civil or criminal) in the Court, an inferior court or a tribunal against the same person or different persons.
(3)An order under subsection (2) may provide that the vexatious litigant must not without leave of—
(a)the Court; or
(b)an inferior court; or
(c)a tribunal constituted or presided over by a person who is an Australian lawyer—
do the following—
(d)…
(e)…
(f)commence any specified type of legal proceedings (whether civil or criminal) in the Court or any specified inferior court or tribunal.

…

In this proceeding, the plaintiff, the Attorney-General, seeks an order pursuant to s 21 of the

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Attorney-General v Skinner

Details

AGLC: Attorney-General v Skinner [2013] VSC 259
Case: [2013] VSC 259
Decision Date: 20 May 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Attorney-General v Skinner, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the defendant, Skinner, should be declared a vexatious litigant under the Supreme Court Act 1986. The dispute arose from a series of legal actions brought by Skinner, which the Attorney-General argued were without merit and intended to harass or vex other parties. The central legal issues before the court were whether Skinner had habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings and whether the court should exercise its discretion to declare him a vexatious litigant.

The court considered the statutory criteria for declaring a person a vexatious litigant, focusing on the pattern and nature of Skinner's legal actions. It examined the frequency, persistence, and lack of substantive merit in the proceedings he had initiated. The court also assessed whether Skinner's actions had the effect of harassing or vexing other parties. After evaluating the evidence presented, the court concluded that Skinner's conduct met the statutory requirements for being declared a vexatious litigant. The court found that Skinner had habitually and persistently brought legal proceedings that were vexatious, lacking in merit, and intended to harass other parties.

Given the findings, the court exercised its discretion under the Supreme Court Act 1986 to declare Skinner a vexatious litigant. This declaration imposed restrictions on Skinner's ability to initiate legal proceedings without prior court approval. The court's decision was based on the clear pattern of vexatious conduct and the need to protect the legal system and other parties from further harassment. The court's ruling was definitive, and Skinner was declared a vexatious litigant under the relevant provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1986.

Orders