Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [ 1999[ FCA 1599

IMMIGRATION – meaning of non-political crime in Article 1F of the Refugees Convention – whether there were serious reasons for considering that appellant had committed serious non-political crime – appropriate test as to the meaning of “non-political” in Article 1F(b) – link between fulfilment of political purpose and crime – whether motive of revenge precludes crime from being political crime.

WORDS AND PHRASES – meaning of “non-political crime”.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2) and 500(1)
Migration Regulations reg 866.221
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) s 7

Applicant A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 considered
Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 FCR 556 considered
T v Home Secretary [1996] AC 742 considered
Re Gil and Minister of Employment and Immigration (1994) 119 DLR (4d) 497 applied
Immigration and Naturalization Service v Aguirre-Aguirre (Supreme Court of the
United States, 3 May 1999) considered
S v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [1998] 2 NZLR 301 considered
Prevato v The Governor, Metropolitan Remand Centre (1986) 8 FCR 358 considered
R v Wilson; Ex parte Witness T (1976) 135 CLR 179 applied
Todea v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 20 AAR 470 considered
R v Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Schtraks [1964] AC 556 considered
Re Hapugoda and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 25 AAR 1 distinguished
Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 considered

DALJIT SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

S 13 OF 1999

MANSFIELD J
ADELAIDE
19 NOVEMBER 1999

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 13 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

DALJIT SINGH
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 NOVEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal is dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 13 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

DALJIT SINGH
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

19 NOVEMBER 1999

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) given on 27 January 1999 that the appellant was not a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol (“the Convention”).  I use those terms as they are defined in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Consequently, the appellant did not satisfy the criterion for the grant of a protection visa for which he had applied, as that criterion is specified in s 36(2) of the Act and reg 866.221 of the Migration Regulations (“the Regulations”). The Tribunal’s decision was based on the conclusion that the appellant fell within the exclusion contained in Article 1F(b) of the Convention. It affirmed the decision of a…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1599
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the High Court was called upon to determine whether the appellant, an Indian citizen and former member of the Khalistan Liberation Force, qualified for refugee status under the Convention. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs had refused the appellant's application for a protection visa, concluding that he was excluded from refugee status under Article 1F(b) of the Convention due to the commission of serious non-political crimes prior to his arrival in Australia. The Refugee Review Tribunal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that there were serious reasons to consider the appellant had committed serious non-political crimes, particularly in relation to providing weapons and explosives to the KLF.

The primary legal issue before the court was the interpretation and application of Article 1F(b) of the Convention, which excludes individuals who have committed serious non-political crimes from refugee status. The court had to determine whether the crimes committed by the appellant were indeed serious and non-political, and if so, whether this exclusion applied. The court considered the meaning of "non-political" as articulated in previous case law, including the House of Lords' decision in T v Home Secretary, which established that a crime is non-political if it is not committed for a political purpose or lacks a close and direct link to a political objective.

The court found that the appellant's involvement in the KLF, including his role in supplying weapons and explosives, constituted serious non-political crimes. It held that the nature of these actions and their lack of a direct causal link to the political objectives of the KLF meant they were properly classified as non-political. The court emphasised that the term "serious" in Article 1F(b) involved an evaluative judgment about the nature of the crime, and once a crime was properly characterised as serious, the provisions of the Convention did not apply.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Tribunal's decision that the appellant was excluded from refugee status under Article 1F(b) of the Convention. The court's reasoning underscored the importance of distinguishing between political and non-political crimes when applying the Convention, ensuring that the serious nature of the crimes committed by the appellant warranted exclusion from refugee status.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Article 1F of the Convention provides:“The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:(a)he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;(b)he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission of that country as a refugee;(c)he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”Background The appellant is an Indian citizen of Sikh ethnicity. At the time of the decision, he was forty-eight years of age. He and his family operated a trucking business in Delhi for many years. Following the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, members of his family were killed by Hindu mobs and the family business was destroyed. In 1986, the appellant joined the Khalistan Liberation Force (“KLF”), whose aims included the creation of the independent Sikh state of Khalistan and he remained an active member of the KLF until he left India in December 1996, that is for some ten years. By 1991, he was a senior member of the KLF, in the position (as he described it) of “commander of information”. The appellant arrived in Australia on 28 December 1996. On 23 January 1997, he applied for a protection visa under s 36 of the Act. He claimed that his life would be in jeopardy should he return to India, by reason of his activities as a member of the KLF. On 1 July 1997, that application was refused by a delegate of the respondent. The delegate decided that the appellant had committed crimes against peace within the meaning of Article 1F(a) of the Convention. It is not necessary to refer to that finding in detail.The Tribunal’s reasons The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision pursuant to s 500(1) of the Act. The Tribunal refused to grant the visa sought on the ground that the applicant was excluded from being a refugee within the meaning of that term in the Convention, by reason of Article 1F(b) of the Convention. In reaching its conclusion, the Tribunal applied the directions of the High Court in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 as to the proper approach to the interpretation of the Convention. The Tribunal decided that the Convention did not apply to the appellant because it was satisfied that there were serious reasons for considering that the appellant had committed a serious non-political crime outside Australia prior to his admission to Australia. It directed itself that the requirement that there be “serious reasons for considering” that the applicant had committed such a crime meant that it had to be satisfied that there are strong grounds for being of the opinion that the appellant has committed a serious non-political crime. It noted and applied the observations of French J in Dhayakpa v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1995) 62 FCR 556 at 565 that the phrase“suggests that it is unnecessary for the receiving State to make a positive or concluded finding about the commission of a crime or act of the class referred to. It appears to be sufficient that there be strong evidence of the commission of one or other of the relevant crimes or acts”and as to the word “serious” at 563:“the adjective “serious” in Article 1F(b) involves an evaluative judgment about the nature of the allegedly disqualifying crime. A broad concept of discretion may encompass such evaluative judgment. But once the non-political crime committed outside the country of refuge is properly characterised as “serious” the provisions of the Convention do not apply. There is no obligation under the Convention on the receiving state to weigh up the degree of seriousness of a serious crime against the possible harm to the applicant if returned to the state of origin …”

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
Issues
1. Whether the appellant's activities as a member of the KLF constitute "serious non-political crimes" under Article 1F(b) of the Convention, excluding him from refugee status.
2. How the term "non-political" should be interpreted in the context of Article 1F(b) of the Convention.

Held
1. The court concluded that the appellant's activities as a member of the KLF constitute "serious non-political crimes" under Article 1F(b) of the Convention, excluding him from refugee status. The appeal was dismissed.
2. The court determined that the term "non-political" should be interpreted in the context of Article 1F(b) of the Convention by considering whether the crime was committed for a political purpose and whether there is a sufficiently close and direct link between the crime and the alleged political purpose. In this case, the court found that the crimes committed by the appellant did not meet the criteria for being considered political.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

It also observed that it was “not unreasonable to infer” that the appellant’s role on one or more of those occasions was such as to constitute a serious reason for considering that he had committed a serious non-political crime within the meaning of Article 1F(b), and that the provision by the appellant of weapons and explosives to members of the KLF to “hit any target” (an expression used in the appellant’s statutory declaration to the respondent) and corroborative material obtained at interview also resulted on one or more occasions in the appellant having committed a serious non-political crime. It concluded:“The nature of the actions of the applicant and the KLF in the above regard strongly suggest that these crimes were non-political. There is, in any event, clearly insufficient information before the Tribunal to indicate the necessary nexus or proportionality or close or direct causal link between crimes of this nature and the alleged political objections (sic, objectives) of the KLF. The Tribunal accordingly finds that there are serious reasons for considering that the applicant has committed serious non-political crimes other than that which involved the unlawful killing of a police officer.”Consideration of principal contention The meaning of the expression “non-political” in Article 1F(b) of the Convention has been considered in a number of decisions. They were extensively reviewed in the speeches of Lord Mustill and Lord Lloyd of Berwick of the House of Lords in T v Home Secretary [1996] AC 742 (“T”). For the purposes of this appeal, it is not necessary to rehearse that review again. The appellant, an Algerian national, sought refuge in the United Kingdom. He was a member of a group named ‘F.I.S.’, which he claimed had been elected to power in Algeria but had been ousted by the previous regime. F.I.S. was declared an illegal organisation. It embarked upon a terrorist program intended to secure power in Algeria, and to that end it was prepared to use random violence to achieve that purpose. The appellant had been involved in an indiscriminate bombing attack at the Algiers airport in which a number of innocent civilians were killed. He had also been involved in a raid to seize arms from an army barracks, during which one person had been killed. Lord Lloyd, with whom Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed, proffered the following definition of a political crime for the purposes of Article 1F(b) of the Convention as being one (at 786-787):“… if, and only if (1) it is committed for a political purpose, that is to say, with the object of overthrowing or subverting or changing the government of a state or inducing it to change its policy; and (2) there is a sufficiently close and direct link between the crime and the alleged political purpose. In determining whether such a link exists, the court will bear in mind the means used to achieve the political end, and will have particular regard to whether the crime was aimed at a military or governmental target, on the one hand, or a civilian target on the other, and in either event whether it was likely to involve the indiscriminate killing or injuring of members of the public.”His Lordship (at 787) described that “definition” as the description of an idea. The appellant in that case was found not to have met the second of the two elements of the “definition”.