FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 558
Citation: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 558 Appeal from: Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 382 Parties: RAMANDEEP SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 195 of 2015 Judge: NICHOLAS J Date of judgment: 5 June 2015 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5F
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15A, 1.22 and 1.23, Sch 2Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323Date of hearing: 19 May 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 40 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Nair Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 195 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: RAMANDEEP SINGH
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JUNE 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 195 of 2015
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: RAMANDEEP SINGH
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
NICHOLAS J
DATE:
5 JUNE 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND
This is an appeal from the judgment of a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court given on 24 February 2015 dismissing with costs the appellant’s application for review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 18 October 2013 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent dated 11 November 2011.
The appellant applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) subclass 820 visa on 24 November 2010. His application was sponsored by his spouse, Kirsty McDonald, an Australian citizen, whom he married on 21 November 2010. The appellant’s visa application was lodged under cover of a letter from his migration agent dated 23 November 2010. Enclosed with that letter were various documents including, relevantly, Form 40SP entitled “Sponsorship for a partner to migrate to Australia” completed and signed by Ms McDonald, and a document entitled “Joint Statement”. The Joint Statement is unsigned and undated but it purports to be a…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 558
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether the Tribunal's decision was flawed in the grounds raised by the appellant. The first ground argued that the Tribunal did not consider all the circumstances of the relationship and failed to consider evidence in the sponsorship form completed by Ms McDonald and her letter withdrawing her sponsorship. The second ground argued that the Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the law by failing to consider evidence in connection with domestic violence and the sponsor's allegation that the domestic violence started before the marriage. The third ground argued that the Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the law by relying on text messages between the applicant and his sponsor to determine that the applicant's sponsor was not his spouse at the time of application.
The court found that the Tribunal was aware of the sponsorship form and had regard to Ms McDonald's letter of withdrawal. The court found that the appellant's argument that the Tribunal did not consider all the circumstances of the relationship and misapply the law was not made out. The court found that the Tribunal's reliance on the text messages to determine that the applicant's sponsor was not his spouse at the time of application was not a jurisdictional error because the evidence of history subsequent to the date was only relevant if it tended logically to show the existence or nonexistence of facts relevant to the issue. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was sound and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In response to ground 2 the first respondent filed a notice of contention in which he refers to a submission made on his behalf to the primary judge to the effect that the appellant had not established that the Tribunal overlooked the material referred to in ground 2. The notice of contention further asserts:[G]iven the lack of cogency and probative value of this particular material, and in light of the [Tribunal’s] reasoning, the [Tribunal’s] omission to expressly deal with this item of evidence did not demonstrate jurisdictional error. CONSIDERATIONGround 1 The primary judge was correct to reject the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal had not considered Ms McDonald’s sponsorship form. It is clear that the Tribunal was aware that Ms McDonald was the appellant’s sponsor and that the Departmental file containing the sponsorship form was before it: see para [17] – [20] of the Tribunal’s reasons. The appellant’s argument that the Tribunal did not have regard to the sponsorship form is founded on the proposition that the Tribunal does not explicitly refer to it in its reasons. Counsel does not suggest that the appellant drew any particular feature of the sponsorship form to the Tribunal’s attention. Nor could counsel point me to any information in the document that was of any particular significance to the appellant’s claims beyond the fact that it bore Ms McDonald’s signature. Ultimately, the submission made by counsel for the appellant was that the document was of particular significance because, unlike the Joint Statement, it had been signed by Ms McDonald and was for that reason capable of carrying more weight than the latter document. The absence from the Tribunal’s reasons of any mention that Ms McDonald signed the form is not a sufficient basis for inferring that the existence of the document, the information contained within it or the fact that it was signed by Ms McDonald, were matters that the Tribunal overlooked. This is especially so in circumstances where these matters were given no attention in the appellant’s submission to the Tribunal and where there is no suggestion that the Tribunal’s assessment of the information in the Joint Statement was influenced by the fact that it was not signed by Ms McDonald. The factual premise upon which this aspect of ground 1 is based is not made out. With regard to Ms McDonald’s letter of withdrawal, it is clear that the Tribunal had regard to it because it is specifically referred to by the Tribunal: see para [22] of the Tribunal’s reasons. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the letter showed that Ms McDonald continued to sign her name using “Singh” as her surname well after her relationship with the appellant had broken down. However, the letter of withdrawal is in fact signed by Ms McDonald in her maiden name, so the submission is inconsistent with the facts. It is true that in the first paragraph of the letter Ms McDonald refers to herself by the name of Singh, but that seems to me to be wholly inconsequential in the circumstances, which would explain why the Tribunal made no mention of it in its reasons.Ground 2