Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 558

Citation: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 558
Appeal from: Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 382
Parties: RAMANDEEP SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 195 of 2015
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 5 June 2015
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5F
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15A, 1.22 and 1.23, Sch 2
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Date of hearing: 19 May 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Nair
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 195 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

RAMANDEEP SINGH
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JUNE 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 195 of 2015

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

RAMANDEEP SINGH
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE:

5 JUNE 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. This is an appeal from the judgment of a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court given on 24 February 2015 dismissing with costs the appellant’s application for review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 18 October 2013 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent dated 11 November 2011.

  2. The appellant applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) subclass 820 visa on 24 November 2010.  His application was sponsored by his spouse, Kirsty McDonald, an Australian citizen, whom he married on 21 November 2010.  The appellant’s visa application was lodged under cover of a letter from his migration agent dated 23 November 2010.  Enclosed with that letter were various documents including, relevantly, Form 40SP entitled “Sponsorship for a partner to migrate to Australia” completed and signed by Ms McDonald, and a document entitled “Joint Statement”.  The Joint Statement is unsigned and undated but it purports to be a…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 558
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, the appellant, Mr Singh, sought judicial review of a decision by the Tribunal that he did not meet the requirements for a visa under cl 820.211(2) because he had not demonstrated that he and Ms McDonald had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife at the time of his visa application. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant and Ms McDonald were not living together at the time of the application and that their separation was not temporary. The appellant argued that the Tribunal did not consider all the circumstances of the relationship and misapplied the law in reaching its decision. The Federal Circuit Court found that the Tribunal's decision was sound and dismissed the appeal.

The court was required to decide whether the Tribunal's decision was flawed in the grounds raised by the appellant. The first ground argued that the Tribunal did not consider all the circumstances of the relationship and failed to consider evidence in the sponsorship form completed by Ms McDonald and her letter withdrawing her sponsorship. The second ground argued that the Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the law by failing to consider evidence in connection with domestic violence and the sponsor's allegation that the domestic violence started before the marriage. The third ground argued that the Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the law by relying on text messages between the applicant and his sponsor to determine that the applicant's sponsor was not his spouse at the time of application.

The court found that the Tribunal was aware of the sponsorship form and had regard to Ms McDonald's letter of withdrawal. The court found that the appellant's argument that the Tribunal did not consider all the circumstances of the relationship and misapply the law was not made out. The court found that the Tribunal's reliance on the text messages to determine that the applicant's sponsor was not his spouse at the time of application was not a jurisdictional error because the evidence of history subsequent to the date was only relevant if it tended logically to show the existence or nonexistence of facts relevant to the issue. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was sound and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the time of the delegate’s and the Tribunal’s decisions, cl 820.221 relevantly provided:820.22 Criteria to be satisfied at time of decision820.221 …(3) An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a)the applicant would continue to meet the requirements of subclause 820.211(2) … except that the relationship between the applicant and the sponsoring partner has ceased; and(b)either or both of the following circumstances applies:(i) either or both of the following:(A) the applicant;…has suffered family violence committed by the sponsoring partner;… Regulations 1.22 and 1.23 set out the evidentiary requirements relevant to a claim of family violence. At all material times they relevantly provided:1.22 References to person having suffered or committed family violence(1)A reference in these Regulations to a person having suffered family violence is a reference to a person being taken, under regulation 1.23, to have suffered family violence.…1.23When is a person taken to have suffered or committed family violence?…Circumstances in which family violence is suffered and committed—court order(4)The alleged victim is taken to have suffered family violence, and the alleged perpetrator is taken to have committed family violence, if:(a)a court has made an order under a law of a State or Territory against the alleged perpetrator for the protection of the alleged victim from violence; and…(5)For subregulation (4), the violence, or part of the violence, that led to the granting of the order must have occurred while the married relationship or de facto relationship existed between the alleged perpetrator and the spouse or de facto partner of the alleged perpetrator.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant and Ms McDonald had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others at the time of the visa application. Nor did the Tribunal accept that the appellant and Ms McDonald were living together at the time of the application or that their separation was only temporary. On that basis the Tribunal concluded that the appellant did not satisfy s 5F(2)(d) at the time of application and that he therefore did not meet the requirements of cl 820.211(2) for the grant of a visa. THE APPLICATION TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT The appellant raised the following three grounds in his further amended application for review:(1)The Tribunal did not accord the applicant procedural fairness in that it did not consider all the circumstances of the relationship. It did not consider evidence in the sponsorship form completed by the sponsor. It did not consider evidence in the letter from the sponsor withdrawing her sponsorship.Particulars…6. The Tribunal did not consider the evidence in the sponsorship form.…8.The Tribunal did not consider the circumstances revealed by the content of this letter that confirmed that the applicant had been sponsored by his spouse.9.The Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by not considering the information provided by his sponsor in the sponsorship form completed by her, and by not considering evidence in his sponsor’s withdrawal letter.(2)The Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the law. It failed to consider all the circumstances of the relationship. It failed to consider evidence in connection with domestic violence. It failed to consider that the sponsor had alleged the domestic violence started before the marriage. It failed to consider that the applicant had sought a court order to recover his property. It failed to consider the sponsor’s continuing use of the applicant's surname, in her Protection Order Application and in the letter from her to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship withdrawing her sponsor.Particulars…3.The Tribunal failed to consider circumstances revealed by the evidence in connection with domestic violence:-(i)The Tribunal failed to consider the sponsor’s allegation that the domestic violence started before the marriage.(ii)The Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s request for an order seeking the return of personal property located at the sponsor’s premises.(iii)The Tribunal failed to consider the sponsor’s continuing use of the applicant’s surname after the end of the relationship.(3)The Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied the law. The Tribunal failed to take into account that, when there is an issue as to the existence of a fact at a particular date, the evidence of history subsequent to the date is only relevant if this evidence tends logically to show the existence or nonexistence of facts relevant to this issue. The Tribunal erred in law when it purported to rely on the contents of text messages between the applicant and his sponsor to determine the applicant's sponsor was not his spouse at the time of application.Particulars1.The applicant provided the Tribunal with text messages between him and his sponsor including text messages sent on or after 11 December 2010.2.The Tribunal relied on the contents of the text messages to conclude that the couple had never been “in a genuine married relationship”, and accordingly, that the applicant’s sponsor was not his spouse at the time of time [sic] (CB Vol 1, p.304 at [56]; p.305 at [57]).3.As a matter of law, it was not open to the Tribunal to use the text messages to determine that the applicant’s sponsor was not his spouse at the time of application.4.The Tribunal’s purported determination that the applicant’s sponsor was not his spouse at the time of application was vitiated by this misconstruction and misapplication of the law. It was jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In response to ground 2 the first respondent filed a notice of contention in which he refers to a submission made on his behalf to the primary judge to the effect that the appellant had not established that the Tribunal overlooked the material referred to in ground 2. The notice of contention further asserts:[G]iven the lack of cogency and probative value of this particular material, and in light of the [Tribunal’s] reasoning, the [Tribunal’s] omission to expressly deal with this item of evidence did not demonstrate jurisdictional error. CONSIDERATIONGround 1 The primary judge was correct to reject the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal had not considered Ms McDonald’s sponsorship form. It is clear that the Tribunal was aware that Ms McDonald was the appellant’s sponsor and that the Departmental file containing the sponsorship form was before it: see para [17] – [20] of the Tribunal’s reasons. The appellant’s argument that the Tribunal did not have regard to the sponsorship form is founded on the proposition that the Tribunal does not explicitly refer to it in its reasons. Counsel does not suggest that the appellant drew any particular feature of the sponsorship form to the Tribunal’s attention. Nor could counsel point me to any information in the document that was of any particular significance to the appellant’s claims beyond the fact that it bore Ms McDonald’s signature. Ultimately, the submission made by counsel for the appellant was that the document was of particular significance because, unlike the Joint Statement, it had been signed by Ms McDonald and was for that reason capable of carrying more weight than the latter document. The absence from the Tribunal’s reasons of any mention that Ms McDonald signed the form is not a sufficient basis for inferring that the existence of the document, the information contained within it or the fact that it was signed by Ms McDonald, were matters that the Tribunal overlooked. This is especially so in circumstances where these matters were given no attention in the appellant’s submission to the Tribunal and where there is no suggestion that the Tribunal’s assessment of the information in the Joint Statement was influenced by the fact that it was not signed by Ms McDonald. The factual premise upon which this aspect of ground 1 is based is not made out. With regard to Ms McDonald’s letter of withdrawal, it is clear that the Tribunal had regard to it because it is specifically referred to by the Tribunal: see para [22] of the Tribunal’s reasons. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the letter showed that Ms McDonald continued to sign her name using “Singh” as her surname well after her relationship with the appellant had broken down. However, the letter of withdrawal is in fact signed by Ms McDonald in her maiden name, so the submission is inconsistent with the facts. It is true that in the first paragraph of the letter Ms McDonald refers to herself by the name of Singh, but that seems to me to be wholly inconsequential in the circumstances, which would explain why the Tribunal made no mention of it in its reasons.Ground 2