Singh v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 1154
•29 May 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 1154 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for adjournment – alleged illness of applicant’s father in India – alleged necessity for applicant’s father to have kidney transplant - alleged that applicant’s mother to be kidney donee - consideration of factors – consideration of nature of medical evidence required. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), ss.3, 42 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.1.03 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pt.V, Div.5, ss.140GB, 359A, 359B, 360, 379A, 379G, 476, 478 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.4.17, Sch.2, cl.457.223 |
| Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175; (2009) 83 ALJR 951; (2009) 258 ALR 14 |
| Applicant: | GURJEET SINGH |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | PEG 198 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Antoni Lucev |
| Hearing date: | 29 May 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 29 May 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 29 May 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| For the Applicant: | In person |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr E Solana |
| For the Second Respondent: | Submitting appearance, save as to costs |
Solicitors for the Respondents: | Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
That the applicant’s application for adjournment of today’s hearing be dismissed.
That the application be dismissed.
That the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $7206 by 29 June 2017.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 198 of 2016
| GURJEET SINGH |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore and revised)
Introduction
On 9 May 2016 Gurjeet Singh (“Mr Singh”) lodged an application for judicial review (“Judicial Review Application”) pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”) of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) to affirm a decision of a delegate (“Delegate”) of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“Minister”) to refuse the applicant a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa (“Business Visa”). The Tribunal Decision is Court Book (“CB”) 140-144.
On 24 May 2017 (last Wednesday) Mr Singh filed an application in a case supported by affidavit seeking an adjournment of today’s hearing (“Adjournment Application”).
Adjournment Application
The Adjournment Application was supported by an affidavit affirmed by Mr Singh on 24 May 2017 which deposed that he needed an adjournment so he could return to India because his father requires a kidney transplant, and his mother is the organ donor. Mr Singh also says he is required to be there to sign legal documentation in relation to the transplant, and support his family. A medical certificate and biochemistry report from the Dayanand Medical College and Hospital, Ludhiana was annexure A to the affidavit. It is convenient in the circumstances simply to read the terms of that affidavit which are short and which are as follows:
1. I am the applicant in these proceedings and not legally represented.
2. A hearing in this matter, is listed in the Federal Court in Perth on 29 May 2017.
3. My father Gurnam Singh, born 7 January 1959, is an Indian national who resides in Gurdaspur, India.
4. I’ve been informed by my father and my sister by telephone that my father requires a kidney transplant as soon as practicable. My father’s telephone number is [ the telephone number is set out].
5. My mother is going to be the organ donor, however, my presence in India is required to sign legal documents in relation to the kidney transplantation and to support my family members.
6. I propose to stay in India for approximately four weeks to assist my family with my father’s medical issues.
7. I contacted the solicitors for the respondent, Sparke and Helmore, by email approximately two weeks ago, telling them that I was seeking an adjournment of the hearing on 29 May 2017. I was telephoned by a solicitor from Sparke and Helmore today, who informed me that he was seeking instructions as to whether to consent to an adjournment of the hearing.
8. As of today’s date I’ve yet to receive a response whether Sparke and Helmore will agree to consent orders re the adjournment of the hearing.
9. Annexed to this affidavit and marked A is a medical certificate relating to my father’s condition.
Annexure A to the affidavit comprises, firstly, a clinical biochemistry report, which simply indicates that the patient, who appears to be the Mr Singh’s father, and whose name appears on the biochemistry report, has certain levels of creatinine, but no more, and, secondly, a medical certificate from the medical record department of the relevant hospital, which indicates that the father was admitted to the nephrology department of the hospital from 30 April 2017 to 6 May 2017, but contains, it appears, no other relevant information in relation to the alleged kidney transplant.
Any application for adjournment must be considered in the relevant statutory, factual and case management context. The role and mode of operation of the Court, as set out in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) (“FCCA Act”), and the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCC Rules”), and as prescribed by the objects in ss.3 and 42 of the FCCA Act, and the objects in r.1.03 of the FCC Rules, provide for the Court to operate in a manner: (a) as informal as possible in the exercise of judicial power, (b) which is not protracted in its proceedings, (c) which resolves proceedings justly, efficiently and economically, (d) which uses streamline procedures, and, (e) that avoids undue delay, expense and technicality: Sandeep v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3339 at [23] per Judge Lucev (and the cases there cited).
The Court must also take into account the following principles when determining whether or not to grant leave to allow an adjournment: (a) that the paramount consideration remains the doing of justice between the parties but that a just resolution must have regard to any relevant legislative purpose or object, (b) modern principles of case management, (c) the avoidance of undue delay, and (d) the wastage of public resources: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175; (2009) 83 ALJR 951; (2009) 258 ALR 14 at [30] per French J and [97]-[103] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ.
The Court also notes that whether or not an adjournment is granted is a discretionary matter for the Court and it is a discretion under which the Court is entitled to take into account a broad range of circumstances: Myers v Myers [1969] WAR 19 at 21 per Jackson J; MZZZL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1309 at [9]-[10] per Judge Lucev.
The Minister has indicated that the Adjournment Application is opposed. The Court notes that the matter has been called outside, and that Mr Singh is not present. The Minister’s counsel has explained to the Court that an indication was given to Mr Singh during the course of last week that the Adjournment Application would be opposed, and at that time Mr Singh indicated to the Minister’s representative that he would, in any event, be travelling to India prior to the commencement of the hearing today.
The reasons in support of the Adjournment Application evoke some sympathy in circumstances where there is an understandable desire by a son to return home to be with his parents, where his mother and his father are said to be the donor and donee in relation to the kidney transplant which it alleged that the father requires.
The Court having examined the evidence relied upon by Mr Singh can, however, find no indication in that evidence of any medical practitioner indicating that the father must have a kidney transplant, or, if the father is to have a kidney transplant, when that kidney transplant would take place. There is no indication in the medical evidence attached to the affidavit to that effect and the medical evidence simply indicates a certain level of creatinine in the father’s body and that Mr Singh’s father was discharged from hospital on 6 May 2017, with no indication of re-admission or of any future admission of any kind, whether for the purposes of a kidney transplant or otherwise.
The necessity for medical evidence to be particular has been adverted to by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75 at [48] per Collier, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ, where it was said that there should be medical evidence on affidavit in cases where applicants seek to have procedural orders made in their favour. Likewise, this Court, in WZAWB v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1345 and AWX16 v Minister for Immigration &Anor [2016] FCCA 928, has adverted to the necessity for medical evidence to be particular, on affidavit and ordinarily from an expert.
Even allowing for the tyranny of distance involved in this particular case, there is no medical evidence which indicates that Mr Singh’s father requires a kidney transplant at this point in time, or the timing of any kidney transplant, and certainly none from any qualified medical practitioner, not even by way of a certificate or a letter to the relevant effect, let alone an affidavit.
There is in Mr Singh’s affidavit no indication of what legal documents he is required to sign, or why he is required to sign them, or why, by means of digital or electronic transmission, they could not be sent to him in Australia and signed in Australia.
In all of the above circumstances, the actual merit reasons for seeking the Adjournment Application are not strong, particularly in the absence of detailed medical evidence.
From a case management perspective, the Court notes the application was filed on 9 May 2016 and that on 22 June 2016 a Registrar of this Court made orders which included provision for Mr Singh to file and serve any affidavit containing additional evidence, including a transcript of the Tribunal hearing by 21 August 2016, and any amended application giving completely particulars of the grounds by that same date, and for Mr Singh to file and serve written legal submissions 42 days before the hearing.
Mr Singh has not filed any documents in accordance with the Registrar’s orders, and notably no submissions in support of his application at all and no explanation as to why that has not been done. For case management purposes, the Court notes that, if the matter were to be adjourned today, the next available hearing date in the Perth registry of this Court for a migration matter - in the normal course of programming - would be in early 2020.
The case management factors, including the failure to file submissions, which is arguably indicative of no particular desire to actually run the Judicial Review Application, weigh against an adjournment. So too does the delay. In fact, in terms of the objects of the FCCA Act and the FCC Rules, the delay, which would be caused by an adjournment, weighs heavily against granting the Adjournment Application, but especially so here, where, for reasons that the Court will deal with below, the Judicial Review Application has no merit.
In that context, it is also significant that to adjourn the matter to a later date would involve a significant wastage of public resources, and would also have the somewhat curious result that Mr Singh who, for reasons the Court will come to, has no case on his Judicial Review Application, will continue to remain, one presumes, in Australia for up to a further three years while a case, which has no substance at all, comes to hearing. That, in the Court’s view, is contrary to the interests of justice.
In all of the above circumstances, the Court will, in the exercise of its discretion, dismisses the Adjournment Application. There will be an order to the effect that the Adjournment Application in relation to today’s hearing be dismissed.
The Judicial Review Application
The background to the Judicial Review Application is as follows:
a)Mr Singh is a citizen of India who made an application to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, now the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (“Department”), for the Business Visa: CB 1-11. Mr Singh nominated "Stride Family Trust/ D Stride Bricklaying Services" (“Sponsor”) as his sponsoring employer for the position of "bricklayer";
b)on 21 April 2015, the Delegate refused the grant of the Business Visa on the basis that a nomination of an occupation in relation to the applicant had not been approved under s.140GB of the Migration Act, and accordingly Mr Singh did not satisfy c1.457.223(4)(a) of Sch. 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“MigrationRegulations”): CB 86-87;
c)on 11 May 2015 Mr Singh lodged an application for review to the Tribunal: CB 88;
d)on 26 October 2015 the Tribunal invited Mr Singh to a hearing on 2 December 2015: CB 104;
e)on 30 November 2015 Mr Singh’s newly appointed migration agent (“Agent”) requested an extension of time to prepare submissions and assist his client with the appeal process: CB 107;
f)on 16 February 2016, Mr Singh’s Agent was sent an invitation pursuant to s.359A of the Migration Act inviting Mr Singh to comment on information that he was not the subject of an approved business nomination by a standard business sponsor which had not ceased, and the fact that the Tribunal had affirmed a decision not to approve the Sponsor as a standard business sponsor (“16 February 2016 Letter”);
g)the 16 February 2016 Letter sought Mr Singh’s response by 1 March 2016: CB 133-136. Mr Singh did not respond to this invitation; and
h)on 21 April 2016 Mr Singh with his Agent attended a hearing in the Tribunal: CB 140.
Tribunal Decision
The Tribunal Decision at CB140-144 is as follows:
1. This is an application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the visa applicant a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
2. The visa applicant applied for the visa on 15 October 2014.
3. At the time the visa application was lodged, Class UC contained Subclass 457. The criteria for a Subclass 457 visa are set out in Part 457 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). One of the criteria to be satisfied at the time of decision is c1.457.223 which requires the visa applicant to satisfy one of the alternative 'streams' for the visa. One of these streams is contained in c1.457.223(4) which is set out in the attachment to this decision. In the present case, specific claims have been made against c1.457.223(4) which applies to sponsorship for employment in an occupation by a standard business sponsor. No claims have been made in respect of the other alternative streams in c1.457.223.
4. The delegate refused to grant the visa on 21 April 2015 on the basis that c1.457.223(4)(a) was not met because the nomination was not approved.
5. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 2 December 2015 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from the applicant's sponsoring employer Mr Darren Stride, trustee for the Stride Family Trust trading as Stride Bricklaying.
6. The applicant was represented in relation to the review by his registered migration agent.
7. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision under review should be affirmed.
CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE
Requirement for an approved nomination
8. Clause 457.223(4)(a) requires that there is an approved nomination of an occupation relating to the applicant by a standard business sponsor that has not ceased.
9. The applicant applied for the visa on the basis of his proposed employment with the Darren David Stride ATF Stride Family Trust, in the occupation of Bricklayer (ANZSCO 331111).
10. The delegate's decision record, provided to the Tribunal by the applicant, indicates that on 11 March 2015 the Department refused the nomination application lodged by Darren David Stride ATF Stride Family Trust. The Tribunal affirmed this decision on 15 February 2016.
11. On 16 February 2016 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant pursuant to s.359A of the Act and invited him to comment on, or respond to information that on 15 February 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the decision to not approve the nomination lodged by Darren David Stride ATF Stride Family Trust. The letter also invited the applicant to provide information to demonstrate that there is an approved nomination of an occupation in relation to him by a standard business sponsor that has not ceased. The applicant did not respond to the Tribunal's letter.
12. There is no evidence before the Tribunal, at the time of decision, that there is a current approved nomination of an occupation in relation to the applicant that has been approved under s.140GB of the Act. The Tribunal finds that the applicant does not satisfy c1.457.223(4)(a)(i). Accordingly the applicant does not satisfy c1.457.223(4)(a).
13. For the reasons above, the Tribunal finds that the requirements for the standard business sponsor stream have not been met. No claims have been made in respect of the other streams in c1.457.223 and there is no evidence that the visa applicant would be able to satisfy the specific criteria for those streams.
DECISION
14. The Tribunal affirms the decision not to grant the visa applicant a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa.
The Judicial Review Application contains the following grounds:
1. Darren David Stride Atf Stride Family Trust represented by the executor Mr Darren David Stride lodged a valid sponsorship application under subclass 457 through a Registered Migration Agent Mr Ged Boylan which was refused on 11 March 2015.
2. Soon after the 457 sponsorship application a 457 nomination application was lodged by the same agent for a nomination under 457 being the existing worker Mr Gurjeet Singh. The nomination application was not processed on the basis of sponsorship application being refused on 11 March 2015.
3. Mr Gurjit Singh had applied for the grant of a Subclass 457 - Temporary Work (Skilled) visa on the basis that he has been nominated for the position of Bricklayer by his sponsor DARREN DAVID STRIDE ATF STRIDE FAMILY TRUST which was refused subsequently for not the prospective employer not having an approved nomination of an occupation in relation to the applicant under Section 140GB of the act. The delegate refused to grant the visa on 21 April 2015 on the basis that cl.457.223(4)(a) was not met because the nomination was not approved.
4. My employer and I applied to review the decision to Administrative Appeals Tribunal soon after the decision.
5. I appeared before the Tribunal on 2 December 2015 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal also received oral evidence from the applicant's sponsoring employer Mr Darren Stride, trustee for the Stride Family Trust trading as Stride Bricklaying.
6. In the evidence I stated my employer that Darren David Stride Atf Stride Family Trust represented by the executor Mr Darren David Stride is a legally operating Australian Business. Under sections 140E(1) and (2), a sponsorship application can satisfy the prescribed criteria in order to be approved. The prescribed criteria are set out in regulation 2.59 that states commitment to meet either Training Benchmark A or Training Benchmark B, thereby meeting paragraph 2.59(d) of the Regulations.
7. Without considering that nomination can be approved and thus my application can be approved as well, Administrative Appeals Tribunal first refused affirmed the nomination approval and later affirmed my visa refusal.
8. My appeal to this Honourable Court is to provide me with Natural Justice and set aside the cancellation decision of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and set aside the decision made by Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Migration Review Tribunal). There has been a judicial error by AAT as I do meet the Subclass 457 criteria had AAT considered to remit the 457 nomination that was refused without giving the opportunity to my employer for commitment to meet the training benchmark over 12 months of the nomination application.
(Copied from the Judicial Review Application without amendment)
The Court may only set aside the Tribunal Decision upon review if it involves jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1 at [76] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. Further, an error by the Tribunal will only constitute jurisdictional error if the Tribunal: (a) identifies a wrong issue, (b) asks the wrong question, (c) ignores relevant material, or (d) relies on irrelevant material, in such a way that the Tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected resulting in a decision exceeding or failing to exercise the authority or powers given under the relevant statute: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323; (2001) 75 ALJR 1105; (2001) 180 ALR 1; (2001) 62 ALD 225 at [82] per McHugh, Gaudron and Hayne JJ.
Grounds 1 to 5 of the Judicial Review Application deal with factual matters and, in essence, provide a history of the proceedings before the Delegate and the Tribunal. As such, they disclose no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision.
Grounds 6 to 8 of the Tribunal Decision appear to be directed to the decisions refusing the Sponsor’s nomination application in respect of Mr Singh and those grounds are, in those respects, misconceived. Mr Singh does not have standing to review the delegate’s decision in relation to the nomination application, as appears to be requested by ground 8, because this Court has no jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision which is a primary decision: Migration Act, s. 476.
To the extent that Mr Singh seeks review of the Tribunal Decision in relation to the nomination application, as appears to be requested in grounds 7 and 8, he has no standing to make that application: Migration Act, s.478(a).
In grounds 6 and 8 Mr Singh contends that the Sponsor was denied the opportunity to meet a relevant training benchmark. For present purposes, that issue is irrelevant.
The issue that arises in respect of the Mr Singh’s Business Visa application was whether he satisfied cl.457.223(4) of Sch.2 to the Migration Regulations and, in particular, whether he was the subject of an approved nomination. That provision in the Migration Regulations imposes a strict requirement which requires that Mr Singh was either the subject of an approved nomination or he was not. There was no evidence before the Tribunal that Mr Singh was the subject of an approved nomination and there is certainly no evidence been put before this Court that there was, prior to the Tribunal Decision, an approved nomination of the relevant kind. The Tribunal’s finding in this regard was plainly open to it and discloses no jurisdictional error.
Ground 8 also appears to contend that Mr Singh was denied natural justice or procedural fairness. In that regard, the Court observes that the Tribunal by letter dated 26 October 2015 invited Mr Singh to attend a hearing scheduled for 2 December 2015, in compliance with ss.360 and 360A of the Migration Act. In response to an application for an extension of time, the Tribunal hearing was rescheduled to 21 April 2016. Further, Mr Singh was on notice of the relevant issue from the terms of the Delegate’s Decision, that is, that there was a lack of an approved nomination and whether he met cl.457.223(4)(a) of Sch.2 to the Migration Regulations would be the determinative issue on review.
The Court also notes that the Tribunal appears to have complied with s.359A of the Migration Act by putting information to Mr Singh for comment that would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the Tribunal Decision, and did so by way of the terms of the 16 February 2016 Letter which: (a) gave Mr Singh clear particulars of the information, namely, that on 15 February 2016 the Tribunal had affirmed a decision not to approve the Sponsor’s nomination application, (b) explained that the information was relevant to the Tribunal’s review because the terms of cl.457.223(4)(a) of Sch.2 of the Migration Regulations required an approved nomination by a sponsor that had not ceased and that, if the Tribunal relied upon that information, it may find that Mr Singh did not meet the terms of cl.457.223(4)(a) of Sch.2 of the Migration Regulations, (c) invited Mr Singh to comment in writing, (d) requested a response within the relevant prescribed period which was 14 days from the date that Mr Singh received the invitation, and (e) was sent to Mr Singh’s representative’s email address provided to the Tribunal in connection with the review: CB 108; ss.359A, 359B, 379A and 379G of the Migration Act and reg.4.17(4) of the Migration Regulations (in relation to the putting of information pursuant to s.359A of the Migration Act).
In SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 93 ALD 300 (“SZBEL”) the High Court observed that the relevant question in matters such as this is about the Tribunal’s processes, and not its actual decision, and made reference to a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court, where it was said that it is a fundamental principle that, where the laws of procedural fairness apply to a decision-making process, the party liable to be directly affected by the decision is to be given the opportunity to be heard and that would ordinarily require the party affected to be given the opportunity of ascertaining the relevant issues and to be informed of the nature and content of adverse material in the context, and as the High Court then explained the Migration Act defines the nature of the opportunity to be heard that is given to an applicant for review to the Tribunal, namely, that an applicant be invited to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review, that being the relevant delegate’s decision: SZBEL at [25] and [32]-[33] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.
In this case, having regard to the material that the Court has set out above, the obligations of procedural fairness exhaustively set out in Div.5 of Pt.V of the Migration Act have for relevant purposes not been breached and there is no indication of that apparent in either the Tribunal Decision or any materials put before the Court, noting that Mr Singh did not put any affidavit material before the Court on the Judicial Review Application to support the allegations of a denial of procedural fairness, notwithstanding the opportunity to do so by reason of the Registrar’s order of 22 June 2016.
In this case, the Tribunal invited Mr Singh to appear to give evidence and make arguments in support of his case. He did so and he was, therefore, afforded the opportunity envisaged by Div.5 of Pt.V of the Migration Act of presenting his case to the Tribunal. In those circumstances, there was no denial of natural justice or want of procedural fairness in the Tribunal’s processes: SZBEL at [25] and [32]-[33] and, thus, the allegations of a denial of procedural fairness or natural justice are not made out.
Conclusion and orders
In conclusion, the Court takes the view that there is no evidence before it to establish that the Tribunal erred in deciding that the applicant was not the subject of an approved nomination and Mr Singh could not meet the requirements of cl.457.223(4)(a) of Sch.2 to the Migration Regulations, and further considers that no other finding was open to the Tribunal on the materials. The Court has, therefore, concluded that the Tribunal Decision does not involve jurisdictional error. Further, or alternatively, the Court takes the view that even if there were a jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision relief could be refused on the basis of futility as, if the matter were to be remitted to the Tribunal and the Tribunal would be again bound to affirm the Delegate’s Decision not to grant the Business Visa. It follows that the Minister is entitled to costs, and there will therefore be a further order that Mr Singh pay the Minister’s costs in the sum of $7206 by 29 June 2017.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Antoni Lucev
Date: 7 June 2017
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Immigration
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Administrative Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Jurisdiction
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Procedural Fairness
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Statutory Construction
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Natural Justice
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