Sims and Hayes (Compensation)

[2018] AATA 869

Sims and Hayes (Compensation) [2018] AATA 869 (11 April 2018)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:           2016/2910

Re:Ryan Sims

APPLICANT

AndDimity Hayes

RESPONDENT

INTERLOCUTORY DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President K Bean

Date:11 April 2018

Place:Adelaide

1.Subject only to the issue of whether the vessel “Gabo Bay” was engaged in trade or commerce among the States at the time of the applicant’s injury, the Tribunal has jurisdiction in this matter.

2.      Accordingly, the Tribunal makes the following directions:

(a)   On or before 27 April 2018, the respondent is to file and serve any further evidence or submissions in support of its contention that the Gabo Bay was not engaged in trade or commerce among the States at the relevant time; and

(b)   On or before 11 May 2018, the applicant is to file and serve any evidence and/or submissions in reply.

..................[Sgd].....................................

Deputy President K Bean

CATCHWORDS

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – Seafarers – Jurisdiction – Where applicant injured while working as a deckhand on a ship that is registered in Australia – Where on the relevant voyage the vessel departed from Robe and returned there – Where the catch from the relevant voyage was sold to purchasers that included interstate purchasers – Where respondent does not make a decision within the statutory timeframe – Where the respondent does not comply with the relevant Act in making a reviewable decision – Whether there was a reviewable decision – Whether the vessel was a prescribed ship – Whether the vessel was engaged in trade or commerce among the States.

LEGISLATION

Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992, ss 3, 19, 63, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79 and 88

The Navigation Act 1912, ss 2 and 10

The Constitution, s 51(i)

CASES

Re Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1978) 1 ALD 167

Tiwi Barge Services Pty Ltd v Stark (1997) 78 FCR 218
Samson Maritime Pty Ltd v Aucote (2014) 229 FCR 125
S.G. White Pty Ltd v the Ship “Mediterranean” [1966] Qd R 211

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President K Bean

11 April 2018

1. The applicant, Mr Sims, was a deckhand on the Gabo Bay, a fishing vessel operated by the respondent. Mr Sims went on three fishing trips, one in May 2014, one in June 2014 and another in August 2014. He claims that during the trip in June 2014, which departed from Robe in South Australia and then returned there, he was stung by a seaborne creature, likely a jelly fish, and developed a subsequent infection.

2. On 23 December 2015, Mr Sims made a claim for worker’s compensation under s 63 of the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (the Seafarers Act). The respondent did not respond to the claim within the 12 day period as required by s 73(2) of the Seafarers Act and was therefore potentially deemed to have made a decision disallowing the claim pursuant to s 73(6) of the Seafarers Act.

3. On 5 February 2016, Mr Sims requested a reconsideration of that decision pursuant to s 78 of the Seafarers Act.

4. By letter from the respondent’s solicitors dated 6 April 2016, the respondent rejected Mr Sims’s claim. The reasons given included that the respondent was not satisfied that the incident alleged by Mr Sims had occurred.

5. On 1 June 2016, Mr Sims applied to the Tribunal for a review of the respondent’s decision.

6. On 5 June 2017, an Interlocutory Hearing was convened in the matter to determine two threshold preliminary issues, namely:

   (a)Whether there was a reviewable decision pursuant to ss 77 and 79 of the Seafarers Act so as to give the Tribunal jurisdiction under s 88 of the Seafarers Act; and

   (b)Whether or not the respondent’s ship, the Gabo Bay, fell within the definition of a “prescribed ship” under the Seafarers Act.

   The hearing was adjourned until 14 June 2017, as Mr Sims’ representative requested an opportunity to consider the issues more carefully and file written submissions.

7. At the resumed hearing on 14 June 2017, I raised a further jurisdictional issue with the parties, namely whether the Gabo Bay was engaging in interstate trade or commerce so as to satisfy s 19 of the Seafarers Act. I directed the parties to file any written submissions addressing that point.

8. On 5 July 2017 the solicitors for Mr Sims filed written submissions. On 18 July 2017, Mr Peter Westley for the respondent wrote an e-mail to the Tribunal and to Mr Sims’ solicitors indicating that he was “instructed to make no further submissions” and that he did not “have instructions to make a formal submission”. However, attached to the e-mail was correspondence from the person who owned the Gabo Bay at the relevant time, Ms Dimity Hayes, dated 7 July 2017. I will set out the e-mail in full:

   In response I can only reply that all fishing licences and quota, were leased from Anthony Circonte. Pascatore fishing (sic), leased monthly or as quota demanded. I believe he lives or operates from Victoria.

   The Gabo Bay fished only in South East, South Australia. The three trips Sims undertook were near Cape Jaffa. In the middle of winter. Most likely under 20 nautical miles. This can be clarified with the skipper of the vessel. However I was not on the vessel on these trips.

   I no longer have any authorisation to obtain fishing records as the boat has been sold.

   Fish were sold at the Robe Marina to a fish buyer representing Pescatore fishing, at the Robe wharf. Once fish were unloaded into their truck to the fish Buyer they were no longer the Property of the Gabo Bay, they were weighed, recorded and considered sold. Were (sic) the fish were sold. I do not know. They became property of Pescatore. The boat never travelled to Victoria at any time, catch log records, Vms tracking. 100% observation cameras are held with AFMA and can be Subpoenaed at any time. Log books remain on the Vessel and no longer are in my possession since sale of the Vessel. Please contact the new owner, for the original paper work or contact AFMA.

   Please be mindful that this claim was submitted over a year after initial injury, thrown out of work cover (sic) 2x and has changed from a skin infection treated with antibiotics to carpel tunnel after several doctors and several lawyers. This claim came after the boat was sold and trading had ceased. If a genuine claim should it not have been reported within a year not after that period.

9. The material before me also indicates that on 26 June 2017 Mr Westley sent an email in the following terms to the applicant’s solicitor:

   Dear Ms Kellett

   I refer to your letter of 16th June and respond as follows:-

   1The Gaybo Bay fished locally within 80 nautical miles of the Township of Robe. Whilst fishing on the boat, your client travelled between Robe and the Coorong. The exact details of where your client fished are contained in the Ship’s logbook, which is still on the boat (since sold). As of last week, the Skipper was out of range.

   2The Gaybo Bay only unloaded its catch at Robe where its catch was sold locally. Some fish was occasionally sold interstate as is evidenced by the statements attached to the T-Documents.

   3The trips undertaken by your client were local and short as it was winter time and the seas were unpredictable.

   4Apart from occasional sales to interstate fish buyers, most of the fish caught was sold locally to local traders and fish shops.

   5My client does not have the registration papers for the boat. These are with the new owner.

   I regret this may not assist you much.[1]

   [1]     Applicant’s further submissions dated 5 July 2017 [2.3].

10. Because the email from Ms Hayes contained new information, on 22 September 2017, the Tribunal wrote to the parties to request any further submissions.

11. On 20 October 2017, Mr Sims’ solicitors filed further submissions. On 25 October 2017, Mr Westley reiterated that he did not “have instructions to make a formal submission in response”, although he repeated the main submissions the respondent had previously made, including as to the “true respondent”, who he had previously contended should be Ms Dimity Hayes.

    ISSUES

12. There are three main issues I will need to address. These are:

    (a)Whether there was a reviewable decision pursuant to ss 77 and 79 of the Seafarers Act so as to potentially give rise to the Tribunal’s power to review the decision under s 88 of the Seafarers Act;

    (b)Whether or not the respondent’s ship fell within the definition of a “prescribed ship” under the Seafarers Act; and

    (c)Whether the respondent’s ship as at the date of the injury was engaging in trade or commerce “between Australia and places outside Australia” or “among the States” so as to satisfy s 19 of the Seafarers Act?

    For reasons I will go on to explain, if the Gabo Bay was not engaged in “trade or commerce” among the States, the Seafarers Act does not apply and the other two issues will not arise. Nevertheless, against the possibility that the Seafarers Act does apply, I will address those issues first before turning to the question of the application of the Act pursuant to s 19(1) and whether the Gabo Bay was engaged in interstate trade or commerce.

    HAS THE RESPONDENT MADE A REVIEWABLE DECISION PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 77 AND 79 OF THE SEAFARERS ACT SO AS TO POTENTIALLY ENLIVEN THE TRIBUNAL’S JURISDICTION?

13. Pursuant to s 88(1) of the Seafarers Act, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review only reviewable decisions. Section 76 of the Seafarers Act defines a reviewable decision as a decision made under s 78.

14. Section 78 of the Seafarers Act relevantly reads:

    Reconsiderations of determinations

    (2) A claimant may, by notice in writing given to an employer, request the employer to reconsider a determination made by the employer.

    (3)A request for reconsideration of a determination must:

    (a)    set out the reasons for the request; and

    (b)be given to the employer within 30 days after the day on which the determination first came to the notice of the claimant, or within such further period (if any) as the employer, either before or after the end of that 30 day period, allows.

    (4)    On receipt of a request, the employer must for the purposes of this section:

    (a)if the employer is a party to a collective agreement or a pre-reform certified agreement that relates to industry panels—arrange for an industry panel; or

    (b)in any other case—arrange with Comcare for a Comcare officer;

    to assist the employer in reconsidering the determination under subsection (5).

    (5) After making arrangements under paragraph (4)(a) or (b), the employer must, with the assistance of the industry panel or the Comcare officer, reconsider the determination.

    (6) After an employer reconsiders a determination, the employer must make a decision affirming or revoking the determination or varying the determination in such manner as the employer thinks fit.

15. Before a decision can be reviewed pursuant to s 78, a claimant must lodge a claim for compensation under s 63 of the Seafarers Act and the claim must be determined. Mr Sims lodged such a claim on 23 December 2015.

16. The Seafarers Act prescribes time limits in which claims must be determined by an employer. Because Mr Sim’s claim was related to incapacity for work and the costs of medical treatment, the relevant time limit was 12 days under s 73(2) of the Seafarers Act. The respondent did not determine the claim within 12 days and as such, if the Seafarers Act applied, was deemed to have made a decision disallowing the claim pursuant to s 73(6).

17. On 5 February 2016, pursuant to s 78 of the Seafarers Act, Mr Sims requested a reconsideration of that deemed decision.

18. On 6 April 2016, the respondent rejected the claim pursuant to s 78 of the Seafarers Act. However, it would appear that in rejecting the claim, the respondent did not comply with subss (4) and (5). Namely, there was no arrangement for a Comcare officer to assist the respondent with the reconsideration of the determination.

19. In my view, notwithstanding the respondent’s non‑compliance with the Seafarers Act, if that Act applies, the respondent has made a reviewable decision under s 78 of the Act.[2] 

    [2]     See Re Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1978) 1 ALD 167.

    DID THE GABO BAY FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF A “PRESCRIBED SHIP” IN S 3 OF THE SEAFARERS ACT?

20. Because s 19 of the Seafarers Act limits the application of the Act to prescribed ships, for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction, I must be satisfied that the Gabo Bay meets the definition of a prescribed ship under the Act. “Prescribed ship” is defined in s 3:

    "prescribed ship" means a ship that:

    (a)    is either:

    (i)     a ship to which Part II of the Navigation Act 1912 would apply if that Act had not been repealed; or

    (ii)    a ship that is declared under subsection 3A(1) to be a prescribed ship; and

    (b)is neither a Government ship nor a ship declared under subsection 3A(2) not to be a prescribed ship.

21. As neither party submitted that paras (a)(ii) or (b) of the definition of prescribed ship were relevant and the Tribunal has not received any evidence to suggest otherwise, I will proceed on the basis that the only relevant aspect of the definition of prescribed ship is that contained in para (a)(i). The issue therefore is whether the Gabo Bay is a ship to which Pt II of the Navigation Act 1912 (the Navigation Act) would apply if that Act had not been repealed.

    Is the Gabo Bay a ship to which Part II of the Navigation Act would apply if that Act had not been repealed?

22. Section 10 of the then Navigation Act set out the application of Pt II of the Act. It stated:

    Application of Part

    Except so far as the contrary intention appears, this Part applies only to:

    (a)    a ship registered in Australia;

    (b)a ship that is used to engage in coastal trading (within the meaning of the Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012) under a general licence (within the meaning of that Act); or

    (c)a ship (other than a ship to which paragraph (a) or (b) applies) of which the majority of the crew are residents of Australia and which is operated by any of the following (whether or not in association with any other person, firm or company, being a person, firm or company of any description), namely:

    (i)     a person who is a resident of, or has his or her principal place of business in, Australia;

    (ii)    a firm that has its principal place of business in Australia; or

    (iii)     a company that is incorporated, or has its principal place of business, in Australia;

    and to the owner, master and crew of such a ship.

23. In relation to s 10(a) of the Navigation Act, Mr Sims submitted that he had “no reason to consider that the Gabo Bay was not a registered ship on the Australian Shipping Register”, and indeed I note the material before me includes what appears to be a “screenshot” showing the Gabo Bay as registered on the List of Registered Ships as at 4 July 2017.[3]

    [3]     Annexure to submissions of the applicant, dated 5 July 2017.

24. With respect to whether Pt II of the Navigation Act would have applied, a further issue arises. Before it was repealed, Pt I, s 2 of the Navigation Act relevantly provided as follows:

    Application of Act

    (1)Except in so far as the application of this section is expressly excluded by a provision of this Act, this Act does not apply in relation to:

    (a)a trading ship proceeding on a voyage other than an overseas voyage or an inter‑State voyage;

    (b)an Australian fishing vessel proceeding on a voyage other than an overseas voyage;

    (ba)a fishing fleet support vessel proceeding on a voyage other than an overseas voyage;

    (c)an inland waterways vessel; or

    (d)a pleasure craft;

    or in relation to its owner, master or crew.

    (2)A ship shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be proceeding on a voyage from the time when it is got under way for the purpose of proceeding on the voyage until the time when it is got under way for the purpose of proceeding on another voyage.

25. Therefore, a question arises as to whether the Gabo Bay would in fact have been a ship to which Pt II applied, unless it was also a ship to which the Act applied, that is, relevantly, an Australian fishing vessel proceeding on an overseas voyage.

26. However, in the case of Tiwi Barge Services Pty Ltd v Stark (1997) 78 FCR 218, at 222 the Full Court of the Federal Court concluded that it was not necessary to consider Pt I of the Navigation Act for the purposes of the definition of “prescribed ship” in the Seafarers Act. Therefore there is no need to consider this issue further.

27. I am satisfied on the basis of the material before me that, at the relevant time, the Gabo Bay was registered in Australia and therefore a “prescribed ship” under the Seafarers Act.

    WAS THE GABO BAY ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE OR OVERSEAS TRADE OR COMMERCE?

28. As I have alluded to above, this issue arises from the terms of s 19 of the Seafarers Act, which relevantly provides:

    Application of Act

    (1)This Act applies to the employment of employees on a prescribed ship that is engaged in trade or commerce:

    (a)    between Australia and places outside Australia; or

    (aa)    between 2 places outside Australia; or

    (b)    among the States; or

    (c)within a Territory, between a State and a Territory or between 2 Territories.

29. As the Full Federal Court explained in Samson Maritime Pty Ltd v Aucote 229 FCR 125 (Samson Maritime), s 19 is designed to give the Seafarers Act maximum effect within Constitutional limits. The only one of the Constitutional foundations which potentially applies here is s 19(1). Therefore, the applicant must show that s 19(1) applies to the voyage in question, otherwise the Seafarers Act does not apply to him and the Tribunal would be without jurisdiction.

30. In Samson Maritime, the Court also referred to the difficulties associated with applying s 19(1)(a), and that this would require “the consideration and application of the principles of constitutional law in the interpretation of the commerce power in s 51(i)”.[4] The Court also stated as follows with respect to the relevant High Court authorities:

    The court affirmed the principle of constitutional law that, where a connection that is not insubstantial, tenuous or distant exists between a law in question and a head of legislative power then the connection will not be displaced by lack of some further or additional connection (214 CLR at [39]). The same considerations would be apposite in evaluating whether the relevant activity, relationship, status or other subject matter relied on is sufficiently connected to the attempt by the parliament to regulate it in a law enacted under the relevant head or heads of power. This was recognised long ago by Knox CJ, Isaacs and Starke JJ in W & A McArthur Ltd at CLR 549, ALR 137, with whom Rich J agreed at CLR 569, ALR 157, where they discussed the need to look at the substantial nature of a particular transaction or dealing in order to characterise whether it was or was not wholly intrastate so as to fall within the commerce power in s 51(i).

    The complexities of the possible application of s 19(1)(a) to a seafarer that were discussed in argument before the tribunal and the Full Court largely result from the decision in Kalibia that ss 51(i), 98 and 76(iii) of the Constitution did not permit the parliament to make a law of general application for the payment of workers’ compensation to seafarers. It would be productive of unfortunate complexity if an injured seafarer had to prove the nature of his or her employer’s business dealings in order to establish whether a particular course of events or transactions attracted the operation of the SRC Act or a state or territory law with respect to a claim for workers’ compensation.[5]

    It was unnecessary for the Court in Samson to fully grapple with these issues, as the employer in that matter was a constitutional corporation.

    [4]     Samson Maritime Pty Ltd v Aucote (2014) 229 FCR 125, 142.

    [5]     Samson Maritime [57]-[58].

1. With respect to the possible application of s 19(1)(a), I see no scope for that provision to apply here, given there is no evidence of any commercial transaction or activity involving another party “outside Australia”. Therefore the real issue is whether at the relevant time the Gabo Bay was engaged in trade or commerce “among the States”.

2. The applicant contends that the Gabo Bay was involved in interstate trade or commerce on a number of bases. The solicitor for the applicant has directed my attention to verbal concessions made by Mr Westley at the hearing on 14 June 2017 that the Gabo Bay “was a fishing vessel which embarked upon voyages in both intra‑state and inter‑state waters to catch fish for sale to both intra‑state and intra‑state purchasers”, and that “the Gabo Bay fished in Commonwealth waters”.[6] 

   [6]     Applicant’s further submissions dated 5 July 2017 [10.1].

3. However, in order for the Seafarers Act to apply to Mr Sims’ injury, it must be shown that the Gabo Bay was engaged in interstate trade or commerce at the time of that injury, and it is not clear based on the information available to me exactly where the Gabo Bay travelled during the voyage on which the applicant’s injury occurred. Further, with respect to verbal concessions made by Mr Westley on 14 June 2017, I note that these have been overtaken to some extent by the email from Ms Hayes dated 7 July 2017 and Mr Westley’s email of 26 June 2017. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that it would be appropriate for me to rely on the concessions which preceded those communications.

4. The applicant further relies upon the fact that:

   The Gabo Bay apparently used a port in Robe, South Australia, from which it embarked and to which it returned in relation to various fishing trips. However, based on the registration information that is referred to above, the home port of the Gabo Bay is in Melbourne.[7]

   However, in my view, these facts are not sufficient by themselves to support a conclusion that at the time of Mr Sims’ injury, the Gabo Bay was engaged in trade or commerce “among the States”.

   [7]     Ibid [10.2].

5. The applicant further contends that:

   This connection to Victoria is further emphasised by the fact that the only documentation provided by the Respondents in this matter as to who purchases the catch is a bundle of purchases receipts from a business in Victoria called Pescatore Di Mare Pty Ltd. [8]

   I am not currently persuaded that the mere fact of some of the Gabo Bay’s catch being sold to a purchaser based in Melbourne would be sufficient to support a conclusion that in undertaking the voyage during which those fish were caught, the Gabo Bay itself was engaged in “trade or commerce among the States”. I note the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Queensland in S.G. White Pty Ltd v the Ship “Mediterranean” [1966] Qd R 211 at 215:

   I do not think that by engaging in trawling off the New South Wales coast and bringing her catch to a port in that State the “Mediterranean” is engaged in interstate trade, nor that she would be engaged in such trade when trawling off the Queensland coast and bringing her catch to a Queensland port, even though in either case her catch be divided and sold partly in one State and partly in the other.

   [8]     (bid [10.3].

6. However, the material before me suggests that in the period from April 2014 to August 2014, a significant proportion if not all of the catch of the Gabo Bay was sold (in South Australia) to Pescatore Di Mare Pty Ltd (Pescatore), a company based in Victoria. Perhaps even more significantly, Ms Hayes’ email of 7 July 2017, together with the invoices which have been provided, clearly indicate that at the relevant time in 2014, the Gabo Bay was fishing pursuant to licences and quotas held by Pescatore. So, although Pescatore did not own the Gabo Bay, either it or an individual associated with the company owned the quotas and licences, and purchased the fish caught pursuant to these quotas and licences.

7. In effect, it appears the Gabo Bay was fishing at the behest and on behalf of Pescatore, who then appear to have bought the bulk of the resulting catch. While the ultimate destination of the fish bought by Pescatore is not apparent on the material before me, I note Ms Hayes’ comment in her email that she believes Anthony Circonte of Pescatore “lives or operates from Victoria”, and it seems likely that some of the fish purchased was transported to Victoria by or on behalf of Pescatore.

8. If indeed some or all of the relevant catch of the Gabo Bay was transported to Victoria by or on behalf of Pescatore, I consider that would provide a firm basis for a conclusion that the Gabo Bay was engaged in interstate trade or commerce at the relevant time. In any event, however, regardless of whether or in what circumstances her catch was taken across state borders, it appears the Gabo Bay was fishing in accordance with a commercial arrangement with a Victorian company, pursuant to which the Gabo Bay used the quotas and licence of that company, and sold most if not all of the resulting catch to that company. In my view the fact that this arrangement was made between entities in different States and carried out across State borders, has the result that it constituted trade or commerce “among the States”. Although the question is not free from doubt, given the Gabo Bay was an essential and integral part of the arrangement, in my view this probably also has the consequence that, at the time Mr Sims was injured, the Gabo Bay was engaged in trade or commerce “among the States”.

9. For completeness, the applicant has also contended that:

   The act of fishing itself is trade and commerce and therefore if a fishing voyage of a prescribed ship travels between States or into Commonwealth waters then that is sufficient to comply with section 19(1) of the SRC Act. However, as stated above, it is not clear based on the information provided by the Respondents to date exactly where the Gabo Bay was travelling at the time of the Applicant’s injury.[9]

   I consider the above concession to have been properly made and in any event, as I have indicated, I am not persuaded that if the Gabo Bay ventured into Commonwealth waters, she was therefore engaged in trade or commerce “between Australia and places outside Australia”. I am not aware of any authorities to the contrary and it would be peculiar, in my view, if Commonwealth waters could be considered to be “outside of Australia” under the Act.

   [9]     Ibid [19.1].

   CONCLUSION

10. On the material available to me, I am currently inclined to the view that, at the time Mr Sims sustained his injury, the Gabo Bay was engaged in trade or commerce “among the States”. However the material I have is extremely limited and I note the applicant has sought directions requiring the respondent to provide additional material directed to the issues I have canvassed above.

11. If I were persuaded the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction, of course it would not be appropriate for me to issue such directions. However in circumstances where I consider the Tribunal’s jurisdiction probably is engaged, and noting the consequences for the respondent if that is in fact the position, I have decided that before reaching a final conclusion on this issue I should direct the respondent to provide any further material or submissions in support of her contention that the Gabo Bay was not engaged in trade or commerce among the States, and give the applicant an opportunity to respond to that material.

12. Given the conclusions I have reached, I have also formed the view that the issue raised by Mr Westley as to the correct name of the respondent should be addressed, and the name of the respondent should be changed to Dimity Hayes.

    INTERLOCUTORY DECISION

13. Subject only to the issue of whether the “Gabo Bay” was engaged in trade or commerce among the States at the time of the applicant’s injury, the Tribunal has jurisdiction in this matter.

14. Accordingly, the Tribunal makes the following directions:

    (a)On or before 27 April 2018, the respondent is to file and serve any further evidence or submissions in support of its contention that the Gabo Bay was not engaged in trade or commerce among the States at the relevant time; and

    (b)On or before 11 May 2018, the applicant is to file and serve any evidence and/or submissions in reply.

I certify that the preceding 44 (forty-four) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President K Bean

.........................[SGD].................................

Associate

Dated: 11 April 2018

Dates of hearing:	5 and 14 June 2017
Solicitors for the Applicant:	Ms A Kellett Griffins Lawyers
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Mr P Westley Westley DiGorgio Norcock