Shirley Thomas v Goona Warra Vineyard
[2014] FWC 513
•21 JANUARY 2014
[2014] FWC 513 |
FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Shirley Thomas
v
Goona Warra Vineyard
(U2013/10214)
COMMISSIONER JOHNS | MELBOURNE, 21 JANUARY 2014 |
Application for Relief of Unfair Dismissal - Minimum Employment Period - Casual employee - Small Business Fair Dismissal Code - Compensation ordered.
Introduction
[1] “[I]f ever there was a truly “forgotten people” in our time it must be the working poor .... the cleaners and carers and hospitality workers...” 1 And if ever there was an example of how indecently, the working poor are sometimes treated it is how John Barnier of Goona Warra Vineyard Pty Ltd (Respondent) treated Shirley Thomas (Applicant) on 16 May 2013.
[2] Ms Thomas, a cleaner, was unceremoniously sacked by Mr Barnier (in his capacity as a director of the Respondent), when he falsely accused her of stealing money and threatened to call the police. As a result of that treatment, this is a decision about whether, pursuant to section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act), Ms Thomas should be entitled to a remedy because the Respondent dismissed her from her employment.
Permission to be represented
[3] A directions hearing in the matter was conducted on 25 November 2013. There was no attendance by the Respondent.
[4] The directions hearing was held to seek submissions from the parties about whether the Fair Work Commission (Commission) should grant permission for any party to be represented by a lawyer or paid agent pursuant to section 596 of the FW Act. A determination of this issue was necessary to ensure that the manner in which any hearing was to be conducted was fair and just, Warrell v FWC [2013] FCA 291.
[5] Mr Nicholas Dircks for the Applicant submitted that granting permission for him to represent the Applicant would enable the matter to be dealt with more efficiently, having regard to the jurisdictional issues raised by the Respondent, namely that the Applicant had not served the minimum employment period because she was a casual employee not engaged on a regular and systematic basis. Having regard to the submissions of Mr Dircks, the Commission was satisfied that granting permission would enable the matter to be dealt with more efficiently, having regard to the complexity of the matter. The Applicant was granted permission to be represented by a paid agent.
[6] At the beginning of the substantive hearing on 6 December 2013 Mr Rohan Millar of counsel sought permission to represent the Respondent on the basis of the complexity of the matter. The application was not opposed by the Applicant. Having regard to the submission of Mr Millar the Commission was satisfied that, in addition to section 596(2)(a) of the FW Act, section 596(2)(c) also applied in that it would be unfair not to allow the Respondent to be represented taking into account fairness between it and the Applicant (she having already been given permission to be represented).
Conference or Hearing
[7] At the directions hearing on 25 November 2013 the Commission also sought submissions from the parties about whether the Commission should conduct either a conference (section 398) or a hearing (section 399) in relation to the matter.
[8] Taking account any differences in the circumstances between the parties and their wishes and also considering whether a hearing would be the most effective and efficient way to resolve to the matter, the Commission as presently constituted, decided to conduct a hearing.
The hearing
[9] At the hearing the Applicant was represented by Mr N Dircks, a paid agent. The Applicant relied on her own evidence and did not call any further witnesses.
[10] At the hearing the Respondent was represented by Mr R Millar of counsel. The Respondent relied on the evidence of:
Mr John Barnier - Director of the Respondent
Mrs Elizabeth Barnier - Director of the Respondent
Factual circumstances
[11] It is common ground between the parties that the Applicant:
a) was employed by the Respondent as a cleaner;
b) was a casual employee;
c) commenced employment on 30 March 2012;
d) initially only cleaned the Respondent’s vineyard buildings;
e) also then commenced cleaning the home of the Respondent’s directors in or about late April or early May 2012 after Mrs Barnier asked the Applicant to do so and she agreed; and
f) ceased employment on 16 May 2013 when, during a telephone call with Mr Barnier, he wrongly accused her of stealing money from their home.
[1] The telephone call from Mr Barnier occurred between 7.15 pm and 7.30 pm on 16 May 2013. 2 The Applicant’s evidence is that Mr Barnier spoke in a very aggressive and angry tone.3 Her evidence is that Mr Barnier said words to the effect of:
“It is John Barnier here. We are going to China tomorrow, and our money is missing. We had taken the money out. Elizabeth took $50 out of that for hairdressing. Now the rest of the money is not there. We had friends over, and we know it wasn’t any of them, so that leaves you. Because the money is missing your services are no longer required. Return your key ... I’ll be going to the police in half an hour.” 4
[2] The Applicant gave evidence that the morning after the telephone call she made a note of the conversation 5 (Exhibit “A6”). The Applicant conceded that in writing the notes the following morning “I could have missed something. I couldn’t have written it word for word...”6 Notwithstanding that the notes were taken the following morning, they were taken less than 24 hours after the telephone call occurred. Consequently, they are sufficiently contemporaneous and accord with the evidence given by the Applicant before the Commission.
[3] In any case the Applicant’s account of the telephone call is not contested in any real sense. Mrs Barnier says she was in the same room as her husband when the call was made. 7 She says she doesn’t remember the exact words that were said,8 but:
● did not refute the general substance of the Applicant’s account of the conversation; 9 and
● agreed that her husband used an “agitated and angry” tone. 10
[1] Mrs Barnier also says she could hear the Applicant saying “John, let me explain. John, let me explain.” 11 The Applicant’s notes of the conversation have her saying “can I talk about it.”12 She then records Mr Barnier continuing to talk over her.13
[2] Mr Barnier’s evidence was that he recalled “very little of [the telephone conversation].” 14 He described the conversation, in which he terminated Ms Thomas’ employment, as “an unimportant conversation for me.”15 However, despite his general lack of recollection, in substance, Mr Barnier did not contradict the Applicant’s account of the conversation.16
[3] It is also common ground between the parties that within approximately half an hour of the telephone call between Mr Barnier and the Applicant, Mrs Barnier called the Applicant. 17 During the telephone call with Mrs Barnier the Applicant was advised that the money had been found. In her witness statement Mrs Barnier says,
“I felt awful, knowing that Ms Thomas had been wrongly accused and immediately telephoned her. She was obviously upset. I apologised to her, profusely and genuinely. I told her that we would like her to keep working for us, and, if it helped, that I would make sure she didn’t have to deal with [Mr Barnier], but only with me. Ms Thomas declined the offer.” 18
[4] Before the Commission Mrs Barnier reiterated that, when she called the Applicant, Ms Thomas “was extremely upset. She was in tears...” 19. Mrs Barnier says that in response to her saying that she would like Ms Thomas to keep working for them, Ms Thomas responded by saying “Elizabeth, after what John has said to me I could not work for you anymore. I could not come back.”20
[5] The Applicant’s recollection of the telephone call with Mrs Barnier is marginally different. The Applicant says Mrs Barnier said “when the dust settles ... maybe we can talk about you coming back.” 21 The Applicant says she responded by “[brining] up the issue of trust and about how aggressive [Mr Barnier] had been.”22
[6] The Applicant’s notes of the conversation (Exhibit A6) record:
● Mrs Barnier saying “when the dust settles [and] we return from China maybe you can come back (to work)”; and
● Ms Thomas replying “How could I ever come back to work for you when you don’t trust me”; and
● Mrs Barnier responding “Yes, I understand”. 23
[1] Both Mrs Barnier and Ms Thomas presented as honest witnesses. However, there is an important difference between the recollections of:
● Mrs Barnier, who says she says “I told her that we would like her to keep working for us”; and
● Ms Thomas’ recollection which is that Mrs Barnier said ““when the dust settles ... maybe we can talk about you coming back.”
Mrs Barnier’s recollection arguably constitutes an offer of re-employment. Ms Thomas’ recollection does not. It is no more than the offer of a possible conversation in the future about future re-employment.
[1] The evidence of the Applicant is that her notes of the conversation with Mrs Barnier were written by her the morning after the telephone call happened at around 7.48 pm 24 the evening before. Because it was less than 24 hours after the telephone call occurred the events would have been fresh in the Applicant’s mind and, consequently, Exhibit A6 satisfies the accepted definition of contemporaneity. For that reason the Commission prefers the Applicant’s recollection of the telephone call between Ms Thomas and Mrs Barnier. That is to say, the Commission finds that there was no unequivocal or definite offer of re-employment ever made to the Applicant.
[2] In any case it is common ground that the Applicant made it clear that she did not think she could return to work for the Respondent. 25
[3] In contrast to her husband, Mrs Barnier exhibited empathy and care for Ms Thomas. On 5 June Mrs Barnier wrote an email to the Applicant entitled “Thankyou”. She wrote,
“You have been on my mind ever since the very sad episode before we left for our trip to China - just back yesterday. I feel I just have to write to you to firstly offer my apologies for the dreadful scene and accusations so incorrectly levelled at you - in the heat of the moment I'm afraid, when we were having to leave a few hours later for China. A boys look, not a girls look, then sudden mayhem, which I could not stop. It should never have happened. I felt quite heartbroken for you as you have been a very loyal and trustworthy employee, who bent over backwards to accommodate the fluctuating shifts and last-minute requests, always received by you with good grace. As you said, you had always been an employer too so knew the difficulties small businesses face. You are going to be hard to replace. I will be very pleased to give you a good reference if you ever require one, both written and verbal. I’ll just warn them of your ability to chat!” 26
[4] By reason of the facts stated above the Applicant submits she was unfairly dismissed. The Applicant seeks an order for compensation. In her view, reinstatement would not be appropriate because she has lost trust in the Respondent. 27
[5] The Respondent argues that the application for relief from unfair dismissal should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. It says the Respondent is a small business employer and, consequently, pursuant to section 383(b) of the FW Act, the minimum employment period that the Applicant must have fulfilled in order for her to bring an application for unfair dismissal is 12 months. Despite the period of employment between 30 March 2012 and 16 May 2013 being 14 months, the Respondent contends that because the Applicant was a casual employee that period of service does not count towards the Applicant’s period of employment. It further contends that the Applicant resigned from her employment on the basis that she did not accept Mrs Barnier’s offer of re-employment.
Protection from Unfair Dismissal
[6] On any assessment Mr Barnier’s treatment of Ms Thomas on 16 May 2013 was unjustified. Although it is not relevant to the question of whether the termination of the Applicant’s employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, it is a statement of his lack of decency that, even up to the date of the hearing in this matter, Mr Barnier had not apologised to Ms Thomas for how rudely he treated her. The following exchange occurred between the Commission, as presently constituted, and Mr Barnier,
COMMISSIONER: Have you ever personally apologised to the applicant?
MR BARNIER: No, it was done by my wife on my behalf.
COMMISSIONER: [So] you created the mess and she cleans it up for you?
MR BARNIER: Absolutely. That’s a perfectly fair arrangement in my - - - 28
[7] However, as rude as Mr Barnier was to Ms Thomas the Commission cannot make an order for reinstatement or compensation unless it is satisfied the Applicant was protected from unfair dismissal at the time of the dismissal. As stated above, the Respondent objected to the Commission exercising its jurisdiction on the basis that the Applicant was not an employee protected from unfair dismissal.
[8] Section 382 sets out the circumstances that must exist for the Applicant to be protected from unfair dismissal:
“382 When a person is protected from unfair dismissal
A person is protected from unfair dismissal at a time if, at that time:
(a) the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and
(b) one or more of the following apply:
(i) a modern award covers the person;
(ii) an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;
(iii) the sum of the person’s annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the regulations, is less than the high income threshold.
Note: High income threshold indexed to $129,300 from 1 July 2013.”
[9] The Applicant was employed with the Respondent on a casual basis from 30 March 2012 to 16 May 2013.
[10] In its supplementary written submissions 29 the Respondent argues that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with the application on the grounds that the Applicant did not serve the minimum employment period.
[11] Section 383 of the FW Act defines what a minimum employment period is and provides that for an employer who is not a small business, the period is 6 months ending at the time the person was given notice of dismissal or immediately before the dismissal (whichever time is earlier). For a small business the minimum employment period is 12 months.
Was the Respondent a small business?
[12] The Respondent argues it is a small business and that the Applicant’s period of service with the Respondent does not satisfy the requirements under section 384(2)(a) of the FW Act.
[13] Section 23 of the FW Act sets out the meaning of small business and relevantly provides:
“23 Meaning of small business employer
(1) A national system employer is a small business employer at a particular time if the employer employs fewer than 15 employees at that time.
(2) For the purpose of calculating the number of employees employed by the employer at a particular time:
(a) subject to paragraph (b), all employees employed by the employer at that time are to be counted; and
(b) a casual employee is not to be counted unless, at that time, he or she has been employed by the employer on a regular and systematic basis.”
[14] Evidence was led by both the Applicant and Respondent in respect of the number of employees employed with the Respondent at the time of the Applicant’s dismissal. It is clear from the evidence of the Respondent, and it is not disputed by the Applicant, that the Respondent is a seasonal business. 30 Consequently its staffing levels can and do change over time.
[15] However, the Applicant disputed the small business nature of the Respondent’s business. In doing so the Applicant relied on a list containing the names of 25 people who she believed were employed by the Respondent at the time of her dismissal. During cross examination it became clear that the Applicant’s representative added additional names to the list from the Respondent’s records. 31 The Applicant admitted to not knowing three of the people on the list.32
[16] In any case the Applicant could not possibly have known the nature of the engagement of all of the people named on the list. The Applicant could do no more than guess whether she thought they were full-time, part-time, casual, an employee or a contractor. At the end of the day she was a co-worker and not their employer. Her evidence in relation to each person on the list was of little probative value.
[17] The best evidence was that of Mrs Barnier. She gave evidence about each of the people contained on the list. That evidence is summarised in the table below:
Number on Applicant’s list of employees | Mrs Barnier’s evidence |
1 | Mrs Barnier was not aware, nor was her functions manager, of a person by this name working for the Respondent. 33 |
2 | He was a long standing casual. 34 |
3 | He is a contractor chef who invoices the Respondent for work performed. 35 |
4 | She is still employed with the Respondent. 36 |
5 | He no longer works for the Respondent. He was a casual. 37 |
6 | As above. |
7 | She is a casual who started earlier in 2013 and is still working for the Respondent. 38 |
8 | She did two shifts for the Respondent in May. No longer employed by the Respondent. 39 |
9 | She is still employed with the Respondent on a casual basis. 40 |
10 | He was a short term casual who did about 8 shifts early in 2013. No longer works for the Respondent. 41 |
11 | She did about 14 shifts in winter 2013. No longer works for the Respondent. 42 |
12 | She was a casual, did very spasmodic shifts. She was on the B emergency list as she had a full time job. 43 |
13 | He is not on payroll as an employee. 44 |
14 | On payroll as part time employee. 45 |
15 | She is full time functions and sales manager. 46 |
16 | He is the bookkeeper. He invoices the Respondent for services by his own Pty Ltd company. 47 |
17 | The Applicant |
18 | She is a casual who has worked for the Respondent for over 12 months. 48 |
19 | Mrs Barnier was not sure who the Applicant was referring to. 49 |
20 | She was a short term casual who did very few shifts. Some shifts April and May 2013 but no longer with the Respondent. 50 |
21 | She was on a three month working visa. She was employed for two months as a casual. 51 |
22 | Mrs Barnier believed this was the same person as immediately above. 52 |
23 | He was an intern from Italy. He worked for the Respondent for a three month internship. 53 |
24 | Mrs Barnier stated the Respondent did not employ a gardener. 54 |
25 | He was employed on a full time basis. He stopped working for the Respondent in approximately April 2013. 55 |
[18] For the purpose of determining whether the Respondent is a small business within the meaning of section 23 of the FW Act, the Commission is satisfied, on the above evidence, that the Respondent employed fewer than 15 employees at the time of the Applicant’s dismissal. In particular, the Commission finds that, in respect of the above list, only employees number 2, 4, 5, 9, 14, 15, 17 and 18 (and possibly 3) (i.e. 9 in total) were employees working for the Respondent at the time of the Applicant’s dismissal.
[19] Based on the above finding, the minimum employment period applying to the Applicant was 12 months.
Does the Applicant’s employment as a casual count towards her service?
[20] For the purpose of determining period of employment for casual employees, regard must be had to section 384(2)(a) of the FW Act. It provides that:
(a) a period of service as a casual employee does not count towards the employee’s period of employment unless:
(i) the employment as a casual employee was on a regular and systematic basis; and
(ii) during the period of service as a casual employee, the employee had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment by the employer on a regular and systematic basis;
Was the Applicant’s employment regular and systematic? - (section 384(2)(a)(i))
[21] The representatives of both the Applicant and the Respondent referred the Commission to the decision in Ponce v DJT Staff Management Services Pty Ltd (Ponce) 56 and other decisions. The Commission has had regard to those decisions. The decided cases in this area of the law state that:
● “The test is simply whether or not during a period of at least [12 months in the present case] prior to dismissal the employment as a casual employee was on a regular and systematic basis and the employee had, during that period, a reasonable expectation of continuing employment by the employer on a regular and systematic basis”; 57
● “It is the employment which must be on a regular and systematic basis. This does not mean that the hours or days of work must be regular and systematic. ... The previous authorities have also established that the employment or engagement can be regular and systematic even if it is seasonal, or where the times and dates of work are quite irregular or are not rostered, or where there are breaks due to school holidays or other needs of the employee”; 58
● “The fact that an employee works more hours in one week or one month than another and the fact that an employee might have variable start and finish times is not conclusive evidence of irregular, occasional, or non-systematic employment or engagement”; 59
● “... the set of facts in each case must be examined ... if the number of hours worked is small and the gaps between days and times worked is long and irregular this means that there needs to be other evidence that the employment of a casual is regular and systematic. Conversely, if there is a clear pattern or a roster for the hours and days worked then this would be strong evidence of regular and systematic employment”; 60 and
● “In situations where there is not a clear pattern or roster of hours and days worked or a clear agreed arrangement between the employer and the employee, then evidence of regular and systematic employment can be established where:
○ The employer regularly offers work when suitable work is available at times when the employer knows that the employee has generally made themselves available; and
○ Work is offered and accepted sufficiently often that it could no longer be regarded as simply occasional or irregular.” 61
[1] The Applicant’s evidence was that she worked for the Respondent all but one of the weeks she was employed with the Respondent (i.e. for 58 weeks out of 59 weeks). This was not disputed by the Respondent. 62 In cross examination, Mrs Barnier conceded that, although the Applicant’s hours were sometimes irregular, her employment was not occasional.63
[2] In evidence before the Commission was:
● payroll advices for the period of the Applicant’s employment; 64
● the published rosters of the Respondent (the Applicant being employed according to a published roster every month); 65 and
● the 2013 year planner for the Respondent. 66
[1] However, the best evidence again came from Mrs Barnier. She created, and attached to her witness statement, a document entitled “Thomas Weekly Roster Summary”. 67 It purported to record all of the hours worked by the Applicant over the 59 weeks she worked for the Respondent. It set out the days and hours the Applicant worked during her time with the Respondent. Although it was conceded by Mrs Barnier that there were some errors in the document,68 (for example she failed to include the hours worked for one week in May 2013) the Thomas Weekly Roster Summary was the most useful summary of the working pattern of the Applicant.
[2] The Thomas Weekly Roster Summary evidences the following:
● The Applicant worked 58 out of the 59 weeks between when she commenced employment for the Respondent and when she ceased employment.
● The week when the Applicant did not work was during the 2012 Christmas period. Mrs Barnier explained “Well, we were closed. No casual has any work while we we’re closed and on holidays, no chefs, no staff, no waitresses, no cleaner. We all go away. Everybody gets a break” 69.That is to say, the break was at the initiative of the Respondent which closed its business over this time.
● Over the period of her employment the Applicant worked:
○ 74% of all Mondays;
○ rarely on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays;
○ 66% of all Fridays;
○ 25% of all Saturdays; and
○ 50% of all Sundays.
● In terms of hours each week, these varied. The Applicant worked the least in July 2013 when she worked:
○ 2.5 hours in one week; and
○ 3 hours in another.
● However, in each of the other 56 weeks the Applicant worked a minimum of 4 hours. In some weeks the Applicant worked up to 20 hours in the week.
[1] Accordingly, the evidence is that there were variations in shift hours and the number of shifts each week (although in all but one week the Applicant has a pre-rostered shift every week of her engagement). However, this was not occasional employment. This was properly conceded by Mrs Barnier. 70 The systematic and regular basis of the Applicant’s employment is consistent with her evidence and consistent with what Mrs Barnier wrote to her on 5 June 2013, “you have been a very loyal and trustworthy employee, who bent over backwards to accommodate the fluctuating shifts and last-minute requests, always received by you with good grace.”71
[2] Therefore the evidence establishes, and the Commission finds, that the Applicant’s employment was regular and systematic.
Did the Applicant have a reasonable expectation of continuing employment by the employer on a regular and systematic basis? - (section 384(2)(a)(ii))
[3] But for the unwarranted termination of her employment by Mr Barnier, Ms Thomas had a continuing expectation that her employment would continue on the basis that it had in the past. 72
[4] Mrs Barnier described the Applicant as “a very loyal and trustworthy employee, who ... [would] be hard to replace.” 73 There was nothing in Mrs Barnier’s evidence to suggest that, but for the ill-mannered and ill-tempered actions of her husband, the employment of the Applicant would not have continued.
[5] In his witness statement and in his evidence before the Commission Mr Barnier attempted to dress up some performance issue that he had raised with the Applicant. 74 However, his evidence, to the extent that it was intended to suggest that the Applicant’s employment might have been terminated in the future for a valid reason, is completely discredited by the evidence of his honest and decent wife.75
[6] Mrs Barnier’s evidence was that she had had discussions with the Applicant about reducing the number of shifts or splitting the shifts during the upcoming winter period (a usually quieter period for the business). 76 The Applicant properly conceded that those discussions had occurred.77 The best evidence, therefore, is that of Mrs Barnier. Her evidence was that, but for the dismissal, the Applicant would have continued in employment undertaking “short shifts” (which she defined as 3 hours per week).78
[7] Consequently, the Commission finds that the Applicant had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment by the Respondent on a regular and systematic basis.
[8] By reason of the Commission finding that the Applicant’s employment was regular and systematic (over more than 52 weeks) and that she had a reasonable expectation of continuing employment on that basis the Commission finds that the Applicant served the minimum employment period with the Respondent.
[9] Consequently, the Commission is satisfied the Applicant was protected from unfair dismissal.
[10] The Commission will now consider if the dismissal of the Applicant by the Respondent was unfair within the meaning of the FW Act.
Was the dismissal unfair?
[11] A dismissal is unfair if the Commission is satisfied, on the evidence before it, that all of the circumstances set out at s.385 of the FW Act existed. Section 385 provides the following:
“385 What is an unfair dismissal
A person has been unfairly dismissed if the FWC is satisfied that:
(a) the person has been dismissed; and
(b) the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable; and
(c) the dismissal was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code; and
(d) the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy.
Note: For the definition of consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code: see section 388.”
Was the Applicant dismissed?
[12] A person has been unfairly dismissed if the termination of their employment comes within the definition of “dismissed” for purposes of Part 3–2 of the FW Act. Section 386 of the FW Act provides that:
“386 Meaning of dismissed
(1) A person has been dismissed if:
(a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.”
Did the Applicant resign from her employment?
[13] The Respondent submits the Applicant resigned from her employment on 16 May 2013 because the Applicant did not accept the Respondent’s offer to re-employ her ‘once the dust settled’. The Respondent further argues that, as a true casual, each engagement is distinct and separate. 79 Therefore, when Mrs Barnier called the Applicant to apologise for her husband’s conduct, and made an offer to re-employ the Applicant, the Applicant having declined that offer, the Applicant resigned (so the Respondent contends).
[14] The Applicant refutes this argument.
[15] It is conceded by Mr Barnier that during the telephone call to the Applicant on 16 May 2013 he said words to the effect of “Because the money is missing your services will no longer be required”. 80 That was the act of termination at the initiative of the employer.
[16] The Commission has already noted above that it has concluded that there was no unequivocal or definite offer of re-employment ever made to the Applicant. Consequently, there was nothing to decline. The Applicant expressed understandable reservations about returning to work for the Respondent, but that is as far as it went. To seek to characterise the Applicant’s conduct in this regard as a resignation is nonsense.
[17] The Commission is satisfied, based on the evidence before it, that on 16 May 2013 (through the actions of Mr Barnier) the Respondent dismissed the Applicant from her employment. Consequently the Commission finds that the Applicant was terminated at the initiative of the Respondent.
Was the dismissal consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code?
[18] A person has not been unfairly dismissed where the dismissal is consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (Code). It is useful to set out s.388(2) of the FW Act:
“388 The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code...
(2) A person’s dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code if:
(a) immediately before the time of the dismissal or at the time the person was given notice of the dismissal (whichever happened first), the person’s employer was a small business employer; and
(b) the employer complied with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code in relation to the dismissal.”
[19] As stated above the Commission has found the Respondent to be a small business within the meaning of section 23 of the FW Act.
[20] The Code was declared by the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations on 24 June 2009:
“Small Business Fair Dismissal Code
Commencement
The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code comes into operation on 1 July 2009.
Summary Dismissal
It is fair for an employer to dismiss an employee without notice or warning when the employer believes on reasonable grounds that the employee’s conduct is sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal. Serious misconduct includes theft, fraud, violence and serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures. For a dismissal to be deemed fair it is sufficient, though not essential, that an allegation of theft, fraud or violence be reported to the police. Of course, the employer must have reasonable grounds for making the report.
...
Procedural Matters
In discussions with an employee in circumstances where dismissal is possible, the employee can have another person present to assist. However, the other person cannot be a lawyer acting in a professional capacity.
A small business employer will be required to provide evidence of compliance with the Code if the employee makes a claim for unfair dismissal to Fair Work Australia, including evidence that a warning has been given (except in cases of summary dismissal). Evidence may include a completed checklist, copies of written warning(s), a statement of termination or signed witness statements.”
[21] The Respondent concedes that it does not have a strong argument that it complied with the Code. 81 The Applicant was not guilty of theft, fraud, violence or serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures. The allegation of theft was falsely made. The circumstances of the Applicant’s dismissal did not allow her to have a support person present.
[22] It is clear from the undisputed evidence that the Respondent did not comply with the Code. The Commission now proceeds to consider s.387 of the FW Act.
Harsh, unjust or unreasonable
[23] Having been satisfied of each of s.385(a),(c)-(d) of the FW Act, the Commission must consider whether it is satisfied the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The criteria the Commission must take into account when assessing whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable are set out at s.387 of the FW Act:
“387 Criteria for considering harshness etc.
In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:
(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.”
[24] The ambit of the conduct which may fall within the phrase ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’ was explained in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd[1995] HCA 24; (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 465 by McHugh and Gummow JJ as follows:
.... It may be that the termination is harsh but not unjust or unreasonable, unjust but not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust. In many cases the concepts will overlap. Thus, the one termination of employment may be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon inferences which could not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct in respect of which the employer acted.
[25] The Commission is under a duty to consider each of these criteria in reaching its conclusion. 82
[26] The Applicant submits the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable because:
● the Applicant was dismissed by Mr Barnier who made unsubstantiated allegations that the Applicant stole money from his home;
● the Applicant was notified of her dismissal by telephone call after a decision to terminate the Applicant’s employment was made;
● the Respondent did not provide the Applicant with an opportunity to respond to the allegation;
● the Applicant was not able to have a support person with her at the time of her dismissal due to the manner in which it occurred; and
● no investigation into the alleged theft had been conducted by the Respondent.
[1] The Respondent submits the dismissal was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable because an apology and reinstatement was offered within half an hour of the dismissal.
[2] The Commission will now consider each of the criteria at s.387 of the FW Act separately.
Valid reason - s.387(a)
[3] The Respondent must have a valid reason for the dismissal of the Applicant, although it need not be the reason given to the Applicant at the time of the dismissal. 83 The reasons should be “sound, defensible and well founded”84 and should not be “capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced.”85
[4] The Respondent dismissed the Applicant’s employment based on a false allegation that she stole money from their home.
[5] Consequently, the Commission finds that was no valid reason for the dismissal.
Notification of the valid reason - s.387(b)
[6] As the Commission has found there was no valid reason for the dismissal, the Applicant could not be notified of the valid reason. Although the Applicant was notified of the reason when it was thought that the Applicant had stolen the money.
Opportunity to respond - s.387(c)
[7] An employee protected from unfair dismissal must be provided with an opportunity to respond to any reason for dismissal relating to the conduct or capacity of the person. This criterion is to be applied in a common sense way to ensure the employee is treated fairly and should not be burdened with formality. 86
[8] The evidence of Mrs Barnier is that, when Mr Barnier made the allegation of theft against the Applicant, the Applicant attempted to explain. 87 Mrs Barnier stated that her husband’s tone during the conversation was agitated and angry, “more than cross”.88
[9] Mr Barnier’s evidence of the conversation is that it was an unimportant one. 89 He stated in cross examination that he had little or no recollection of the conversation.90
[10] There is no evidence before the Commission which suggests that the Applicant was given an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against her. The Applicant’s evidence is that during the telephone call with Mr Barnier he talked over her. Consequently the Commission finds the Applicant was not given an opportunity to respond to the reason for the dismissal.
Unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow a support person - s.387(d)
[11] In the circumstances of this matter, this consideration is not applicable.
Warnings regarding unsatisfactory performance - s.387(e)
[12] The Applicant’s employment was not terminated for unsatisfactory performance. In the circumstances of this matter, this consideration is not applicable.
Impact of the size of the Respondent on procedures followed - s.387(f)
[13] The Commission finds the size of the employer’s enterprise did impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal. However, it was no excuse for the indecency of Mr Barnier’s treatment of the Applicant. A small business employer may be excused from the usual procedural steps expected of all employers considering termination of employment. However, the Commission knows of no general principle that a small business employer is excused from basic civility.
Absence of dedicated human resources management specialist/expertise on procedures followed - s.387(g)
[14] The Commission finds the absence of dedicated human resource management or expertise in the Respondent’s enterprise has impacted on the procedures followed by the Respondent in effecting the dismissal.
Other relevant matters - s.387(h)
[15] Section 387(h) provides the Commission with a broad scope to consider any other matters it considers relevant. In the present matter it does not.
Conclusion
[16] Having considered each of the matters specified in s.387, the Commission is satisfied the dismissal of the Applicant was harsh. This is a case where a conclusion was jumped to without reasonable cause or investigation. Mr Barnier made a serious allegation and did not provide the Applicant with an opportunity to respond to the allegation.
[17] Accordingly, the Commission find the Applicant’s dismissal was unfair.
Remedy
[18] Section 390 of the FW Act sets out the circumstances in which the Commission may make an order for reinstatement or compensation:
“390 When the FWC may order remedy for unfair dismissal
(1) Subject to subsection (3), the FWC may order a person’s reinstatement, or the payment of compensation to a person, if:
(a) the FWC is satisfied that the person was protected from unfair dismissal (see Division 2) at the time of being dismissed; and
(b) the person has been unfairly dismissed (see Division 3).
(2) The FWC may make the order only if the person has made an application under section 394.
(3) The FWC must not order the payment of compensation to the person unless:
(a) the FWC is satisfied that reinstatement of the person is inappropriate; and
(b) the FWC considers an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
Note: Division 5 deals with procedural matters such as applications for remedies.”
[19] The Commission has already dealt with the issues at s.390(1)(a)–(b) above. The Commission is satisfied the Applicant was protected from unfair dismissal pursuant to s.382 of the FW Act and the Applicant was dismissed unfairly. Accordingly, the Commission is required to determine whether to order the reinstatement of the Applicant or, in circumstances where reinstatement is inappropriate, an order for compensation if the Commission is satisfied such an order is appropriate in all the circumstances.
Reinstatement
[20] The Applicant seeks compensation as the primary remedy. Regardless of the remedy sought by the Applicant, s.390 of the FW Act requires the Commission first determine whether reinstatement is appropriate before it may consider an order for compensation.
[21] The Applicant submits reinstatement would be inappropriate. The Applicant gave the following evidence:
“So you were of the view that after what had happened, you didn't want to work for the organisation any more?---It's not so much I didn't want to work. I just felt - how can you - when you're accused of such a thing, how can you go back? There's no going back. It was a trust - not so much that they didn't trust me any more, but I just definitely didn't trust them.” 91
[22] Mrs Barnier’s evidence is that she would have liked the Applicant to continue working for the Respondent. 92 She stated that if it helped she could make arrangements for the Applicant to only have to deal with her, and not with Mr Barnier.93
Consideration
[23] In Regional Express Holdings Ltd T/A Rex Airlines 94 a Full Bench of Fair Work Australia (as the Commission then was) considered what factors may be taken into account when considering if reinstatement is inappropriate under s.390(3)(a) of the FW Act:
“[26] Whenever an employer dismisses an employee for misconduct, assuming the employer is acting honestly, there is an implied loss of trust and confidence in the employee. If it is subsequently found that the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable it is appropriate to consider whether the relationship can be restored if the employee is reinstated. That question cannot be answered solely by reference to the views of management witnesses. All of the circumstances should be taken into account. In this case there is a number of relevant matters. They include the fact that not all of the conduct alleged against the respondent has been proven, the respondent’s apparently unblemished record in the performance of his flying duties over a period of 14 years, the fact that the misconduct is not directly related to the performance of the respondent’s professional duties as a first officer and Rex’s failure to pursue any substantial disciplinary action against another pilot who, it is alleged, has been guilty of misconduct at least as serious as that of which the respondent was accused. The significance of the last consideration is that the pilot in question is still carrying out the full range of his duties, despite allegations of conduct of a kind which, in the respondent’s case, is said to have led to an irrevocable loss of trust and confidence. Assuming a positive approach on both sides we find there is a reasonable chance that the employment relationship can be restored with the necessary level of mutual trust.” 95
[24] In the circumstances, the Commission considers that Mr Barnier’s conduct, including his failure to apologise for his own actions, broke the trust the Applicant had in the Respondent. Consequently, the Commission considers reinstatement to be an inappropriate remedy.
Compensation
[25] Section 390(3)(b) provides the Commission may only issue an order for compensation to the Applicant if it is appropriate in all the circumstances. There is no evidence before the Commission that compensation is not appropriate in all the circumstances.
[26] Section 392 of the FW Act sets out the circumstances that must be taken into consideration when determining an amount of compensation, the effect of any findings of misconduct on that compensation amount and the upper limit of compensation that may be ordered:
“392 Remedy—compensation
Compensation
(1) An order for the payment of compensation to a person must be an order that the person’s employer at the time of the dismissal pay compensation to the person in lieu of reinstatement.
Criteria for deciding amounts
(2) In determining an amount for the purposes of an order under subsection (1), the FWC must take into account all the circumstances of the case including:
(a) the effect of the order on the viability of the employer’s enterprise; and
(b) the length of the person’s service with the employer; and
(c) the remuneration that the person would have received, or would have been likely to receive, if the person had not been dismissed; and
(d) the efforts of the person (if any) to mitigate the loss suffered by the person because of the dismissal; and
(e) the amount of any remuneration earned by the person from employment or other work during the period between the dismissal and the making of the order for compensation; and
(f) the amount of any income reasonably likely to be so earned by the person during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the FW Actual compensation; and
(g) any other matter that the FWC considers relevant.
Misconduct reduces amount
(3) If the FWC is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the employer’s decision to dismiss the person, the FWC must reduce the amount it would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on account of the misconduct.
Shock, distress etc. disregarded
(4) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not include a component by way of compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to the person by the manner of the person’s dismissal.
Compensation cap
(5) The amount ordered by the FWC to be paid to a person under subsection (1) must not exceed the lesser of:
(a) the amount worked out under subsection (6); and
(b) half the amount of the high income threshold immediately before the dismissal.
Note: subsection 392(5) indexed to $64,650 from 1 July 2013
(6) The amount is the total of the following amounts:
(a) the total amount of remuneration:
(i) received by the person; or
(ii) to which the person was entitled;
(whichever is higher) for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal; and
(b) if the employee was on leave without pay or without full pay while so employed during any part of that period—the amount of remuneration taken to have been received by the employee for the period of leave in accordance with the regulations.”
[27] The method for calculating compensation under s.392 of the FW Act was dealt with by a Full Bench of the Commission in Bowden, G v Ottrey Homes Cobram and District Retirement Villages Inc. T/A Ottrey Lodge 96 (Bowden). In that decision the Full Bench set out the order in which the criteria and other factors should be applied, taking into account authority under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 in Sprigg v Paul’s Licensed Festival Supermarket97 and Ellawala v Australian Postal Corporation98. The Commission has adopted the methodology utilised in Bowden in determining the amount of a payment of compensation.
[28] The Commission will now consider each of the criteria in s.392 of the FW Act.
Remuneration that would have been received: s.392(2)(c)
[29] The Applicant’s remuneration with the Respondent was a base rate of $18.00 per hour.
[30] The Commission needs to determine the period of time the Applicant would have remained employed by the Respondent, or would have likely remained employed with the Respondent, had it not dismissed her.
[31] While the Respondent is a seasonal business the Applicant performed work 58 weeks out of the 59 weeks that she was employed by it. During the winter months business is quieter and there is less cleaning work to be done. The Respondent maintains it was significantly winding down the hours of cleaning and Mrs Barnier had taken on some of the cleaning duties.
[32] The evidence of the Applicant is that she understood it was a seasonal business, and she was prepared for a reduction in hours. She was happy to “go with the flow”. 99
[33] The Commission finds the Applicant would have continued to be employed by the Respondent for 12 months had she not been dismissed. While the Applicant’s shifts may have reduced there is no evidence that her employment would otherwise have ended.
[34] Although the Applicant’s hours varied week to week, the best evidence is that of Mrs Barnier who said that the the Applicant would have continued on “short shifts” which she defined as 3 hours in length. Therefore, the Commission finds that the Applicant would have worked on average a minimum of 3 hours per week at not less than $18.00 per hour for the next 12 months. The amount the Applicant would have received is therefore $2,808.00.
Remuneration earned: s.392(2)(e)
[35] The Commission must consider any remuneration earned by the Applicant in the period following her dismissal, to determine whether the amount of compensation should be reduced.
[36] The Applicant’s evidence is that she and her husband run a bus business. 100 The Applicant stated that in the period following her dismissal she continued to do work for the bus business. 101 She admitted that the bus work has picked up substantially over the last three years.102 However, the Applicant’s evidence is that she is not paid a wage for her work with the bus business.103
[37] The Commission finds the Applicant has earned $0.00 in remuneration for employment or other work during the period since the dismissal. Therefore nothing is to be deducted from the amount of compensation to be ordered.
Income likely to be earned: s.392(2)(f)
[38] Given the Applicant’s circumstances, and her commitments to her family business, the Commission finds the Applicant is reasonably likely to earn $0.00 in income during the period between the making of the order for compensation and the actual compensation. Therefore nothing is to be deducted from the amount of the compensation to be ordered.
Other matters: s.392(2)(g)
[39] The Commission finds it is not appropriate in the circumstances that a contingency should be applied.
Viability: s.392(2)(a)
[40] There is no evidence before the Commission to indicate that an Order for compensation will affect the viability of the Respondent’s enterprise.
Length of service: section (s.392(2)(b))
[41] The Commission finds that the Applicant’s period of service with the Respondent, being 59 weeks, should not affect the amount of compensation to be ordered.
Mitigating efforts: s.392(2)(b)
[42] In considering whether the Applicant has taken steps to mitigate the loss suffered as a result of the dismissal the Commission must take into account whether the Applicant acted reasonably in the circumstances. 104
[43] The Respondent says that the Applicant has not made reasonable attempts to mitigate her loss generally or because she did not return to work for the Respondent. The issue of whether an unequivocal offer of re-employment was made has been dealt with above. It was not.
[44] The Applicant’s evidence is that she searched for other employment after her dismissal, but that she could not find comparable suitable alternatives. Her position at the Respondent was perfect for her as it was a basis of four to eight hours. 105 The Applicant had, sadly, increasing caring responsibilities for her mother as well as her work for the family business.
[45] The Commission finds that the Applicant made satisfactory efforts to mitigate her loss suffered as a result of the dismissal.
Misconduct: s.392(3)
[46] The Commission has not found any misconduct by the Applicant that contributed to the dismissal.
Shock, Distress: s.392(4)
[47] There is no doubt that the Applicant was deeply shocked and distressed by the manner in which Mr Barnier terminated her employment. 106
[48] Further, Ms Thomas is entitled to feel distressed by the indecent failure of Mr Barnier to personally apologise for his conduct.
[49] Mr Barnier has never apologised for his conduct towards the Applicant on 16 May 2013. He considered it sufficient that his wife apologise on his behalf. As stated above, in response to questions from the Commission, Mr Barnier expressed a view that it was a “perfectly fair arrangement” for him to create a mess, and his wife to clean it up. 107
[50] Mr Barnier has done nothing to show the Commission he is genuinely remorseful of his actions. Mr Barnier’s failure to apologise has compounding the harshness of the Applicant’s dismissal.
[51] However, by operation of the FW Act, these events and the shock and distress caused to the Applicant are not relevant to the question of compensation. Consequently, the amount of compensation calculated does not include a component for shock, humiliation or distress and is not influenced by Mr Barnier’s ungracious behaviour in never having apologised for his ill-tempered behaviour.
Compensation cap: s.392(5)
[52] The Commission must reduce the amount of compensation to be ordered if it exceeds the lesser of the total amount of remuneration received by the Applicant, or to which the Applicant was entitled, for any period of employment with the employer during the 26 weeks immediately before the dismissal, or the high income threshold immediately prior to the dismissal.
[53] The amount the Applicant would have earned, or to which the Applicant was entitled, for the 26 week period immediately prior to the dismissal was $1,404.00.
[54] It is noted that this amount is not above the high income threshold.
Payment by instalments: s.393
[55] The Commission orders the Respondent to pay to the Applicant an amount of $1,404.00 in four instalments of $351.00 over 4 weeks.
Conclusion
[56] The Commission is satisfied that the Applicant was protected from unfair dismissal, that the dismissal was unfair and a remedy of compensation is appropriate.
[57] An order will be issued with this decision.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Mr N Dircks representing the Applicant.
Mr R Millar of counsel representing the Respondent.
Hearing Details:
Melbourne.
2013.
6 December.
1 Tim Winton, “The C Word - Some thoughts about class in Australia”, The Monthly, (December 2013 - January 2014), 24, 30.
2 Exhibit “A4” at [16] and Exhibit “A6”.
3 Exhibit “A4” at [17].
4 Exhibit “A4” at [18].
5 Transcript, PN677.
6 Transcript, PN686.
7 Transcript, PN268.
8 Transcript, PN269.
9 Transcript, PN280 - PN282.
10 Transcript, PN276.
11 Transcript, PN272 and PN274.
12 Exhibit “A6”.
13 Ibid.
14 Transcript, PN345.
15 Transcript, PN346.
16 Transcript, PN352 - PN364.
17 Exhibit “A4” at [24] and Exhibit “A6”.
18 Exhibit “R3”, at [11].
19 Transcript, PN287.
20 Transcript, PN291.
21 Exhibit “A4” at [29].
22 Exhibit “A4” at [30].
23 Exhibit “A6”.
24 Exhibit “A6”.
25 Transcript, PN569.
26 Exhibit “A4”, attachment ST04.
27 Transcript, PN569.
28 Transcript, PN406 - PN407.
29 Exhibit “R1”.
30 Transcript, PN161 and PN369, Exhibit “R5” at [2]
31 Transcript, PN514 - PN515.
32 Transcript, PN466 - PN468.
33 Transcript, PN39.
34 Transcript, PN41.
35 Transcript, PN45.
36 Transcript, PN46.
37 Transcript, PN50-52.
38 Transcript, PN53-55.
39 Transcript, PN56-57.
40 Transcript, PN58-62.
41 Transcript, PN63.
42 Transcript, PN65-66.
43 Transcript, PN68.
44 Transcript, PN69.
45 Transcript, PN70.
46 Transcript, PN72.
47 Transcript, PN74-76.
48 Transcript, PN77.
49 Transcript, PN78.
50 Transcript, PN80.
51 Transcript, PN82.
52 Transcript, PN83.
53 Transcript, PN85.
54 Transcript, PN89.
55 Transcript, PN90-93.
56 [2010] FWA 2078.
57 Ibid, para [64].
58 Ibid, para [66], footnotes omitted.
59 Ibid, para [68].
60 Ibid, para [75].
61 Ibid, para [76].
62 Transcript, PN258.
63 Transcript, PN260.
64 Attached to Exhibit “R5”, Witness Statement of Mr Barnier.
65 Attached to Exhibit “R5”, Witness Statement of Mr Barnier.
66 Attached to Exhibit “R5”, Witness Statement of Mr Barnier.
67 Exhibit “R3”, Attachment 2.
68 Transcript, PN247.
69 Transcript, PN264.
70 Transcript, PN260.
71 Exhibit “A4”, attachment ST04.
72 Trascript, PN185 - PN186.
73 Exhibit “A4”, attachment ST04.
74 Exhibit “R5” at [3], Transcript, PN386 - PN391.
75 Exhibit “A4”, attachment ST04, Exhibit “R3” at [11].
76 Transcript, PN185 - PN186, Exhibit “R3” at [8].
77 Transcript, PN551.
78 Transcript, PN186 - PN188.
79 Exhibit “R1” at [11].
80 Transcript, PN359.
81 Transcript, PN718.
82 Sayer v Melsteel[2011] FWAFB 7498.
83 Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359 at 373, 377-378.
84 Selvachandran v Peterson Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371, 373.
85 Ibid.
86 RMIT v Asher (2010) 194 IR 1, 14-15.
87 Transcript, PN274.
88 Transcript, PN276 - PN278.
89 Transcript, PN346.
90 Transcript, PN338, PN343 and PN345.
91 Transcript, PN569.
92 Exhibit “R3” at [11].
93 Ibid.
94 [2010] FWAFB 8753.
95 Ibid at [26].
96 [2013] FWCFB 431.
97 (1998) 88 IR 21.
98 Print S5109.
99 Transcript, PN551 - PN555.
100 Transcript, PN598.
101 Transcript, PN603.
102 Transcript, PN618.
103 Transcript, PN626.
104 Biviano v Suji Kim Collection PR915963 at [34].
105 Transcript, PN628.
106 Exhibit “A4” at [23], Exhibit “R3” at [11].
107 Transcript, PN407.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<Price code G, PR547014>
1
7
0