IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QG 7429 of 1998
BETWEEN:
JOHN LAWRENCE SHERRY AND CARMEL MARY DELORES SHERRY
APPLICANTSAND:
PHILIP GREGORY JEFFERSON AND JAY ARSCOTT STEVENSON
FIRST RESPONDENTSJOHN ERNEST DUNWOODY
SECOND RESPONDENTCHELMSCLIFF PTY LTD
THIRD RESPONDENTWESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
FOURTH RESPONDENTJUDGE(S):
DOWSETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 DECEMBER 1998
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The applicants are to pay the first respondents’ costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs.
As between the applicants and the second and third respondents, the first respondents’ said costs are reserved.
The costs of proceedings as between the applicants and the second and third respondents are reserved.
As between the applicants and the second and third respondents, the costs which the applicants have previously been ordered to pay to the fourth respondent are reserved.
The application is otherwise dismissed.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QG 7429 of 1998
BETWEEN:
JOHN LAWRENCE SHERRY AND CARMEL MARY DELORES SHERRY
APPLICANTSAND:
PHILIP GREGORY JEFFERSON AND JAY ARSCOTT STEVENSON
FIRST RESPONDENTSJOHN ERNEST DUNWOODY
SECOND RESPONDENTCHELMSCLIFF PTY LTD
THIRD RESPONDENTWESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
FOURTH RESPONDENT
JUDGE(S):
DOWSETT J
DATE:
18 DECEMBER 1998
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
These proceedings commenced as an application to annul a bankruptcy and to restrain the registration of a transfer of real property. It is, unfortunately, necessary to give a little of the background. It seems that the applicants and Mr Dunwoody, one of the respondents, have been involved in unpleasantness and litigation over a period of many years. They have the mutual misfortune of being neighbours in Mackay.
The applicants have obtained a substantial judgment against Mr Dunwoody in the District Court and seek to enforce it. Mr Dunwoody has presented a petition in bankruptcy and become bankrupt. Before doing so, he transferred a substantial asset to the third resondent, Chelmscliff Pty Ltd, which is the trustee of a trust of which Mr Dunwoody and other members of his family are beneficiaries.
The first respondents are Mr Dunwoody’s trustees in bankruptcy, having been nominated by him at the time that he presented his own petition. I stress that I am not, in anything that I have said or propose to say, reflecting adversely upon the trustees. I see no reason in the material for concluding that they have done other than their duty, and that in an entirely competent and industrious way.
Nonetheless, one could imagine that the applicants, if not their legal advisers, would be most concerned at the situation in which Mr Dunwoody had disposed of a substantial asset and then gone voluntarily into bankruptcy. They therefore brought the present applications and sought interlocutory relief restraining the registration of the transfer of the property from Mr Dunwoody to Chelmscliff.
That purchase was financed by Westpac, which company was originally joined in the proceedings. In the end, it was conceded…
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- Case
- [1998] FCA 1719
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the consent order was indeed made without genuine consent and whether the costs order was appropriate and proportionate. The court was required to assess the evidence and submissions to determine if there was any basis to set aside the consent order and if the costs order was fair and just. The applicants contended that the consent order was a result of coercion and misunderstanding, and thus should not be upheld. Regarding the costs order, the applicants argued that it was excessive and should be reconsidered in light of the circumstances.
The court, after considering the submissions and evidence, determined that the applicants had not demonstrated that the consent order was not genuinely agreed upon. It found that there was no evidence of coercion or misunderstanding to the extent that it would warrant setting aside the order. The court also upheld the costs order, concluding that it was fair and proportionate given the nature and complexity of the proceedings. The applicants' arguments did not sufficiently challenge the validity of the consent order or the reasonableness of the costs order. Consequently, the court dismissed the application in its entirety and ordered the applicants to pay the costs of the proceedings as outlined in the orders above.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The applicants are to pay the first respondents’ costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs.
2.
As between the applicants and the second and third respondents, the first respondents’ said costs are reserved.
3.
The costs of proceedings as between the applicants and the second and third respondents are reserved.
4.
As between the applicants and the second and third respondents, the costs which the applicants have previously been ordered to pay to the fourth respondent are reserved.
5.
The application is otherwise dismissed.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi