Sherman, J.C. v Repatriation Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

Re: JOHN CHEYNE SHERMAN
And: REPATRIATION COMMISSION
No. V G152 of 1990
FED No. 304
Veterans' Entitlements

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA


VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Gray J.(1)
CATCHWORDS

Veterans' Entitlements - special rate pension - applicant over sixty-five at date of application - whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal applied arbitrary criterion that applicant would not have worked beyond sixty-five - whether evidence to justify tribunal's findings - whether state legislation on preference for discharged servicemen relevant - whether "substantial justice" provision of Act assisted applicant to qualify.

Words and phrases - "substantial justice".

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s. 44.

Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 ss. 15, 21, 23, 24, 28, 138.

Discharged Servicemen's Preference Act 1943 (Vic.) ss. 2, 9.

HEARING

MELBOURNE

#DATE 6:6:1991

Solicitor for the applicant: R.F.M. Hollow

Counsel for the respondent: Mr N. Green

Solicitor for the respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDER

The Court orders that the appeal is dismissed.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by O.36 of the Federal Court Rules.

JUDGE1

This appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") was instituted without any real prospect of success. The real grievances of the applicant could not be fitted into a proceeding which, by virtue of s.44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, is limited to a question of law. Indeed, some of the points which the solicitor who appeared for the applicant attempted to make bore no relationship to the jurisdiction or function of the Tribunal, or of the Court. The result was a confused and erratic discourse from that solicitor, which involved numerous digressions, even from its own broad path.

  1. The applicant was born on 25th June 1918. He served an apprenticeship as a tailor and became qualified as a master tailor, to make both men's and women's clothing. After the death of his father, he took over his father's tailoring business and worked as an "order tailor" in Capitol House, Melbourne, from 1933 until he joined the army in 1941. He was discharged from the army in March 1945 and returned to his tailoring business. On 18th November 1949, he was first granted a pension by the Repatriation Board, for pleural hydatids, which necessitated an operation. The pension was at the rate of ten per cent.

  2. In 1968, the applicant went to work as an "order cutter" for Myer Melbourne. He worked there until late 1971. In 1972, he was employed as a technical assistant by the Department of Defence, where he worked in the quality assurance division. On 6th June 1977, the Repatriation Commission changed the rate of the applicant's pension to forty per cent, because of the applicant's war-caused hypertension.

  3. On 19th March 1979, when the applicant was aged sixty, he retired on medical grounds. There is no dispute that the applicant was forced to retire by his war-caused diseases.

  4. On 6th March 1980, the Repatriation Commission increased the applicant's rate of pension to fifty per cent.

  5. On 20th February 1986, the applicant…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Sherman, J.C. v Repatriation Commission and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1991] FCA 304
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Sherman, J.C. v Repatriation Commission, the applicant sought a special rate pension under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth). The applicant, who was over sixty-five years old at the time of application, contested the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) decision that he would not have continued working past the age of sixty-five. The dispute reached the Federal Court of Australia, where the court was tasked with determining whether the AAT's decision was arbitrary, whether there was evidence to support the tribunal's findings, and if state legislation on preference for discharged servicemen was relevant. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the "substantial justice" provision in the Act could assist the applicant in qualifying for the pension.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the AAT's criterion that the applicant would not have worked beyond sixty-five was arbitrary and unsupported by evidence, and whether the state legislation on preference for discharged servicemen had any bearing on the case. Furthermore, the court examined whether the "substantial justice" provision in the Act could be invoked to assist the applicant in qualifying for the pension. The applicant argued that the AAT's decision was based on an arbitrary criterion and lacked evidence, while the Commission contended that the AAT's findings were reasonable and that state legislation did not apply.

The court examined the AAT's decision and found that it had not applied an arbitrary criterion in determining that the applicant would not have worked beyond sixty-five. The tribunal's findings were supported by evidence, including the applicant's employment history and the nature of his work. The court also found that the state legislation on preference for discharged servicemen did not apply to this case, as it was a matter governed by federal law. Lastly, the court held that the "substantial justice" provision in the Act did not assist the applicant in this instance, as it was not applicable to the specific circumstances of the case.

The Federal Court of Australia dismissed the appeal, affirming the AAT's decision. The court held that the tribunal's findings were reasonable and supported by evidence, and that the state legislation on preference for discharged servicemen was not applicable. Additionally, the court found that the "substantial justice" provision in the Act did not assist the applicant in this case. Consequently, the applicant's appeal was dismissed, and the AAT's decision stood.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Court orders that the appeal is dismissed.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by O.36 of the Federal Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.