FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Buadromo
[2012] FCAFC 101
Citation: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Buadromo [2012] FCAFC 101 Appeal from: Opetaia Babakobau Baudromo v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] AATA 896 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v OPETAIA BABAKOBAU BUADROMO and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 50 of 2012 Judges: RARES, COWDROY AND BUCHANAN JJ Date of judgment: 13 July 2012 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal that set aside decision of the Minister’s delegate to cancel visa under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal failed to take into account a primary consideration under cl 10(1) of Direction [No. 41] Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 – comprehensive reasons given by Tribunal
Held: the Tribunal took into account the relevant primary consideration – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501(2), 501(6)
Direction [No. 41] – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 cll 10(1)(a), 10(1)(b), 10(1)(c), 10.3(1)
Cases cited: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 applied
Steed v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 4 ALD 126 appliedDate of hearing: 18 May 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 21 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms A Douglas-Baker
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 50 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
ApplicantAND: OPETAIA BABAKOBAU BUADROMO
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, COWDROY AND BUCHANAN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 JULY 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 50 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
ApplicantAND: OPETAIA BABAKOBAU BUADROMO
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, COWDROY AND BUCHANAN JJ
DATE:
13 JULY 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
The first respondent, Opetaia Buadromo, is a citizen of Fiji. He arrived in Australia on 21 December 1988 at the age of eight and was subsequently granted a permanent resident visa. It was common ground that, as a result of his criminal history, Mr Buadromo failed the character test in s 501(6) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Mr Buadromo’s criminal history, dating from the age of 13, was substantial and involved sentences to various periods of imprisonment. On 30 September…
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- Case
- [2012] FCAFC 101
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Court of the Federal Court rejected the Minister's argument, asserting that the AAT did indeed consider the relevant factors. The AAT had noted twice in its reasons that Mr Buadromo arrived in Australia at age eight and began engaging in criminal activity at age 13. The court observed that the AAT's detailed discussion of other primary considerations and the specific mention of Mr Buadromo's arrival and criminal activity timeline indicated that the tribunal was fully aware of these facts. Furthermore, the court noted that while the AAT considered the overall length of Mr Buadromo's stay in Australia, it also highlighted his extensive time in incarceration, indicating that the AAT did not treat the five-year period of residence before criminal activity as a favourable factor.
The Full Court concluded that the AAT did not fail to take into account the relevant primary consideration and that the Minister's appeal should be dismissed. In addition, the court ordered that Mr Buadromo pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister accepted before the Full Court that the AAT had taken the primary consideration in cl 10(1)(b) into account because it had acknowledged that Mr Buadromo was a minor when he began living in Australia. However, the Minister contended the AAT did not mention at this point in its reasons that Mr Buadromo had been ordinarily resident in Australia for only 5 years before he first started engaging in criminal activity. The Minister asserted that it followed that the AAT did not have regard to the primary consideration in cl 10(1)(c).Consideration The Minister’s argument must be rejected. First, after its discussion of the primary consideration in cl 10(1)(a), the AAT stated that it was turning to consider the other primary considerations. That could only have been a reference to cll 10(1)(b) and (c), since the AAT said that cl 10(1)(d) was not relevant in the present case as Mr Buadromo had no children and was not a refugee. Secondly, the AAT had twice stated in the earlier part of its reasons that Mr Buadromo arrived here at the age of eight and began his criminal activity at the age of 13. It is difficult to think that the AAT needed to say this a third time when evaluating the relationship between Mr Buadromo’s time in this country and the commencement of his offending. Thirdly, the AAT expressly recorded that it was required to take into account the primary consideration in cl 10(1)(c). We can see little support in the decision of the AAT for any suggestion that this primary consideration was taken into account in Mr Buadromo’s favour. While the AAT did take into account the overall length of time Mr Buadromo had spent in Australia, it immediately noted that Mr Buadromo had spent a considerable part of that time in incarceration. Indeed, if the primary consideration had been taken into account in favour of Mr Buadromo, then that assessment of the merits would be beyond review, as the Minister accepted. Rather the complaint of the Minister now is that the primary consideration was not taken into account at all. However, it is far from clear what significance, beyond bare jurisdictional error, would follow if this submission were correct. There is no reason, in our view, to think that the AAT gave this primary consideration any weight in favour of Mr Buadromo. Further, we are not satisfied that the AAT failed to take the primary consideration in cl 10(1)(c) into account at all or did not consider it. Indeed, it appears to us from a fair reading of the whole of the decision that the contrary is the case. In our opinion, given that the AAT had twice set out earlier in its reasons that Mr Buadromo had commenced engaging in criminal activity at the age of 13, there is no reason to think that it was unmindful of this factor or that it concluded that the period of five years before criminal activity commenced independently counted in Mr Buadromo’s favour. Clearly, on the whole of the AAT’s decision and reasons, it did not. Furthermore, it is important to appreciate the purpose which lies behind the primary consideration in cl 10(1)(c). It is not concerned with a mechanical comparison of periods of time or any simplistic calculation based on such a comparison. Clause 10.3(1) amplifies how cl 10(1)(c) could be assessed in particular situations as follows:10.3 The length of time that a person has been ordinarily resident(1)Reflecting the fact that the longer a period of residence in Australia the greater likelihood of significant ties to the Australian community, more favourable consideration is to be given the longer the person has been ordinarily resident in Australia prior to engaging in criminal activity or activity that bears negatively on their character.Note:For example, a period of more than 10 years of residence in Australia prior to a person engaging in criminal activity or activity which bears negatively on the person’s character would be an important consideration.”