Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Shaw v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 106

MIGRATION – Minister’s discretion to cancel visa – whether impermissibly fettered by application of Direction No 17 – inference to be drawn in absence of reasons for Minister’s decision – effect of references in briefing paper furnished to the Minister – whether cancellation of visa of resident in Australia from the age of 18 months a valid exercise of the power conferred by s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether deportation of appellant a valid exercise of power with respect to aliens under s 51(xix) of the Constitution.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499 and 501

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 3rd Edn

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 cited
Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 203 ALR 143 cited
Re Patterson; ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433 cited
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992)
176 CLR 1 cited
Re Woolley and Anor; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (2004) 210 ALR 369 cited
Ruhl v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 401 cited
Aksu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 65 ALD 667 cited
Jahnke v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 268 cited
Madafferi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326 explained
Howells v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 327 applied
Andary v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1544 cited
Turini v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 822 not followed
Surinakova v Minister for Immigration and Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 33 FCR 87 cited
Javillonar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 114 FCR 311 cited
Bustescu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1713 cited
Awa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 189 ALR 328 cited

JASON SHAW  v  MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Q 231 of 2004

SPENDER, RYAN and TAMBERLIN JJ
8 JUNE 2005
MELBOURNE (heard in BRISBANE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 231 of 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

JASON SHAW
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, RYAN and TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE (heard in BRISBANE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 231 of 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

JASON SHAW
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the appellant, Jason Shaw, challenged the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs to cancel his visa under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958. Shaw argued that the Minister’s decision was flawed because it was influenced by Direction No 17, which allegedly constituted an impermissible fetter on the Minister’s discretion. The central legal issue before the court was whether the Minister’s reliance on Direction No 17 in making the decision to cancel Shaw’s visa amounted to an unlawful fetter on his discretion.

The court examined the application of Direction No 17 and its impact on the Minister’s decision-making process. It was established that the Minister had adopted the reasoning contained in the decision record, which incorporated the provisions of Direction No 17. The court found that the Minister had voluntarily applied the Direction in his decision-making process, effectively fetter his discretion. This was held to be analogous to the reasoning in Ruhl v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, where Cooper J found that the Minister had unlawfully fettered his discretion by applying the direction in a way that precluded other considerations.

The court dismissed Shaw’s appeal and ordered that he pay the respondent’s costs. The reasoning of the court was that the Minister’s decision to cancel Shaw’s visa, influenced by Direction No 17, constituted an impermissible fetter on his discretion, which was unlawful. The decision underscored the importance of maintaining the discretionary powers of the Minister without undue influence from policy directions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, to be taxed in default of agreement.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

At [45] of the briefing paper provision was made as follows for a notation of the “Minister’s Decision on Cancellation under s 501(2)” (original emphasis):‘MINISTERS DECISION ON CANCELLATION UNDER S.501(2)[45] I have considered all relevant matters including (1) an assessment of the Character Test as defined by s501(6) of the Migration Act 1958, (2) the Minister's Direction under s499 of that Act and the non-citizen's comments (if any), and have decided that:Please delete whichever is NOT applicable:(a) I am satisfied that Jason SHAW passes the character testOR(b)I reasonably suspect Jason SHAW does not pass the character test and Jason SHAW has not satisfied me that he passes the character test BUT I have decided NOT to exercise my discretion under subsection 501(2) of the Act to cancel the visaOR(c)I reasonably suspect Jason SHAW does not pass the character test and Jason SHAW has not satisfied me that he passes the character test BUT I have decided NOT to exercise my discretion under subsection 501(2) of the Act to cancel the visa BUT Jason SHAW is to be WARNED that a fresh assessment will be made with a view to consider cancelling his visa if he is convicted of any further offencesOR(d)I reasonably suspect Jason SHAW does not pass the character test and Jason SHAW has not satisfied me that he passes the character test AND I have decided TO EXERCISE MY DISCRETION UNDER SUBSECTION 501(2) OF THE ACT TO CANCEL THE VISA so I hereby cancel the visa’ The Minister, on 17 July 2001, recorded his decision by striking through options (a), (b) and (c) and leaving option (d) to stand as a record of his decision to exercise the discretion conferred by s 501(2) to cancel the appellant’s visa.The contentions of the parties on the reasoning at first instance(a) The submissions of the appellant On behalf of the appellant it was contended that Direction No 17 had been applied by the Minister in such a way as to constitute an impermissible fetter on the discretion reposed in him by s 501(2). That was because the Direction precluded an individual “other consideration” from being accorded more importance than a “primary consideration”. The fetter constituted by that stipulation was said to be indistinguishable from that considered by Cooper J in Ruhl v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 401. In that case his Honour observed, at 408:‘[32] In these circumstances it is not a question of whether the Minister was bound by the direction or regarded himself as bound by the direction. Rather, it is whether the Minister voluntarily applied the provisions of Direction No 17 to his decision-making and thereby unlawfully fettered his discretion under s 501 of the Act.[33] In my view it is clear, beyond argument on the material that the Minister voluntarily applied the provisions of Direction No 17 to the exercise of his discretion under s 501 of the Act when he adopted as his own the reasoning contained in the decision record; it is not a mere matter of surmise that he did so.[34] It is no answer to submit, as the Minister does, that it was open to him to adopt and apply the substance of Direction No 17 as a matter of policy. The limits on the development and use of policy were identified by Brennan J in Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 640-641.’

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established