Sharpe and Repatriation Commission (Veterans' entitlements) [2018] AATA 173 (14 February 2018)
Division:VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION
File Number: 2015/1684
Re:Azalea Sharpe
APPLICANT
AndRepatriation Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member A. Nikolic AM CSC
Date:14 February 2018
Place:Melbourne
The decision under review is affirmed.
............................[sgd]............................................
Senior MemberVETERANS’ AFFAIRS – war widow’s pension – operational service – whether veteran’s death was war-caused – Statement of Principles concerning Malignant Neoplasm of the Prostate – whether Prostate Cancer caused by increased consumption of animal fat during service – whether reasonable hypothesis connecting death of veteran with service – cause of death dementia – material found not to raise reasonable hypothesis – veteran’s death not war-caused – decision under review affirmed
Legislation
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth); ss 5E, 8, 11, 13, 14, 120, 120A, 138, 196, 196A, 196BCases
Bushell v Repatriation Commission [1992] HCA 47; (1992) 175 CLR 408
Byrnes v Repatriation Commission [1993] HCA 51; (1993) 177 CLR 564
Collinsv Repatriation Commission [2009] FCAFC 90; (2009) 177 FCR 280
Dunlop v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCAFC 201
East v Repatriation Commission [1987] FCA 242; (1987) 16 FCR 517
Fogarty v Repatriation Commission [2003] FCAFC 136; (2003) 37 AAR 363
Forrester v Repatriation Commission [2013] FCA 898
Hill and Repatriation Commission [2009] FCAFC 91; (2009) 177 FCR 434
Meehan v Repatriation Commission [2001] FCA 597; (2001) 64 ALD 366
Repatriation Commission and Hancock [2003] FCA 711; (2003) 37 AAR 383
Repatriation Commission v Bey [1997] FCA 1347; (1997) 79 FCR 364
Repatriation Commission v Codd [2007] FCA 877; (2007) 95 ALD 619
Repatriation Commission v Deledio [1998] FCA 391; (1998) 83 FCR 82
Repatriation Commission v Towns [2003] FCA 1262; (2003) 38 AAR 77
Secondary Materials
Statement of Principles Concerning Malignant Neoplasm of the Prostate, No.28 of 2005 (as amended by No.70 of 2012)
Statement of Principles Concerning Malignant Neoplasm of the Prostate, No.53 of 2014 (as amended by No.19 of 2017)English, R., (1998), Animal Fat in the Australian Diet Including the Armed Services’ Rations in World War 2: A Scientific Review for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, August 1998
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member A. Nikolic AM CSC
14 February 2018
INTRODUCTION
Mr John Sharpe was a veteran of the Second World War. He came from a farming background before enlisting into the Australian Army in 1942, where he served as a driver and mechanic. He rendered eligible operational service in Papua New Guinea from June 1943 until December 1945, before returning to Australia to run his own farm. Mr Sharpe met his wife Azalea in 1947. They married in 1949 and remained together for over 64 years until he passed away on 12 February 2013 at the age of 92. His Death Certificate[1] records cause of death as:
‘(1)(a) Dementia, 2 years
(b) Prostate cancer, 3 years
(c) Dehydration, 2 weeks’
[1] Ibid, p.9
On 15 April 2014 Mrs Sharpe made a claim…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether Mr Sharpe's death arose out of, or was attributable to, his eligible war service, and what standard of proof applied to such a determination. Specifically, the court was required to consider the provisions of the *Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986* (Cth) concerning war-caused death, the definition of a dependant, and the evidentiary requirements for establishing a connection between service and death. The court also had to assess whether a reasonable hypothesis existed, within the meaning of section 120A of the Act, connecting Mr Sharpe's prostate cancer to his war service, particularly in light of the applicable Statement of Principles.
The court found that the evidence presented, primarily from Mrs Sharpe, regarding Mr Sharpe's diet before, during, and after his war service, was insufficient to establish a reasonable hypothesis connecting his prostate cancer to his service. While Mrs Sharpe contended that her husband's service diet was high in animal fats and significantly different from his pre-service diet, the court noted that this was largely based on assumption, speculation, and inference, with no direct evidence available from Mr Sharpe himself. The court concluded that, at best, the material pointed to a possibility rather than a reasonable hypothesis as required by the Act.
Consequently, the decision under review was affirmed, meaning Mrs Sharpe's claim for a pension was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Operational Service. The expression ‘operational service’ is defined at sections 6 - 6F of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (the Act). Mr Sharpe’s service during the Second World War constitutes eligible service under the Act. Section 8 of the Act provides for circumstances where the death of a veteran is taken to be war-caused. Section 8(1)(b) applies where ‘the death of the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service...’ Section 13(1) of the Act provides that where a veteran’s death is war-caused, the Commonwealth is liable to pay a pension ‘by way of compensation to the dependants of the veteran.’ Section 14(1) of the Act provides that a dependant of a deceased veteran may make a claim for a pension. Section 11(1) defines the term ‘dependant’ to include ‘the partner’ or ‘a widow’ of the veteran, ‘other than a widow…who marries, re-marries or enters into a de facto relationship.’ Section 5E of the Act defines the term ‘widow’ to include a woman ‘who was the partner of a person immediately before the person died.’ Standard of Proof. The standard of proof to determine the cause of death of a veteran is the balance of probabilities. As Mrs Sharpe’s claim relates to the operational service of her husband, the applicable standard of proof regarding any connexion between his service, the subsequent diagnosis of prostate cancer and cause of death is provided by sections 120(1) and 120(3) of the Act:(1)Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of…the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the…death of the veteran was war-caused…unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.Note:This subsection is affected by section 120A.(2)...(3)In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of…the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:(a)…;(b)…; or(c)that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the…death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.Note:This subsection is affected by section 120A. Section 120A of the Act is enlivened because Mrs Sharpe’s claim was lodged after 1 June 1994. If prostate cancer is found to be a cause of Mr Sharpe’s death, I am required to assess the reasonableness of the hypothesis connecting his prostate cancer with service, against the relevant Statement of Principles (SoP). Section 120A(3) of the Act provides:(3)For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting…the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:(a)a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or... that upholds the hypothesis.