Shambler and Repatriation Commission (Veterans' entitlements) [2019] AATA 5491 (19 December 2019)
Division:VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION
File Number: 2018/2056
Re:Veronica Shambler
APPLICANT
Repatriation CommissionAnd
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Dr D. H. Katter
Date:19 December 2019
Place:Brisbane
The decision under review is affirmed.
..................................................................
Senior Member Katter
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – widow’s pension – whether death of veteran defence-caused – material – decision affirmed
LEGISLATION
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth)
CASES
Bushell v Repatriation Commission [1992] HCA 47; (1992) 175 CLR 408
East v Repatriation Commission [1987] FCA 242; (1987) 16 FCR 517
Forrester v Repatriation Commission [2013] FCA 898
Re Dell and Repatriation Commission (1986) 9 ALD 596
Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 79 FCR 364
Repatriation Commission v Deledio [1998] FCA 391; (1998) 83 FCR 82
Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Katter
19 December 2019
INTRODUCTION
This is an application to review the decision of the Respondent, refusing a claim for a pension by the Applicant.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mr Kenneth Shambler served in the Royal Australian Air Force from 18 February 1957 to 17 February 1969[1]. From 8 January 1964 to 15 July 1964 Mr Shambler rendered service at Ubon, Thailand[2].
[1] Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, T14, page 61.
[2] Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, Veteran Community Details Report.
Mrs Veronica Shambler married Mr Kenneth Shambler on 28 January 1960[3], in Australia[4].
[3] Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, T3, page 2.
[4] Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, T4, page 7.
Mr Kenneth Shambler passed away on 11 October 2014[5].
[5] Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, T4, page 7.
The cause of death of Mr Shambler stated in the Queensland Death Certificate was[6]: “(a) Right sided intracerebral haemorrhage (b) Hypertension”.
[6] Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, T4, page 7.
On 4 August 2015 the Applicant claimed a war widow’s pension[7].
[7] Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, T3, pages 1 to 6.
The Applicant requested a review under ss 31 and/or 136 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 15 September 2015, stating the following grounds[8]:
“The delegate erred in that the Veteran served in Thailand at RAAF Base UBON and was declared Operational Service:
Pensions Officers Handbook states:
A.8 Service in Thailand
Service in North East Thailand (including Ubon) during the period 31 May 1962 to 24 June 1965 (inclusive) is classified as operational service. However such service will not count as qualifying service for service pension.
Service rendered as a member of the Defence Force in North East Thailand (including Ubon) during the period 25 June 1965 to 31 August 1968 (inclusive) as part of a unit listed on the Ministerial Determination of Warlike Service is warlike service. Warlike service is both operational service for the purpose of disability compensation, and qualifying service for service pension purposes.
A8.1 RAAF Service at Ubon BaseA RAAF contingent was stationed at the Royal Thai Air Force base at Ubon in Eastern Thailand…
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- Case
- [2019] AATA 5491
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the material before it pointed to a reasonable hypothesis connecting Mr Shambler's death to his defence service, as required by sections 120(1), 120(3), and 120A of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth). This involved determining if the applicant's proposed hypothesis, that Mr Shambler's service in Ubon led to increased alcohol and cigarette consumption, which in turn caused hypertension and his fatal haemorrhage, was supported by sufficient facts to be considered reasonable. The Tribunal was required to consider all the material, including the applicant's evidence and the medical evidence, in light of established principles for assessing such claims.
The Tribunal applied the principles outlined in cases such as *Roncevich v Repatriation Commission* and *Forrester v Repatriation Commission*, which detail a multi-step process for evaluating hypotheses connecting a veteran's condition or death to their service. Crucially, the Tribunal noted that a mere possibility of a connection is insufficient; the material must "point to" or "support" the hypothesis. While acknowledging that Mr Shambler's service in Ubon was operational and that his death resulted from intracerebral haemorrhage and hypertension, the Tribunal found that the applicant's hypothesis regarding increased drinking and smoking during service was not supported by material that went beyond mere possibility. The Tribunal concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable hypothesis connecting the veteran's death to the specific circumstances of his service at Ubon.
Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review, finding that the death of Mr Shambler was not defence-caused.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There was no other oral or documentary evidence as to that service medical record of 19 May 1968[41]. [41] The record being at Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, T2, page B9. CONSIDERATION The operational service of Mr Shambler at Ubon is not in issue[42]. It is also not in contention that Mr Shambler died from[43]: “(a) Right sided intracerebral haemorrhage; and (b) Hypertension”. [42] Paragraph 2 of the Respondent’s submissions filed 31 July 2019. [43] Exhibit 1, Section 37 T-Documents, T4. The hypothesis of the Applicant is that the veteran “ … began to drink and smoke cigarettes when he was posted to Ubon”[44]. [44] Transcript, page 28, lines 32 to 33. In applying ss 120(1), 120(3) and 120A of the Act, consideration is to be made of all the material before the Tribunal, including the oral evidence of the Applicant, and whether all that material points to some fact or facts (the ‘raised facts’) which support the hypothesis connecting the disease or death of the veteran with the circumstances of operational service and whether that hypothesis can be regarded as reasonable, in that the ‘raised facts’ are true. Sub-section 70(5)(a), as referred to above, requires a determination as to whether the death arose out of, or was attributable to, any defence service of the member. In Roncevich v Repatriation Commission (2005) 222 CLR 115 at 126 [27] per McHugh, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ it was stated that: The use disjunctively in s 70(5) of the expressions “arose out of” and “attributable” manifest a legislative intention to give “defence-caused” a broad meaning, and certainly one not necessarily to be circumscribed by considerations such as whether the relevant act of the appellant was one that he was obliged to do as a soldier. A causal link alone or a causal connexion is capable of satisfying a test of attributability without any qualifications conveyed by such terms as sole, dominant, direct or proximate.[[45]][45] R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission; Ex parte National House Building Council [1994] TLR 38; Walsh v Rother District Council [1978] 1 All ER 510 at 514 per Donaldson J. In Forrester v Repatriation Commission [2013] FCA 898 (6 September 2013) at [23] to [32] per Mortimer J, it was relevantly stated: “Identifying a Hypothesis23.To engage the process in ss 120(1) and 120A, a particular hypothesis must be identified. The language of ‘hypothesis’ is significant: it is a textual indication of at least two matters. First, the scheme’s recognition of the difficulties associated with establishing an injury, disease or death as war-caused, sometimes long after the relevant service; second, the beneficial threshold set by ss 120 and 120A. A hypothesis is no more than a supposition or conjectural explanation of an ultimate fact: Repatriation Commission v Stares (1996) 66 FCR 594 at 601 per Black CJ, Ryan and Einfeld JJ. 24.In the present case, the ‘ultimate fact’ is Mr Forrester’s death from an aortic aneurysm. The supposition or conjectural explanation for that death is (reducing the hypothesis as set out at [61] of the Tribunal’s reasons to its essential components) that Mr Forrester commenced drinking heavily during his operational service in Vietnam partly or wholly as a result of five identified ‘stressors’ he encountered during his service, each of which involved tasks he was said to have been charged with or events in which he was said to have been involved while in Vietnam. This heavy drinking is said to have continued on his return from Vietnam and to have caused him to develop hypertension, which in turn caused the aortic aneurysm. The Deledio Steps25.A Full Court of this Court in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 at 97–98 set out the manner in which s 120(1), read together with the provisions that qualify it, is to be applied. The Court identified four steps:1.The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.2.If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force a SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.3.If a SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the ‘template’ to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person’s service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be ‘reasonable’ and the claim will fail.4.The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.26.In Collins v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2007) 163 FCR 35 at [31], Allsop J pointed out that the second sentence in the second paragraph is not correct. Otherwise these four steps have been consistently endorsed and applied to the operation of ss 120 and 120A of the Act.27.It is especially important to understand the difference between the first and fourth steps in Deledio, although the line between them is far from bright: see Collins 163 FCR 35 at [49] per Allsop J.28.At the first Deledio step, the authorities are clear that the Tribunal is not to engage in ‘fact finding’: Bull v Repatriation Commission (2001) 66 ALD 271 [2001] FCA 1832; Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82. The fourth Deledio step is the point at which there needs to be fact finding by the decision-maker, and will occur only once the Tribunal is satisfied a reasonable hypothesis has been raised. Recalling the beneficial nature of the process established by s 120, even that task remains a confined exercise. In Byrnes v Repatriation Commission (1993) 177 CLR 564 at 571, Mason CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ described the fact-finding exercise in the following terms:The claim will succeed unless (a) one or more of the facts necessary to support the hypothesis are disproved beyond reasonable doubt; or b) the truth of another fact in the material, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis, is proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus disproving, beyond reasonable doubt, the hypothesis.29.Nevertheless, the first step in Deledio, requiring the formation by the Tribunal of a view or opinion about the material before it, and a characterisation of that material as ‘pointing to’ or ‘supporting’ the hypothesis advanced, involves some level of factual assessment.30.Whether material ‘points to’ or ‘supports’ a hypothesis is, of its nature, a matter which can be determined by inference or assumption: Elliott v Repatriation Commission (2002) 73 ALD 377; [2002] FCA 26 at [5]. In Stares (a pre-Deledio case), the Full Court held that assuming a fact — in that case, that the veteran started his heavy drinking during war service — was permissible at what is now identified as the first stage of the Deledio approach. Referring to the judgment of Mason CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Byrnes 177 CLR 564 at 569, the Full Court stated (66 FCR 594 at 601):By there saying that ‘the material must point to some fact or facts’ their Honours were not erecting a requirement that each element in the hypothesis must be supported by evidence tending to establish it. Such a requirement would convert the hypothesis to a prima facie conclusion. 31.Importantly for the resolution of the issues in this case, the use of the verb ‘raise’ in s 120(3), and the subsequent approach of asking whether material ‘points to’ or ‘supports’ a hypothesis, has been held to require more than that the material before the decision-maker leaves the propounded hypothesis open as a possibility. A possibility of connection between war service and death, injury or disease is not enough: Repatriation Commission v Bey (1997) 79 FCR 364 at 372, 375. 32.The reasonableness of a hypothesis in the context of a determination under s 120(3) therefore has two aspects: a medical or scientific aspect, and what I shall describe as a factual aspect. One looks to the factual circumstances relating to the particular veteran and the other looks to the medical or scientific basis for what is factually asserted. Since the introduction of s 120A in 1994, consideration of these aspects has become somewhat separated. However it is important to recall that they both form part of the assessment of whether a hypothesis is reasonable. A hypothesis will be reasonable if there are facts that point to or support it, but it also needs to be reasonable because a SoP determined under s 196B(2) or (3) (or medical or scientific opinion if there is no SoP) upholds it: see Repatriation Commission v Hill (2002) 69 ALD 581; [2002] FCAFC 192 at [53]. The manner in which these two aspects of reasonableness operate assists in resolving the third argument raised by the applicant.”