Supreme Court of South Australia
(Civil)
SHAHIN v CITY OF BURNSIDE
[2022] SASC 142
Decision of Auxiliary Judge Norman a Master of the Supreme Court
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - CASE MANAGEMENT - GENERALLY
HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT - FEDERAL COURT - ORIGINAL JURISDICTION - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - SUMMARY DISPOSAL AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
Application for orders that the proceedings be placed under a moratorium of steps or alternatively for an order that the proceedings be stayed pending the determination of taxations of costs in District Court, ERD Court and Supreme Court proceedings - consideration of principles in relation to moratorium on steps and stays - moratorium and stay refused.
Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 64.5, r 12.1(2)(o); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 123, referred to.
In the Estate of Liu; Yan v Kong (in her capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased) & Ors [2020] SASC 143; In the Estate of a Protected Person [2022] SASC 81; UDP Holdings Pty Ltd v Ironshore Corporate Capital Ltd [2016] VSC 400; Aon Risk Services v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; Viscariello v Tamasauskas [2018] SASC 111; In the Matter of G, AL [2020] SASC 144; Stirling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Boots Company (Australia) Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 287; Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571; CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 345, considered.
SHAHIN v CITY OF BURNSIDE
[2022] SASC 142CIVIL
This is an application of the applicant dated 15 August 2022 (FDN 25) for orders that the proceedings be placed under a moratorium of steps pursuant to Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 64.5 or alternatively for an order pursuant to UCR r 12.1(2)(o) that the proceedings be stayed pending the determination of taxations of costs in District Court, Environment Resources and Development Court and Supreme Court proceedings.
Background
The proceedings were commenced by summons filed on 5 December 2018 supported by a statement of claim filed on the same date.
They follow earlier proceedings involving the applicant and his neighbours Malcolm and Deborah Raedel (the Raedels) which arose after the Raedels had undertaken excavations and had built a retaining wall along the boundary of their respective properties at Burnside which work was undertaken without approval and had lacked a safety fence. The applicant had issued legal proceedings against the Raedels in both the District Court and in the Environment Resources and Development Court leading to a 19-day trial and a judgment by Judge McIntyre on 23 August 2017 in favour of the applicant and an award of costs on a party/party basis in his favour. The Raedels had appealed from those orders to the Full Court, but on 14 November 2019 it dismissed their appeal and awarded the applicant…
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- Case
- [2022] SASC 142
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicant had argued that the correct forms and affidavits were not filed to initiate a moratorium, and that the court could impose a moratorium on its merits. However, the court found that the applicant had not complied with the requirements of the Uniform Civil Rules, and that the election for a moratorium was an administrative process undertaken in the registry, not a judicial one. The court also found that there was no case law on the moratorium provisions of the Supreme Court Rules or the Uniform Civil Rules. The court considered whether a stay of proceedings was warranted pending the determination of the taxations, but ultimately found that it was not necessary to make any orders. The applicant had not demonstrated that a stay was necessary to avoid injustice or to ensure a fair trial, and the court was not satisfied that the applicant's costs would be fully recovered from his neighbours. The court noted that the applicant had already recovered several interim allocaturs from his neighbours, and that there was no guarantee that the applicant would recover the full amount of his costs from them. The court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated that a stay was necessary to avoid duplication of proceedings or to conserve resources.
In summary, the court found that the applicant had not properly made an election for a moratorium, and that there was no case law on the moratorium provisions. The court also found that a stay of proceedings was not warranted pending the determination of the taxations. The court did not make any orders in relation to the applicant's application. The case highlights the importance of following the correct procedures when making an application for a moratorium, and the need for applicants to demonstrate the necessity of a stay of proceedings. The court's decision also underscores the importance of considering the interests of all parties in determining whether a stay is appropriate.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Notwithstanding the change in wording in subr (1), the purpose and effect of the rule is the same as its predecessor, that is, to avoid difficulties of a party issuing proceedings arising from limitation periods when it is not ready to proceed, but to otherwise prevent the progression of the matter, and thus the usual costs and burdens associated with ongoing proceedings.ConsiderationMoratorium on steps In the applicant’s written submissions, it was indicated[16] that the necessary forms and affidavit as to a moratorium had been filed and served (identifying these as FDNs 25 and 26). In his oral submissions[17] Mr McCarthy likewise submitted that the election form and affidavit had been filed (although he had not personally seen them). However, the documents FDN 25 and FDN 26 comprising the present application and its supporting affidavit of Mr Andrew Bullock are not the appropriate documents to initiate a moratorium.[16] At [9.7].[17] T23.20-21, 6 October 2022. The correct forms to elect for a moratorium are in the case of the SCR, a Form 7 “Notice to Defendant of Moratorium on Steps” (as provided in Schedule 3 Approved Forms to the Supreme Court Supplementary Rules 2014) and in the case of the UCR, a Form 15 B “Election - Moratorium on Steps” (as referred to in UCR r 64.5 (1) and provided in Schedule 7 “Originating Process” to the UCR.) SCR 123 did not provide for the filing of an affidavit, but UCR requires the filing of a supporting affidavit of proof of service deposing to service of the claim documents and the election document, this is in Form 42. Again, the supporting affidavit of Mr Andrew Bullock here is not in that form, rather it is an affidavit in Form 12. Accordingly, there has been no appropriate election for a moratorium to be made in compliance with either the SCR or the UCR. No dispensation with the rules has been sought. Further, nothing in either rule indicates an intention that the Court in the sense of a judge or master might impose a moratorium. To the contrary, its clear structure is that an applicant may make an election. The election is an administrative process only, undertaken in the registry. The Court’s power under both the SCR and the UCR is limited to the removal of the claim from the moratorium and it is only at this stage that judicial intervention is required. It is important that the correct processes as to entry into of a moratorium are undertaken. Anecdotal information indicates instances where the filing of an election is not accompanied by an affidavit of service as required, and matters in consequence being entered into the inactive cases list pursuant to UCR r 64.2 and later dismissed by the Registrar pursuant to UCR r 64.3. I find that no application for a moratorium has been properly made and insofar as it is sought pursuant to UCR r 64.5(1) this is misconceived as there has not been compliance with this subrule. If I am in error in coming to the above conclusions, I have considered whether an order should be made for a moratorium on its merits. Counsel have addressed contrary submissions on the provisions of the moratorium rule, as are set out below. As far as I am aware, there has been no case law on the moratorium of steps provisions of either the SCR or the UCR.