Sgt v Queensland Police Service

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

SGT v Queensland Police Service [2024] QDC 191

PARTIES:

SGT
(appellant)

v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

DC 223 of 2024

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Richlands

DELIVERED ON:

7 November 2024 (ex tempore)

DELIVERED AT:

Southport

JUDGE:

Holliday KC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The appeal is allowed.

2.   The sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court at Richlands on 6 August 2024 with respect to the charge of driving under the influence of liquor is set aside, and the following sentencing orders are made:

a)   The appellant is fined $1200.   

b)     The appellant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a Queensland driver licence for a period of 8 months to commence on 6 August 2024.  

c)   No conviction is recorded.

3.   The respondent pay the appellant’s costs on this appeal,     calculated to be the amount of $1800.  

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – MAGISTRATES – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE – an appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – where the appellant was sentenced for an offence of driving under the influence of liquor pursuant to s 79(1)(a) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) – where the appellant was fined $2000 and disqualified from holding or obtaining a drivers licence for a period of 15 months – where a conviction was recorded – where specific error was conceded by the respondent as the learned Magistrate erroneously determined that s 86(2A) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) operated as prescribed statutory criteria – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive

LEGISLATION: 

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223, 225

Justices Regulation 2014 (Qld) sch 2

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 9, 12

Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) ss 79, 86

CASES:

Chilcott v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 142
Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym) (2017) 91 ALJR 1063
Ferris v Commission of Police [2023] QDC 206
Mayne v Purtill [2016] QDC 124
R v Jackson [2011] QCA 103
R v Lawley [2007] QCA 243
Rongo v Commissioner of Police [2017] QDC 258
Ross v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 99

Schwarz v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 105

COUNSEL:

S French for the appellant

C Wilson for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Donnelly Law Group for the appellant

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) for the respondent

Introduction

  1. On 6 August 2024 the appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court at Richlands to one charge of driving under the influence of liquor, pursuant to section 79(1)(a) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) (‘Act’).

  2. For the drink driving offence, the appellant was fined $2000 and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for a period of 15 months from the date of sentence.[1] A conviction was recorded.

    [1]A mandatory minimum disqualification of six months was to be imposed. Parliament has also allowed for the courts…

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Details
Case
[2024] QDC 191
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Sgt v Queensland Police Service, the appellant, Sgt, appealed against the sentence imposed by a Magistrate in the Magistrates Court at Richlands for an offence of driving under the influence of liquor. The appellant was fined $2000 and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of 15 months. The appeal focused on the contention that the sentence was manifestly excessive due to an error in the application of statutory provisions. The respondent, Queensland Police Service, conceded that the sentence was excessive and that the appropriate sentence should be a fine between $1200-$1500, disqualification for 8-9 months, and no conviction recorded. The legal issue before the court was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

The court found that the Magistrate had erred in applying section 86(2A) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) as the prescribed statutory criteria for determining the period of disqualification. The Magistrate had mistakenly believed that this section prescribed the statutory considerations for exercising the discretion under section 86(5), which is not the case. This error led to an incorrect sentencing exercise and resulted in a manifestly excessive sentence. The court agreed with the respondent’s concession that the sentence was indeed excessive and accepted that the appropriate sentence should be within the range proposed by the respondent.

The court referenced previous decisions, such as Mayne v Purtill and Chilcott v Commissioner of Police, which highlighted the correct approach to sentencing under the Act. The court concluded that the Magistrate's error in applying the statutory criteria led to an incorrect understanding of the sentencing process, resulting in a sentence that was manifestly excessive. The appeal was allowed, and the original sentence was set aside.

The court ordered that the appellant be fined $1200, disqualified from holding or obtaining a Queensland driver's licence for 8 months, and no conviction recorded. Additionally, the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of $1800 on the appeal. This decision underscored the importance of correctly applying statutory provisions in sentencing and the consequences of failing to do so.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court at Richlands on 6 August 2024 with respect to the charge of driving under the influence of liquor is set aside, and the following sentencing orders are made:

a) The appellant is fined $1200.

b) The appellant is disqualified from holding or obtaining a Queensland driver licence for a period of 8 months to commence on 6 August 2024.

c) No conviction is recorded.

3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs on this appeal, calculated to be the amount of $1800.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondent concedes that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, in all the circumstances[4] and accepts this court ought to sentence the appellant afresh with the appropriate sentence being a fine in the range of $1200-$1500, disqualification for 8-9 months and no conviction recorded.[4]And referred to the sentences imposed in Schwarz v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 105 and Ferris v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 206. Consideration I agree with the joint submission of the parties that specific error is established. The learned Magistrate proceeded on the erroneous basis that section 86(2A) of the Act operated as prescribed statutory criteria. The learned Magistrate stated in his remarks that:the period of disqualification must be decided by the court, which, in making its decision, must have regard to the concentration of alcohol in the blood or breath of the defendant, or the presence of a relevant drug in the defendant’s blood or saliva, and the danger, real or potential, to the public in the circumstances of the case. [emphasis added]The learned Magistrate also commenced his sentencing remarks with: Taking into account your plea of guilty, but I’m also specifically required to take into account the level of the reading, the risk you posed to yourself, and, more importantly, other road users by getting into a car and driving it with three and a-half times the legal limit of alcohol in your system. [emphasis added] The respondent’s concession of specific error is an appropriate one. I agree with the view taken by Horneman-Wren SC DCJ in Mayne v Purtill [2016] QDC 124 and Farr SC DCJ in Chilcott v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 142. In Mayne v Purtill, which is apposite to the present case, the learned Magistrate observed that he was “required under the Act to take into account the level of the reading and the danger the appellant posed to himself, and, more importantly, other road users.”[5] [5]Mayne v Purtill [2016] QDC 124 at page 3 lines 40–45. As was stated by Horneman-Wren SC DCJ commencing at page 4 line 8: Those provisions [s86 (2A) and (2C) of the Act] relate to circumstances whereby other operative provisions of section 86 prescribe statutory minima and maxima for periods of disqualification, between which the sentencing Court must formulate and impose a period of disqualification. An offence against section 79, subsection (1) operates in a different way. Section 86, subsection (1) prescribes that where a person is convicted of an offence in relation to a motor vehicle against section 79(1), there is to be, by operation of law, a disqualification, by virtue of that conviction and without any specific order, for a period of six months. A further discretion is conferred upon the sentencing Court to impose some other specific order by section 86, subsection (5). Section 86, subsection (5), is an exercise of power under section 86, subsection (5), however, is not governed by the same statutory considerations prescribed in, for example, … subsection (2A). That is not to say that those criteria, that is, the concentration of alcohol in the blood or the presence of a drug in salvia and the real or potential danger posed, are not irrelevant considerations to the exercise of the discretion under section 86(5); however, they are not the prescribed statutory criteria.It is quite evident from his Honour’s reasons that the sentencing exercise proceeded on a mistaken understanding on his Honour’s part that he was required to exercise his discretion by reference to the matters, for example, contained in … subsection (2A). That was an error in the exercise of his Honour’s jurisdiction; therefore, the sentence imposed by his Honour must be set aside.