[2009] HCATrans 281
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S282 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
CHRISTINE SEROBIAN
First Applicant
SHAHEN SEROBIAN
Second Applicant
and
COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for stay
HAYNE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM MELBOURNE BY VIDEO LINK TO SYDNEY
ON THURSDAY, 22 OCTOBER 2009, AT 10.13 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MRS C. SEROBIAN appeared in person.
HIS HONOUR: Can I just be certain about what papers I have and what the application is. Firstly, I have an application for special leave to appeal to this Court that you filed this morning. I have a copy of some orders made by Justice Hodgson in the Court of Appeal on 12 October 2009 and I have an affidavit that you have sworn this morning on 22 October 2009. Those are the principal papers on the file. In addition, I have looked at the reasons for judgment of Mr Justice Campbell in an application that I believe you made and was an application that was determined on 17 September of this year. Do you understand that?
MRS SEROBIAN: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Now, I immediately have before me your summons of 22 October which is for a stay of the enforcement of the writ of possession order made by Justice Hammerschlag in April this year and for a number of consequential orders. Is that right?
MRS SEROBIAN: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Can I just understand, the application for special leave to appeal is an application for special leave to appeal from two decisions. Firstly, there is a decision of Justice Hodgson of 12 October, but also there is reference to the Full Court of Appeal’s decision dated 19 October 2009 given by Justice McColl, Justice Basten and Justice Handley. Is that right?
MRS SEROBIAN: Yes, your Honour, that is correct.
HIS HONOUR: Now, I have not seen any papers about the orders made by the Full Court of Appeal. Do I understand that court refused your application for a stay of the writ of possession that was an application for stay that you had made? Is that right?
MRS SEROBIAN: That is correct, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, all right. Now, I think then I understand the papers that are before me. The papers relating to today’s application have not yet been served on Commonwealth Bank. Is that right?
MRS SEROBIAN: That is correct, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. Well, then, I have looked at the affidavit that you have sworn this morning. Understanding that I have looked at that, what else is it that you would wish to say to me this morning in support of your application for stay?
MRS SEROBIAN: Your Honour, my main concern is my daughter who is actually doing her Higher School Certificate exam and today because we had to leave in a rush to come to the Court we actually left her uniform behind…
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- Case
- [2009] HCATrans 281
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the guarantee extended to the full amount of the company's indebtedness to the Bank, or if it was limited by the terms of the guarantee document itself. Specifically, the court had to determine the proper construction of the guarantee clause in light of the surrounding circumstances and the principles of contractual interpretation.
Hayne J, delivering the judgment of the High Court, applied established principles of contractual interpretation, emphasising that the meaning of a contract is to be determined by what the parties have agreed to, objectively ascertained from the language they used. His Honour found that the language of the guarantee was clear and unambiguous, and that it unequivocally extended to all present and future liabilities of the company to the Bank. The Court rejected the appellants' submission that the guarantee should be read down or limited in scope, finding no basis in the contract or the surrounding circumstances to support such a contention.
The appeal was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter before the court is an application for a stay filed by Christine Serobian and Shahen Serobian against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The applicants, the Serobians, are seeking a stay of the enforcement of a writ of possession order made by Justice Hammerschlag in April 2009, and various consequential orders. This application follows several refusals of stay applications made to different judges in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Serobians have also applied for special leave to appeal the decisions of the Court of Appeal dismissing their stay applications. The primary grounds for the stay application include the imminent hardship that will be suffered by the applicants and their daughter, who is about to undertake her Higher School Certificate examinations. The applicants also argue that the writ of possession should be stayed on the basis that the trial judgment is open to attack on various grounds, such as alleged inaccuracies in the bank's records and the conduct of the bank's representative in dealings with the applicants. The court, however, is not persuaded that the application for special leave to appeal has a substantial prospect of success and that the balance of convenience lies with the applicants. Consequently, the application for stay is dismissed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is there a substantial prospect that special leave to appeal will be granted?
2. Have the applicants failed to take whatever steps are necessary to seek a stay from the court in which the matter is pending?
3. Will the grant of a stay cause loss to the respondent?
4. Where does the balance of convenience lie as between the parties?
5. Does the court have the jurisdiction to grant a stay pending application for special leave?
6. Is the application for special leave to appeal in interlocutory matters?
7. Was the stay which the Serobians seek an unconditional stay?
8. Should the court consider the hardship that the Serobians will suffer if the writ of possession is executed?
Held
1. Is there a substantial prospect that special leave to appeal will be granted?
The court concluded that the prospects of obtaining special leave to appeal in respect of the refusals of stay were not high. The balance of convenience also lies against the applicants.
2. Have the applicants failed to take whatever steps are necessary to seek a stay from the court in which the matter is pending?
The court noted that the applicants have made several applications for a stay in the Court of Appeal and that they have not taken any steps to seek a stay from the court in which the matter is pending.
3. Will the grant of a stay cause loss to the respondent?
The court did not explicitly address whether the grant of a stay would cause loss to the respondent. However, it did consider the rights of the mortgagee and the balance of convenience between the parties.
4. Where does the balance of convenience lie as between the parties?
The court concluded that, so far as the material presently available to the court reveals, the balance of convenience lies wholly against the applicants.
5. Does the court have the jurisdiction to grant a stay pending application for special leave?
The court has the jurisdiction to grant a stay pending application for special leave, but it is an extraordinary jurisdiction that requires exceptional circumstances to be shown before its exercise is warranted.
6. Is the application for special leave to appeal in interlocutory matters?
The application for special leave to appeal concerns two interlocutory orders made by the Court of Appeal in the course of proceedings instituted by the applicants by way of appeal.
7. Was the stay which the Serobians seek an unconditional stay?
The court observed that the stay which the Serobians seek is an unconditional stay in which they offer no terms to preserve the status quo, such as making any payments in respect of the amount for which judgment has now been given.
8. Should the court consider the hardship that the Serobians will suffer if the writ of possession is executed?
The court acknowledged that the applicants would suffer hardship if the writ of possession is executed, but it did not consider this to be sufficient grounds for granting a stay.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court in Serobian & Anor v Commonwealth Bank of Australia was asked to determine whether to grant a stay of execution of a writ of possession on the applicants' property pending the outcome of an application for special leave to appeal. The applicants, Christine and Shahen Serobian, sought a stay to prevent the Commonwealth Bank of Australia from enforcing a writ of possession issued by Justice Hammerschlag in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had granted judgment for nearly $8.2 million and possession of their home at Manly. The applicants had already made multiple unsuccessful applications for a stay in the Court of Appeal, and they now sought an interlocutory stay pending their application for special leave to appeal to the High Court.
The Court began by noting the well-established principle that the power to grant a stay pending an application for special leave to appeal is an extraordinary jurisdiction that requires exceptional circumstances. The Court identified several factors relevant to the exercise of this discretion, including whether there is a substantial prospect that special leave to appeal will be granted, whether the applicants have taken necessary steps to seek a stay from the Court of Appeal, whether the grant of a stay will cause loss to the respondent, and where the balance of convenience lies.
The Court observed that the application for special leave to appeal involved interlocutory matters, as the orders sought to be appealed were interlocutory orders made by the Court of Appeal dismissing the applicants' applications for a stay. The Court noted that it is well-established that the High Court will ordinarily not grant special leave to appeal in interlocutory matters to avoid unduly fragmenting and prolonging litigation. However, the Court was prepared to assume that if it did not grant the stay, the application for special leave to appeal would effectively be rendered nugatory.
The Court then considered whether there was a substantial prospect that special leave to appeal would be granted. Given the history of the case and the repeated refusals of stay by the Court of Appeal, the Court concluded that the prospects of obtaining special leave to appeal in respect of the fourth and fifth refusals of stay would not be considered high.
The Court also considered the balance of convenience. The applicants sought an unconditional stay in which they offered no terms to preserve the status quo, such as making any payments in respect of the judgment amount. In all the circumstances, the Court was not persuaded that this was a case in which it was appropriate to grant a stay of execution of the writ of possession.
The Court dismissed the application for a stay, finding that the application for special leave to appeal did not enjoy prospects of success sufficient to warrant the granting of that extraordinary relief. The balance of convenience also lay against the applicants. The Court's decision reflects the principles that the power to grant a stay pending an application for special leave to appeal is an extraordinary jurisdiction that requires exceptional circumstances and that interlocutory matters are generally not suitable for special leave to appeal.