Selwood & Selwood
[2023] FedCFamC1F 680
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Selwood & Selwood [2023] FedCFamC1F 680
File number(s): SYC 4251 of 2021 Judgment of: ALTOBELLI J Date of judgment: 17 August 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Where both parties seek a costs order against the other – Where both parties seek indemnity costs – Where neither party was wholly unsuccessful – Where both parties made more favourable offers to settle than the orders provided – Where the evidence is insufficient to displace the starting position that each party will bear their own costs as set out under s 117(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Costs application dismissed – Each party pay their own costs of the proceedings. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 117
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 12.17(1)
Cases cited: Browne & Green (2002) FLC 93-115; [2002] FamCA 791
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225; [1993] FCA 801
Cross & Beaumont (2008) 39 Fam LR 389; [2008] FamCAFC 68
Gambetto & Farrelli (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 202
Gambetto & Farrelli (No 6) [2022] FedCFamC2F 1007
In the Marriage of I & I (No. 2) (1995) FLC 92-625; [1995] FamCA 80
Medlon & Medlon (No. 6) (Indemnity Costs) (2015) FLC 93-664; [2015] FamCAFC 157
Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784
Parke & The Estate of the Late A Parke (2016) FLC 93-748; [2016] FamCAFC 248
PBF (as child representative for AF (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) & TRF & LKL (2005) 33 Fam LR 123; [2005] FamCA 158
Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311; [1980] HCA 4
Phillips & Hansford (2020) FLC 93-941; [2020] FamCAFC 28
Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725; [1978] FamCA 84
Selwood & Selwood [2023] FedCFamC2F 339
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 45 Date of last submission/s: 31 July 2023 Date of hearing: In Chambers Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Edwards Moloney Family Law Solicitor for the Respondent: Dorter Family Lawyers and Mediators ORDERS
SYC 4251 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR SELWOOD
Applicant
AND: MS SELWOOD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ALTOBELLI J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 AUGUST 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant husband’s Amended Application in a Proceeding filed 4 July 2023 is dismissed.
2.The Respondent wife’s Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 15 June 2023 is dismissed.
3.Each party is to pay their own costs of the proceedings including the present costs application.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Selwood & Selwood has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALTOBELLI J:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant husband (“the husband”) seeks an order for costs against the respondent wife (“the wife”) in respect of his Application in a Proceeding filed 25 October 2022 (“the interim application”) and his Application for Review filed 31 January 2023 (“the review application”). The orders for costs are sought on an indemnity basis, or in the alternative, to be calculated in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”). The precise orders sought are as follows:
Costs of Interim Application filed 25 October 2022
1.That the Wife pay the Husband's costs of and incidental to the Husband's interim application filed on 25 October 2022 on an indemnity basis in the amount of $28,722.
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE:
2.That the Wife pay the Husband's costs of and incidental to the Husband's interim application filed on 25 October 2022 calculated in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 in the amount of $10,978.64
13,767.03.Costs of Application for Review filed 31 January 2023
3.That the Wife pay the Husband's costs of and incidental to the Husband's Application for Review filed on 31 January 2023 on an indemnity basis in the amount of $35,352.77.
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE:
4.That the Wife pay the Husband's costs of and incidental to the Husband's Application for Review filed on 31 January 2023 calculated in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 in the amount of $13,767.03.
The wife opposes the application and instead seeks that a costs order be made against the husband on an indemnity basis, or in the alternative as agreed or assessed. The precise orders sought are as follows:
Application in a Proceeding filed 18 May 2023
1. That the Husband's Application in a Proceeding filed 18 May 2023 be dismissed.
2. That the Husband pay the Wife's costs of and incidental to this Application on an indemnity basis.
Application in a Proceeding filed 25 October 2021
3. That within fourteen (14) days from the date of these Orders, the Husband pay the Wife's costs of and incidental to the Husband's Application in a Proceeding filed 25 October 2022 on an indemnity basis in the amount of $41,435.85.
4. That in the alternative to Order 3 herein but without concession, that within fourteen (14) days from the date of these Orders, the Husband pay the Wife's costs of and incidental to the Husband's Application in a Proceeding filed 25 October 2022 as agreed or as assessed, to be calculated in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021.
Application for Review filed 31 January 2023
5. That within fourteen (14) days from the date of these Orders, the Husband pay the Wife's costs of and incidental to the Husband's Application for Review filed 31 January 2023 on an indemnity basis in the amount of $27,238.05.
6. That in the alternative to Order 5 herein but without concession, that within fourteen (14) days from the date of these Orders, the Husband pay the Wife's costs of and incidental to the Husband's Application for Review filed 31 January 2023 as agreed or as assessed, to be calculated in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021.
BACKGROUND
On 25 October 2022 the husband filed the interim application. The interim application related to parenting arrangements for the parties’ three children, where the father sought for all of the orders made on 8 December 2021 to be discharged, for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility, for the children to live with the wife and spend time with the husband in an arrangement that would effectively be dinner each Thursday (one week being with two of the children, and the alternate week being with the third child) and overnight time each alternate weekend with all three children, with the timing of the changeovers on the alternate weekends to gradually increase (as the orders of 8 December 2021 did not include overnight time). This time would begin by being supervised and then become unsupervised. The interim application was heard by a Senior Judicial Registrar on 30 November 2022 and judgment was delivered on 11 January 2023 which amended Orders 4 and 5 of the orders made on 8 December 2021, extending the orders to cover successive school holiday periods rather than the limited terms specified. The interim application and the wife’s response were otherwise dismissed.
On 31 January 2023 the husband filed the review application regarding the above decision. The husband sought for Orders 2–7 of the orders made on 8 December 2021, and Orders 1–2 of the orders made 11 January 2023 to be discharged. He instead sought similar orders to the interim application, including time during school holidays and special occasions, albeit with an additional night on alternate weekends and no supervision. The review application was determined on 24 March 2023 by Judge Howe, who discharged the orders made on 11 January 2023 as well as Orders 2–7 and 10 of the orders made on 8 December 2021. Orders were made regarding the time the children are to spend with the husband and the amount of supervision required, which aligned with the alternative orders proposed by the wife, including some overnight time and a mixture of supervised and unsupervised time.
PRESENT APPLICATION
On 18 May 2023 the husband filed an application for costs, and on 4 July 2023 he filed an amended application for costs.
On 27 June 2023 I made orders for the costs application to proceed by way of written submissions and to be determined in chambers.
In support of his case, the husband relies upon the following material:
(a)Amended Application for Costs filed 4 July 2023;
(b)His affidavit filed 18 May 2023;
(c)Written submissions filed 4 July 2023;
(d)Written submissions in reply filed 31 July 2023;
(e)Notice to Admit Facts dated 1 June 2023;
(f)Notice Disputing Facts dated 15 June 2023; and
(g)Tender bundle to affidavit of 18 May 2023.
In support of her case, the wife relies upon the following material:
(a)Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 15 June 2023;
(b)Her affidavit filed 15 June 2023; and
(c)Written submissions filed 24 July 2023.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The law relating to costs in family law proceedings is well settled and is set out in detail in the Full Court decision of Parke & The Estate of the Late A Parke (2016) FLC 93-748 (“Parke”).
An application for costs is governed by s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). Section 117(1) of the Act sets out the general presumption that each party to the proceedings shall bear their own costs. This is subject to s 117(2), which provides that:
If, in proceedings under this Act, the court is of opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so, the court may, subject to subsections (2A), (4), (4A) and (5) and the applicable Rules of Court, make such order as the court may make such order as to costs and security for costs, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise, as the court considers just.
Section 117(2A) sets out the matters that the Court is to have regard to:
(2A)In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (2), the court shall have regard to:
(a)the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings;
(b)whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance to that party;
(c)the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters;
(d)whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;
(e)whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;
(f)whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer; and
(g)such other matters as the court considers relevant.
Although the Court is required to consider each of the abovementioned factors, it is plain that their relevance to a particular matter will depend upon the circumstances of that case and they should be considered in that light. That is, no one factor prevails over another and it is a question of the weight that is to be afforded to each of the relevant factors depending on the circumstances of the matter (Medlon & Medlon (No. 6) (Indemnity Costs) (2015) FLC 93-664 at [24]). There is also “nothing to prevent any factor being the sole foundation for an order for costs” (PBF (as child representative for AF (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) & TRF & LKL (2005) 33 Fam LR 123 at [41]).
Whilst the applicant in a costs application must establish the circumstances justifying the making of a costs order, the Court is not limited to making such an order only in what has been described as a “clear case” (Penfold v Penfold (1980) 144 CLR 311) (“Penfold”).
The provision relating to the calculation of costs is governed by r 12.17(1) of the Rules which is as follows:
12.17 Method of calculation of costs
(1) The court may order that a party is entitled to costs:
(a) of a specific amount; or
(b)as assessed on a particular basis (for example, party and party, solicitor and client or indemnity); or
(c) to be calculated in accordance with the method stated in the order; or
(d)for part of the proceeding, or part of an amount, assessed in accordance with Schedule 3.
The rule further provides that:
(3) In making an order under subrule (1), the court may consider the following:
(a) the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues;
(b)the reasonableness of each party’s behaviour in the proceeding including by having regard to the matters set out in subrule 12.08(2);
(c) the rates ordinarily payable to lawyers in comparable cases;
(d)whether a lawyer’s conduct has been improper, unfair, unreasonable or disproportionate;
(e)the time properly spent on the proceeding, or in complying with pre‑action procedures; and
(f)whether expenses (paid or payable) are fair, reasonable and proportionate.
In relation to an award of indemnity costs, the Full Court decision of Phillips & Hansford (2020) FLC 93-941 (“Phillips & Hansford”), helpfully summarises the position as follows:
35.Indemnity cost orders are made only in exceptional cases (Kohan and Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340; Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; D & D (Costs) (No. 2) (2010) FLC 93-435).
36.Whilst the categories of cases in which indemnity cost orders may be awarded are not closed, it is accepted that such costs may be ordered where a case was pursued with “wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law” and where there has been “an imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise” (Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 at 233).
37.In relation to the first category, it has been said that indemnity costs may be awarded where “the applicant, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success” (Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 at 401) and where “a party persists in what should on proper consideration be seen to be a hopeless case” (J Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federation Union of Workers – Western Australian Branch & Anor [1993] FCA 70 per French J at 5).
DISCUSSION
Costs orders are made at the Court's discretion based on the factors listed in s 117(2A) of the Act. The Court must consider all the factors in s 117(2A), and no one factor takes precedence over another (In the Marriage of I & I (No. 2) (1995) FLC 92-625). A discussion of these considerations follows.
Section 117(2A)(a): Financial circumstances of the parties
A party’s inability to pay costs is not a bar to a costs order being made if that party’s conduct is found to warrant such an order (Cross & Beaumont (2008) 39 Fam LR 389).
In any event, neither party asserts that they are unable to meet an order for costs.
At paragraph 9 of his reply to the wife’s written submissions, the husband contends that the wife holds four properties, a valuable business which was worth around $4 million as at 30 June 2022, and has met legal costs to date of over $380,000 from her income. He also asserts that both parties earn substantial income and that the parties’ net asset pool exceeds $5 million.
At paragraphs 5–6 of her written submissions, the wife submits that the Court must consider the parties’ financial circumstances by way of an abridged inquiry (citing Browne & Green (2002) FLC 93-115), that the husband is employed on a full-time basis and earns between $350,000 and $500,000 per year, and is responsible for meeting significantly less expenses than the wife.
In this matter, I am satisfied that there is no evidence before me to indicate that a costs order should not be made against either party due to their financial circumstances.
Section 117(2A)(b): Whether the parties are in receipt of legal aid
Neither party is in receipt of legal aid.
Section 117(2A)(c): The conduct of the parties
In his written submissions and reply, the husband refers to the wife’s conduct in relation to the interim application and also in relation to the costs application before me. Regarding the interim proceedings, the husband submits at paragraphs 4–5 of his reply that the submissions made on behalf of the wife on 30 November 2022 were misleading, resulting in the Senior Judicial Registrar applying the principle from Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 (“Rice & Aslpund”) and thus not making orders regarding his therapeutic treatment and the release of the expert report, and his costs being thrown away. Regarding the costs application, the husband submits that the wife’s Notice Disputing Facts dated 15 June 2023 is “an exercise in obfuscation and deflection demonstrating a continuing lack of candour”.
In her written submissions, the wife asserts that the father has filed four interlocutory applications in these proceedings and that his conduct has caused significant delays in the matter proceeding to final hearing which has resulted in the parties incurring significant legal costs. The wife further suggests that the Court should have regard to the husband’s “conduct in the proceedings as a whole, rather than a limited aspect of the matter as a threshold issue” (citing Murphy J at [67] in Parke).
For the reasons below in the Court’s consideration of s 117(2A)(g), the Court finds that the submissions made on behalf of the wife were not misleading. Further, the wife’s conduct in response to the costs application has no effect on the Court’s consideration of whether to order costs in relation to the interim application and the review application.
The husband does not address the wife’s submissions in his reply, but the Court finds that irrespective of whether the Court regards the husband’s conduct in the proceedings as a whole or limited to the relevant proceedings, while the husband’s applications (including seeking parenting orders, a review, and costs) may well have inevitably resulted in delays in the matter proceeding to final hearing, they were not unreasonable or without merit and they were open to him to make.
Section 117(2A)(d): Failure to comply with orders of the Court
Neither party contended this was a relevant consideration in determining whether a costs order should be made.
Section 117(2A)(e): Whether a party has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings
The husband submits that the wife was wholly unsuccessful in respect of the review application. He asserts that he offered to enter into orders which were more favourable to the wife than her alternate orders sought and that the wife was “wholly unsuccessful in continuing litigation to dismiss [the review application] pursuant to the principles of Rice & Asplund”.
The wife submits that neither she nor the husband were wholly unsuccessful. She submits that although the Court used its discretion not to find wholly in favour of her Rice & Asplund application, it was an arguable application and not wholly unsuccessful. She argues that she was successful insofar as the orders made by Judge Howe on 24 March 2023, regarding the children’s time with the husband, aligned with the wife’s alternate orders sought in her Application in a Proceeding filed 21 November 2022 and Case Outline Document filed 28 November 2022. The wife refers to the case of Penfold where she says the Court accepted that “if a party obtains substantial parts of the relief sought by them, then that in itself may be a circumstance justifying a costs order and departing from the primary presumption that each party bare their own costs”.
The Court finds that neither party was wholly unsuccessful. The husband was not wholly unsuccessful because his review application led to the relevant orders of the Senior Judicial Registrar made on 11 January 2023 being discharged and some of the orders of the Senior Judical Registrar made on 8 December 2022 being discharged and amended. The wife was not wholly unsuccessful because although her Rice & Asplund argument was rejected, Judge Howe made orders in line with the wife’s proposed alternate orders (Selwood & Selwood [2023] FedCFamC2F 339 at [87]).
Section 117(2A)(f): Offers of settlement
In relation to the review application, the husband submits at paragraphs 8–13 of his written submissions that he made a number of offers of settlement which were rejected by the wife. For example, he asserts that the wife refused two offers – his offer dated 31 January 2023 where he was willing to accept a lesser progression of time than the orders sought in the wife’s response filed 21 November 2022, and his offer dated 27 February 2023 where he offered no progression to overnight time. He submits that the orders made by Judge Howe on 24 March 2023 were more favourable to him than the two offers he made above, and than the wife’s offer dated 20 October 2022.
The husband further submits at paragraphs 6–7 of his reply that he made three offers which would have each party bear their own costs and warned of costs consequences, which the wife rejected. He claims that the wife’s “unwarranted expectation of an entitlement to costs needlessly continued litigation concerning the best interests of the children”.
The wife submits at paragraphs 11–13 of her written submissions that she made various offers in 2022 and 2023 which were more favourable to the husband than the orders made by Judge Howe on 24 March 2023 and that the husband “imprudently refused numerous offers to compromise”. She asserts that consideration of the quantum of costs should be made from the date of the offer of settlement (citing Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225) (“Colgate”).
The Court finds that both parties made and rejected offers which would have been more favourable to the other than the orders ultimately made by Judge Howe on 24 March 2023. The offering and rejection of favourable offers, while significant, is not determinative of a costs order and is only one of the factors that the Court will consider when deciding whether to make a costs order.
Section 117(2A)(g): Any other relevant matters
The husband raises matters that do not fall into the categories above. Firstly, in relation to the interim application, he asserts at paragraphs 1–3 of his written submissions that there has been a denial of procedural fairness due to the “fundamental shift in the case” two days prior to the hearing with the mother raising a Rice & Asplund argument without notice to the husband after having filed his case outline. The Court finds little merit in this argument where Judge Howe accepted the submissions made on behalf of the husband and did not apply the principle in Rice & Asplund in his Honour’s reasons for judgment (Selwood at [31]–[33]).
Secondly, the husband asserts at paragraphs 5–7 of his written submissions that misleading statements were made on behalf of the wife at the hearing on 30 November 2022, including a statement in the wife’s case outline regarding the Rice & Asplund argument, and a statement by the wife’s counsel during the interim hearing regarding supervision and overnight time. The husband submits that “[t]he error contained in paragraph 65 of SJR’s judgment leaves no doubt that this conduct impacted the Court’s exercise of discretion”.
Paragraph 65 of the Senior Judicial Registrar’s reasons for judgment of 11 January 2023 is reproduced below:
There remains, however, the issue of the existing orders for school holiday time. It appears to be the case that each party agrees or at least concedes that the “expiration” of those orders arose not as a result of the expressed intention of [the Senior Judical Registrar] but rather out of an expectation by all parties and the Court that the orders made would see this family through to the final hearing. It may be that the appropriate way of dealing with those orders would have been for the parties to agree to that time continuing until further order, or failing that to seek that those orders be amended pursuant to the slip rule so that they might accurately reflect the intention of the Court. However, as this matter has come before me and submissions have been made to me on that point, I am satisfied that it is consistent with the overarching purpose of case management, and in the children’s best interests, for me to rectify this issue and save the parties and the children the unnecessary cost, time and stress of seeking to separately rectify that issue. I shall therefore make an order making it clear that the arrangements ordered for the school holidays should continue until further order. Those interim arrangements will therefore continue until such time as final orders are made, either by agreement between the parents or by a judge at final hearing.
The Court finds that the statements made by and on behalf of the wife in her case outline and during the interim hearing did not mislead the Court. It was open to the Senior Judicial Registrar to consider the wife’s Rice & Asplund argument as these principles apply to interim proceedings (see Gambetto & Farrelli (No 6) [2022] FedCFamC2F 1007 at [93]; Gambetto & Farrelli (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 202 at [41]). Further it is not clear that the comment made by the wife’s counsel regarding supervision and overnight time had any bearing on the outcome. The wife’s conduct did not inappropriately impact the Court’s exercise of discretion.
INDEMNITY COSTS
Both parties submit that the circumstances give rise to an order for costs on an indemnity basis.
The husband asserts that indemnity costs are warranted given “the misleading of the Court, imprudent refusal of offers, and raising of Rice & Asplund in wilful disregard of known facts” (citing Colgate at [248] and Phillips & Hansford).
The wife asserts that indemnity costs are warranted because the father imprudently refused an offer to compromise, which is a serious omission giving rise to the Court entertaining an order for costs on an indemnity basis (citing Colgate and Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784) (“Munday v Bowman”).
In Munday v Bowman at 84,660, CJ Holden summarised the High Court of Australia’s consideration as to when circumstances justify an order of costs on an indemnity basis per Colgate as follows:
(a) Where it appears that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where a party properly advised should have known that he had no chance of success. In such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts (see Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty. Ltd. v. International Produce Merchants Pty. Ltd. [1988] FCA 202; [1988] 81 ALR 397.)
(b) Making allegations of fraud, knowing them to be false, and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud (see Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty. Ltd. (supra).
(c) Evidence of particular misconduct causing loss of time to the court and to other parties (see Tetijo Holdings Pty. Ltd. v Keeprite Australia Pty. Ltd (unreported, Federal Court, 3 May 1991)).
(d) The making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions (see Ragatta Developments Pty. Ltd. v Westpac Banking Corporation (unreported Federal Court, 5 March 1993)).
(e) An imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise [Medlon No. 6 (supra)].
The Court finds that neither of the parties’ conduct falls within the parameters described by the High Court and the findings made in my reasons for judgment support this conclusion.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, I am not satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for an order for costs to be made in favour of either party. These are parenting proceedings that are being conducted with undue and unhelpful adversarialism. On balance, the combined circumstances above are insufficient to displace the starting position that each party will bear their own costs in proceedings as set out under s 117(1) of the Act. Each party will bear their own costs relating to the interim application, the review application, and the application for costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-five (45) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli. Associate:
Dated: 17 August 2023
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