Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Objection to subpoena – claim of legal professional privilege – whether there has been an implied waiver of privilege – waiver not found.
The respondent shall within 2 clear business days provide the Court with a minute of orders that are consistent with these reasons.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT ADELAIDE
ADG 266 of 2012
TEJINDER SINGH SEKHON
Applicant
And
THE DIRECTOR OF QUARANTINE
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
I have before me an objection to a subpoena issued by the Court at the request of the applicant requiring the respondent, the Director of Quarantine (“the Director”) to produce documents. To understand the issues to be dealt with in the objection to subpoena it is necessary to have an understanding of the substantive proceedings and the history of events.
In the initiating document for the substantive proceedings, the applicant is seeking judicial review of a decision of a…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The applicant, Mr Sekhon, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Director of Quarantine. The core of the dispute concerned the reasons for the decision, with the applicant alleging that the Director's stated reasons were not those that underpinned the decision at the time it was made. The matter came before Judge Simpson.
The court was required to determine whether legal advice obtained by the Director of Quarantine after the initial decision was made, but before a subsequent statement of reasons was provided, was relevant to the review. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the Director’s assertion that the later statement of reasons reflected the state of mind at the time of the original decision was credible, and if so, whether the legal advice was inextricably linked to the production of that statement of reasons, thereby potentially waiving legal professional privilege.
Judge Simpson reasoned that the Director’s contention that the legal advice could not have contributed to the decision because it post-dated the decision was flawed. The applicant disputed the assertion that the reasons articulated in the later statement were extant at the time of the original decision. The court found that the Director, by filing a subsequent statement of reasons that was partly inconsistent with earlier communications, had raised the question of what the actual reasons for the decision were. The applicant argued that the legal advice was likely to have influenced the Director's state of mind when producing the later statement of reasons, and therefore was relevant to assessing the credibility of the assertion that those reasons were operative at the earlier date. The court considered that the principle of issue waiver arises from inconsistencies between a party's conduct and their claim to confidentiality, and that fairness dictates the applicant should be able to test the Director's assertion about the reasons for the decision by reference to the advice that contributed to its formulation. The court noted that the situation was distinct from cases where a decision-maker merely states that advice was relevant; here, the Director's assertion about the timing of the reasons laid the contents of the privileged documents open to scrutiny.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
The applicant provided the Court with further oral and written submissions when the matter was called back on for them to do so on 15 March 2013. The further written submissions stated:“1.The respondent contends that the legal advice given by the AGS could not have contributed to the decision to export as the legal advice post-dated the date of decision. Although superficially attractive, the premise of the submission is flawed and unduly limits the ambit of the general principle of issue waiver. The respondent’s contention presupposes the correctness of Mr McDonald’s assertion that the reasons for decision articulated on or about 10 December 2012 existed on 25 October 2012. That assertion is disputed by the applicant and therefore the legal advice remains relevant to the court’s determination of his actual state of mind as at 25 October 2012. The threshold question to be asked before the merits of the review can be considered is “What were the reasons for the decision of 25 October 2012?” The respondent has, by filing a subsequent statement of reasons (inconsistent in part with the earlier statement of reasons), raised this issue for the court’s determination. But for this, the review would have proceeded upon a consideration of the reasons articulated in the letter of 23 October 2012, the applicable legislation and the ADJR Act. 2.The applicant contends that the legal advice is likely to have contributed to Mr McDonald’s state of mind when he produced the reasons of 10 December 2012 and accordingly it is relevant to determining the credibility of his assertion that those reasons were extant and operative on 25 October 2012. The fact that reasons were produced on or about 10 December 2012, after the initiation of proceedings and after advice from AGS, provides a compelling basis for an inference that this advice contributed or directly resulted in the production of this statement of reasons. Or, to put another way, the legal advice is likely to have contributed to a state of mind different from that which in fact existed on 23 and 25 October 2012. It is only upon an examination of the circumstances under which those reasons were provided that the court can determine the veracity of Mr McDonald’s assertion. The nature and content of that legal advice is inextricably linked to the production of that statement of reasons. 3.Although it may be common for a decision maker to provide a statement of reasons for the purposes of litigation (and there may be a statutory requirement to do so in some cases)[12] and that such a statement of reasons may be provided following legal advice, that will usually occur where no (or no adequate) reasons accompanied the original decision. However, that is a different situation from the case at bar where there is a letter accompanying the decision which purported to ‘articulate the basis of the decision’ and contemporaneous documents which reveal the manner in which the decision was arrived at, including the detailed balancing of a number of factors and considerations. None of the authorities cited by the respondent, in particular Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto, refer to a factual situation analogous to the case at bar. That is, in each case where a decision had been made there were not two separate and (in part) inconsistent accounts of the reasons for that decision.[12] See Commissioner for Taxation v Rio Tinto Pty Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341 at [66].4.In any event, the principle of issue waiver is not confined to a situation where legal advice is provided at the time of the decision. It is a waiver that arises by reason of the inconsistency ‘which the courts, where necessary informed by considerations of fairness, perceive, between the conduct of the client and the maintenance of confidentiality, not some overriding principle of fairness operating at large”[13]. The authorities that have specifically considered ‘issue waiver’ are of limited utility, principally because each turns on its own particular facts. Whether or not privilege is waived will depend upon the particular character of the case and how it is conducted.[14] The relevant inconsistency between the conduct of the respondent and the maintenance of the confidentiality is the assertion that the 10 December 2012 reasons existed on 25 October 2012 but that the applicant should not be permitted to test that assertion by reference to the advice that contributed to it. The considerations of fairness are those that dictate that the applicant’s ability properly to test this assertion should not be defeated by the claim of legal professional privilege. 5.Mr McDonald will give evidence at the review hearing. He will no doubt assert that his reasons for decision were those set out in the statement of reasons. Without the documents revealing the process by which that statement of reasons was produced the applicant will be unfairly deprived of a proper opportunity to test his evidence. He has made an assertion as part of his case that necessarily lays open the contents of the privileged documents to scrutiny. 6.In Rio Tinto the Court observed:“Even though communications may contribute to the decision-making, the mere reference to this fact by a decision-maker in the course of defending a judicial review application or on a taxation appeal is not inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege...This is because the decision-maker...would not put such legal advice in issue merely by saying that the advice was relevant or contributed to his decision. There would be no issue waiver because the decision-maker would not have done anything inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege. The situation might be otherwise if the decision-maker puts the contents of the legal advice in issue by specifically relying on the contents of the advice (and not merely the fact of the advice) to vindicate his claimed state of satisfaction or exercise of discretion.In this case, everything turns on the particular given by the Commissioner in response to Rio’s request. The question is whether, by his particulars, the Commission made an assertion as part of his case that puts the contents of the privileged scheduled documents in issue, or necessarily lays them open to scrutiny, with the consequence that an inconsistency arises between the making of the assertion and the maintenance of the privilege. To answer this the relevant assertions must be considered in their proper context”.[15] (emphasis added). 7.Further, permitting inspection of the documents over which the claim is made will not give rise to a ‘floodgates’ argument or set a precedent for the disclosure of legal advice where a decision maker subsequently provides a statement of reasons.[16]8.In the ordinary case of judicial review of an administrative decision, the review is determined by an examination of the decision and the asserted reasons against the established facts and the applicable legislation. In those cases, state of mind is not in issue because there is no dispute that a decision was made for the reasons stated. What is in dispute is whether that decision, for those reasons, should be set aside.”[13] Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 of [29].[14] Commissioner for Taxation v Rio Tinto at [60].[15] [66] – [68].[16] See Idaport v NAB [2012] NSWSC 58 at [67] for discussion of the principles distilled from the authorities, including “the fact that the documents over which privilege is claimed are materially relevant to a pleading of state of mind is not alone sufficient to compromise the assertion of privilege”.