Seeter Pty Ltd t/a Great Barrier Reef Tuna v Hester
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Seeter Pty Ltd t/a Great Barrier Reef Tuna v Hester [2004] FCAFC 39
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – proceedings wrongly constituted - necessity for contradictor – entitlement of appellant to access evidence subject to specific objection – public interest immunity – statutory protection of confidentiality not considered.
SEETER PTY LIMITED TRADING AS GREAT BARRIER REEF TUNA AND ROBERT L LAMASON V DARYELLE LESLEY HESTER, MLADEN BOSNIC, PATRICK MEYERS, CATHERINE COWLING AND TANIA STOKES
Q 174 OF 2003
BEAUMONT, DOWSETT AND ALLSOP JJ 27 FEBRUARY 2004 SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 174 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SEETER PTY LIMITED TRADING AS GREAT BARRIER REEF TUNA AND ROBERT L LAMASON APPELLANTS
AND:
DARYELLE LESLEY HESTER FIRST RESPONDENT
MLADEN BOSNIC SECOND RESPONDENT
PATRICK MEYERS THIRD RESPONDENT
CATHERINE COWLING FOURTH RESPONDENT
TANIA STOKES FIFTH RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
BEAUMONT, DOWSETT AND ALLSOP JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
27 FEBRUARY 2004
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed in part.
2.The order dismissing the application be set aside and the matter be remitted to the primary Judge for such orders as may appear to the Judge to be appropriate in accordance with these reasons for judgment.
3.There be no order for the costs of the appeal. Costs at first instance to be decided by the primary Judge.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 174 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SEETER PTY LIMITED TRADING AS GREAT BARRIER REEF TUNA AND ROBERT L LAMASON APPELLANTS
AND:
DARYELLE LESLEY HESTER FIRST RESPONDENT
MLADEN BOSNIC SECOND RESPONDENT
PATRICK MEYERS THIRD RESPONDENT
CATHERINE COWLING FOURTH RESPONDENT
TANIA STOKES FIFTH RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
BEAUMONT, DOWSETT AND ALLSOP JJ
DATE:
27 FEBRUARY 2004
PLACE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
By their application for an order of review dated 11 November 2003, filed 12 November 2003, the appellants applied to review the decision(s) of the first respondent (then the only respondent) made on 27 October 2003, to issue warrants authorising the parties who are the second to fifth respondents to enter and search the vessels, properties and a vehicle then specified.
The appellants claim to be aggrieved by the decision(s) because, as owners of the vessels, properties and…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Seeter Pty Ltd t/a Great Barrier Reef Tuna, trading as Great Barrier Reef Tuna, and Robert Lamason, trading as Hooked, appealed against the dismissal of their application for orders quashing search warrants issued by a justice of the peace under the Crimes Act 1914. The warrants authorised the seizure of various items from their possession, including documents and computers, on suspicion of offences under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 and the Fisheries Management Act 1991. The primary judge dismissed the application, finding the warrants validly issued and the application misconceived. The Full Court was asked to quash the warrants and order the return of the seized items.
The legal issues before the court involved the validity of the search warrants and the procedural fairness in their issuance. The appellants argued that the warrants were improperly issued, as the decision-maker was not a proper party and the specific warrant-issuing authority under the Fisheries Management Act was not invoked. Furthermore, they contended that they were denied procedural fairness as they were not granted access to the evidence upon which the warrants were issued. The court had to determine whether the warrants were validly issued and whether the procedural rights of the appellants were respected.
The Full Court found that the proceedings before the primary judge were wrongly constituted, as the decision-maker was not a proper party and the specific warrant-issuing authority was not invoked. The court held that the proper respondents, the relevant officers of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutor’s Office, should have been joined. Additionally, the court found that the appellants were entitled to access the evidence upon which the warrants were issued, in the absence of a specific objection such as a claim of public interest immunity. The Full Court concluded that the dismissal of the application did not properly resolve the dispute between the real parties.
The appeal was allowed in part, and the order dismissing the application was set aside. The matter was remitted to the primary judge for reconsideration in light of the court's reasons. The Full Court made no order for the costs of the appeal, leaving the costs at first instance to be decided by the primary judge.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed in part.
2. The order dismissing the application be set aside and the matter be remitted to the primary Judge for such orders as may appear to the Judge to be appropriate in accordance with these reasons for judgment.
3. There be no order for the costs of the appeal. Costs at first instance to be decided by the primary Judge.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
A copy of the warrant was annexed to this affidavit. It was addressed to the second respondent as a ‘Federal Agent’. It provided, inter alia, for a condition in these terms:‘Things as to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that they will afford evidence as to the commission of the following offence(s) against the laws of the Commonwealth:That between 27 October 2002 and 27 October 2003, in waters within the Cairns and Far Northern Sections of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, Robert Lamason did, contrary to section 38CB of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 as amended, intentionally or negligently fish in the marine park in a manner contrary to the zoning plans for the Cairns and Far Northern Sections.That between 27 October 2002 and 27 October 2003 in waters described as Area E, of the Eastern Tuna and Billfish Fishery (ETBF), Robert Lamason did, contrary to section 95(1) of the Fisheries Management Act (Commonwealth) 1991, breach conditions of his permit by fishing with in excess of 500 hooks.Including any storage medium or storage device which contains any of the above things and any manual, instruction, password or other thing which is needed to gain access to or interpret or decode any of the above things.’ In this affidavit, Mr Lamason referred to the issue of similar warrants. Reverting to Mr Lamason’s affidavit sworn 11 November 2003, Mr Lamason said that his solicitor had called upon the first respondent to provide a copy of the information laid before the first respondent, but that this was refused. Annexed to this affidavit was a fax to the appellants’ solicitors from the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions dated 4 November 2003 stating that ‘the Australian Federal Police will not supply you with a copy of the affidavit placed before the Justice of the Peace’. No reason for this refusal was given. The fax also stated that the first respondent was the issuing officer of the warrant. In his affidavit sworn 11 November 2003, Mr Lamason proceeded to give the following further evidence:‘8.I refer to the two alleged offences recited in the search warrants. As to the first offence alleged against the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act, I am unable to discern the nature of the alleged offence and therefore am unable to comment thereon. I know of no offence that I have committed under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act.9.As to the second alleged offence, I deny that I have ever committed the offence of fishing in “Area E” with more than 500 hooks, contrary to the Fisheries Management Act.10.I say that I need the documents and computers purportedly seized pursuant to the search warrants for the efficient running of my business. In particular I am obliged under the Fisheries Management legislation to keep the records contained in the fisheries log books aboard each vessel.11.Last Saturday, 8th November 2003, I was served with a further unsigned and unidentified search warrant in respect of the vessel Hooked. Exhibited hereto and marked “RLJRA2” is a true copy of the said search warrant issued on 8th November 2003 together with copy Property Seizure Record No. 84754.12.Federal Agent Bosnic, who served me with the search warrant, took possession of the new confidential fishing log for Hooked that we had just received from AFMA. It relates to a period outside the time frame referred to in the warrant.13.In order for the vessels to be compliant in their operations with both the Fisheries Management Legislation and fishing permit conditions I need all confidential fishing logs to be returned.’THE HEARING BEFORE THE PRIMARY JUDGE
Decision
Reasons for decision
BEAUMONT, DOWSETT AND ALLSOP JJ
Accordingly, the appellants ask the Full Court to quash the warrants and order the return of all things seized thereunder.CONCLUSIONS ON THE APPEAL As was mentioned in argument, the proceedings before the primary Judge were, in our view, wrongly constituted. The joinder of the first respondent, as the decision-maker, was purely nominal. The ordinary course, as was in fact done here, is for it to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court and to play no active role in the proceedings. As the Full High Court held in The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 35 – 36:‘If a tribunal becomes a protagonist in this Court there is the risk that by so doing it endangers the impartiality which it is expected to maintain in subsequent proceedings which take place if and when relief is granted. The presentation of a case in this Court by a tribunal should be regarded as exceptional and, where it occurs should, in general, be limited to submissions going to the powers and procedures of the Tribunal.’ See also BTR Plc v Westinghouse Brake & Signal Co (Aust) Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 246 at 265. At the same time, the power of this Court conferred by O 6 r 2 of the Federal Court of Australia Rules should have been invoked (as it was for this appeal) to ensure that the proper respondents to the appellants’ claim, that is, (at least) the relevant officers of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutor’s Office, be joined. In other words, the claim at first instance proceeded without a proper contradictor, an impermissible process (see, e.g. Forster v Jododex Aust Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 437 – 438; Merit Protection Commissioner v Nonnenmacher (1999) 86 FCR 112 at [10] – [12]). Since the second to fifth respondents were not parties to the application at first instance, they are not able to benefit from its dismissal; likewise the appellants are not estopped from making such a claim against them in other proceedings. In short, the resolution of the dispute between the real disputants was not, in truth, advanced by the dismissal of the claim as originally constituted. Three further important procedural difficulties appear. Firstly, the general authority contained in s 3E of the Crimes Act to issue a search warrant was invoked here, notwithstanding that s 85 of the Fisheries Management Act confers, subject to certain conditions, a specific authority to issue a warrant in connection with the surveillance and enforcement of that Act. Secondly, the primary Judge’s attention was not drawn to the entitlement of the appellants in the absence of a specific objection (such as a claim of public interest immunity), to access the evidence upon which the warrant was issued. In Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 103 ALR 167, Burchett J (Sheppard and Pincus JJ concurring) said (at 194 – 195):‘That leaves (in respect of the first and second warrants) the question whether the appellants should have been permitted by the learned primary judge to examine the material that was before the justice of the peace, in order to see if they could find a foothold for an argument against its sufficiency. The judge accepted the respondents’ objection of public interest immunity, after examining the material for himself. At the hearing of the appeal, though with some hesitation, we also took the course of examining the material. It is appropriate to note at once that it confirms the claims made about it in the affidavit in support of the objection of public interest immunity.The argument raised some fundamental issues. For the applicants, reliance was placed upon a number of cases, in Australia and overseas, where ... information was made available to a person challenging the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a search warrant had issued. In some cases, a justice who had issued a search warrant has even been called to give evidence concerning the basis on which he proceeded: Montague v Ah Shen [1907] VLR 458; Parker v Churchill [(1985) 9 FCR 316] .... That is not usual. If, in a case under s 10, an issue is raised as to the sufficiency of the “information on oath” which was placed before the justice, I do not think the nature of the proceedings is such as to preclude an applicant having access to the information, in the absence of a specific objection. It was argued for the respondents that the right time to consider the sufficiency of the evidence is during the course of any prosecution proceedings which may eventuate: cf the remarks of Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 338-9; 94 ALR 11; and see Coghill v McDermott (1982) 48 ALR 351 at 360. At the stage when a search warrant is issued, premature disclosure of how much the police know may lead to the stultification of their inquiries, whereas a general rule of non-disclosure would merely postpone the right of an accused person, without extinguishing it. However, search warrants may be issued against innocent third parties who, on this view, might never have an opportunity to test the validity of the basis on which their privacy and their property were invaded. In my opinion, Toohey J expressed the true rule in Quartermaine v Netto, [Toohey J, 14 December 1984, unreported], when he said:“I do not think that the information itself necessarily enjoys an immunity from production. It may be largely formal in its language. But it may be, on examination, that it details investigations being conducted, material which is protected by the public interest immunity of which Lord Wilberforce spoke [ie in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rossminster Ltd [1980] AC 952 at 999].”’ (Emphasis added.)